me, however, for the purposes that these Acts of the General Lia were intended to and do , of whatever kind, against er, for the recovery of specific y distraint or of damages for tntion, and leaves to the cousole right of action, the suit back the money illegally collected 1952, that it does forbid actions | formity required in the practice and procedure er for legally levying upon the of the courts of the United States with that of Le coupon holder for the tax which the State Courts needs only to be "as near as d to pay. The language of the may be." No one would contend that a law of brace only such suits as are a State, forbidding all redress by actions at law the direct object of preventing or for injuries to property, would be upheld in from taking steps to collect the the courts of the United States, for that would And uncertainty is not made clear be to deprive one of his property without due atory Act of March 13, 1884, process of law. This is exactly what the statsly forbidding actions of tres-utes in question undertake to do, in respect to on the case to be brought or that class of persons whose property is taken arast any collecting officer for from them for the offense of asserting, under the property of any taxpayer who the protection of the Constitution, the right to red coupons in payment of the pay their taxes in coupons. The contract with would seem to have left the ac- Virginia was not only that the coupons should which was authorized in such be received in payment of taxes, but, by nepreviously existing law of Vir- cessary implication, that the taxpayer making ed by the prohibition. such tender should not be molested further, as though he were a delinquent; and that, for every illegal attempt subsequently to enforce the collection of the tax, by the seizure of property, he should have the remedies of the law in force when the contract was made, for redress, or others equally effective. "The obligation of a contract," said this court, in McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How., 608, 612,"consists in its binding force on the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in existence when it is made. These are necessarily referred to in all contracts, and forming a part of them, as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party and the right acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either than that which the terms of the contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing esult, then, of giving effect to contracted for, and gives the other a right to of the Act in question is to de-enforce the performance by the remedies then height of the coupon holder to in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish this coupons, which we have the duty or to impair the right, it necessarily voids that part of the Acts in bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor forbids it in terms, and to take of one party to the injury of the other; hence, ht as a defense against the any law, which in its operation amounts to a s committed upon him and denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by al and defiance of it. All per- a contract, though professing to act only on the y is unlawfully taken, oth- remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition trant of action for redress. But free payment of taxes, are se- of the Constitution." , to whom the Constitution a's guarantees the right, conby the law and contract of his taxes in coupons, is exmation is made against him ve him of that right, and, if have the effect of denying to ara deprivation of a right se*y the Constitution. To take for the enforcement of a right (at the right itself. But that is not *d the State. we have already seen, is no er for the loss of the specific is taxes with coupons. It does so to be. Neither is it a remof the right sought to be vindiother personal actions against funlawfully taking from the perty, And, upon the supposirong is without remedy by any Rs, it will be observed, makes ta, in reference to the adopstava rules of decision, of cases age on otherwise requires, #wherever the adoption of the state earning party of a remedy Se vidication of a right, and that from or protected by the ConErred States. The same exdan section 914, the language Sur is not imperative, as the con The Acts of Assembly in question must be taken together, as one is but an amendment to the other. The scheme of the whole is indivisible. It cannot be separated into parts. It must stand or fall together. The substantive part of it, which forbids the tax collector to receive coupons in payment of taxes, as we have already declared, as, indeed, on all sides, is admitted, cannot stand, because it is not consistent with the Constitution. That which is merely auxiliary to the main design must also fall with the principal of which it is merely an incident; and it follows that the Acts in question are not laws of Virginia, and are therefore not within the sections of the Revised Statutes referred to, nor obligatory upon the courts of the United States. It is undoubtedly true that there may be cases where one part