ple from doing everything whether "herein mentioned specifically or omitted."

"The men named in the injunction and their cooperators, their associates, and conspirators, to the affiant unknown." That means the whole world who might be associated with these men in any way, however remote, are enjoined from doing anything specified in the injunction, or anything else that is omitted in the injunction.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. What case is that, Mr. Gompers?

Mr. GOMPERS. It is about page 20 of the last year's hearings. It is the Kansas and Texas Coal Company, of Huntington, Ark., and the judgment, this injunction, was issued by the Hon. James H. Rodgers, United States district court, on the 22d of April, 1899.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Give us the volume and page of the Federal reports.

Mr. GOMPERS. I have not that here now. I should say that the injunction in its entirety is printed in the hearings to which I referred in the opening of my remarks.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. That is a hearing already had before this committee?

Mr. GOMPERS. Yes, sir. I quote from a comment that I made in that hearing.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Oh, yes.

Mr. GOMPERS. And an extract from the injunction which I later submitted to the committee and which is found in this volume of hearings.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. I think I have the case here. I find the injunction printed here, the preliminary injunction in the case of The Kansas and Texas Coal Company against William Denney and others. This is on page 34 of the report of the circuit court of the western district of Arkansas, Fort Smith division. That does not seem to be dated in the report. Have you a memorandum of the date there?

Mr. GOMPERS. April 22, 1899. In one of Judge Rick's injunctions the words occur the men are enjoined from doing several things, among others criminal acts, unlawful acts, and then he says: "Or otherwise obstructing, interfering with, hindering, or delaying any of the employees of such railway company engaged in the transportation of coal."

You will observe that the enjoining of men from committing any criminal act we contend is an improper exercise of the power of the equity court, yet some of our opponents would have it appear that we favor criminal acts, or that we favor their commission.

But we contend that the writ of injunction was never intended to be issued to enjoin men from committing any unlawful or criminal act; that both our country and our States provide for the apprehension and the trial by a jury of persons who commit such acts to ascertain whether such person has been guilty of a criminal act and to punish him if he is found guilty, and that organized civil society has constituted a police force, large or small as the circumstances may warrant, for the apprehension and prevention of any criminal act, and that it is hardly fair to put it as has been stated by the opponents of our injunction bill, which your committee reported favorably, and which the gentleman who just preceded me stated in his very brief remarks. But the essence of the opposition and the pur

pose of the opposition is made clearly manifest by him. It is to avoid the jury trial.

And you will observe in these provisions of the injunction of Judge Ricks, where he says "otherwise obstructing, interfering with, hindering or delaying any of the employees of said railway company engaged in the transportation of said coal." It is immaterial whether that be an unlawful act, a crime, or a simple question that one man may interpose and ask another. It is delaying him; it is interfering with him in the performance of his duties as to transporting said coal.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Before we suspend for lunch I have here this preliminary injunction to which you have referred, and I have been very hastily running my eye over it. I do not find the language that you quote in the connection in which you think it is found. I wish during the intermission you would look it over and see if you can find it. The thing which comes the nearest to it that I can find occurs on page 39 of last year's hearings. I will read this:

"And you and each of you are hereby commanded that you do de

And you and each of you are hereby commanded that you do desist and refrain from doing or causing to be done or aiding or abetting in doing or causing to be done any of the acts or things herein recited, or interfering, or injuring, or attempting to interfere with or injure any of the property herein mentioned

Now, here comes the language which I think you may perhaps have had in your mind

or any other property of the Kansas and Texas Coal Company, whether herein mentioned specifically or omitted.

And the general language that you quoted in this connection simply relates to the indefinite acts to be done. I wish you would look it through. I may be entirely wrong about that.

Of course we will continue this hearing this afternoon in any event, but I would like to inquire of the gentlemen upon the other side and of Mr. Fuller about how many gentlemen you have that would like to be heard in addition to Mr. Gompers. That may be perhaps somewhat simplified.

