[54] eral defendants, and that they were each and It also appears from the statements in the pe- iff, a citizen of the State of New York, and the defendant, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, your petitioner, a citizen of the State of Kentucky, which can be fully determined as between them without the presence of any of the other persons or bodies corporate made parties to said suit." The Supreme Court of the State accepted the petition and ordered. the removal of the suit, but the circuit court, when the case got there, remanded it. This writ of error was brought for a reversal of the last order. The petition for removal was filed under the last clause of section 2 of the Act of 1875, which is as follows: 66 And when in any suit *** there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants, actually interested in such controversy, may remove said suit to the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district." As we have already said at this Term in Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S., 192 [Bk. 28, L. ed., 695], "the rule is now well established that this clause in the section refers only to suits where there exists a 'separate and distinct cause of action, on which a separate and distinct suit might have been brought and complete relief afforded as to such cause of action, with all the parties on one side of that controversy citizens of different States from those on the other. To say the least, the case must be one capable of separation into parts, so that in one of the parts a controversy will be presented with citizens of one or more States on one side and citizens of different States on the other, which can be fully determined without the presence of the other parties to the suit, as it has been begun."" Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S., 407 [Bk. 26, L. ed., 823]; Fraser v. Jennison, 106 U. S., 191 [Bk. 27, L. ed., 131]. In the present case all the defendants are sued jointly and as joint contractors. There is more than one contract set out in the complaint, and there is therefore more than one cause of action embraced in the suit; but all the contracts are alleged to be joint and binding on all the defendants, jointly and in the same right. There is no pretense of a separate cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the Louisville and Nashville Company alone. The answer of the company treats the several causes of action alike and makes the same defense to all. For the purposes of the present inquiry the case stands as it would if the complaint contained but a single cause of action. The claim of right to a removal is based entirely on the fact that the Louisville and Nashville Company, the pe titioning defendant, has presented a separate defense to the joint action by filing a separate answer tendering separate issues for trial. This, it has been frequently decided, is not enough to introduce a separate controversy into the suit within the meaning of the statute. Hyde v. Ruble, supra; Ayres v. Wiswall, supra. Separate answers by the several defendants sued on joint causes of action may present different questions for determination, but they do not necessarily divide the suit into separate controversies. A defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several which a plaintiff elects to make joint. Smith v. Rines, 2 Sum., 348. A sepa. [55] [56] [57] Mr. Charles E. Perkins, for defendant in error. rate defense may defeat a joint recovery, but it | Swayne, Lewis E. Stanton and Edward W. Bell, Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin- This is a writ of error for the review of an order of the Circuit Court remanding a suit to a State Court. The suit was brought in the Superior Court of the County of Hartford, Connecticut, by George E. Ingraham, the defendant in error, a citizen of Connecticut, against N. D. Putnam and Henry Earle, citizens of New York, and W. G. Morgan, a citizen of It is said, however, that by the New York Connecticut, as partners in business under the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1204, "judg-name of Putnam, Earle & Co., to recover a balment may be given for or against one or more plaintiffs, and for or against one or more defendants," and under this it has been held that when several are sued upon a joint contract, and it appears that only a portion are bound, the plaintiff may recover against those who are actually liable. The same rule undoubtedly prevails in many other States, but this does not make a joint contract several, nor divide a joint suit into separate parts. It may expedite judicial proceedings and save costs, but it does not change the form of the controversy, that is to The defendants, Putnam and Earle, filed a say, the case. The plaintiff can still sue to re- separate answer, which contained: 1. A general cover from all, though he may be able to suc-denial of all the allegations in the complaint; 2. ceed only as to a part. The order remanding the case is affirmed. ance claimed to be due from the partnership on An averment as to the account, that the alleged loans were all made to the defendant Morgan for his individual and private use, and not to the firm; 3. An averment as to the note, that it was given for money loaned to W. G. Morgan alone for his individual use, and not to the firm, and that it was indorsed by Morgan in the name James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. of the firm by collusion between him and In Mr. Justice Blatchford took no part in the decision of this case. Dissenting: Mr. Justice Harlan. Cited-114 U. S., 59, 62; 115 U. S., 42, 61, 259. N. D. PUTNAM ET AL., Plffs. in Err., 0. GEORGE E. INGRAHAM. (See 8. C., Reporter's ed., 57-60.) Removal of causes-joint action against several defendants-separate defenses. 