of a statute may be enforced as constitutional, and another be de clared inoperative and void, because unconstitutional; but these are cases where the parts are so distinctly separable that each can stand alone, and where the court is able to see and to declare, that the intention of the Legislature [304] [305] [306] was that the part pronounced valid should be enforceable, even though the other part should fail. To hold otherwise would be to substitute for the law intended by the Legislature one they may never have been willing by itself to enact. An illustration of this principle is found in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, [Bk. 25, L. ed. 550], where an Act of Congress, which, it was claimed, would have been valid as a regulation of commerce with foreign Nations and among the States, was held to be void altogether, because it embraced all commerce, including that between citizens of the same State, which was not within the jurisdiction of Congress, and its language could not be restrained to that which was subject to the control of Congress. "If we should," said the court in that case (page 99), " in the case before us undertake to make, by judicial construction, a law which Congress did not make, it is quite probable we should do what, if the matter were now before that body, it would be unwilling to do." Indeed it is quite manifest, from the face of the laws themselves, that they are together but Pral Assembly of Virginia, passed February parts of a larger whole. By an Act of the Gen14, 1882, the Legislature restated the account between the State and its creditors on a basis of readjustment which reduced it to the sum of $21,035,377.15, including interest in arrears to July 1, 1882, which was thereby declared to be her equitable share of the debt of the old and entire State, and on which it was also declared that the State was not able to pay interest for the future at a larger rate than 3 per cent per annum. The outstanding debt, of which this was a reduction, was then classified, and bonds of the State were authorized to be issued, bearing interest at the rate of three per cent per annum, in exchange for outstanding bonds of the different classes, scaled at rates of 53 per cent, 60 per cent, 69 per cent, 63 per cent, and, as to one class, as high as 80 per cent, which were to be retired and canceled. The coupons on the new bonds were not made receivable in payment of taxes. To coerce creditors holding bonds issued under the Act of March 30, 1871, to exchange them for these new bonds, at these reduced rates, and with them to give up their security for the payment of interest arising out of the receivability of coupons in payment of taxes, is the evident purpose of the Acts of January 26, 1882, and of March 13, 1884, and all together form a single scheme, the undisguised object of which is to enable the State to rid itself of a considerable portion of its public debt, and to place the remainder on terms to suit its own convenience, without regard to the obligation it owes to its creditors. The whole legislation, in all its parts, as to creditors affected by it and not consenting to it, must be pronounced null and void. Such is the sentence of the Constitution itself, the fundamental and supreme law for Virginia, as for all the States and for all the people, both of the States separately and of the United States, and which speaks with sovereign and commanding voice, expecting and receiving ready and cheerful obedience, not so much for the display of its power, as on account of the majesty of its authority and the justice of its mandates. The judgment of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond is accordingly reversed and th James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S Justices Bradley, Miller and Gray. Se Dissenting, Mr. Chief Justice Waite and opinion, post, 207. Cited-114 U. S., 308, 310, 314; 116 U. S., 570, 571. of the State of Virginia. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of Appeal The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, the related case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, ante, 185, and the dissenting opinion, post, 207. Messrs. William L. Royall, Daniel H Chamberlain, Wager Swayne, Wm. M Evarts and Wm. B. Hornblower, for plaintiff in error. Mr. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen. of Virginia, R T. Merrick and A. H. Garland, for de fendant in error. Mr. Justice Matthes delivered the opin ion of the court: This was an action in trespass de bonis aspor tatis, brought by the plaintiff in error agains the defendant in the Circuit Court for the Coun ty of Henrico in Virginia, for the recovery of $150 damages for unlawfully entering upon the plaintiff's premises and seizing, taking and carrying away one horse, the property of the plaintiff, of the value of $100. treasurer of Henrico County, charged by law The defendant justified the taking, etc., as with the duty of collecting taxes due the State of Virginia on property and persons in sai seized and taken for taxes due from the plain county, alleging that the property was lawfully