Tan Boyce, 12 U. S. 320 (Bk. 23, L. ed. 608], | ed to the State by the Act of 1853, so far as [No. 56.] A Nov. 11, 1885. Decided Nov. 23, 1885. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State Theaction was brought in the Circuit Court Sdard County, Missouri, by the plaintiff Art, to recover eighty acres of land with ares and rent for its retention and use. case having been submitted to the court the intervention of a jury, judgment vered for the plaintiff. This judgment een reversed, on appeal, by the court the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The facts of the case are stated by the court. YA. B. Browne, A. T. Britton and J. Partis, for plaintiff in error. So counsel appeared for defendant in error.) 4. That the said lands hereby granted d States shall be subject to the disposLegislatures thereof, for the purposes and no other; and the said railroad ranches shall be and remain a public for the use of the Government of the tates free from toll or other charge trasportation of any property or The United States. That the lands hereby granted to as shall be disposed of by said States manner following: that is to say, city of land not exceeding one hun twenty sections, and included within length of twenty miles of said be sold, and when the Governors of or States shall certify to the SecreInterior that twenty continuous dad is completed, then another of land hereby granted may be from time to time until said road ed, and if said road is not completed years, no further sales shall be d the land unsold shall revert to the a dispute is within the limits of and Fulton Railroad of Missouri ed as a railroad company under Muri, January 12, 1854, and February, 1855, the Legislature and an Act vesting in that comomplete title to the lands grant the same were applicable to the building of the road from the northern boundary of Arkansas to the Mississippi, opposite the math_of_the Ohio. This grant by Missouri was aade "for the uses and purposes, and subject to the condition, reversion and provisions set forth and contained in said Act of Congress and of this Act." Section 5 is as follows: "For the purpose of raising funds from time the said company may sell the said lands, in the to time, for the construction of the said railroad, and may issue their bonds in such sums as they manner provided for by said Act of Congress, may deem proper, at rates of interest not exsemi-annually, and the principal of said bonds ceeding seven per cent per annum, payable payable at such time and place as they may bonds by mortgage of said lands, or any part designate; and may secure the payment of said thereof, to be executed by said company, and may make the said bonds convertible into land or stock of the company within such periods as they may prescribe; Provided, That the faith of the State is in no manner pledged for the redemption of said bonds, or any part thereof; And provided further, That nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize said company to sell, dispose of or apply the said lands, or the proceeds thereof, in any other manner, or to any other purpose, than as required and limited by the said Act of Congress." Laws of Mo. 1855, 314. " This On the 3d of January, 1859, the company sold and conveyed the land sued for to M'Gee, who immediately went into possession, and has ever since occupied and improved it as his own, and paid the taxes and assessments thereon. deed was duly recorded January 10, 1859. The land is more than forty miles from the starting point of the road on the Mississippi, and it does not appear that when it was sold a sufficient number of miles of the road had been built to authorize its sale. On the 19th of February, 1966, the Legisla ture of Missouri directed the Governor of the State to sell at auction the Cairo and Fulton Railroad of Missouri, so far as the same was "constructed or projected, together with their appurtenances, rolling stock, and property of every description, and all rights and franchises thereto belonging," "in pursuance of the provisions of the several Acts creating a lien on said railroads, their appurtenances, rights and franchises, in favor of the State." Laws of Mo. 1866, 1867, 107. [471] On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that the original Act of February 9, 1853, grant- [472] ing lands to the States of Arkansas and Missouri, "with all the provisions therein made, be, and the same is hereby revived and extended for the term of ten years from the pas sage of this Act; and all the lands therein granted, which reverted to the United States under the provisions of said Act, be, and the same are hereby restored to the same custody, control and condition, and made subject to the uses and trusts in all respects as they were before and at the time such reversion took effect; Provided, That all mineral lands within the limits of this grant and the grant made in section two of this Act, are hereby reserved to the United States; And provided further, That all [473] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. property