the judgment it sought to annul, recited the proceedings in which it was rendered, and verred that no service of a copy of the petition or citation in said suit was ever made on them, either individually or collectively, personally or otherwise," and "that the return of the sheriff that personal service of a copy of the petition and citation was made on J. S. Abbott, one of your petitioners and defendant in said suit, is not true." The prayer was that for this reason the said judgment be declared to be absolutely null and void and of no effect. To this petition Wilbur, the defendant therein, answered as follows: "Now comes the defendant, I. L. Wilbur, radic, etc., of his creditors and the creditors of Wilbur & Co., Wilbur & Arnot, and Wilbur & Berge, and for answer to the petition of the plaintiffs denies all and singular the allegations therein contained, and avers that the judgment in suit No. 16,987 on the docket of this court, sought to be annulled, is a valid judgment rendered on citation of proper parties, and cannot be impeached. This respondent further pleads that the plaintfs have judicially admitted that they were properly cited in said suit No. 16,987, and are stopped to deny citation in said suit for this: that said plaintiffs after the institution of said Fuit against them in this court, and after judgment rendered in said suit No. 16,987, did institute a suit in the Third District Court of New Orleans against Frank Borge, as a partner of the firm of Wilbur & Borge, said suit being entied J. 8. & E. A. Abbott v. Frank Borge, and ambered 21,376 on the docket of said third district court, and the said Frank Borge, to protect himself as a partner, as aforesaid, from the just demand of the plaintiffs, set up and made in said suit in the third district court a conventional claim or demand against the Paintiffs for the matters and things and for the Rae cause of action which constituted the s of the judgment now sought to be anled; and this respondent intervened and made himself, as syndic, a party to said recontional demand, and the said plaintiffs in suit and the plaintiffs in said suit No. 2876, in the third district court aforesaid, bethe same parties, did, for the purpose of eating and causing the dismissal of said reventional demand in the third district court fresaid, plead to the same the judgment aforerendered against them by this court in said Nc. 16,987, now sought to be annulled, and the same up and made use thereof as a dese to said reconventional demand as in the ure of a plea of lis pendens, and the said district court recognized said plea of lis and refused to hear any evidence as to Ronventional demand of said Borge as er, as aforesaid, and dismissed the same rave judgment in favor of plaintiffs for zinal demand. fore, this respondent avers that plainthaving used the said suit No. 16,987 and ment therein rendered in manner aforeare precluded from alleging that no such pending and no such judgment was fel, as in point of law there is no suit and dzment without citation; and hence rest avers that plaintiffs have judicially wed they were parties defendants to said suit No. 16,987, and to the judgment therein rendered, and that said suit and judgment were valid." This action of nullity resulted in a judgment, signed May 7, 1868, as follows: "This cause came on to-day for trial, when, after hearing pleadings, evidence and counsel, and for the reasons orally assigned, it is adjudged and decreed that this suit be dismissed with judgment in favor of defendant, I. L. Wilbur." From this judgment a devolutive appeal was granted and taken to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, by which court it was affirmed for reasons set out in an opinion forming part of the record put in evidence in the present case, and thus embodied in the record before us. The following extract from that opinion sufficiently shows the ground of the judgment: "Returning to the facts of this case, we find the plaintiffs in the Third District Court defeating a large demand of defendant by the plea that there was then pending in the Fifth Dis trict Court a suit against them for the same deinand by same party. They thus declared judicially that they had been cited in the Fifth District Court, and they made this assertion to their own benefit and to the injury of the opposite party; and they cannot be heard now to say that their assertion was false and that the person on whom service of citation was made was not of the commercial firm." Abbot v. Wilbur, 22 La. Ann. 368. There was no evidence in the present case, except the foregoing two transcripts, and it is upon them that the questions of law decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire have arisen. That court, whose opinion is certifled to us in the record, in affirming the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction in New Hampshire in favor of the defendant, proceeded on the ground that, by the common law in force in New Hampshire, a joint judgment against two defendants is void as to both where only one is served with process; and although valid by the law of Louisiana where it was rendered, can have no other effect when sued on in New Hampshire than if it had been rendered in the latter State. This court, upon writ of error to the highest court of a State, does not take judicial notice of the law of another State, not proved in that court and made part of the record sent up, unless by the local law that court takes judicial notice of it. Hanley v. Donoghue, [ante, 535]. But the Supreme Court of New Hampshire took judicial notice, and rightfully, we are bound to assume, under the law and practice of that State, of the law of Louisiana on the point, citing article 182 of the Code of Practice of 1853, as follows: "Nevertheless, if the defendants are husband and wife, or minors interdicted, or absent persons having the same curator, or persons represented by the same attorney in fact, or partners of the same firm or members of the same corporation, it will be sufficient to deliver one citation and one single copy of the petition to the person representing such defendants." It thereupon says: "This statute sustains the plaintiffs' con