ment within the limitations of Section 156 of the
Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 262). Standard-Vacuum
Oil Co., 137.
II. Where, on August 20, 1942, the War Shipping Admin-
istration, acting pursuant to the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, as amended, requisitioned title to and
possession of the Maitland No. 1, a car ferry be-
longing to the plaintiff, and fixed the sum of
$72,500 as just compensation; and where plaintiff,
under the provisions of the statute, notified the
defendant that the award was not satisfactory
and elected to receive 75 percent of the amount
awarded by the defendant and reserved its right
to sue for the balance; it is held that plaintiff
is entitled to recover on the basis of a valuation
of $161,833.72, against which the defendant is
entitled to credit for the sum of $54,375 paid on
June 10, 1944; and plaintiff is further entitled to
recover compensation measured by interest at 4
percent per annum for delay in payment on $161,-
833.72 from August 20, 1942, to June 10, 1944, and
on $107,458.72 from June 10, 1944, to date of
payment. Toronto, Hamilton and Buffalo Navi-
gation Co., 240.
III. In ascertaining a fair valuation of the Maitland No.
1, at the time of taking, where it is found that
the vessel had a value in excess of the residual
value of an obsolete car ferry not in actual opera-
tion in 1942, the earnings of the vessel during the
time it was in operation are given consideration
as well as contemporaneous transactions in vessels
of close similarity on or about the time the vessel
was requisitioned. Id.
RETIREMENT PAY.
See Suit For Salary III, IV, V, VI.
I. Where plaintiffs file joint actions under Rule 9 (a) of
the Court of Claims which allows "claimants
whose claims arise out of the same transactions,
occurrences or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all
of them will arise in the action" to join in one
action as plaintiffs; the Government's motion to
dismiss such portions of the claim of each plaintiff
as accrued prior to six years before the filing of
his suit is granted. Moorehead et al., 298.
II. All of the claimants in the four suits with which the
court is here concerned were employees of The
Alaska Railroad, an agency of the United States,
who claim to have worked more than 40 hours per
week at some time since March 28, 1934, and to be
entitled to overtime pay under the Act of that date
(48 Stat. 509), and the question will arise in each
of the instant cases whether the Act of March 28,
1934, is applicable to employees of The Alaska Rail-
road. (See Townsley v. United States, 101 C. Cls.
237, affirmed United States v. Townsley, 323 U. S.
557; Hearne v. United States, 107 C. Cls. 335, United
States v. Hearne, certiorari denied, 331 U. S. 858;
Gray v. United States, 110 C. Cls. 661.) If the
Court of Claims should conclude, as a matter of
law, that the Act of March 28, 1934, is not appli-
cable to the employees of The Alaska Railroad,
all these suits would fail and there would be no
necessity for taking evidence. The joint actions,
therefore, are proper cases for the use of Rule 9
(a) to save trouble and expense to litigants whose
cases present a common question. Id.
III. It is a jurisdictional requisite in suits of this nature in
the Court of Claims that the claim shall not have
accrued more than six years before the filing of the
suit, unless the claimant was subject to one of the
disabilities named in the Statute of Limitations.
(156 Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. 262, amended after
the filing of these suits by the Act of June 25, 1948,
62 Stat. 869, in which Section 2501 of Title 28 U.
S. Code is the pertinent section.) Id.
IV. It does not substantially impair the utility for plain-
tiffs of Rule 9 (a) to require that, as to each plain-
tiff, the petition should show either the accrual of
his claim within six years prior to the filing of the
petition or a disability which has tolled the statute.
The court is impelled to this conclusion both by the
jurisdictional quality of the statute in relation to
cases in the Court of Claims and by considerations
of the economy and convenience of the parties and
the court. Id.
SOVEREIGN, ACT OF.
See Contracts XVI.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
I. Additional adjustments for recovery of income tax,
involving amortization of engineering expendi-
tures, were properly introduced after the statute
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Continued
of limitations for filing claims had run by amend-
ments of pending claims which had been filed on
time, where the facts upon which the amended
claims were based did not involve a new and un-
related ground but bore a close relationship to
the original claim for refund, involving a consider-
ation of depreciation; and plaintiff is entitled to
recover. Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation,
201.
II. The income tax of decedent's estate for 1938 was
paid in 1939. The litigation concerning the valid-
ity and probate of decedent's will was not finally
determined and settled until March 30, 1944, al-
most 5 years after the 1938 tax had been paid;
and long before that date (March 1944), the time
within which an original refund claim could be
filed had expired under the statute of limitation of
3 years from the due date of the return and 2 years
from the payment of the tax. However, soon after
the will had been admitted to probate and plaintiff
Roe had been appointed executor the estate made
written application to the Commissioner asking
that the refund claim of September 28, 1941, be al-
lowed for the amount of tax overpaid for 1938, but
no action was taken on this application and sub-
sequently the instant suit was filed. It is held
that the application of the plaintiff to the Commis-
sioner was proper and the suit was not barred by
the statute. Roe, 224.