and troops of the United States shall | 1866, was such a legislative declaration by Con- lands, and defeat conveyances thereof by the By section 2 of the same Act an additional grant of lands was made, "subject to the same uses and trusts, and under the same custody, control and conditions, and to be held and disposed of in the same manner as if included in the original grant." It was then provided "that the lands embraced in this grant and the grant revived by section one of this Act shall be disposed of only as follows: Whenever proof shall | be furnished, satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior, that any section of ten consecutive miles of said road *** is completed in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner as a first class railroad, the Secretary of the Interior shall issue patents for all the lands granted as aforesaid, not exceeding ten sections per mile opposite to and within the limits of twenty miles of the section of said road and branches thus completed," and so on, as each section of ten miles was completed, until the end. It was then provided that if the road was not constructed within ten years from the time the On the contrary, the evident purpose of Con In the present case no such intention appears Act went into effect, "the lands granted, or the gress was to waive a forfeiture and extend the grant of which is revived or extended by this time for earning the lands under the origina Act, and which at the time shall be unpatented Act. The language is that the provisions of the to or for the benefit of the road or company, Act of 1853 be "revived and extended for the *** shall revert to the United States.' section three, all lands "mentioned in this act, If this had been all, no one could doubt that i By term of ten years from the passage of this Act. and hereby granted, are hereby reserved from was the intention of Congress to place all par entry, preemption, or appropriation for any ties interested in the grant just where the other purpose than herein contemplated, for would be if the Act of 1853 had fixed July 28 the said term of ten years from the passage of 1876, as the time for the completion of the rai this Act; Provided, That all lands heretofore road. given to the State of Missouri for the construc- manifest any different intention. What follows does not, in our opinion tion of the Cairo and Fulton Railroad, or for are: "and all the lands therein granted, whic the use of said road lying in the State of Mis-reverted to the United States under the pro The word souri, and all lands proposed to be granted by vision of said Act, be, and they are hereby re this Act for the use or in aid of the road herein stored to the same custody, control and cond named, and lying in said State of Missouri, tion, and made subject to the uses and trusts i shall be granted and patented to the said State all respects as they were before and at the tim whenever the road shall be completed through such reversion took effect." When this Act w said State, which lands may be held by said passed the property of the original company ha State and used toward paying the State the not been sold by the State under its Act of Fel amount of bonds heretofore issued by it to aid ruary, 1866. There had been no proceedings b said company, and all interest accrued or to the United States to enforce a forfeiture, an accrue thereon." 14 Stat. at L. 338, ch. 300. the possession of the lands under the origin: After the passage of this Act of Congress, the grant had not been changed. Everything, railroad property was sold and conveyed by the far as the United States was concerned, r State to certain persons, under whom the St. mained after the original limit of time for buil Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway ing the road had been passed, as it did befor Company claims title. the sale was of "the said Cairo and Fulton back its transfer of title to the company. The conveyance upon Neither had the State done anything to tak Railroad of Missouri, with all the franchise, legislation looked only to a sale and to the pas privileges, rights, title and interest appertaining of the franchises and property of the con ing to said road, and all roads, road bed, rolling pany into the hands of those who would g stock, machine shops, and all other property, forward and complete the road. This implie both real and personal, of every description, a preservation of the title of the company belonging or in any wise appertaining thereto." the lands rather than its destruction. The railroad was completed by the pur- guage of the newAct is to be construed with re chasers, or those claiming under them, and, on erence to these facts, and inasmuch as there h The la the 23d of January, 1877, the lands in dispute not been in law any reversion of the lands were patented, with others of the same class, to the United States when the Act was passe the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern the words "reverted," "reversion" and " Company. ing