Mr. FULLER. I do not know of anybody else to be heard except the Hon. Mr. Gilbert, who introduced one of the bills.

Mr. GILBERT. I will not take over three or four minutes, Mr. Chairman. I simply want to make a short statement to the committee. (Informal discussion followed.)

Mr. GOMPERS. Before you determine this finally, may I ask whether, if the proponents of anti-injunction legislation deem it necessary to be heard after the other side has gotten through, we may have the opportunity of being heard briefly in answer to them?

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. You want to be heard in reply?

Mr. GOMPERS. Yes, sir.

(At this point the committee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock p.

m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The committee reconvened pursuant to adjournment, Hon. Charles E. Littlefield (acting chairman) in the chair.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Mr. Gilbert, the author of the bill H. R. 9328,

has something else to attend to this afternoon and wishes to make a short statement at this time in regard to the bill, if it would be agreeable to you, Mr. Gompers.

Mr. GOMPERS. Entirely agreeable, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEWTON W. GILBERT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA.

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Chairman, I introduced one of the bills which I understand is under discussion here, and I find that it is attracting a great deal of attention over the country. In fact, I have received letters and telegrams from many of my constituents and from people of my State protesting against the bill, but evidently upon the theory that it provides for something that it does not provide for. I wish this committee to understand that I am an ultra man on the proposition of the anti-injunction bills that have been proposed from time to time. I believe absolutely that the courts should have the power of granting injunctions.

But my bill-and I want to call the attention of the committee to it does not seek in any sense to impair the right of injunction; but it does do what it seems to me is the American thing-it provides that before a judgment can be rendered-a judgment or injunction, if you please against me, that I must know that an injunction is sought. I may be wrong, but it seems to me there is no principle upon which we can defend the proposition that a judgment can be taken in a court against a man without his knowledge-constructive knowledge at least. So that my bill provides only that notice shall be given to one against whom an injunction is sought. It provides not for notice of a definite time, but for reasonable notice-notice, which it seems to me, if I understand the interpretation of the word "reasonable" in the courts of our country, might vary a great deal.

As I understand the word "reasonable," it is such that if the circumstances demanded short notice, very short notice, and immediate bringing into court of the defendant that that might be done. But as strong a believer as I have always been in the power of the injunction, I have never been able to conceive how a man should have judgment or injunction issued against him without notice that the proceeding was to be had. For that principle I contend. For that principle the bill was introduced. As to the precise wording, the wording was drawn exactly in line with the words of the President, using almose his exact language in his message sent to this Congress, and because that language was used in the drafting of this bill the language which appears in it was used.

I do not contend for the language, but I do contend for the proposition that there should be no injunction without notice, and there being able men representing very large interests from all over this country appearing on both sides of this proposition, I do not desire to take up any more time of the committee; but I did hope to be able to make that statement as to my position, because I have been considerably annoyed by seeing in the public prints these statements and receiving letters and telegrams stating that I had introduced a bill directly against the power of the injunction.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. Do you care to make any suggestion in relation to the suggestions of Mr. Furuseth and Mr. Gompers that this bill

in effect confers powers upon the courts that they do not now possess, and is therefore objectionable?

Mr. GILBERT. I did not hear what they had to say. I will say this, that in my individual judgment my bill is too narrow. It was narrowed down, not in accordance with my best judgment, but it was narrowed down to injunctions which pertain to labor disputes. I would be glad myself to see the committee or the House amend it so as to apply to all injunctions. But that was done so as to bring it within the line of the recommendation of the President.

Mr. FURUSETH. With reference to that, the gentleman has already answered one question that I was going to ask-namely, whether he wanted generally the injunctions not to be issued until a hearing could be had. Now, assuming that you own a piece of property, and a railroad corporation or somebody else is about to take it from you by laying a track over it, or using it, or taking the quarry out of it, or taking the forest off of it, it being your real property, do you believe that there must be a hearing before the trespass upon that property of yours is prohibited?

