currency and weight, showed the cost to be above twelve cents per pound. Between the time of purchase and the time of shipment and exportation to the United States, the market ralue or wholesale price of this wool fell at Rosario; and at the time and place of shipment and exportation to the United States the market value or wholesale price was less than welve cents per pound excluding charges in sch port or place. The acting United States casul made under his official seal the followcertificate upon the invoice, which is obted to by the defendant as incompetent and amaterial: "U. S. Consulate, Rosario, June 10, 1873. "1. Thomas B. Wood, acting United States sasul for Rosario, do hereby certify, after inestigation, that the market value of unwashed ordova wool at this place at the date of shipzent of the annexed invoice was thirty-two to Linty-two and one-half Bolivian reals, equivato 24% to 24 reals fuerta per arroba set weight. "Given under my hand and seal, this day. (Signed) Thomas B. Wood, Acting U. 8. Consul." Which, being reduced to United States weight and currency, shows a value per pound than twelve cents at Rosario. In conrty with law and treasury regulations, entry of this merchandise by the plaintthe proper number of designated packages berecf were sent to the public store, and this cice was sent by the defendant as Collector * the United States Appraiser for his examitation, appraisement and report. The Apser, after examination, made on the invoice following report, and returned the same to Collector, as and for his appraisement, which no appeal was claimed or taken to Serchant appraiser: "Wool, class 3, dutiable invoice value six cents per pound less 10 rentum;" said report bearing date August 173 and upon this appraisement the Colfor assessed and exacted the duty as afore-1 It is admitted and agreed, if it be maand competent, that the appraiser made d report to the Collector as and for his sement, believing that he had no legal to appraise the wool at less than the inale, although in fact he believed the market value of said wool at the last port ace whence exported to the United States, se time of exportation, excluding charges was less than twelve cents per pound. stiff contended that this was not a sfficient appraisement. The defendCollector, exacted the duty of six cents xand less 10 per centum, upon the that whatever the market value or price of this wool might have been at the time of shipment and ex, inasmuch as the invoice showed the le above twelve cents per pound, it ay hable to the duty exacted. This of the third class named in the first the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. which provides "that upon wools td class, the value whereof at the last pace whence exported to the United ading charges in such port, shall *re rents or less per pound, the duty -ree cents per pound. Upon wools of the same class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the United States, including charges in such port, shall exceed twelve cents per pound, the duty shall be six cents per pound." If the court shall be of opinion upon the foregoing facts that said duty was illegally assessed and exacted of the plaintiff, then judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff for an amount equal to one half of the duties paid in gold, with interest, to be ascertained by an assessor to be appointed by the court, and costs. On the contrary, if the court shall be of opinion that the duty was properly assessed and exacted, judgment shall be entered for the defendant, with costs. Mr. Charles Levi Woodbury, for plaintiff in error. for defendant in error. Mr. Wm. A. Maury, Asst. Atty-Gen., Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: The duties chargeable upon the importations in question were levied and collected under section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1867, "to provide increased revenue from imported wool and for other purposes.' 14 Stat. at L. 559. It provides that from and after the passage of this Act, in lieu of the duties now imposed by law on the articles mentioned and embraced in this section, there shall be levied, collected and paid on all unmanufactured wool, hair of the alpaca, goat, and other like animals, imported from foreign countries, the duties hereinafter provided." For the purpose of fixing the duties to be charged thereon, the articles mentioned are divided into three classes, as follows: class 1, clothing wool; class 2, combing wools; class 3, carpet wools and other similar wools, the last being "such as Douskoi, native South American, Cordova, Valparaiso, native Smyrna, and including all such wools of like character as have been heretofore usually imported into the United States from Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Syria and elsewhere." The importations affected by this suit were of this class. It was further provided that "Upon wools of the third class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported into the United States, excluding charges in such port, shall be twelve cents or less per pound, the duty shall be three cents per pound; upon wools of the same class, the value whereof at the last port or place whence exported to the United States, excluding charges in such port, shall exceed twelve cents per pound, the duty shall be six cents per pound." By the Act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 230, § 2, the duties on wool imposed by the Act