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241 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

of Article III of the Treaty of 1889. Kelly v. Griffin, ante, pp. 6, 15.

It is insisted that the Consul General's complaint does not allege that the offense was committed in Canada, that the evidence relied upon raises no presumption that appellant committed anywhere the offense of receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen (the offense specified in the treaty), and that it raises no presumption that appellant committed the offense in Montreal or anywhere in the Dominion of Canada.

The criticism upon the complaint is unsubstantial. It is fairly to be inferred from what is stated that the crime was committed in Canada, and it is distinctly averred that appellant is a fugitive from justice from the District of Montreal, in that Dominion, and that the offense with which he is charged is an offense within the treaties between the United States and Great Britain. Besides this, it is stated that deponent's information is based upon authenticated copies of a warrant issued by the police magistrate of Montreal and of the complaint upon which that warrant was issued, and upon certain depositions submitted and to be filed with the present complaint; the depositions being those taken in Montreal. It is clear that the intent was to charge that the offense was committed in Canada.

As to the effect of the evidence: The Commissioner doubtless held that the fact of possession, taken in connection with the other facts of the case, raised a presumption either that appellant was a party to the burglary or that he afterwards obtained possession of the bills with guilty knowledge. Appellant disputes the inference, and, assuming it to be well founded, insists that there is nothing in the law of probabilities to sustain an inference that "possession by a man during a visit of a few days to Montreal of goods that were stolen more than three years previously in British Columbia makes it more probable

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that he received the goods in Canada than that he received them in the United States." There is nothing in the evidence to require the inference that appellant was paying a brief visit to Montreal. It appears that he has a brother who is in business in Chicago, and that he himself was in that city in the summer of 1914, and, on three occasions, with intervals of several weeks, exchanged Canadian money there for United States currency. This is consistent with the inference that he was then exchanging part of the stolen money, but does not require the inference that he had a fixed place of abode in Chicago. The stolen bills that were in appellant's possession in Montreal in February, 1915, are not shown to have been removed from the Dominion after the time they were stolen from the bank in September, 1911. As it was a reasonable inference they being "new bills"-that they had never before been used in exchange, and because so many of them were found together in the hands of appellant and his confederate three and a half years after the burglary, it was further inferable that they had been retained during the intervening period with the purpose of awaiting such opportunity for passing them as might come from relaxed vigilance on the part of the authorities; and since the Dominion of Canada is the natural and convenient market for bills of the Bank of Montreal, it was inferable that the bills had not been taken out of the Dominion since the time they were stolen; and, if not, it followed that appellant must have been within the Dominion when he received them. That they were received with knowledge that they had been stolen, might be inferred from the fact of the burglary coupled with the suspicious circumstances (only a part of which we have referred to) attending the efforts to exchange them for other forms of property.

The Commissioner deemed the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge (Rev. Stat., § 5270), and since he had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the accused, and

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the offense is within the treaty, his finding cannot be reversed on habeas corpus if he acted upon competent and adequate evidence. McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U. S. 520, 523.

It is insisted that the Montreal affidavits, essential to show that the alleged offense was committed within the Dominion, were incompetent because taken ex parte, in the absence of appellant and without opportunity for crossexamination. The Treaty of 1842 provides in Article X that extradition shall only be had "upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed." Section 5271, Rev. Stat., as amended by act of August 3, 1882, §§ 5 and 6 (c. 378, 22 Stat. 215, 216), provides that any depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof shall be admissible in evidence at the hearing if properly authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country, and that the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in the foreign country shall be proof of such authentication. The Montreal affidavits, complaints, warrant, etc., are properly authenticated in accordance with this provision. It is one of the objects of § 5271 to obviate the necessity of confronting the accused with the witnesses against him; and a construction of this section, or of the treaty, that would require the demanding government to send its citizens to another country to institute legal proceedings would defeat the whole object of the treaty. Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371, 375; Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U. S. 227, 231.

All of the objections savor of technicality. And since the jurisdiction of the Commissioner is clear, and the evidence abundantly sufficient to furnish reasonable ground for the belief that appellant has committed within

Statement of the Case.

241 U. S.

the Dominion of Canada a crime that is an offense under the laws of the Dominion, as well as under those of Illinois (2 Jones & Add. Ill. Stat. Ann., § 3892), and is covered by the terms of the treaty, and that he is a fugitive from justice, a fair observance of the obligations of the treaty requires that he be surrendered. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U. S. 508, 512.

Final order affirmed.

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. DUNLEVY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 290. Argued May 14, 15, 1916.-Decided June 5, 1916.

A party to an action does not after final judgment still remain in court and subject without further personal service to whatsoever orders may be entered under the title of that cause.

Interpleader proceedings brought by a garnishee are not essential concomitants of the original action in which the judgment was rendered on which the garnishment is based, but are collateral and require personal service on the judgment debtor.

In Pennsylvania, a judgment debtor is not a party to a garnishment proceeding to condemn a claim due him from a third person, nor is he bound by a judgment discharging the garnishee.

Any personal judgment which a state court may render against one not voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, and who is not a citizen of the State, nor served with process within its border, no matter what the mode of service, is void because the court has no jurisdiction over his person.

214 Fed. Rep. 1, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the effect of a garnishee proceeding in one State and pleaded in an action in another State, are stated in the opinion.

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Mr. James H. McIntosh, with whom Mr. E. J. McCutchen, Mr. Warren Olney, Jr., Mr. Charles W. Willard and Mr. J. M. Mannon, Jr., were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Nat Schmulowitz, with whom Mr. Frank W. Taft and Mr. Clarence Coonan were on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

Respondent, Effie J. Gould Dunlevy, instituted this suit in the Superior Court, Marin County, California, January 14, 1910, against petitioner and Joseph W. Gould, her father, to recover $2,479.70, the surrender value of a policy on his life which she claimed had been assigned to her in 1893, and both were duly served with process while in that State. It was removed to the United States District Court, February 16, 1910, and there tried by the judge in May, 1912, a jury having been expressly waived. Judgment for amount claimed was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 204 Fed. Rep. 670. 214 Fed. Rep. 1.

The insurance company by an amended answer filed December 7, 1911, set up in defense (1) that no valid assignment had been made, and (2) that Mrs. Dunlevy was concluded by certain judicial proceedings in Pennsylvania wherein it had been garnished and the policy had been adjudged to be the property of Gould. Invalidity of the assignment is not now urged; but it is earnestly insisted that the Pennsylvania proceedings constituted a bar.

In 1907 Boggs & Buhl recovered a valid personal judgment by default, after domiciliary service, against Mrs. Dunlevy, in the Common Pleas Court at Pittsburgh, where she then resided. During 1909, "the tontine dividend period" of the life policy having expired, the insurance

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