* your petitioner verily believes, | nary "inhabitant" of a State, as that term is ourt never acquired jurisdiction, used in said section 739. This mode of acquir ent is invalid and void, and that ing personal jurisdiction of a foreign corporad personal service as aforesaid is al- tion applies to the Federal Courts as well as to swer in the present action, and the State Courts. See Ex parte Shollenberger, of this action will necessarily in- 96 U. S., 369 [Bk. 24, L. ed. 853]. Again; "estruction and effect of the said jurisdiction may also be acquired by the actual Ted States, to wit: the 739th sec-appearance of such a corporation to a suit d United States Revised Statutes. brought against it in the United States Circuit And your petitioner further says, Court. So that merely alleging that the deed and verily believes, that the fendant was not an inhabitant of Ohio, and was this action is not the real party in not found there, and was not personally served been but that said Cochran is the with process by itself or its officers, was not interest, and that said alleged as- sufficient to raise a defense under section 739 of ****t a merely colorable; that it was made want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, withcasderation and merely for the out also negativing service of process on an peecuting and collecting said judg. agent of the defendant in Ohio and the actual benefit of said Cochran, and to avoid appearance of the defendant to the suit; for, cy of said Cochran's giving security want of jurisdiction set up to avoid a judgment * as a tecresident of this State, and to must be shown with the greatest certainty. The d, if possible, prevent the transfer petition of removal is very careful not to negato the United States Courts, and tive these important contingencies, and that, in troversy in this action is in reality the face of the allegation of the complaint that bance between the defendant and the defendant did appear to the suit, and did Charles Cochran, who are citizens of answer the petition and appear at the trial. to wit: the defendant is in law Hence we say that the allegation of a defense New York, and said Cochran a under the statute is clearly evasive and inconsequential, and we are not at all surprised to find that when the record of the Ohio suit was produced it showed that the defendant's agent was served with process, and that the defendant did actually appear to the suit and answer the petition, and did appear at and contest the trial, which lasted for a fortnight. L then concluded with the proffer and a prayer for removal of the cause sal form. The court refused to recase and the trial proceeded and reerdict and judgment for the plaindzment is brought here by the for our consideratiou is, whethpetition as presented, and the her then stood, the application Tould have been granted. nd of removal set forth in the effect, that the defendant had a under section 739 of the Revised United States, which defense jdment sued on was absolutely of purisdiction in the court, beforbids any suit to be brought al process before either of the rts against an inhabitant of les in any other district than that an inhabitant, or in which he the time of serving the writ; d that the suit was by original that sad process was never served the defendant in Ohio (the deNew York corporation) or upon there, and that the defendant Reading the petition for removal, therefore, in the light of the pleadings on file when it was presented, we are satisfied that the first ground of removal set out therein was insufficient. The second ground was, in effect, that the assignment of the judgment by Cochran to Ford was colorable merely, and that the real party in interest was Cochran, who was a citizen of Ohio, and as to whom the defendant, being a citizen of New York, was entitled to removal of the cause, and should not be deprived of its right by the fraudulent assignment. The plain answer to this position is, that the action was nevertheless Ford's, and as against him there was no right of removal. If he was a mere tool of Cochran, and if the latter was the person really interested in the cause, the action could not have been sustained; for the Code of Procedure of New York declares, that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," except in a few cases not including this, and not alone in New York, but anywhere, if it could be shown that the assignfa defense under the section ment was fraudulent as against the defendant, Jarly evasive and inconsequen- it would be void, and this fact would be a deto Deary that a corporation fense to the action brought by the assignee. We tabitant of a State, or should know of no instance where the want of conshould be personally served sideration in a transfer, or a colorable transfer, ugh its officers, in order that of a right of action from a person against whom art of the United States sitting in the defendant would have a right of removal have jurisdiction of a personal to a person against whom he would not have Its well known that corpora- such a right, has been held a good ground for ter of the defendant, desirous removing a cause from a State to a Federal a S'ate other than that in Court. Where an assignment of a 'cause of save their domicil, are generally action is colorably made for the purpose of are an agent therein to receive giving jurisdiction