Matins of such citizens. 6 Ops. Attys- with reference to all instrumentalities created by the General Government. Their exemption from state control is essential to the independauthorities are sufficient to support the ence and sovereign authority of the United e which follows naturally from the States within the sphere of their delegated powthe Constitution, that no other legis-ers. But, when not used as such instrumentaliwer than that of Congress can be exer- ties, the legislative power of the State over the ranter lands within a State purchased by the places acquired will be as full and complete as dates with her consent for one of the over any other places within her limits. designated; and that such consent Constitution operates to exclude all ative authority. As already stated, the land constituting the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation was not purchased, but was owned by the United States by cession from France many years before Kansas became a State; and whatever political sovereignty and dominion the United States had over the place comes from the cession of the State since her admission into the Union. It not being a case where exclusive legislative authority is vested by the Constitution of the United States, that cession could be accompanied with such conditions as the State might see fit to annex, not inconsistent with the free and effective use of the fort as a military post. reference to lands owned by the ates, acquired by purchase without -war of the State, or by cessions from ments, the case is different. Story, taries on the Constitution, says: been no cession by the State of though it has been constantly ocused under purchase, or otherwise, States for a fort or arsenal, or **tutional purpose, the state jurisdicas complete and perfect;" and in statement he refers to People v. In the recent case of Fort Porter Military 17 Johns, 225. In that case the land on Reservation, the opinion of the Attorney-GenFe Nacara was erected, in New York, eral was in conformity with this view of the law. been ceded by the State to the On the 28th of February, 1842, the Legislature it was adjudged that the courts of New York authorized the commissioners of jurisdiction of crimes or of its land-office to cede to the United States the - the laws of the State committed title to certain land belonging to the State withfort or its precincts, although it had in her limits, "for military purposes, reserving by the troops of the United a free and uninterrupted use and control in the by them since its surrender by canal commissioners of all that may be necesparant to the Treaties of 1793 ary for canal and harbor purposes." Under inding the case, the court said this Act the title was conveyed to the United of the post by the United States. The Act also ceded to them jurisdic- considered as a possession for tion over the land. In 1880, the superintendent in derogation of her right ob of public works of New York, upon whom the rearded it as a fundamental duties of canal commissioner were devolved,inat the rights of sovereignty were formed the Secretary of War that the interests away by implication. "If the of the State required that the land, or a portion the court added, "had the right of it, should be occupied by her for canal pur sation over the Fortress of poses, claiming the right to thus occupy it ld have also exclusive juris- under the reservation in the Act of cession. we are of opinion that the right of The opinion of the Attorney-General was, thereon within the territorial limits fore, requested as to the authority of the Secre be acquired by the United tary of War to permit the State, under these themode pointed out in the Con- considerations, to use so much of the land as ase, by consent of the Legis- would not interfere with its use for military - Nate in which the same shall be, purposes. The Attorney-General replied that of forts, magazines, arsenals, the United States, under the grant, held the land and other needful buildings. The for military purposes, and that the reservation that provision is that the State in favor of the State could be deemed valid only so far as it was not repugnant to the grant; that, hence, the right of the State to occupy and use the premises for canal or harbor purposes must be regarded as limited or restricted by the purposes of the grant; that, when such use and occupation would defeat or interfere with those purposes, the right of the State did not exist; but, when they would not interfere with those purposes, the State was entitled to use so much of the land as might be necessary for her canal and harbor purposes. 16 Ops. Attys-Gen., 592. de the particular place to the one of the specific and enuThis jurisdiction cannot be rly by disseisin of the State; be acquired by mere occupied or tacit consent of the cupancy is for the purpose refore, lands are acquired in any the United States within the that by purchase with her conid the lands subject to this that if upon them forts, arsenals, rings are erected for the Government, such buildings, amirpurtenances, as instrumentalities and its powers, will be free from erence and jurisdiction of the or impair their effective pas designed Such is the law We are here met with the objection that the Legislature of a State has no power to cede away her jurisdiction and legislative power over any portion of her territory, except as such cession follows under the Constitution from her consent to a purchase by the United States for some one of the purposes mentioned. If this were so it would not aid the Railroad Company; the [540] [541] [542] James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S Jurisdiction of the State would then remain as | worth was not, as already said, acquired by pur In their relation to the General Government, the States of the Union stand in a very differ. ent position from that which they hold to foreign governments. Though the jurisdiction and authority of the General Government are essentially different from those of the State, they are not those of a different country; and the two, the State and General Government, may deal with each other in any way they may deem best to carry out the purposes of the Constitution. It is for the protection and interests of the States, their people and property, as well CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC v. WILLIAM MCGLINN. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 542-547.) Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation—mu nicipal law of Kansas, not abrogated by cession of, to the United States. 1. The Act of Kansas purporting to cede to th United States exclusive jurisdiction over the For Leavenworth Military Reservation is a valid cession within the requirements of the Constitution. 