III. Where plaintiffs file joint actions under Rule 9 (a)
of the Court of Claims which allows "claimants
whose claims arise out of the same transactions,
occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all
of them will arise in the action" to join in one
action as plaintiffs; the Government's motion to
dismiss such portions of the claim of each plaintiff
as accrued prior to 6 years before the filing of
his suit is granted. Moorehead et al., 298.
IV. All of the claimants in the four suits with which the
court is here concerned were employees of The
Alaska Railroad, an agency of the United States,
who claim to have worked more than 40 hours per
week at some time since March 28, 1934, and to be
entitled to overtime pay under the Act of that date
(48 Stat. 509), and the question will arise in each
of the instant cases whether the Act of March
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Continued
28, 1934, is applicable to employees of The Alaska
Railroad. (See Townsley v. United States, 101 C.
Cls. 237, affirmed United States v. Townsley, 323
U. S. 557; Hearne v. United States, 107 C. Cls. 335,
United States v. Hearne, certiorari denied, 331 U. S.
858; Gray V. United States, 110 C. Cls. 661.) If
the Court of Claims should conclude, as a matter
of law, that the Act of March 28, 1934, is not ap-
plicable to the employees of The Alaska Railroad,
all these suits would fail and there would be
no necessity for taking evidence. The joint ac-
tions, therefore, are proper cases for the use of
Rule 9 (a) to save trouble and expense to litigants
whose cases present a common question. Id.
V. It is a jurisdictional requisite in suits of this nature
in the Court of Claims that the claim shall not
have accrued more than 6 years before the filing
of the suit, unless the claimant was subject to one
of the disabilities named in the Statute of Limita-
tions. (156 Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. 262,
amended after the filing of these suits by the Act
of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, in which Section 2501
of Title 28 U. S. Code is the pertinent section.)
Id.
VI. It does not substantially impair the utility for plain-
tiffs of Rule 9 (a) to require that, as to each
plaintiff, the petition should show either the ac-
crual of his claim within 6 years prior to the
filing of the petition or a disability which has
tolled the statute. The court is impelled to this
conclusion both by the jurisdictional quality of the
statute in relation to cases in the Court of Claims
and by considerations of the economy and con-
venience of the parties and the court. Id.
VII. Where, on December 24, 1941, the War Department
requisitioned certain automobiles and equipment
from the plaintiff, Reliance Motors, Inc., a corpo-
ration organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, then a possession of the United States, and
on December 30, 1941, issued a check to said
plaintiff in payment therefor; and where it is
alleged that on account of the Japanese invasion
and occupation of the islands the plaintiff corpo-
ration was unable to deposit promptly the check
which was in the possession of an officer of the
corporation, W. A. H. Duff, who was captured and
imprisoned; and where, during the imprisonment
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-Continued
of Duff and another officer of the corporation,
Keiffer, the two endorsed the check in blank as
officers of the corporation and in June 1942 ex-
changed it with persons outside the prison camp
for pesos at a discount; the plaintiff on June 15,
1945, made demand upon defendant for payment of
the full amount of the check, $4,300, alleging that
at the time of their endorsement Duff and Keiffer
were no longer officers or agents of the corporation
and had no authority to act for or on behalf of nor
to bind the corporation. No action having been
taken on plaintiff's claim, suit was filed in the
Court of Claims December 12, 1947. Reliance
Motors, etc., 324.
VIII. By leave of the court, and without objection, on
April 16, 1948, an intervening petition was filed
by E. Awad & Company, Inc., also a Philippine
corporation, alleging that during June 1942 Reli-
ance Motors, Inc., endorsed and caused to be
delivered to the intervenor through its then presi-
dent, Samuel E. Awad, at Manila, the U. S. Treas-
ury check in question "in exchange for the full
amount of said check then and there paid in
lawful Philippine currency." Because of the
continued Japanese occupation, the check could
not be deposited or presented for payment and
was accordingly retained by the intervenor until
December 1944, at which time Awad was arrested
by the Japanese forces and presumably put to
death. All property of E. Awad & Company, Inc.,
including the check, was seized and the check was
presumably destroyed. Id.
IX. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the intervening petition
upon the ground that the claim first accrued at
the time of the check, dated December 30, 1941,
should have been presented for payment and that
the claim on which the intervening petition is
based accrued December 31, 1941, and was barred
more than four months before such petition was
filed on April 16, 1948, is denied. Id.
X. The general rule is that a claim accrues, within the
meaning of the statute (28 U. S. C. 262), when all
the events have occurred which fix the liability of
the United States to a claimant and which entitle
such claimant to sue thereon. Where two parties
assert ownership of a claim against the United
States under circumstances such as the instant
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