to the United States Court, *** devem for them. This is exacted as the fifth section of the Act of Congress of f her doing business in such State, March 3, 1875, relating to removals, has now emma turperation, differs from an ordi- given to the Circuit Court power to dismiss or - mhabitant of Ohio. [640] [641] [642] remand the cause at any time when the fact is It is suggested, however, that a suit on a FORT LEAVENWORTH RAILROAD v. PERCIVAL G. LOWE, Sheriff of the (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 525-542.) Constitutional law-jurisdiction over lands, within a State, occupied by the United Stateswhen exclusive in United States-conditional grant to United States. over lands within a State purchased with its con1. The legislative power of Congress is exclusive sent by the United States for a constitutional purpose. a State in any other way than by purchase with its 2. Where the United States acquires lands within consent, forts, arsenals or other public buildings powers, will be free from any such interference and ment, as instrumentalities for the execution of its jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. But, lative power of the State over the places acquired when not used as such instrumentalities, the legis will be as full and complete as over any other places within its limits. It is observable that the removal of the cause was not claimed on any such broad ground as this; but so far as the character of the case was concerned, only on the ground that the defend-erected thereon for the use of the General Governant had a defense under section 739 of the Revised Statutes, specifying what the defense was; and we have already shown that that ground of removal, as stated in the petition, was insufficient. But, conceding that the defendant is now entitled to take its position on the bro-der ground referred to, is it tenable and sufficient for the purpose? What is a judgment, but a security of reword showing a debt due from one person to another? It is as much a mere security as a treasury note, or a bond of the United States. If A brings an action against B, trover or otherwise, for the withholding of such securities, it is not therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, although the whole value of the securities depends upon the fact of their being the obligations of the United States. So if A have title to land by patent of the United States and brings an action against B for trespass or waste, committed by cutting timber, or by mining and carrying away precious ores, or the like, it is not therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States. It is simply the case of an ordinary right of property sought to be enforced. A suit on a judgment is nothing more, unless some question is raised in the case (as might be raised in any of the cases specified), distinctly involving the laws of the United States such a question, for example, as was ineffectually attempted to be raised by the defendant in this case. If such a question were raised, then it is conceded it would be a case arising under the laws of the United States. These considerations show a wide distinction, as it seems to us, between the case of a suit merely on a judgment of a United States Court, and that of a suit by or against a United States corporation; which latter, according to the masterly analysis of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat., 738, is pervaded from its origin to its close by United States law and United States authority. Without pursuing the subject further, we The judgment of the Supreme Court of New True copy. Test: States may be upon such conditions as the State 3. The cession of lands by a State to the United may see fit to annex not inconsistent with the free and effective use of such lands for the purposes in tended. 4. After the admission of the State of Kansas the United States retained only the rights of an ordinary proprietor in the Fort Leavenworth Military cution of the powers of the General Government, Reservation; except as an instrument for the exethat part of the tract, which was actually used as a fort or military post, was beyond such control of its use for those purposes. The clause of the Act of the State, by taxation or otherwise, as would defeat the Legislature of Kansas of February 23, 1875, to cede jurisdiction over said Reservation to the United States, saving to the State" the right to tax chises and property, on said Reservation" is valid, railroad, bridge and other corporations, their franand a tax upon a railroad paid to the State cannot be recovered back. [No. 243.] . Argued Apr. 9, 10, 1885. Decided May 4, 1885. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. This action was brought in the District Court of Leavenworth, Kansas, by the plaintiff in error, to recover certain taxes paid under an alleged illegal assessment upon property situated within the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation. The court rendered judgment on demurrer, for the defendant. This judgment having been affirmed, on error, by the court below, the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The facts of the case are stated by the court. Messrs. E. E. Cook, Thos. F. Withrow and M. A. Low, for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. Hallett Phillips, for defendant in error. [525) Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of [526] the court: The plaintiff, a Corporation organized under the laws of Kansas, was in 1880, and has ever since been, the owner of a railroad in the Reservation of the United States in that State, known as the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation. In that year its track, right of way, James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. franchises, road bed, telegraph line and instru Cited-115 U. S., 257. 