! by counsel, his personal presence being excused | preme court may render in the cause, or if s "This case came on to be heard before me pursuant to the order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia, Eastern Division, dated May 15, 1885, to which court an appeal was allowed May 5, 1855, and which was perfected upon the execution of a bond approved by the district judge, and filed May 7, 1885. "After argument heard, it is ordered that the Judgment of the district judge of May 4, 1885, that the writ is disallowed and the petition of the relator be dismissed, and that he be remanded to the custody of Philip Reilly,' be, and it is hereby, affirmed at the costs of the re The appeal to this court having been perfected, the appellant filed the following assignment of errors: "Afterwards, to wit: on the second Monday of October, in this same term, before the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the Capitol, in the City of Washington, came the said William S. Roberts, by W W Montgomery, his attorney, and says that in the record and proceedings aforesaid there is manifest error in this, to wit: that by the record aforesaid it appears that an order was passed referring said cause to Judge Woods, to be heard by him in vacation, said order having been passed at a term of said circuit court which was in ses"It is further ordered that this order be en- sion when the appeal from the district judge tered on the minutes of the Circuit Court of the was allowed, whereas appellant insists that the United States for the Southern District of Geor-appeal from the district judge was to the term gia, Eastern Division, and a certified copy transmitted to the district judge of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia, Eastern Division, for enforcement by him of his judgment of May 4, 1885. lator. "It further appearing that sufficient cause was shown before me for the nonappearance of the relator, it is ordered that no liability rest upon the sureties upon the bond filed May 7, 1885, for such nonappearance, but that said bond remain of full force until complied with by the delivery of the relator to the United States Marstal to be turned over to said Philip Reilly, or ach other duly constituted agent as may be apprented by the Governor of New York to re ceive him. "It is further ordered that the relator have leave to apply to the district judge for stay of has order of May 4, 1885. until physically able to be removed; and that for the cause shown in the affidavit of Henry F Campbell of May 18, 1985, submitted at the hearing, and now ordered to be filed, the delivery of the relator to PALip Reilly to be made by the marshal of Georgia, the obligee in the bond, be stayed until June 19, 1885. "May 19, 1885. W. B. Woods, Circuit Justice." Thereupon the relator, Roberts, filed in the drcuit court, on June 20, 1885, his petition, praying an appeal from this order and judgment to this court, which was allowed, and it ordered "that the clerk of the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Georpa Eastern Division, do send up to the Ocker Term, 1885, of the Supreme Court of the ased states a transcript of the petition, writ of labeas corpus, return thereto, and other pro of said circuit court next after the judgment of "And again; because no copy of the laws of "And again; because the evidence submitted to the Governor of Georgia showed that if any crime was committed, it was committed in Georgia and not in New York. "And again; because it nowhere appears that the affidavits accompanying the requisition of the Governor of New York were sworn to before officers authorized to take them. "And the said Roberts prays that the said several judgments herein complained of may be reversed, annulled and altogether held for naught, and he be discharged from custody and restored to all rights which he has lost by reason of the said executive warrant of the Governor of Georgia and the judgments complained of." And afterwards, the counsel for the appellant filed additional assignments of error, as follows: in said cause. Further ordered, that igments heretofore had in the cause reang said Roberts into the custody of said By be, and the same are hereby, superseded the final decision of the supreme court can bad in the case, and that the bail of said "And again; because the warrant of the Govtera retain him in their custody and pro- ernor of Georgia does not state upon what eviface tim to answer whatever decision the sudence it is issued, or that the Governor was sat "That the circuit court erred in not discharg ing appellant, for the reason that the affidavits on which the requisition of the Governor of New York is found are not authenticated by him. [91] [92] isfied from the testimony that a case was made "And again, because the affidavits on which "And again; because the facts show a crime under the laws of Georgia, which, even if they show a crime under the laws of New York also, take the case out of the operation of the extradition laws." Mr. W. W. Montgomery, for the appel lant. Messrs. Frank H. Miller, Daniel Lord, Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion There is nothing in the Revised Statutes, 763, providing an appeal in cases of habeas corpus to the circuit court from the final decision of the district court, or the judge thereof, which requires it to be taken, as in ordinary cases at law or suits in equity or admiralty, to the next term of the circuit court thereafter to be held. On the contrary, the subject is regulated otherwise by section 765, R. S.,which enacts, that "The appeals allowed by the two preceding Bections shall be taken on such terms, and under such regulations and orders, as well for the custody and appearance of the person alleged to be in prison or confined or restrained of his liberty, as for sending up to the appellate tribunal a transcript of the petition, writ of habeas corpus, return thereto and other proceedings as may be prescribed by the supreme court or, in default thereof, by the court or judge hearing the cause." This statutory provision evidently contemplates the summary character of proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus as not admitting, in favor of the liberty of the citizen, the delays usually and necessarily attending ordinary litigations between parties, and confers upon the judicial tribunal, or the judge hearing the application and making the order which is the subject of the appeal, discretion to send up the case to the appellate tribunal, under such regulations and orders as may seem best adapted to secure the speediest and most effective justice. This harmoniously adapts the practice in direct appeals in such cases, under these sections of the Revised Statutes, to that exercised independently of these provisions, by means of the original writ of habeas corpus, with the