of 1867, among other things, was reduced 10 per centum of such duties. As the value of the wool in question, at the last port or place whence exported into the United States, excluding charges in such port at the time of shipment, was less than twelve cents per pound, under these provisions of the law, standing alone, it would be subject to a duty of but three cents per pound, and it is contended by the plaintiff in error that the case is governed exclusively by these sections. But as the wool was bought in Rosario, and was shipped from there to the United States, [17] [17] [18] [19] and was invoiced there and entered at the custom house in Boston at the price paid for it in the currency and weight in which it was bought, which, upon being reduced to United States currency and weight, showed the cost to be above twelve cents per pound, it is contended on the part of the Collector that it was properly chargeable according to that value, with the duty actually exacted of six cents per pound. This conclusion is based upon a proviso, occurring in the seventh section of the Act of March 3, 1865, "amendatory of certain Acts imposing duties upon foreign importations." 13 Stat. at L. 491, and repeated in the ninth section of the Act of July 28, 1866, "to protect the revenue, and for other purposes." 14 Stat. at L. 330. The first of these sections is as follows: "Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That, in all cases where there is or shall be imposed any ad valorem rate of duty on any goods, wares or merchandise imported into the United States, and in all cases where the duty imposed by law shall be regulated by or directed to be estimated or based upon the value of the square yard, or of any specified quantity or parcel of such goods, wares or merchandise, it shall be the duty of the collector within whose district the same shall be imported or entered, to cause the actual market value or wholesale price thereof, at the period of the exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from which the same shall have been imported into the United States, to be appraised; and such appraised value shall be considered the value upon which duty shall be assessed. That it shall be lawful for the owner, consignee or agent of any goods, wares or merchandise which shall have been actually purchased or procured otherwise than by purchase, at the time and not afterwards, when he shall produce his original invoice or invoices to the collector, and make and verify his written entry of his goods, wares or merchandise, as provided by section 36 of the Act of March 2, 1799, entitled 'An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage,' to make such addition in the entry to the cost or value given in the invoice as in his opinion may raise the same to the actual market value or wholesale price of such goods, wares or merchandise, at the period of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from which the same shall have been imported; and it shall be the duty of the collector, within whose district the same may be imported or entered, to cause such actual market value or wholesale price to be appraised in accordance with the provisions of existing laws; and if such appraised value shall exceed by 10 per centum or nore the value so declared in the entry, then, in addition to the duties imposed by law on the same, there shall be levied, collected and paid a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem on such appraised value; Provided, That the duty shall not be assessed upon an amount less than the invoice or entered value, any Act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding. The second section is as follows: "Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That in determining the dutiable value of merchandise hereafter imported, there shall be added to the cost or to the actual wholesale price or general market value at the time of exportation in the principal markets of the country from whence the same shall have been imported into the United States, the cost of transportation, shipment and transhipment, with all the expenses included from the place of growth, production or manufacture, whether by land or water, to the vessel in which shipment is made to the United States, the value of the sack, box or covering of any kind in which such goods are contained; commission at the usual rates, but in no case less than 24 per centum; brokerage, export duty and all other actual or usual charges for putting up, preparing, and packing for transportation or shipment. And all charges of a general character incurred in the purchase of a general invoice shall be distributed pro rata among all parts of such invoice, and every part thereof charged with duties based on value shall be advanced according to its proportion, and all wines or other articles paying specific duty by grades shall be graded and pay duty according to the actual value so determined: Provided, That all additions made to the entered value of merchandise for charges shall be regarded as part of the actual value of such merchandise; and if such addition shall exceed by 10 per centum the value so declared in the entry, in addition to the duties imposed by law, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of 20 per centum on such value Provided, That a duty shall in no case be as sessed upon an amount less than the invoice or entered value; Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall apply to long combing of carpet wools costing twelve cents or less per pound, unless the charges so added shall carry the cost above twelve cents per pound, in which case one cent per pound duty shall be added." In our opinion the rule declared in the pro visos in both these sections, that the duty shal not be assessed upon an amount less than the invoice, or entered value, is applicable to th valuation of wools, for the purpose of determin ing the rate of duty chargeable upon them unde the Acts of 1867 and 1872, and was therefor properly applied in the present case. It is quit true that the Act of 1867 provides a differet classification of wools and imposes a specifi and not an ad valorem duty; but neverthele the duty varies according to the value p pound of the article, and a valuation is, ther fore, as necessary to the ascertainment of th rate of duty as if it were strictly an ad valore duty; and there is nothing in the Act of 18 which, by express words or necessary implic tion, repeals the proviso in question, as four in the previous Acts of 1865 and 1866. In the Act of 1865, the rule is declared to of general application, not only "in all cas where there is or shall be imposed any ad valor rate of duty on any goods, wares or merch dise imported into the United States," but a "in all cases where the duty imposed by l shall be regulated by, or directed to be estim ed or based upon, the value of the square ya or of any specified quantity or parcel of st goods, wares, or merchandise." There is more inconsistency between this provision s the Act of 1867 than if the proviso had been pressly added to the section of the latter A which contains the substituted classification woo's for dutiable purposes and fixes the vary- | him to the plaintiff, and annexed the transfer to Jame: H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup Court; U. S. The defendant took no objection to the admission or sufficiency of this evidence, otherwise than by requesting the court to instruct the jury that "If said evidence was competent to prove a notice to said Nahum, or to put him on the inquiry whether said shares had been transferred to the plaintiff, yet no such notice was BRIDGEWATER IRON COMPANY, Piff. effectual to deprive the defendant of the right in Err., as creditor to attach said shares as the proper- The court declined so to rule; and instructed A transfer for a valuable consideration of shares Argued Dec. 8, 4, 1885. Decided Dec. 14, 1885. ை ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United ition of the court. Charles A. Welch, for plaintiff in Darwin E. Ware, for defendant in Justice Gray delivered the opinion of To this instruction the defendant excepted and, after verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, tendered a bill of exceptions which was allowed. The principal question argued by counsel and the only one presented by the bill of exceptions for decision is, whether a transfer for valuable consideration, of shares in a Massachusetts manufacturing corporation, not recorded as required by the Statute of Massachusetts of 1870, chap. 224, § 26, is valid against a subsequent attachment by a creditor having knowledge or notice of the transfer. That statute provides that Shares may be transferred by the proprietor, by an instrument in writing under his hand, which shall be rean action of tort, brought by a citi- corded by the clerk of the corporation in a book New York against a manufacturing cor- to be kept for that purpose;" and "the purstablished under the laws of Massa- chaser named in such instrument so recorded for refusing to issue to him a certifi- shall, on producing the same to the treasurer twenty shares of its capital stock. and delivering to him the former certificate, be Atral, the plaintiff introduced evidence entitled to a new certificate." These provisions to show that the defendant Corporation were re-enacted in the Public Statutes of Mas4cepted a new charter from the Legis-sachusetts of 1882, chap. 106, § 30; and similar Massachusetts (Mass. Stat. 1874, chap. provisions had existed since 1809. Mass. Stat. et made it subject to the provisions of 1808, chap. 65, § 4; 1829, chap. 53, § 4; R. S. Act of 1870, chap. 224; that on 1836, chap. 35, 12; Stat. 1846, chap. 45, § 1; 4.79 1977, George B. Stetson, being the Gen. Stat. 1860, chap. 60, § 13. of these shares executed to the plaintiff der of them, absolute in form but incollateral security for a debt due from By a series of decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, on which the plaintiff in error relies, it has been held that [9] [10] [45] Messrs. Wm. B. Webb and Enoch Tot. ten, for appellee, in support of motion. Mr. W. Willoughby, for appellant, in opposition. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin these provisions, taken in connection with the But the learned counsel for the plaintiff in This is an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered at general term upon a mandate from this court. In Stewart v. Salamon, 97 U. S. 361 [Bk. 24, L. ed. 1044], this rule was promulgatcourt from a decree entered in a circuit court or other inferior court in exact accordance with our mandate upon a previous appeal. Such a decree when entered is in effect our decree, and the appeal would be from ourselves to ourselves. If such an appeal is taken, however, we will, upon the application of the appellee, examine the decree entered and, if it conforms to the mandate, dismiss the case with costs. If it does not, the case will be remanded, with appropriate directions for the correction of the error. This suit was begun in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, May 2, 1871, to subject to the payment of certain judgments so much of lot 7, in square 223 of the City of Washington, as had not been been conveyed by the Marshal of the District of Columbia to Alfred Richards by deed bearing date October 7, 1870. A decree was entered in favor of the complainants, at special term, on the 23d of May, 1873. This decree was affirmed at general term, October 16, 1873, and by this court, March 19, 1877. Under the decree, a sale was made and reported to the court below; but James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. upon the return Mackall filed exceptions be BROOKE MACKALL, JR., Appt., ALFRED RICHARDS. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 45-48.) 1. An appeal will not be entertained from a decree 2. Where one appeal was taken for the sole purpose of correcting a certain error, it is proper to construe the mandate as in effect nothing more than an order for such correction, leaving the remainder of the decree to stand. 3. Where, since the original decree, the rights of the parties have so changed as to make it improper to carry the decree into execution, relief can only be had through some form of original proceeding. It cannot be had by way of defense before decree upon the mandate. 4. The decree in this case, although rendered at general term, was still the decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. cause the property sold had not been sufliciently described. Upon hearing, these exceptions were sustained and the sale set aside. The court then took steps to fix the boundaries of the property, and on the 11th of December, 1879, a decree was entered at special term directing that the sale be made according to a certain description. From this an appeal was taken to the general term, where the decree was affirmed April 5, 1881, in all respects, except that one of the two trustees who had been appointed to make the sale was removed at his own request, and the other directed to proceed alone. An appeal was thereupon taken to this court, where the only error assigned was that the boundaries of the property had been erroneously fixed. At the last term this appeal was heard and the cause remanded, with directions "to set aside the de ree from which this appeal is prosecuted, and to order the sale in satisfaction of complainant's demands, and in such mode as may be consistent with the practice of the court and with law, of all of lot seven (7) outside of that on which the building known as Palace Market stands." Mackall v. Richards, 112 U. S. 369 [Bk. 28, L. ed. 737]. On the production of this mandate, the court below entered a decree at general term in all material respects like that appealed from, except in the description of the property, which was made to conform exactly to the order of this court. Upon examination, therefore, we are satisfied that the decree as entered is in accordance with ous. the mandate. As no complaints were made on | utes against usury, the latter is not illegal or usuri- it was quite right in the court to follow the old the sole purpose of correcting the_description, stand. The decree upon the mandate, although rendered at general term, was still the decree of the Supreme Court of the District. Richards V. Mackall, 113 U. S. 540 [Bk. 28, L. ed. 1132]; and the order on the trustee to report his sale to this court can work no injury. The order to take possession was part of the original decree; | and as no objection was taken to it on the former appeals, it ought not to be permitted now. A motion was made by Mackall in the court below after the mandate was received, for leave to file what was called a supplemental bill" but which was in reality a supplemental answer to the original bill, setting up new defenses growing out of matters occurring since the original decrees. This was properly denied. No discretion was left in that court to grant such a motion. The order of this court was in effect to enter the precise decree which has been made. If since the original decree the debts have been paid or anything else has happened which makes it improper to carry the decree into execution, resort must be had to some form of original proceeding appropriate to relief on that account. It cannot be done by way of defense before decree upon our mandate. The order of this court places the case where it would be if the original decree had been what it is now. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed under the rule, with costs; and it is so ordered. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. ASA C. CALL, Appt., อ. HENRY H. PALMER (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 98-103.) Usury, what constitutes-intent-new security 1. To constitute usury, within the prohibition of NOTE.-Usury-acts of agent of lender; when render Co. v. Hendrickson. 13 Neb., 157. [No. 67.] Argued Nov. 18, 1885. Decided Dec. 14, 1885. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa. Statement of the case by Mr.Justice Woods: The record disclosed the following facts: Al- On November 13, 1875, the principal note The consideration for the note was as follows: Palmer delivered up to Call the $10,000 note, which he had purchased from Mrs. Davidson [98] [99] |