264 ments connected therewith on the Reservation, 527] were assessed by the board of assessors of the State, and a tax of $394.40 levied thereon, which was paid by the Railroad Company under protest, in order to prevent a sale of the property. The present action is brought to recover back the money thus paid, on the ground that the property, being entirely within the Reservation, was exempt from assessment and taxation by the State. treaties with the United States, which provided "That exclusive jurisdiction be, and the The land constituting the Reservation was The necessity of complete jurisdiction over [528] [529] [642] remand the cause at any time when the fact is It is suggested, however, that a suit on a FORT LEAVENWORTH RAILROAD v. PERCIVAL G. LOWE, Sheriff of the (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 525-542.) Constitutional law-jurisdiction over lands, within a State, occupied by the United Stateswhen exclusive in United States-conditional grant to United States. over lands within a State purchased with its con1. The legislative power of Congress is exclusive sent by the United States for a constitutional purpose. a State in any other way than by purchase with its 2. Where the United States acquires lands within consent, forts, arsenals or other public buildings powers, will be free from any such interference and ment, as instrumentalities for the execution of its jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. But, lative power of the State over the places acquired when not used as such instrumentalities, the legis will be as full and complete as over any other places within its limits. It is observable that the removal of the cause was not claimed on any such broad ground as this; but so far as the character of the case was concerned, only on the ground that the defend-erected thereon for the use of the General Governant had a defense under section 739 of the Revised Statutes, specifying what the defense was; and we have already shown that that ground of removal, as stated in the petition, was insufficient. But, conceding that the defendant is now entitled to take its position on the broder ground referred to, is it tenable and sufficient for the purpose? States may be upon such conditions as the State 3. The cession of lands by a State to the United may see fit to annex not inconsistent with the free tended. and effective use of such lands for the purposes in United States retained only the rights of an ordi4. After the admission of the State of Kansas the What is a judgment, but a security of reword forced. A suit on a judgment is nothing more, These considerations show a wide distinction, Without pursuing the subject further, we The judgment of the Supreme Court of New True copy. Test: cution of the powers of the General Government, Reservation; except as an instrument for the exethat part of the tract, which was actually used as a fort or military post, was beyond such control of the State, by taxation or otherwise, as would defeat the Legislature of Kansas of February 23, 1875. to its use for those purposes. The clause of the Act of cede jurisdiction over said Reservation to the United States, saving to the State" the right to tax chises and property, on said Reservation" is valid, railroad, bridge and other corporations, their franand a tax upon a railroad paid to the State cannot be recovered back. [No. 243.] Argued Apr. 9, 10, 1885. Decided May 4, 1885. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. of Leavenworth, Kansas, by the plaintiff in The facts of the case are stated by the court. in error. [525 the court: the laws of Kansas, was in 1880, and has ever James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. franchises, road bed, telegraph line and instru Cited-115 U. S., 257. 264 ments connected therewith on the Reservation, 527] were assessed by the board of assessors of the State, and a tax of $394.40 levied thereon, which was paid by the Railroad Company under protest, in order to prevent a sale of the property. The present action is brought to recover back the money thus paid, on the ground that the property, being entirely within the Reservation, was exempt from assessment and taxation by the State. The land constituting the Reservation was part of the territory acquired in 1803 by cession from France, and, until the formation of the State of Kansas and her admission into the Union, the United States possessed the rights of a proprietor, and had political dominion and Sovereignty over it. For many years before that admission it had been reserved from sale by the proper authorities of the United States for military purposes, and occupied by them as a military post. The jurisdiction of the United States over it during this time was necessarily paramount. But in 1861 Kansas was admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States, that is, with