Mr. GILBERT. Yes; there should be a hearing. There must be notice given. That is, that is my judgment; else you may take judg ment against a man, else you may enjoin a man for something that he has never heard about or thought of doing or dreamed of doing. Mr. FURUSETH. Then, by a hearing you mean simply the filing of a notice that it is done?

Mr. GILBERT. I am not talking about a hearing. My bill provides for notice here.

Mr. FURUSETH. Notice to the opposite party?

Mr. GILBERT. Notice to the one against whom the injunction was sought. That is all there is in my bill, as I read it. If there is anything else in it, then I do not understand my own bill; and it seems to me that is right.

Mr. SPALDING (representing the Typothetæ of Philadelphia). I desire to know whether Mr. Gilbert is aware that his bill is drawn in the exact language of the existing equity rules of the Supreme Court of the United States?

Mr. GILBERT. I am not aware of that. I am aware that it is not drawn in conformity with the practice of all of the courts. It is in most of the courts. Most of the courts of the United States do just what my bill provides, and there have been instances-I think I am correct-in which that has been done.

Mr. SPALDING. But you did not know that you were following that exact language in this bill?

Mr. GILBERT. No, sir. I do not know it now.

Mr. SPALDING. That is a fact.

Mr. GILBERT. The present equity rules?

Mr. SPALDING. The equity rules of the Supreme Court of the United States have exactly that language in them, except that it applies to all cases. This is limited to labor disputes, and it is subject to modification in particular cases. The objection is that this bill will make binding upon the courts in every case that general rule which is now subject to qualifications in some particular cases.

STATEMENT OF MR. SAMUEL GOMPERS—Continued.

Mr. GOMPERS. Since Mr. Gilbert has made the statement he has, I want to say at this time that the representatives of labor appearing for and advocating the enactment of an anti-injunction bill, and an effective one-I want it to be clearly understood-neither directly nor indirectly nor remotely aim to attack the writ of injunction as a writ. We recognize its importance and its value and efficiency and appropriateness and effectiveness within the limits of its original purpose, and that is to protect property rights when there is no other remedy at law.

I should say, too, that it is quite news to me, although I am not surprised by it, that Mr. Gilbert should have received numerous protests against that bill, his bill, H. R. 9328; for, as a matter of fact, if there is any one thing upon which there is perfect clearness in the minds of the workingmen of the United States, it is upon this subject of injunctions, and I do not think that they can be easily persuaded to another course than what they have in mind, and that is an effective bill that shall remove the condition that has selected them as workmen specially to have injunctions issued enjoining them from doing things that applies to no other man, woman, or child.

Mr. FULLER. Before Mr. Gilbert goes out I want to have an understanding and ask him a question. I think there is a misunderstanding.

(Mr. Gilbert was in the act of passing out of the door of the committee room as Mr. Fuller commenced to speak.)

Mr. GOMPERS. I wanted to say, though, that if he has received the protests to which he refers, then they have not been artificially stimulated or suggested, for the American Federation of Labor officers and the legislative committee are expected to keep the workmen of America advised as to the progress of legislation affecting their interests, and nothing of that sort affecting this bill has yet gone forth, and I simply make this statement as indicating how rife and general is this consensus of opinion on an accurate and effective injunction bill upon. the workingmen of our country.

And I want to add further, in view of the statement made by Mr. Gilbert, that the language of this bill, as well as the language contained in the President's message, was based upon a bill that was introduced into Congress in the last session. These things are not original with this bill, nor are they original with the President in his message. It fell to our duty last Congress to oppose that bill, as we now oppose it in this session, and to ask that H. R. 4445 be reported upon and passed. I find upon examination that the language used in the injunction of Judge Rodgers applies to property specified, property in that injunction specifically mentioned or omitted, not to personal actions.

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. So that the original reference was erroneous in that respect?

Mr. GOMPERS. Yes, sir; and I will say that there was no intent-it was in the hurried reading

Mr. LITTLEFIELD. There is no impression that it was, Mr. Gompers. We simply wanted to get at the facts, so that the record would be consistent all the way along.