tention on this point, and shows that the judg ment on which this suit is brought is valid in Louisiana. But it is nevertheless invalid in New Hampshire because it is invalid by New [285] [286] [287] Hampshire law, would be invalid if it had been | which shall be rendered in its courts in actions rendered in New Hampshire, and because the against joint defendants, one of whom has not Constitution and laws gave it no more force or ❘ been duly served with process, shall be valid effect than it would have if it had been ren dered here." as to those who have been so served, or who have appeared in the action." In Hall v. LanSo the judgment in the action of nullity, in ning, ubi supra, it was said: "Various effects which both the Abbotts were actors and by and consequences are attributed to such judg which they were both bound, is a direct adju-ments in the States in which they are rendication by the Supreme Court of Louisiana dered. They are generally held to bind the that the original judgment now sued on, al- common property of the joint debtors, as well though process was served upon one defendant as the separate property of those served with only, was a valid judgment by the laws of that process, when such property is situated with State. And on the point of the estoppel, based in the State, but not the separate property of on the judgment in_the_action of nullity, the those not served; and whilst they are bindSupreme Court of New Hampshire said: "The ing personally on the former, they are reres adjudicata is the Louisiana decision that girded as either not personally binding at all, or these defendants asserted that the first judg-erly prima facie binding on the latter." ment was valid in Louisiana by the law of that It is not material in the present case to inState, and were by Louisiana law estopped to assert the contrary. The defendants do not now assert the contrary. They assert that if ir. Louisiana, by the law of that State, the first judgment is valid, with notice given to one of the defendants, it is not valid here, and that if they are estopped to assert that it is invalid in Louisiana upon the law of Louisiana, they are not estopped to assert that it is invalid in New Hampshire by the law of New Hampshire." But the Act of Congress of May 26, 1790, chap. 11, 1 Stat. at L. 122, now section 905 of the Revised Statutes, passed in pursuance of the express authority of the first section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States, prescribes the manner in which the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State shall be authenticated and proved, and enacts that "The said records and judicial proceedings so authenticated shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken." In Hanley v. Donoghue, ubi supra, it was said: "By the settled construction of these provisions of the Constitution and Statutes of the United States a judgment of a state court, in a cause within its jurisdiction and against a defendant lawfully summoned, or against lawfully attached property of an absent defendant, is entitled to as much force and effect against the person summoned or the property attached, when the question is presented for decision in a court of another State, as it has in the State in which it was rendered." The Act of Congress has been restricted in its application by a series of decisions of this court to judgments of state courts, when they had jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties; and in actions brought on such judgments in other States it has always been held that it was open to a defendant, whether sued alone or jointly with others, to show by plea and proof that he had not been served with process or had not voluntarily appeared. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 [52 U. S. bk. 13, L. ed. 648]; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 [85 U. S. bk. 21, L. ed. 897]: Knowles v. Gas Light Co. 19 Wall. 58 [86 U. S. bk. 22, L. ed. 70]; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S; 160 [Bk. 23, L. ed. 271]. On the other hand, it has never been denied, that, as was said in Hanley v. Donoghue, ubi supra; "It is within the power of the Legislature of a State to enact that judgments quire into or to know what effect the laws of Louisiana purport to give to the judgment sued on in respect to Edward A. Abbott, one of the defendants not served with process and who did not appear in the action, because he is not sued in the present action. If he had been joined in this action, the record itself showing that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment, his defense would have been apparent and perfect; and the judgment in the action of nullity might perhaps be restrained as an estoppel, to prevent him only from asserting the invalidity of the judgment, to the extent and for the purposes merely for which he had used and enforced it judicially in Louisiana. However that may be, it is not and cannot be denied that the judgment in Louisiana here sued on is effective and conclusive as a personal obligation against Joseph S. Abbott, who was within the jurisdiction of the court by personal service of process, and enforceable within that State against him severally, notwithstanding it was a joint judgment against two, of whom he alone was served. The same effect should have been given to it when the administrator of Joseph S. Abbott was sued upon it in New Hampshire, for such is the requirement of the Act of Congress. The principle which protects a person against the operation of judicial proceedings to which he is not a party is one of universal jurisprudence, because it is the dictate of common justice. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 [Bk. 24. L. ed. 565]. But the rule that exonerates a defendant actually served with process from the obligation of a judgment, because rendered also against another who has not been served and therefore is not bound, is purely technical; and when by the local law, according to which such a judgment has been rendered, a different rule has been established, which enforces the personal obligation of the defendant who has been served or who has appeared in the action, the Act of Congress requires that the same effect shall be given to it in every other State in which it may be sued on, whatever may be the rule that there prevails in respect to its domestic judgments. Such was the ground of decision in Burt v. Delano, 4 Cliff. 