the same rights of political dominion and soverignty, subject like them only to the Constitution of the United States. Congress might undoubtedly, upon such admission, have stipulated for retention of the political authority, dominion and legislative power of the United States over the Reservation, so long as it should be used for military purposes by the Government; that is, it could have excepted the place from the jurisdiction of Kansas, as one needed for the uses of the General Government. But from some cause, inadvertence perhaps, or overconfidence that a recession of such jurisdiction could be had whenever desired, no such stipulation or exception was made. The United States, therefore, retained after the admission of the State, only the rights of an ordinary proprietor; except as an instrument for the execution of the powers of the General Government, that part of the tract which was actually used for a fort or military post was beyond such control of the State, by taxation or otherwise, as would defeat its use for those purposes. So far as the land constituting the Reservation was not used for military purposes, the possession of the United States was only that of an individual proprietor. The State could have exercised, with reference to it, the same authority and jurisdiction which she could have exercised over similar property held by private parties. This defect in the jurisdiction of the United States was called to the attention of the government in 1872. In April of that year the Secretary of War addressed a cominunication to the Attorney-General, inclosing papers touching the Reservation, and submitting for his official opinion the questions, whether, under the Constitution, the reservation of the land for a site as a military post and for public buildings took it out of the operation of the law of March 3, 1859, 11 Stat. at L., 430, and, if so, what action would be required on the part of the Executive or Congress to restore the land to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The Attorney-General replied that the Act admitting Kansas as a State into the Union had the effect to withdraw from federal jurisdiction all the territory within the boundaries of the new State, excepting only that of the Indians having treaties with the United States, which provided that without their consent such territory should not be subject to state jurisdiction, and the Reservation was not within this exception; and that to restore Federal jurisdiction over the land included in the Reservation; it would be necessary to obtain from the State of Kansas a cession of jurisdiction, which he had no doubt would upon application be readily granted by the State Legislature. 14 Ops. Attys-Gen., 33. It does not appear from the record before us that such aplication was ever made; but, on the 22d of February, 1875, the Legislature of the State passed an Act entitled "An Act to Cede Jurisdiction to the United States over the Territory of the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation," the first section of which is as follows: "That exclusive jurisdiction be, and the same is hereby ceded to the United States over and within all the territory owned by the United States, and included within the limits of the United States military reservation known as the Fort Leavenworth Reservation in said State, as declared from time to time by the President of the United States, saving, however, to the said State the right to serve civil or criminal process within said Reservation, in suits or prosecu tions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred, or crimes committed in said State, but outside of said cession and Reservation; and saving further to said State the right to tax railroad, bridge, and other corporations, their franchises and property, on said Reservation." Laws of Kansas of 1875, p. 95. The question as to the right of the plaintiff to recover back the taxes paid depends upon the validity and effect of the last saving clause in this Act. As we have said, there is no evidence before us that any application was made by the United States for this legislation, but, as it conferred a benefit, the acceptance of the Act is to be presumed in the absence of any dissent on their part. The contention of the plaintiff is that the Act of cession operated under the Constitution to vest in the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the Reservation, and that the last saving clause, being inconsistent with that result, is to be rejected. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square), as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Goverment of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.' Art. 1, § 8. The necessity of complete jurisdiction over the place which should be selected as the seat of government was obvious to the framers of the Constitution. Unless it were conferred, the deliberations of Congresss might in times of excitement be exposed to interruptions without adequate means of protection; its members and the officers of the government be subjected to insult and intimidation, and the public archives be in danger of destruction. The Federalist, in support of this clause in the Constitution, in addition to these reasons, urged that "a dependence of the members of the General Gov. ernment on the State comprehending the seat [528] [529] |