aid of a writ of certiorari, to bring up the record of the proceedings to be reviewed. This form of appellate jurisdiction was declared by this court in Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 [75 U S. bk. 19, L. ed. 332], to exist independently of the provisions for a direct appeal, now incorporated into the sections of the Revised Statutes above referred to; and it was exercised without regard to the beginning and ending of the terms of the appellate court, and in a summary maner. The appeal in the present case, from the Judgment of the district court to the circuit Court, was therefore not heard prematurely, alugh it was lodged and disposed of at a term of the latter court, which was current at the time the appeal was taken. In regard to the objection now taken that the hearing of the appeal was had before the Circuit Justice at Atlanta at chambers, and not at Savannah in open court, it is sufficient to say that the order to that effect was made without objection taken at the time, or afterwards, in the district or circuit court, or at the hearing before Justice Woods; that the appellant appeared at the time and place by counsel and was heard; that the arrangement was made for the convenience of the parties and to avoid delay; and that it does not seem to have involved any hardship or injustice to the party now complaining. The objection, if it could ever have been properly interposed and insisted on, cannot now be made for the first time. It comes too late. The other assignments of errors relate to the merits, and require a consideration of the limits of the jurisdiction of judicial tribunals in cases of the extradition of fugitives from justice under the clause of the Constitution by which it is regulated. 66 That constitutional provision declares that "A person charged in any State with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." Art. IV. § 2, clause 2. There is no express grant to Congress of legislative power to execute this provision; and it is not, in its nature, self executing; but a contemporary construction, contained in the Act of 1793, 1 Stat. at L. 302, ever since continued in force, and now embodied in sections 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes, has established the validity of its legislation on the subject. 'This duty of providing by law" said Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 104 [65 U. S. bk. 16, L. ed. 717, 728] "the regulations necessary to carry this compact into execution, from the nature of the duty and the object in view, was manifestly devolved upon Congress; for if it was left to the States, each State might require different proof to authenticate the judicial proceeding upon which the demand was founded and as the duty of the Governor of the State where the fugitive was found is, in such cases, merely ministerial, without the right to exercise either executive or judicial discretion, he could not lawfully issue a warrant to arrest an individual without a law of the State or of Congress to authorize it." It follows, however, that whenever the Executive of the State upon whom such a de mand has been made, by virtue of his warrant, causes the arrest for delivery of a person charged as a fugitive from the justice of another State, the prisoner is held in custody only under color of authority derived from the Constitution and laws of the United States, and is entitled to invoke the judgment of the judicial tribunals, whether of the State or the United States, by the writ of habeas corpus, upon the lawfulness of his arrest and imprisonment. The jurisdic tion of the courts of the States is not excluded in such cases, as was adjudged by this court in the case of Robo v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 Bk. 28, L. ed. 542]; for although the party is | laws of New York. The objection to it, that The Act of Congress (§ 5278 R. S.) makes it the duty of the executive authority of the State to which such person has fled, to cause the arrest of the alleged fugitive from justice, whenever the executive authority of any State demands such person as a fugitive from justice, and produces a copy of an indictment found or affidavit made before a magistrate of any State, charging the person demanded with having commited a crime therein, certified as authentic by the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the State from whence the person so charged has fled. It must appear therefore, to the Governor of the State to whom such a demand is presented, before he can lawfully comply with it; first, that the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the State from whose justice he is alleged to have fed by an indictment or an affidavit, certified as authentic by the Governor of the State maktag the demand; and second, that the person demanded is a fugitive from the justice of the State the executive authority of which makes the demand. The first of these prerequisites is a question of law and is always open upon the face of the papers to judicial inquiry, on an application for discharge under a writ of habeas corpus. The sercnd is a question of fact, which the Governof the State upon whom the demand is made st decide, upon such evidence as he may satisfactory. How far his decision may be reviewed judicially in proceedings in habeas , or whether it is not conclusive, are estions not settled by harmonious judicial disins, nor by any authoritative judgment of this court. It is conceded that the determinatre of the fact by the executive of the State in ng his warrant of arrest, upon a demand e on that ground, whether the writ contains ▲ recital of an express finding to that effect or must be regarded as sufficient to justify removal until the presumption in its favor thrown by contrary proof. Ex parte Bard, 114 U. S. 642 [ante, 250]. Further than that it is not necessary to go in the present The objections taken in this proceeding to ciency of the indictment, which were ruled both in the district and circuit courts which are still relied on here, are not well The indictment itself is certified by Governor of New York to be authentic and *duly authenticated, which is all that is reby the Act of Congress. It charges a under and against the laws of that State. material that it does not appear that a ted copy of such laws was furnished to vernor of Georgia. The statute does not it, and the Governor could have insisted at is to be presumed did insist upon the Paction of whatever he deemed necessary rtant properly to inform him on the And the courts of the United States, process the relator has appealed, take oral sotice of the laws of all the States. The indictment in question sufficiently Cares the substance of a crime against the On the question of fact, whether the appellant was a fugitive from the justice of the State of New York, there was direct and positive