618, and in Stockwell v. McCracken, 109 Mass. 84, as well as in the case of Hanley v. Don oghue, already referred to. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire is accordingly reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to take such fur- | Extend the Powers of and Confer a Charter ther proceedings therein as are not inconsistent with this opinion. True copy. Test: upon the Same," approved February 28, 1867, and in accordance with the vote of the electors James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. July 21, 1866, in accordance with said Act. of said township, at the special election held opinion in the state court. Where such rights have accrued before the state court has announced its construction, the federal courts, although leaning to an agreement with the state court, must determine the question apon their own independent judgment. 3 Where the liability of a municipal corporation upon negotiable securities depends upon a local statute the rights of the parties are to be determined according to the law as declared by the state courts at the time such securities were issued. Upon a review of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, as well as upon its independent izment, this court holds that the Act of the Lerislature of that State of February 28, 1867, was rd, being within the principle that the Legislature, when not restricted by the Constitution, may, by retroactive statutes, legalize the unauthorized acts and proceedings of subordinate municipal encies where such acts and proceedings might have been previously authorized by the Legislature. [No. 76.] Argued Nov. 25, 1885. Decided Jan. 4, 1886. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Mrs. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., George W. Gere and W. M. Ramsey, for plaintiff in This is an action to recover from the Townhip of Santa Anna, established under the eral township organization laws of Illinois, the amount of certain negotiable bonds, with erest coupons attached, signed by its superand clerk and purporting to have been by it on the first day of October, 1867, er and by virtue of a law of the State of itos, entitled "An Act to Amend the Articles Association of the Danville, Urbana, Bloomo and Pekin Railroad Company, and to TL-Municipal bonds: how affected by change truction of statutes by state courts, or by mal changes. See Mitchell v. Burlington, er of state courts to construe state statutes. Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.), 250, bk. * 4 Wall, 270, bk. 22, 350, note. See When the court will review their decisions. ial Bank v. Buckingham, 48 U.S. (5 How.), ba. 12, 169, note. Each bond also recites that the faith of the Township is pledged for the payment of said principal sum and interest. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the declaration and amended declaration and gave judgment for the township. The Act of February 28, 1867, empowered the railroad company to locate and construct a railroad from Pekin, in Tazewell County, through, or as near as practicable, certain State of Illinois. For the purpose of aiding in named towns to the eastern boundary of the its construction, authority was given to incorporated towns or townships in counties acting under the township organization law, along the route of the road, to subscribe to the capital stock of the company in any sum not exceeding $250,000. 66 By the 13th section of the Act it is provided: until the question has been submitted to the "S 13. No such subscription shall be made legal voters of such incorporation, town or township in which the subscription is proposed to be made; and the clerk of each of said towns or townships is hereby required, upon the presentation of a petition signed by at least ten citizens, who are legal voters and taxpayers of such town or township for which he is clerk, and in which petition the amount proposed to be subscribed shall be stated, to post up notices in at least three public places in each town or township; which notice shall be posted not less than thirty days before the day of holding such [358] election, notifying the legal voters of such town or township to meet at the usual place of holding elections in such town or township, or some other convenient place n med in such notice, for the purpose of voting or or against such subscription; Provided, Thut where elections may have already been held, and the majority of the legal voters of any township or incorporated town were in favor of a subscription to said railroad, then and in that case no other election need be had, and the amount so voted for shall be subscribed as in this Act provided. And such elections are hereby declared to be legal and valid, as though this Act had been in force at the time thereof and all the provisions hereof had been complied with." The pleadings allege that on the 21st of July, 1866, the Township of Santa Anna, through which the road passed, held a special election upon the question of subscribing the sum of $50,000 to the capital stock of said Danville, Urbana, Bloomington and Pekin Railroad Com pany, at which said election a majority of the legal voters of said Township voted for and were in favor of a subscription to the capital stock of said railroad company, by the said Township, of the said sum; that on the first of October, 1867, in pursuance of said vote, and of said Act of February 28, 1867, the then su pervisor of the Township subscribed, in its name, the sum of $50,000, receiving from the railroad company, for the Township, proper certificates of stock; and in connection with the township clerk and in payment for such stock, executing and delivering to the company the [359] [360] bonds and coupons in suit; that the Township, election was not held at the time directed by the In Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill. 421, one of the questions presented was as to