more than that no advantage was to stored" are to be understood as implying not taken by the United States of the fact that t The first question presented by the assignment of errors is whether the Act of July 28, 448 I her provisions of the Act except from the 1853, as well as that of 1866, all minwithin their respective limits, and ake patents necessary for the transfer of from the United States. This shows an to take advantage of the breach of tions of the original grant, so far as sary to reassert title to and reclaim of any mineral lands that may have ded in that grant, and to change the sect pessing title, but it does not go further. wer extent, also, the obligations of the (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 454-463.) y for the transportation of the property Tax sales under Illinois statutes-validity- at which was made, and the extendue which was given for the completion d. On the whole, we conclude that tas never been a forfeiture of the grant so far as the lands now in dispute are and that the title of McGee stands prewould if the original company had edits road within the time fixed in the The purchasers at the sale made te in 1866 took subject to his rights, Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern from these purchasers no better they had themselves. Under these , the patent which issued in 1877 to the benefit of McGee just as it would ed to the Cairo and Fulton Railare the transfer under which the new 2. Under the decision of the Supreme Court of 4. This court cannot consider an objection raised APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit ed States for the Northern District of Illi The history and facts of the case appear in Messrs. Augustus N. Gage and Albert ase of Wilson v. Boyce, 92 U. S. 320 The service of notice upon which the tax deed issued to appellant September 6,1877, and the affidavits filed with the county clerk to show such service of notice, were sufficient to authorize the county clerk to issue the deed to appellant. Garrick v. Chamberlain, 97 Пl. 620; Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11; Frew v. Taylor, 106 Ill. 159. "ght of the State to sell under its If, at the time of such sale, the pany under the Act of 1853 had ed by forfeiture, and the company der the new grant of 1866, the St. - Muntain and Southern Company diment. If, however, the origit had not been forfeited, and the Cairo Company held under that grant 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 498. The judgments of the County Court of Cook County under which appellant purchased, are res judicata and cannot be collaterally attacked. The county court is a court of record with general original jurisdiction in the matter of the sale of lands for delinquent taxes. Graceland Cemetery Co.v. People, 92 Пll. 619. 449 Its judgment is conclusive while it remains in operation. Chicago Theological Seminary v. Gage,12 Fed Rep. 398. It does not appear by this record whether ob Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal.479; Porter v. Purdy, 29 N. Y. 106; People v. Brislin, 80 Ill. 423; C.jection was made to the rendition of the judg. N. W. R. R. v. People, 83 Ill. 467; Andrews v. ments for the sale of the land for taxes. People, 84 Ill. 28; Graceland Cemetery Co. v. Mr. Edward G. Mason, for appellees: People, supra, Chicago Theological Seminary v. Only appellant's actual investments with Gage, 12 Fed. Rep. 398. per cent interest should be refunded to him. People v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172; Edwards v. Hill,11 Пl. 22; Reed v. Tyler, 56 Ill. 288; Smith v. Hutchinson, 108 Ill. 662, 669; Gage v. Busse, 102 Ill. 595. The action of the court in such matters is in rem against the property. Rev. Stat. of Ill.1874, ch. 120, sec.191; Pidgeon v. People, 36 Ill. 249; Chestnut v. Marsh, 12 Ill. 173; Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 Ill. 409; Olcott v. State, 5 Gil. 431; Brown v. Joliet, 22 11. 123; People v. Nichols, 49 Ill. 517; St. John v. E. St. Louis, 50 Ill. 92; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gil. 437. Hence the judgment is binding on all the world. Starkie, Ev. secs. 320, 380; Wells, Res Adjudicata, 504, Groudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, 434 (8 U. S. bk. 2, L. ed. 670). See also Gelston v. Hoyt, 13 Johns. 561; 3 Wheat. 