tiff to the State, which, on demand, he had re fused to pay. payment of the taxes, when demanded and be To this plea the plaintiff replied a tender in due, in coupons cut from bonds of the State of fore the trespass complained of, of the amoun Virginia. receivable in payment of taxes by virtue of the Act of March 30, 1871. To the replication the defendant demurred specially, on the ground, first, that by the Ac of January 26, 1882, he was forbidden to re that by the Act of March 13, 1884, an action of ceive coupons in payment of taxes; and, second trespass would not lie in such a case. In this demurrer the plaintiff joined, and as signed, as a reason why it should be overruled Head note by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS. 2 we statutes mentioned and relied on by 2 were repugnant to section 10, f the Constitution of the United therefore null and void. was rendered on the demurrer in Messrs. William L. Royall, Daniel H. Messrs. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen. of Virginia, defendant. Thereafter, on Novem-A. H. Garland, R. T. Merrick, J. Ambler Smith and S. B. Witt, for defendant in error. the plaintiff filed his petition in the me Court of Appeals of Virginia for the writ of error; whereupon, as the Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opin- [307] , the petition "having been ma- t of the Supreme Court of Ap- aed 133]. of the case are disposed of by the nderter v. Greenhowe [ante, 185], decided that the Act of January and the Act of March 18, 1884, were , and therefore null and void. ed that, but for these Acts, the would lie in such a case under Virginia; and as the Acts relied on dant must be treated as ineffectual ***, they do not work a repeal of By existing law. The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, brought his action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia against the defendant, both being citizens of that State. The declaration, in substance, sets out that the plaintiff, owning property in the City of Richmond, was assessed thereon for the year 1882 for certain taxes to be paid to the State of Virginia, leviable for after December 1, 1882; that the defendant was Treasurer of the City of Richmond, and, as such, collector of taxes due to the State assessed on property in that City; that plaintiff tendered to the defendant, on demand being made for payment of said taxes, the amount thereof in coupons cut from bonds issued by the State of Virginia under the Act of March 30, 1871, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Funding and Payment of the Public Debt," which coupons, by the terms of said Act, were receivable in payment of taxes by virtue of a contract with the State of Virginia; that the defendant refused to receive said coupons, under color of the authority of the Act of the General Assemof the Supreme Court of Ap- bly of the State of Virginia, passed January ly reversed, and the cause is re- 26, 1882, which forbade him to receive the court, with directions to take same; that the defendant, after refusal of said ge, in accordance with law, in tender, forcibly and unlawfully entered the eth this opinion; and it is so or-premises of the plaintiff, and levied upon and [308] seized and carried away personal property of sell the same for the satisfaction of said taxes, the plaintiff of the value of $3,000, in order to that the Acts of the General Assembly of Virwhich he claimed to be unpaid and delinquent; ginia, specified in the pleadings, which require the tax collector to refuse to receive such coupons in payment of taxes, and to proceed with the collection of taxes, for the payment of which they have been tendered, as if they were delinquent, impair the obligation of the said contract between the State of Virginia and the plaintiff; and that by reason of the said wrongs the plaintiff has suffered damage in the sum of $6,000, for which he brings suit. $. Test: Kenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. Mr. Chief Justice Waite and Miller, Bradley and Gray. See AL WHITE, Piff. in Err., SAMUEL C. GREENHOW. 5. C., Reporter's ed., 307-308.) the Circuit Court of the Unit* Eastern District of Virginia. and facts of the case appear in le court. See, also, the preed case of Poindexter v. Green5 and the dissenting opinion, to by Mr. Justice Matthews. To this declaration the defendant demurred All the questions raised and argued upon the The present action, as shown on the face of In conformity with the views expressed in the opinion in Poindexter v. Greenhow, the judg [311] [311] *1. The general questions arising and argued in this case are fully discussed and decided in the case 2. The remedy by injunction to prevent the collection of taxes by distraint upon the rolling stock, machinery, cars and engines, and other property of railroad corporations, after a tender of payment in tax-receivable coupons, is sanctioned by repeated decisions of this court, and has become common and unquestioned practice, in similar cases, where exemptions have been claimed in virtue of the Constitution of the United States; the ground of the jurisdiction being