603, 628. Jones National Bank v.. Yates, 240 U. S. 541, 563. The Railroad Company had for its principal object in bringing the case here to set up the Seventh Amendment, and to deny jurisdiction in any state court where a verdict of nine or more out of the twelve men on the jury was allowed by the local law. The notion that a substantive right vesting under the law of one jurisdiction cannot be recognized and enforced in another, at least as between the United States and a State, unless by procedure identical with that of the first is disposed of in Minneapolis &c. R. R. v. Bombolis, ante, p. 211. The first of the other objections is that the Court of Appeals was not authorized to add ten per cent. damages on the amount of the judgment, as it did. But the Railroad Company obtained a supersedeas, and the law of the State makes ten per cent. the cost of it to all persons if the judgment is affirmed. There was no obligation upon the State to provide for a suspension of the judgment and nothing to prevent its making it costly in cases where ultimately the judgment is upheld. So the State may allow interest upon a judgment from the time when it is rendered, if it provides appellate proceedings and the judgment is affirmed, as but for such proceedings interest would run as of course until the judgment was paid. The Railroad Company contends at some length that the case should have been taken from the jury by the direction of a verdict in its favor. As the opinion of both courts below and the jury were against it and as we agree with their judgment we shall not discuss this assignment of error at length. Great Northern Ry. v. Knapp, 240 U. S. 464, 466. The facts were these: Stewart, the deceased, was engineer on a north-bound freight train upon a single track, that had to go upon a siding to make way for a south-bound freight train. There were cars already on the siding which Stewart's train pushed ahead, and this Opinion of the Court. 241 U. S. train and the cars more than filled the siding. Therefore they pushed forward onto the main track to the rear of the south-bound train and the latter went on its way. It still, however, was necessary to keep the main track clear for another south-bound train, and therefore Stewart's train began to back so as to free the main track north of the switch which would be the first point reached by the expected train. While it was backing and approaching the southerly end of the switch the rear brakeman suddenly applied the airbrakes and the sudden shock caused the engineer to strike his head against the cab, by reason of which he died. The conductor in charge of the movement testified that he intended not to cross the southerly point of the switch and it could be found that the brakeman's act was a breach of duty, that it manifestly would cause a sudden shock, and that although the particular position of, or specific damage to Stewart was unknown to the brakeman, generically it was the kind of thing that was likely to happen, and that he and his employers were liable for consequences of that sort. The jury was instructed that Stewart assumed the risks incident to his employment and that if the application of the airbrakes was made upon a reasonable belief that it was necessary to apply them in order to avoid injury to property, they should find for the defendant unless they found that the emergency was brought about by the defendant's servants in the negligent operation of the train before the brakes were applied. As an abstract proposition the qualification was correct, and the jury might have found that the conductor did not manage the train with due care and so made the application necessary. Whatever might have been our opinion had we been in the jury's place we do not feel warranted in saying that they had no evidence to go upon or that the instructions were wrong. Judgment affirmed. 241 U. S. Syllabus. UNITED STATES v. COCA COLA COMPANY OF ATLANTA. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 562. Argued February 29, 1916.-Decided May 22, 1916. Under the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, the fact that a formula has been made up and followed and a distinctive name therefor adopted does not suffice to take an article from § 7, subd. 5, of the Act. In such a case the standard by which the combination is to be judged is not necessarily the combination itself. A poisonous or deleterious ingredient with the injurious effect stated by the statute may be an added ingredient in the statutory sense although it is covered by the formula and made a constituent of the article sold. In construing § 7, subd. Fifth of the Food and Drugs Act held that the term adulteration is used in a special sense and its ordinary meaning is not controlling; that an article may be adulterated by the adding of an injurious ingredient including a component part of the article itself; that adulteration must not be confused with misbranding and provisions as to latter do not limit the explicit provisions of § 7 of adulteration; and that proprietary foods sold under descriptive names are within its provisions, including those which were in the market when the Act was passed. It would reduce the Food and Drugs Act to an absurdity to so construe it as to regard a compound food product, the formula of which included a poisonous or deleterious ingredient, as adulterated within the meaning of § 7 if such ingredient were omitted. Whether an added ingredient-such as caffeine is poisonous or deleterious held, in this case, in view of decided conflict of competent evidence, to be a question for the jury. While a distinctive name may be purely arbitrary it must be one that distinguishes the article; and where more than one name, each descriptive of an article, are united, it amounts to misbranding if the article sold does not contain any of the articles generally known individually by any of such names. Argument for Defendant in Error. 241 U.S. THE facts, which involve the construction and application of the adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Underwood, with whom Mr. Elliott Cheatham was on the brief, for the United States. Mr. Harold Hirsch and Mr. J. B. Sizer, with whom Mr. A. W. Chambliss and Mr. W. D. Thomson were on the brief, for the defendant in error: In construing a statute, every section, provision and clause should be explained by reference to every other, and if possible, every clause and provision shall avail, and have the effect contemplated by the legislature. One portion of a statute should not be so construed as to annul or destroy what has been clearly granted by another. The most general and absolute terms of one section may be qualified and limited by conditions and exceptions contained in another, so that all may stand together. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 623; Montclair v. Ransdell, 107 U. S. 147; United States v. Lexington Mill, 232 U. S. 399, 409; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 670; Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414; Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112; United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U. S. 654, 665; Hall-Baker Grain Co. v. United States, 198 Fed. Rep. 614. Even if caffeine is a poisonous or deleterious substance, which might render the article in controversy injurious to health, its presence would not render the article subject to seizure and condemnation under the Act unless it constituted adulteration within the meaning of the Act. For object of the Food and Drugs Act see Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 530; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540; United States v. 65 Cases, 170 Fed. Rep. 449; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. 241 U. S. Argument for Defendant in Error. The cases referred to by the Government do not sustain any different proposition. The purpose of the Act is to secure the purity of foods and drugs, and to inform the purchasers of what they are buying. United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U. S. 654, 665; and see Cong. Rec., Feb. 20, 1906, pp. 2786, 2787. The statute contemplates a standard and the Government in the libel filed in this case set out the standard when it claimed to have seized a food product known and sold as Coca-Cola. In other words, the product known and sold as Coca-Cola is the standard; it is the product that must be adulterated. Gruley on Act, pp. 8, 22. Where there is no standard fixed by any statute the court must and will fix for itself a proper standard based on the evidence. Von Bremen v. United States, 192 Fed. Rep. 905; People v. Jennings, 132 Michigan, 662. Such a standard is obtained from trade knowledge of the article. McCord v. United States, 182 Fed. Rep. 47; United States v. St. Louis Coffee Mills, 189 Fed. Rep. 193; United States v. Frank, 189 Fed. Rep. 195; 200 Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 431; Hudson Co. v. United States, 192 Fed. Rep. 920; Libby v. United States, 210 Fed. Rep. 148; United States v. Sweet Valley Wine Co., 208 Fed. Rep. 85; United States v. 75 Boxes, 198 Fed. Rep. 934; Weeks v. United States, 224 Fed. Rep. 64; Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U. S. 171. The Government has admitted that a standard must be established, and is to be established in finding out what is a given substance as recognized by reliable manufacturers and dealers. See Notices Judgm., 123, 130, 135. The only standard in this case is a food productCoca-Cola-which has always contained caffeine, Washburn v. United States, 224 Fed. Rep. 395, 398, and therefore caffeine in this product is not an "added" ingredient or an adulteration within the meaning of the Act. "Adulterate" means to make impure by the admixture of other, or baser, or foreign ingredients; to render counter |