246 (16 U. S. bk. 4, L. ed. 381); Graceland Cemetery Co. v. People, 92 l. 619; McCahill v. Ins. Co. 26 N. J. Eq. 531, and cases cited; Monroe v. Douglas, 4 Sandf. Ch. 134; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co. 3 Sumn. 600. It is held in Illinois that a record of a court imports verity and must be tried by itself. Young v. Thompson, 14 Ill. 380. Where the court has jurisdiction the judgment cannot be questioned collaterally. Hobson v. Fran, 62 Ill. 146; Goudy v. Hall, 36 Ill. 313; Young v. Lorain, 11 Ill. 624; Conover v. Musgrave, 68 Ill. 58; Osgood v. Blackmore, 59 Ill. 261; Prescott v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 121; Feaster v. Fleming, 56 Ill. 457. The records of a court import absolute verity, and no evidence will be received to show the want of jurisdiction, if the records affirmatively assert jurisdiction. Zepp v. Hager, 70 Ill. 223, and cases cited; People v. Gray, 72 Ill. 343; Mulford v. Stalzenback, 46 Ill. 303, and cases cited. The valuation of property by the assessor for taxation is conclusive, and a tax based upon the assessment can be assailed only for fraud or want of jurisdiction. Spencer v. People, 68 Ill. 510, and cases cited; Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292; People v. Big Muddy Iron Co. 89 Ill. 116, and cases cited. The county court had no jurisdiction to enter the two judgments upon which the tax deeds rest. The first judgment embraced double pay to the county commissioners. The second embraced unlawful items for entertaining official visitors and interest upon obligations in excess of the constitutional limitation. Laro v. People, 87 Ill. 385: McLaughlin v. Thompson, 55 Ill. 249; Belleville Nail Co.v. Peo ple, 98 Ill. 399, 403; Gage v. Busse, 102 Ill. 595; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Me. 339; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt. 506; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 ̊ Ohio, 308; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; McQuilkin v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 581; Noble v. Indianapolis, 16 Ind. 506; Dogan v. Griffin, 51 Miss. 782; Rhodes v. Sexton, 33 Iowa, 540; Pierce v. Schutt, 20 Wis. 423; Treadwell v. Patterson, 51 Cal. 637. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: Appellees' testator, plaintiff below, was in the possession, and claiming to be the owner, of a certain lot of ground in Chicago, for which the appellant, who was defendant below, held deeds executed by the county clerk of Cook County, Illinois, on the 6th of September, 1877, and 4th of February, 1880; which deeds were based on sales made October 27, 1874, and October 3, 1877, for the non-payment of taxes. These sales were in pursuance of judgments of the county court, rendered at the instance of the treasurer of Cook County, who was,ex officio, the collector of its revenue. To the proceedings in the county court the plaintiff did not appear, nor was he a party thereto otherwise than by publication in a newspaper, giving notice of the application for judgments, and, subsequently, of the order for the sale of the property for non-payment of the taxes assessed against it. fendant to convey to the plaintiff such rights and interests as he had thus acquired. There is now a disposition to draw a distinc- The present suit was brought for the purpose tion between a judgment rendered in a case of removing the cloud on the plaintiff's title, where the owner of the land objected to the en- arising from the before mentioned sales and tax try of the judgment, and a case where the judg-deeds, and to obtain a decree requiring the dement for the taxes was entered by default. The authority for this distinction is traced to the opinion in the Graceland Cemetery Case, 92 Ill. 619. See also Belleville Nail Co. v. People, 98 Ill. 399. But the cases of Gage v. Busse, 102 Ill. 592, and Gage v. Parker, 103 Ill. 528, seem to dispose of the whole question, and although the court was misled in two cases by an eironeous construction of a third, as soon as the matter was presented in its true light the court took steps immediately to correct the error. Shortly after the determination of the case at bar in the circuit court, the learned judge before whom it was tried reviewed to some extent the questions here presented, and arrived at the conclusion now pressed. The plaintiff in the bill avows his readiness and willingness to pay not only the defendant's disbursements for the legal taxes included in the judgments of the county court, but such additional sum as to the court seemed proper. It was adjudged by the circuit court that the plaintiff should pay the redemption moneys allowed by statute, had the judgments and sales been only for legal taxes, with 6 per cent interest, in each case, from the expiration of two years after the the tax sale; also, such other taxes as defendant subsequently paid upon the lot in question, with interest at the like rate on the amount of each payment. The aggre 4 och payments was ascertained to be | His argument is, that by the Constitution and of May 1, 1882. The defendant, laws of the State, the County Court is a court defined to accept that sum with inter- of record, with general original jurisdiction in the same having been paid into court the matter of the sale of lands for delinquent it was finally adjudged that the title taxes; that proceedings in such cases are in by defendant, in virtue of the sales rem against the property assessed; and that be set aside and held for naught as judgment therein rendered is conclusive upon tiff, and that the deeds be delivered the taxpayer, so long as it remains unmodified by the court which rendered it, or until it is Constitution of Illinois declares that the set aside in some