that there is no adequate remedy at law. of Poindexter v. Greenhow (ante, 185). [No. 826.] to the Valley Railroad Company in that State It is alleged in the bill that, "By the 2011 and 21st sections of an Act of the Genera! As sembly of Virginia, approved on the 22d day o April, 1882, and entitled 'An Act for the As sessment of Taxes on Persons, Property, In come, and Licenses, and Imposing Taxes There on for the Support of the Government and Free Schools and to Pay the Interest on th Public Debt,' provision was made for the as sessment and taxation of the railroads withi the State, the board of public works, actin upon the reports of the officers of the railroa companies, and upon the best and most reliabl information that could be procured, being au thorized and required to ascertain and asses the value of the real and personal property o such companies for taxation at the rate forty cents on every $100 of the estimate value thereof; and said Act further provide that it shall be the duty of every railroad cou pany so assessed to pay into the treasury of th State, within sixty days after receipt of notic of such assessment, the tax imposed by law and a company failing to pay the tax assesse upon its property shall be immediately assesso under the direction of the auditor of public a counts, by any person appointed by him fo the purpose, rating their real estate and rollin stock at $20,000 per mile, and a tax there levied of forty cents on the $100 of suc fixed value; and the amount so assessed sha be collected by any treasurer to whom the a ditor may deliver the assessment, who is a thorized to distrain and sell any personal pro erty of such company for the amount of suc taxes." It is further alleged, that on November 2 1882, the board of public works assessed sa Argued Mar. 25, 26, 1885. Decided Apr.20, 1885. railroads for taxation at the rate of $15,000 p mile, of which notice was given to the co APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit-plainant, on January 17, 1893, as the party ed States for the Western District of Virginia. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, the related case of Poindexter v. Greenhow, ante, 185, and the dissenting opinion, post, 207. Messrs. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen. of Virginia, Messrs. John H. Cowen, Hugh W. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opin- This is a bill in equity filed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, a Corporation created by the laws of Maryland, and a citizen of that State, against the appellants, who were defendants below, of whom Allen is Auditor of Public Accounts; Revely, Treasurer of the State of Virginia, and Hamilton, Treasurer of Augusta County, in that State, and all citizens of Virginia. able by law for the payment of the taxes a 44 The complainant is the lessee in possession public accounts, and to the treasurer of Sta of certain railway lines in Virginia-the Win- on the same day, each of whom refused to chester and Potomac, the Winchester and Stras-ceive the same; that thereupon the defendi burg, and the Strasburg and Harrisonburg Railroads and also operates a railroad belonging *Head notes by Mr. Justice MATTHEWS. Allen, the auditor of public accounts, procee to assess the said railroads upon their real tate, not having any rolling stock, at $10, being in default for nonpayment of | 25, L. ed. 903]; quoted in the case of Poindexter essed by the board of public works; v. Greenhow. copies of said assessment in the defendant, Hamilton, as treasurer County, for collection, in pursuich be levied upon certain cars and ve benging to the complainant, used mad railroads, for part of said taxes, to make further levies upon othazines, to be sold for payment of Lassed by the auditor of public : ment to The jurisdiction was exercised with energy in behalf of a stockholder in a banking corpora tion in Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331 [59 U. S., bk. 15, L. ed. 401], where the refusal of the directors of the company to resist the collection of an unconstitutional tax was made the ground of interposition in behalf of a stockholder as a breach of trust. In Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S., for an injunction on the sev- jess arising and argued in involving them are fully frion in the case of Poin (4, 185]. The conclusions ment apply to the present that the decree of the Cirbe affirmed. **ger to add a few observations the jurisdiction of the Cirh cases, in equity, to grant In Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691695 [Bk. 27, L. ed. 584, 586], it was declared Katers of this case bring it, so that a bill in equity would lie which seeks to bedy a in question, fully within have a wharfage ordinance declared void, and ystal bed in this court by for an injunction to restrain further collections WP7 U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat., under it, and any further interference with the eters of the rule as declared right of the complainant to the free navigation * Nut Ba., 101 U. S., 153 [Bk. | of the Ohio River, and, perhaps, as incidental [315] [316] |