proof before the Governor of Georgia, forming part of the record in this proceeding. There is no other evidence in the record which contradicts it. The appellant in his affidavit does not deny that he was in the State of New York about the date of the day laid in the indictment when the offense is alleged to have been committed; and states by way of inference only that he was not in that State on that very day; and the fact that he has not been within the State since the finding of the indictment is irrelevant and immaterial. To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the Act of Congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that, having within a State committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offense, he has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another. We find no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court, and the same is affirmed; and it is directed that the order and judgment of the District Court, remanding the appellant to the custody of the respondent as the agent of the State of New York, be executed. [97] IL [11] [11] [12] WILLIAM D. MARVEL, Plff. in Err., 0. EDWIN A. MERRITT, Late Collector of Duties classification of iron ore-interpretation The words used are not technical, either as having a special sense by commercial usage, or as having a scientific meaning different from their popular meaning. They are the words of common speech, and as such their interpretation is within the judicial knowledge, and therefore matter of law. Webster, in his Dictionary, defines the noun mineral as "any inorganic species having a definite chemical composition;" and ore as "the compound of a metal and some other substance, as oxygen, sulphur or arsenic, called its mineralizer, by which its properties are disguised or lost." The word mineral is evidently derived from mine, as being that Decided which is usually obtained from a mine; and accordingly Webster defines the latter as "a pit or excavation in the earth from which metallic ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit- ores or other mineral substances are taken by 1. Under the Tariff Act of 1874 iron ore is within is matter of law. [No. 72.] Argued and submitted Nov. 25, 1885. Dec. 14, 1885. Ied States for the Southern District of New digging, distinguished from the pits from which York. The facts are stated by the court. stones only are taken and which are called quarries." The importations of iron ore in question, Mr. John Goode, Solicitor-Gen., for de- therefore, were properly subjected to a duty of fendant in error. 20 per centum ad valorem, as a mineral substance in its crude state, not otherwise provided Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff in error brought his action to recover duties paid by him and exacted, as he claims, in excess of those imposed by law, upon certain quantities of iron ore imported by him into the port of New York in 1879. The single question involved in the suit arose under the Tariff Act of 1874, being title XXXIII., R. S. The plaintiff was assessed and compelled to pay a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem on his importations, as coming within the provision in Schedule M, Sundries, § 2504, Revised Statutes, for "mineral and bituminous substances in a crude state, not otherwise provided for." He claimed that iron ore was dutiable upon a proper classification as "an unmanufactured article not herein enumerated or provided for," and subject only to a duty of 10 per cent ad valorem, under the provisions of section 2516 of the Revised Statutes. On the trial below, the plaintiff offered evidence to show that iron ore was known to the trade commercially only under that name, and that scientifically considered it was a metallic and not a mineral substance; but the offer was rejected by the court. It was proven that iron ore was not a bituminous substance. for. The judgment of the Circuit Court is accordingly affirmed. conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the district 1. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which courts (of suits for penalties and forfeitures in curred under the customs laws of the United States), still remains in force, there being no conflict be tween said section and section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1875. 2. The restricted meaning attached for eighty-six years to the language of section 11 of the Act of 1789 Act of 1875. is presumed to attach to the same language in the [No. 78.] Argued Nov. 25, 1885. Decided Dec. 14, 1885. The court instructed the jury, there being no disputed question of fact arising upon the evidence as admitted, to return a verdict for the IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United defendant. Judgment was rendered thereon The Tariff Act of 1874, R. S., Title XXXIII, States for the District of Massachusetts. Statement of the case by Mr. Justice Woods: This was an action at law brought in the circuit court to recover of the defendant $20,000, the value of certain merchandise imported by him, which it was alleged he had forfeited to the United States, because he had knowingly and with intent to defraud the revenue made an entry of the same by means of false and fraudulent invoices. The defendant moved the court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction to entertain it. The court sustained the motion, and the plaintiff's brought this writ of error. Mr. John Goode, Solicitor-Gen., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Charles Levi Woodbury, for defendant in error. 4 Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court: States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common The ninth section of the Judiciary Act of Admitting the plausibility of the argument, we are not able to adopt the conclusion to which Heads For more than three quarters of a palary, under the ninth section of the Act of the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts in suits for penalties and forfeitures under the customs laws was unquestioned. In The C, 2 Dall. 365 [2 U. S. bk. 1, L. ed. 417], derded in 1796 by the United States Circuit t for the District of Pennsylvania, and in Era v. Bollen, 4 Dall. 342 [4 Ú. S. bk. 1, L. decided by this court in 1800, it was ed that under the Judiciary Act of 1789 the courts had no jurisdiction of suits for es and forfeitures under the laws of the states. These decisions have never been tered and the law has remained unchanged, where jurisdiction of suits for penalties feitures has been given to the circuit 7a in special cases by statute. This cona of the ninth section of the Act of 1789 , notwithstanding the provisions of 11 of that Act, which were as follows: cit courts shall have original cognizcurrent with the courts of the several cover and regulate the whole subject. But this [107] |