2. It is a general rule of public law recognized an acted upon by the United States, that wheneve political jurisdiction and legislative power ove any territory are transferred from one nation o sovereign, municipal laws continue in force unt abrogated by the new government or sovereign While there is a wide difference between a cessio and a cession to the United States by a State, of legis of political jurisdiction from one nation to anothe lative power over a particular tract, for a speci purpose of the General Government, the principl which controls as to laws in existence at the time the same in both. 3. The preceding case of the F. L. R. R. Co. Lowe, applied. [No. 262.] Argued Apr. 17, 1885. Decided May, 4, 188. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of th State of Kansas. Messrs. Edward E. Cook, Thos. 1 Withrow and M. A. Low, for plaintiff in e ror. Mr. W. Hallett Phillips, for defenda in error. as for the protection and interests of the people The Military Reservation of Fort Leaven Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion court: This case comes here from the Supren Court of the State of Kansas. It is an acti for the value of a cow alleged to have be killed by the engine and cars of the Chicag Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company corporation doing business in the County Leavenworth, in that State. It was brought a State District Court, and submitted for de sion upon an agreed statement of facts, in su Dews: That on the 10th of February, the property of the plaintiff, of the strayed upon the railroad of the depont within the limits of the Fort Miltary Reservation in that counte, where the road was not inclosed , and was there struck and killed by long the road; that the Reservade ce referred to in the Act of the A of the State, of February, 22, 1875; upon the defendant for the $25 the plaintiff more than thirty days en was brought; and that, if the ved to recover attorney's fees, be a reasonable fee. "aatat was founded upon a Statute of G March 9, 1874, entitled “An Act Regor Wounding Stock by Railakes every railway company ale to the owner for the full ed, and in damages for cattle engine and cars or in any other perating its railway. It provides he way company fails for thirty d by the owner to pay to him the the animal killed, or damages for ded he may sue and recover Ather with a reasonable attorney's prosecution of the action. It further shall not apply to any railway Bead of which is inclosed with a fence, to prevent the animal the road. Laws of Kansas, 1874, ervation was valid, and that the United States Two questions are presented for our deter- It can hardly be the design of counsel for the Railroad Company to contend that the Act of cession to the United States is wholly invalid, for, in that event, the jurisdiction of the State would remain unimpaired, and her statute would be enforceable within the limits of the Reservation equally as in any other part of the State. What we suppose counsel desires to maintain is, that the Act of cession confers exclusive jurisdiction over the territory, and that any limitations upon it in the Act must therefore be rejected as repugnant to the grant. of February, 1875, the Legisa passed an Act ceding to the sdiction over the Reservation, of which is as follows: "That tion be, and the same is hereUnited States over and within cwned by the United States, when the limits of the United * Reservation, known as the Fort Reservation, in said State, as time to time by the President States; saving, however, to the rubt to serve civil or criminal Reservation, in suits or or on account of rights accurred, or crimes commit, but outside of such cession and saving further to said tax railroad, bridge and other er franchises and property on Laws of Kansas, 1875, This point was involved in the case of Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe [ante, 264], decided herewith. We there held, that a building on a tract of land owned by the United States used as a fort, or for other public purposes of the Federal Government, is exempted, as an instrumentality of the government, from any such control or interference by the State as will defeat or embarrass its effective use for those purposes. But, in order that the United States may possess exclusive legislative power over the tract, except as may be necessary to the use of the building thereon as such instrumentality, they must have acquired the tract by purchase, with the consent of the State. This is the only mode prescribed by the Federal Constitution for their acquisition of exclusive legislative power over it. When such legislative power is acquired in any other way, as by an express Act ceding it, its cession may be accompanied with any conditions not inconsistent with the effective use of the property for the public purposes intended. We also held that it is competent for the Legislature of a State to cede exclusive jurisdiction over places needed by the General Government in the execution of its powers, the use of the places being, in fact, as much for the people of the State as for the people of the United States generally, and such jurisdiction necessarily ending when the places cease to be used for those purposes. art gave judgment for the Upon the second question the contention of az his damages at $45, an the Railroad Company is that the Act of Kanmade by estimating the sas became inoperative within the Reservation ked at $25, and the attor- upon the cession to the United States of excluse sums having been agreed sive jurisdiction over it. We are clear that this The case was carried to contention cannot be maintained. It is a genof the State, where the eral rule of public law, recognized and acted hat court holding that upon by the United States, that whenever poating to the killing and litical jurisdiction and legislative power over ek by railroads, continued to be any terrritory are transferred from one nation mits of the Reservation, or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of rated by Congress, and the country, that is, laws which are intended wh the existing laws of for the protection of private rights, continue in in so bolding the court as force until abrogated or changed by the new ses of the case, without, government or sovereign. By the cession pub* fact that the Act ceding lic property passes from one government to the ed States over the Res-other, but private property remains as before, [546] [547] James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S WILLIAM ALLING, Surviving Partner o the Firm of SAMUEL A. BELDEN & Co. Appt., UNITED STATES. and with it those municipal laws which are de- | never having been changed or abrogated. Th The counsel for the Railroad Company does to a mere cession of jurisdiction over a small It is true there is a wide difference between (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 562-564.) Jurisdiction of Court of Claims-sec. 1066, R. -awards under Treaty with Mexico. claim against the United States for moneys I 1. The Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of ceived from Mexico under the Convention Treaty of July 4, 1868, it being a claim founded and growing out of a treaty with a foreign nati 2. The Act of June 18, 1878, confers authority the Secretary of State to distribute the awar made by the Commission organized under 8 Treaty. 