1. The last clause of section 2 of the Act of March 8, 1875, has no application to cases in which the defendants are sued jointly and as joint contractors. The preceding case of The Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co.v. Ide, ante, 63, affirmed. action. 2. A separate controversy is not introduced into the case by separate defenses to the same cause of 3. The fact that one of the defendants is in default is unimportant. [No. 1246.] Submitted Mar. 2, 1885. Decided Mar. 28, 1885. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, the preceding case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Ide. Messrs. Herbert E. Dickson, Wager NOTE-Removal of causes under Act of 1875; citizenship. See Meyer v. Delaware, etc., Co., 100 U. S., bk. 25, 593, note. graham, and with intent to defraud Putnam Morgan has never answered the complaint, And your petitioners further say, that in the suit above mentioned there is a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined be tween them, to wit: a controversy between the present petitioners, N. D. Putnam and Henry Upon the presentation of this petition the Su- [58] [54] " last clause of section 2 of the Act of 1875, which The petition for removal was filed under the is as follows: a controversy which is wholly between citizens "And when in any suit *** there shall be of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants, actually interested in such controversy, may remove said suit to the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district." eral defendants, and that they were each and iff, a citizen of the State of New York, and the all common carriers. It denied that the defend- defendant, the Louisville and Nashville Railants had associated themselves together for the road Company, your petitioner, a citizen of the transportation of goods jointly, or that they held State of Kentucky, which can be fully deter themselves out as common carriers engaged mined as between them without the presence of jointly in the business of such transportation; any of the other persons or bodies corporate but it alleged that a number of corporations, made parties to said suit." The Supreme Court among which were the defendants, entered into of the State accepted the petition and ordered an agreement to carry on a fast freight line be- the removal of the suit, but the circuit court, tween cities in the eastern and western parts of when the case got there, remanded it. This the country, and fixing uniform rates of trans-writ of error was brought for a reversal of the portation and regulating the necessary incidents last order. to such business, which business was to be done under the name of the "Central Transit Company," afterwards familiarly known as the 'White Line." and called in the complaint the "White Line Central Transit Company." It then set out the provisions of the agreement between the several corporations for carrying on the line, showing the way in which the business was to be done and the earnings and expenses divided, "and that each company should pay for any damage or loss occurring on its road, and if such damage could not be located it should be prorated between the companies forming the route over which the property would have passed to its destination, in the same ratios as the freight moneys." "that when goods were delivered to any one of It then averred the said companies to be transported by said fast freight line, bills of lading therefor were to be issued in the name of The Central Transit Company, White Line,' by an agent of such Transit Company, who, in his representative capacity, acted separately for each, and was not authorized to act for such companies jointly; and that in all such bills of lading so issued it was expressly stipulated and agreed that in case of any loss, detriment or damage done to or sustained by the property therein receipted for, that company should alone be held answerable therefor in whose actual custody the same might be at the time of the happening thereof." It then denied that the cotton sued for was ever delivered to the line, or to either of the companies composing the same, for transportation, and averred that if any bills of lading were ever issued it was done by a person who had no authority for that purpose, either from the Louisville and Nashville Company or any of the other defendants. It also averred that no loss had happened to the property while in its actual custody, and that Ide, who brought the suit, was not the real party in interest therein, but that the alleged assignment to him was without consideration, and made simply to vest the right of action in the plaintiff, who was a citizen of New York, and that the real parties in interest were the Cocheco Company and the Amoskeag Company. v. Wiswall, 112 U. S., 192 [Bk. 