direct mode for fraud or colredemption from sales of real estate lusion, or is reversed upon appeal for error. -payment of taxes or special assess- In support of the general rule that forbids coly character whatever, shall exist in lateral attack upon the judgments or decrees rs and persons interested for a of a court having jurisdiction of the subject not less than two years from such matter and of the parties, and where the want And it imposes upon the General Assem- of jurisdiction does not appear upon the record, ay of providing by law "for reason-numerous authorities are cited by appellant's x to be given to the owners or parties counsel. But they have no application to cases by publication or otherwise, of the like the present one, as the settled course of dethe sale of the property for such taxes cision in the highest courts of the State abunts, and when the time of redemp- dantly shows. It will be well to examine a few e expire: Provided, That occupants of the cases determined in that court. cases be served with personal notice time of redemption expires." Art. the statutes in force when these sales to purchaser, or the assignee of any of land, town or city lot, at any sale or levies authorized by the laws of was entitled to a deed for the lands purchased, until he served, or caused red, a written or printed, or partly and partly printed, notice of his purevery person in actual possession or of such land or lot, and also the se name the same was taxed or sed, if, upon diligently inquiring, found in the county, at least three re the expiration of the time of reBach sale, in which notice he shall Then he purchased the land or lot, in taxed, the description of the land purchased, for what year taxed or assed, and when the time of redempA case much relied upon by counsel for apexpre. If no person is in actual pos- pellant is Graceland Cemetery Co. v. The People, pancy of such land or lot, and etc. 92 Ill. 619, That was an appeal from a in whose name the same was taxed judgment rendered by a county court against assessed, upon diligent search and certain lands belonging to the Cemetery Comnot be found in the county, then pany for the taxes of 1871 to 1874 inclusive. It his assignee shall publish' such appeared that, in 1873, application was made *** which notice shall be inserted three lands for the taxes of 1871. The company reme newspaper printed in such coun- to the county court for judgment against the time not more than five months sisted judgment upon the ground that the lands ime not less than three months, were exempted by law from taxation. In McLaughlin v. Thompson, 55 Ill. 249, which was an action of ejectment, in which the plaintiff asserted a tax title, the validity of which the defendant disputed, upon the ground that the sale was, in part, for taxes levied by a county commissioner's court, at a time other than that prescribed by the statute, the court said: "The evidence shows that this county tax entered into and formed part of the judg ment, and the sum for which the land was sold. That tax being illegal, appellant, or those under whom he claims, were not required to pay it, nor did the law impose the duty of redeeming from the sale. And it has been repeatedly held that if any portion of the tax is illegal, or the judgment is too large, only to the extent of a few cents, the sale and tax deed will be void. This being so, the tax deed conveyed no title, and hence there could be no recovery under it, as the plaintiff in ejectment must, as in other cases, establish his right to recover.' e of redemption shall expire." trial the defense was sustained. After A similar ap1874, ch. 120, p. 893. plication was made for judgment for the taxes en deed he received, upon the and the exemption again sustained. No appeal paches the defendant's title, in of 1872, 1873 and 1874. It was again resisted, it was acquired in violation of al and statutory provisions; of those judgments. Nevertheless, in 1879, pect of his title under both deeds, another application was made for judgment nd that the assessment of taxes against the same lands for the taxes for 1871 to the county court ordered the sales, by the county court against the company. question, for the non-payment 1.74 inclusive, and judgment was then rendered each instance, illegal taxes, for The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the was not bound to pay. The appel- mer judgments in favor of the company, in reses were not liable, and which latter judgment upon the ground that the foraded by the judgments of the coun- | having been rendered after a trial on the mer. at these objections to his title are spect of its claim of exemption from taxation, Cannot be urged in any col-its-the court having jurisdiction of the parwadhesh nerty being, it is contended, neous, conclusive so long as they were not reestag or suit, the only remedy of ties and the subject matter-were, even if errowe Supreme Court of the State. versed or modified in some legal proceeding in. or writ of error was prosecuted from either [460] [461] |