3. Great Western Ins. Co. v. U. S., Bk. 28, 687, a Frelinghuysen v. Key, ld. 71, affirmed. [No. 219.] Submiïed Apr. 1, 1885. Decided May 4, 18 APPEAL from the Court of Claims. Messrs. Charles W. Hornor, W. L. M Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion the court: This is an appeal from the Court of Claim Belden and Co., having a claim for seiz and confiscation of goods by the Mexic during or shortly after the Mexican war, ferred their claim to the United States presentation to the Mexican Government. goods having been imported into Matamo while that city was in the possession of American forces, on which Belden & Co. paid duties to the amount of $18,347, the U ed States refunded this sum to Belden & and took an assignment pro tanto of their cl against Mexico. By the Convention or Treaty of July 4, 18 between Mexico and the United States, 15 S at L., 679, a commission was organized for adjustment of the claims of the citizens of respective countries against the governmen the other for injuries to persons and proper To this commission Belden & Co.'s cl was submitted by the United States, and award was, that the Mexican Governm should pay to the United States, on accour this claim, the sum of $53,099.25, of which United States might retain out of this g award the sum of $35,920.81, on accoun the tax which it had refunded to Belden & and its interest. An Act of Congress provided that the d bution of the money received by the U the calm tata daim founded on and growing ay with a foreign nation, within of section 1066 of the Revised in all respects like the case of Western Ins. Co. v. U. S., 112 U. S., B2 L. ed. 657], which holds that the Cams had no jurisdiction by reason case of a claim submitted to the States for reclamation against Great Atreaty between the two powers prothe present case, for an arbitration, claim was allowed and paid to States. On appeal from the Court We decided that it was, within the of section 1066 of this Revision, "a -ng out of and dependent on a treaty ettered into with a foreign govern(which that court could not entertain att case is stronger than that, be At of Congress of June 18, 1878, 20 144 confers on the Secretary of Try to distribute these awards veral claimants. Frelinghuysen U.S. 63 [Bk. 28, L. ed. 71]. Not Cert of Claims forbidden to enter of this claim, but the Secretary law authorized and directed to do e for claimants, without fur amount to a waiver, and a patent issued pending such proceedings is void as to the adverse party. 4. A patent obtained pending a litigation by the defendant, for a new claim affecting the subject matter of the litigation, cannot be set up against the plaintiff. The validity of such patent must abide the result of the litigation. 5. An objection cannot be raised here which has been waived in the court below. 6. The decision of a state court as to what constitutes the commencement of a suit in that court, not presenting a federal question, is not reviewable [No. 248.] here. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. The locations of the claims in question appear from the accompany. ing map which is reproduced from the transcript. Messrs. Walter H. Smith and Thos. Wren, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. A. B. Browne, C. J. Hillyer, A. T. Britton and J. H. McGowan, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Nevada. · The case presents a conflict of mining claims. The contest began in the State District Court for the County of Eureka, Nevada, by defendants in error filing in that court, as plaintiffs, a petition against the Richmond Mining Company. To save repetition and confusion, the parties will be mentioned in this opinion as they are throughout the record, and as they actually were in the state courts, namely: Rose and others as plaintiffs, and the Richmond Mining Company as defendant. This petition or complaint was filed October 1, 1873. A demurrer was filed to it by the defendant November 1, and an answer Novem arent from the record that the Court tertained jurisdiction of the case inst the claimants on the merits. had no such authority, its judg-er 26. *** reversed, with direction to dismiss want of jurisdiction. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were, and ever since January 20, 1872, had been, the H. McKeaney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. lode and deposit of mine:al-bearing rock in the owners of the Uncle Sam mining claim, ledge, MINING COMPANY SEVADA, Plf. in Err., E. H. ROSE ET AL. SEC. Reporter's ed., 576-567.) Eureka Mining District, County of Eureka, and State of Nevada, on the western slope of "Ruby Hill." A minute description of the OF claim is then given, with courses and distances with reference to the shaft. It is then alleged that the defendant, unjustly and adversely to plaintiffs, claims an estate in fee in said premises, and has filed in the United States Land-Office an application for a patent thereto, under the name of the St. 12m including more than 200 feet-George ledge and mine. Plaintiffs, therefore, pilent granted pending a pray judgment that defendant be barred from all estate or interest in the premises, or any part thereof, or any right of possession. * which includes more than two to the excess. The answer of defendant, filed November bot affect rights already ac- 26, 1873, denies any claim to plaintiffs' location, Aator to held more than 200 except as it is covered by their claim, the St. * dacverer, will be sustained George, which does cover a small part of it. tugh there was a mistake as to As to so much of plaintiffs' claim as is ven or lode, no one having covered by the St. George it asserts a superior * be claim was made. Ears under #2, R. S.. all right. red in the Land Department [578] d by a court of com- the defendant, which sets out the fact, that The next pleading is an amended answer of [579] or the adverse claim is we preexiings in court does not |