28, L. ed., 695], As we have already said at this Term in Ayres "the rule is now well established that this clause in the section refers only to suits where there on which a separate and distinct suit might have exists a 'separate and distinct cause of action, been brought and complete relief afforded as to such cause of action, with all the parties on one side of that controversy citizens of different States from those on the other. To say the least, the case must be one capable of separation into parts, so that in one of the parts a controversy will be presented with citizens of one or more States on one side and citizens of different States on the other, which can be fully determined without the presence of the other parties to the suit, as it has been begun.' U. S., 407 [Bk. 26, L. ed., 823]; Fraser v. Jennison, 106 U. S., 191 [Bk. 27, L. ed., 131]. Hyde v. Ruble, 104 For jointly and as joint contractors. There is more In the present case all the defendants are sued than one contract set out in the complaint, and there is therefore more than one cause of action embraced in the suit; but all the contracts are alleged to be joint and binding on all the defendants, jointly and in the same right. There is no pretense of a separate cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the Louisville and Nashville Company alone. The answer of the company treats the several causes of action alike and makes the same defense to all. the purposes of the present inquiry the case stands as it would if the complaint contained but a single cause of action. The claim of right to a removal is based entirely on the fact that the Louisville and Nashville Company, the peIt also appears from the statements in the pe- fense to the joint action by filing a separate antitioning defendant, has presented a separate detition for removal, that the New York Central swer tendering separate issues for trial. This, and Hudson River Company filed a separate an- it has been frequently decided, is not enough swer in the State Court, but that answer has not to introduce a separate controversy into the suit been copied into the transcript. The Louisville within the meaning of the statute. Hyde v. Ruand Nashville Company on filing its answer ble, supra; Ayres v. Wiswall, supra. Separate presented to the State Court a petition for the answers by the several defendants sued on joint removal of the suit to the Circuit Court of the causes of action may present different questions United States for the Southern District of New for determination, but they do not necessarily York, which was the proper district, on the divide the suit into separate controversies. ground "that there is in said suit a controversy defendant has no right to say that an action which is wholly between citizens of different shall be several which a plaintiff elects to make States, namely: a controversy between the plaint-joint. Smith v. Rines, 2 Sum., 348. A sepa64 we bedre may defeat a joint recovery, but it | Swayne, Lewis E. Stanton and Edward W. Bell, aptive a plaintiff of his right to prose- for plaintiffs in error. the own suit to final determination in his Mr. Charles E. Perkins, for defendant in Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: The cause of action is the subject-error. the controversy, and that is for all the of the suit whatever the plaintiff debe in his pleadings. Here, it is certain acts entered into by all the defendants ariation of property. On the one beatroversy upon that cause of action and on the other all the defendparate defenses of the defendants ay to their respective interests in the . The controversy is the case, is not divisible. This is a writ of error for the review of an order of the Circuit Court remanding a suit to a State Court. The suit was brought in the Superior Court of the County of Hartford, Counecticut, by George E. Ingraham, the defendant in error, a citizen of Connecticut, against N. D. Putnam and Henry Earle, citizens of New York, and W. G. Morgan, a citizen of however, that by the New York Connecticut, as partners in business under the 4C Procedure, section 1204, ́judg-name of Putnam, Earle & Co., to recover a balpray be given for or against one or more ance claimed to be due from the partnership on and for or against one or more de- an account for money lent, paid out and ex*-* and under this it has been held that pended, and upon a note of $5,000, made by W. avernd are sued upon a joint contract, G. Morgan to the order of Putnam, Earle & Co. s that only a portion are bound, and by the firm indorsed to Ingraham. The may recover against those who are complaint contained simply the common counts, The same rule undoubtedly pre- but a bill of particulars subsequently filed disany other States, but this does not closed the true nature of the claim to be the contract several, nor divide a joint note, and an account for the purchase and sale erste parts. It may expedite judi- of stocks beginning August 17, 1883, and end. ags and save costs, but it does not ing February 29, 1884. the form of the controversy, that is to The plaintiff can still sue to reall, though he may be able to suc**s to a part. The defendants, Putnam and Earle, filed a remanding the case is affirmed. this case. - C. 8., 50, 62; 115 U. S., 42, 61, 259. 