27 Opinion of the Court. Nor did the formation of an indestructible Union of indestructible States make impossible coöperation between the Nation and the States through the exercise of the power of each to the advantage of the people who are citizens of both. We had recent occasion to consider that question in the case of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, in relation to the operation of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935. 49 Stat. 620. The question was raised with special emphasis in relation to § 904 of the statute and the parts of § 903, complementary thereto, by which the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to receive and hold in the Unemployment Trust Fund all moneys deposited therein by a state agency for a state unemployment fund and to invest in obligations of the United States such portion of the Fund as is not in his judgment required to meet current withdrawals. The contention was that Alabama in consenting to that deposit had "renounced the plenitude of power inherent in her statehood." 301 U. S. at pp. 595, 596. We found the contention to be unsound. As the States were at liberty upon obtaining the consent of Congress to make agreements with one another, we saw no room for doubt that they may do the like with Congress if the essence of their statehood is maintained without impairment. And we added that "Nowhere in our scheme of government-in the limitations express or implied of our federal constitution-do we find that she [the State] is prohibited from assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits received." In the instant case we have coöperation to provide a remedy for a serious condition in which the States alone were unable to afford relief. Improvement districts, such as the petitioner, were in distress. Economic disaster had made it impossible for them to meet their obligations. As the owners of property within the boundaries of the district could not pay adequate assessments, the power of Opinion of the Court. 304 U.S. taxation was useless. helpless. The natural and reasonable remedy through composition of the debts of the district was not available under state law by reason of the restriction imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the impairment of contracts by state legislation. The bankruptcy power is competent to give relief to debtors in such a plight and, if there is any obstacle to its exercise in the case of the districts organized under state law it lies in the right of the State to oppose federal interference. The State steps in to remove that obstacle. The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue. Through its coöperation with the national government the needed relief is given. We see no ground for the conclusion that the Federal Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has reduced both sovereigns to helplessness in such a case. The creditors of the district were Fourth. As the bankruptcy power may be exerted to give effect to a plan for the composition of the debts of an insolvent debtor, we find no merit in appellant's objections under the Fifth Amendment. In re Reiman, supra; Continental National Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., supra. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER are of the opinion that the principle approved in Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, is controlling here and requires affirmation of the questioned decree. MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration and decision of this case. Opinion of the Court. INTERSTATE CIRCUIT, INC., ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.* APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS. No. 709. Argued April 5, 1938.-Decided April 25, 1938. 1. Under Equity Rule 702 it is the duty of the District Court to make special, formal findings of fact, and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, determining all the issues in the case. The opinion of that court in this case was not a substitute. 2. Compliance with this rule is particularly important in an antitrust case which comes to this Court by direct appeal from the trial court. P. 56. Decree in 20 F. Supp. 868, set aside and cause remanded for statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Messrs. George S. Wright and Thomas D. Thacher for appellants. Solicitor General Jackson, with whom Assistant Attorney General Arnold and Mr. Charles H. Weston were on the brief, for the United States. PER CURIAM. The Government brought this suit for an injunction against the carrying out of an alleged conspiracy, in restraint of interstate commerce, between distributors and exhibitors of motion picture films. The restraint was alleged to consist in provisions in license agreements which prevented any "feature picture" of the distributors, which had been shown "first-run" in a theater of the defendant exhibitor at an admission price of 40 cents or more, from thereafter being exhibited in the same locality at an admission price of less than 25 cents or on the same program with another feature picture. *Together with No. 710, Paramount Pictures Distributing Co. et al. v. United States, also on appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas. Opinion of the Court. 304 U.S. The evidence was presented by an agreed statement of certain facts and by oral testimony on behalf of each party. The District Court entered a final decree adjudging that in making the restrictive agreements the distributors had engaged in a conspiracy with the exhibitor, Interstate Circuit, Inc. and its officers, in violation of the Anti-Trust Act and granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the restrictions. 20 F. Supp. 868. The case comes here on direct appeal. Acts of Feb. 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823; February 13, 1925, c. 229. 28 U. S. C. 345. Equity Rule 702 provides: "In deciding suits in equity, including those required to be heard before three judges, the court of first instance shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon; . . . "Such findings and conclusions shall be entered of record and, if an appeal is taken from the decree, shall be included by the clerk in the record which is certified to the appellate court under rules 75 and 76." The District Court did not comply with this rule. The court made no formal findings. The court did not find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law as the rule required. The statements in the decree that in making the restrictive agreements the parties had engaged in an illegal conspiracy were but ultimate conclusions and did not dispense with the necessity of properly formulating the underlying findings of fact. The opinion of the court was not a substitute for the required findings. A discussion of portions of the evidence and the court's reasoning in its opinion do not constitute the special and formal findings by which it is the duty of the court appropriately and specifically to determine all the issues which the case presents. This is an essential aid to the appellate court in reviewing an equity case (Railroad Commission v. Maxcy, 281 U. S. 82, and cases 55 Opinion of the Court. cited) and compliance with the rule is particularly important in an anti-trust case which comes to this Court by direct appeal from the trial court. The Government contends that the distributors were parties to a common plan constituting a conspiracy in restraint of commerce; that each distributor would benefit by unanimous action, whereas otherwise the restrictions would probably injure the distributors who imposed them, and that prudence dictated that "no distributor agree to impose the restrictions in the absence of agreement or understanding that his fellows would do likewise"; that the restraints were unreasonable and that they had the purpose and effect of raising and maintaining the level of admission prices; that even if the distributors acted independently and not as participants in a joint undertaking, still the restraints were unreasonable in their effect upon the exhibitor's competitors. Appellants, asserting copyright privileges, contend that the restrictions were reasonable; that they were intended simply to protect the licensee from what would otherwise be an unreasonable interference by the distributors with the enjoyment of the granted right of exhibition; that there was no combination or conspiracy among the distributors; that it was to the independent advantage of each distributor to impose the restrictions in its own agreement and that the contention that less than substantially unanimous action would have injured the distributors in making such agreements was contrary to the evidence; and that the restrictions did not have an injurious effect. We intimate no opinion upon any of the questions raised by these rival contentions, but they point the importance of special and adequate findings in accordance with the prescribed equity practice. The decree of the District Court is set aside and the cause is remanded with directions to the court to state |