the validity of an Act of 1857, giving a special charter to the Town of Keithsburg, and conferring upon it authority to subscribe stock to a certain railroad company, and at the same time legalizing and confirming a previous subscription to the stock of the same corporation by the town while acting under the general incorporation law for towns and cities. The court, speaking by Mr. Justice Breese, said: "If the subscription was made under the organization al 1849, the 17th section of the Act of 1857 legalizes and confirms it. The subscription, therefore, was good if made under the Act of 1849, confirmed as it is by the 17th section of the Act of 1857. The bonds may be regarded as issued by the old corporation, confirmed by the new Act, or as a new issue under the second section of the Act of 1857.” The record does not disclose the particular ground upon which the circuit court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for the Township. But we cannot understand how that result was possible, except upon the hy-lowed by the general incorporation law of pothesis that the Act of February 28, 1867, legalizing elections previously held, at which a majority of legal voters of a township declared in favor of a subscription to the stock of this company, was unconstitutional. But the constitutionality of that very statute, in respect of the clause now before us, was directly sustained by this court in St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, 663 [83 U. S. Bk, 21, L. ed. 328, In Scholfield v. Watkins, 22 Ill. 72, one of the [361] 338]. The question there was as to the validity questions was as to the constitutionality of a of bonds issued by a township on the first of statute which legalized the acts and proceedOctober, 1867, to the Danville, Urbana, Bloom-ings of certain school district trustees in unitington and Pekin Railroad Company, under ing districts and levying and collecting taxes the authority of the before mentioned Act of for building houses, and for the support of February 28, 1867, and in accordance with a schools therein, and provided that all proceedpopular vote at an election held in August, ings may be had in the same manner as if those 1866. It was there contended that the Act was proceedings had been strictly regular and legal. unconstitutional and void, as creating a debt The court, said by Walker, J., that there could for a municipality, against its will expressed be no doubt that "the Legislature have the in a legal manner. There, as here, the elec- power to form a school district, or may legaltion referred to in the bonds was held without ize the acts of officers in attempting to form a authority of law. But the court, speaking by district, so as to render such district legal. *** Mr. Justice Clifford, said that, according to re- And the power to cure irregularities in the peated decisions of the Supreme Court of Il-manner of levying a tax is equally undoubted, linois and of this court, defective subscriptions and, so far as this tax was levied for the purof the kind there made "may, in all cases, be poses specified in the Act, there is no doubt ratified where the Legislature could have orig-that the levy is thereby made valid." inally conferred the power;" citing, among These cases were all determined before the other cases, Cowgill v. Long, 15 Ill. 203 and Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Id. 405. In Cowgill v. Long, 15 Ill. 202, it appears that a statute of Illinois authorized the legal voters of any school district to meet together at a certain time in any year and determine by vote whether a tax should be levied for the support of common schools, for building and repairing schoolhouses, or for other school purposes. The inhabitants of a district held an election and voted a tax for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse. The tax was assessed and steps were taken for its collection. But as the bonds in suit were issued. While they are not analogous in every respect to the one before us, they seem to rest upon the principle that the Legislature, when not restricted by the Constitution, may, by retroactive statutes, legalize the unauthorized acts and proceedings of subor dinate municipal agencies, where such acts and proceedings would have been valid if done under legislative sanction previously given. The decision in St. Joseph Township v. Rogers only gave effect to principles announced by the state court prior to the issuing of the bonds. If, according to the law of Illinois, as declared by its highest court at the time the bonds in suit were issued, the Act of February 28, 1867 was a valid exercise of legislative power, the rights of the purchasers or holders, could not be affected merely by subsequent change of decision. For it is the long established doctrine of this court-from which, as said recently in Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 105 [Bk. 27, L. ed. 872], we are not disposed to swerve -that where the liability of a municipal corporation upon negotiable securities depends upon a local statute, the rights of the parties are to be determined according to the law as declared by the state courts at the time such securities were issued. In Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677 [Bk. 25, L. ed. 968], the Chief Justice said: "After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is, to all intents and purposes, the same in effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment." See also County of Ralls v. Douglass, 105 U. S. 732 [Bk. 26, L. ed. 958]; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 [83 U. S. Bk. 21, L. ed. 382]; City v. Lumson, 9 Wall. 477, 485 [76 U. S. Bk. 19, L. ed. 725, 729]; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 [Bk. 24, L. ed. 302]; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 71 [Bk. 26, L. ed. 1012]; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 330 [70 U. S. Bk. 18, L. ed. 178]; Brown v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 244; Cooley, Const. Lim. 474,477, 4th ed.; Dill. Mun. Corp. § 46. the States in controversies between citizens of different States." Assuming, then, for the purposes of this case, [364] |