3D PUTNAM ET AL., Plffs. in Err., GEORGE E. INGRAHAM. case of section 2 of the Act of March **** jantly and as joint contractors. ontroversy is not introduced into parate defenses to the same cause of that one of the defendants is in de [No. 1246.] Mar. 2, 1:85. Decided Mar. 28, 1885. to the Circuit Court of the United the District of Connecticut. graham, and with intent to defraud Putnam Morgan has never answered the complaint, "And your petitioners further say, that in the suit above mentioned there is a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined between them, to wit: a controversy between the and facts of the case appear in present petitioners, N. D. Putnam and Henry the court. See, also, the preced-William G. Morgan, as by the pleadings in said Earle, and the said George E. Ingraham and L&N. R. R. Co. v. Ide. Herbert E. Dickson, Wager cause will more fully appear. Upon the presentation of this petition the Suof under Act of 1875: citi-perior Court declined to enter an order for the yer v. Delaware, etc., Co., 100 U. S., removal of the cause. Thereupon the petitioners entered a copy of the record in the Circuit [58] [591 [60] Court of the United States. This being done, We are unable to distinguish this case mate- who are not citizens of Connecticut, have filed In Connecticut, as in New York, "judgment of removal. corporated company of that State and a citizen of Submitted Mar. 2, 1885. Decided Mar. 23, 1885. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit souri. ed States for the Eastern District of Mis The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. James O. Broadhead, for appellants. Mr. James S. Botsford, for appellee. ion of the court: This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States remanding a suit to the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, from which it had been removed upon a petition filed under the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. at L., 470. The suit was in equity and brought by William C. Wilson, the appellee, a citizen of Missouri, against the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company, a Missouri Corporation, and Jesse Seligman and James Seligman, citizens of New York, to combooks certain shares of its capital stock standpel the Company to transfer to Wilson on its ing in the name of the Seligmans, and to issue to him certificates therefor. The petition states that Wilson purchased the stock at a sale under an execution issued upon a judgment in his favor and against the Seligmans, and that on the 19th of December, 1883, he exhibited to the Company his certificate of purchase and demanded that the Company cause his name "to be entered on the stock books of said Corporation as the owner of said shares of said capital stock, *** and further duly notified said CorAs the petitioning defendants have asked no thereafter be declared and payable to and on poration to pay to him all dividends that might affirmative relief either against the plaintiff or said stock;" but that the Company refused so their co-defendant, no question can arise under to do. The prayer is for a transfer of the stock, the rule of practice in Connecticut which al- the cancellation of the certificates to the Seliglows the court to determine the ultimate rights mans, the issue of new certificates and payment of the parties on each side as between them- of dividends to Wilson, and an injunction proselves. In the present case, the only contro-hibiting the Seligmans from acting as stockversy is as to the right of the plaintiff to recover against the defendants. The fact that Morgan has not answered out is in default is unimportant. The suit is still on joint causes of action, and the plaintiff, if he sustains the allegations of his complaint at the trial, will be entitled to a joint judgment against all the defendants. The default places the parties in no different position with reference to a removal than they would occupy if Morgan had answered and set up an entirely different defense from that of the other defendants. A separate controversy is not introduced into the case by separate defenses to the same cause of action. The order to remand is affirmed. True copy. Test: holders. The Company and the Seligmans filed separate answers, but setting up substantially the James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. s. same defense, to wit: that the stock, though Cited-115 U. S., 61, 259. ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAIL- v. WILLIAM C. WILSON. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 60–62.) Removal of causes-action against a citizen of standing in the names of the Seligmans, did not in fact belong to them when the execution was levied, or when the sale to Wilson was made, because they had long before that time sold and transferred their certificates to other parties for value, who were the real holders and owners of the stock, though not transferred to them on the books. The Seligmans in their answer deny the validity of the judgment against them, for the reason that it was rendered in a suit to which they were not parties. The petition for removal was presented by NOTE.-Removal of causes under Act of 1875; citt zenship. See Meyer v. Delaware, etc., Co., 100 U. S., An action brought in a State Court against an in- bk. 25, 593, note. |