power of taxation, however vast in its character
and searching in its extent, is necessarily lim-
ited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the
State. These subjects are persons, property
and business." This proposition would seem,
as stated by Chief Justice Marshall, to be self-
evident, and no force of expression could add
to its manifest truth.

borders, or to impose a license tax so heavy as
to amount to the same thing; but he denied,
great and searching as her taxing power is, that
she could tax either persons or property not
within her jurisdiction. "A foreign corpora-
tion," he said, "has no domicil here and can
have none; hence it cannot be said to draw to
itself the constructive possession of its property
located elsewhere. There are a large number
of foreign insurance companies doing business
here under license from the State. Some of
them have a very large capital. It is usually
invested at the domicil of the company. If the
position of the Commonwealth is correct she
can tax the entire property of the Royal Insur-
ance Company although the same is located
almost wholly in England, or the assets of the
New York Mutual, located in New York.'


In the recent case of Pennsylvania v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St., 119, the liability
of foreign corporations doing business within
that State is elaborately considered by its Su-
preme Court. The corporation was doing busi-
ness there, and it was contended on the part of
the Commonwealth that the tax should be im-
posed upon all of the capital stock of the com-
pany; while on the other side it was urged that
only so much of the stock was intended by the
statute to be taxed, as was represented by prop- Under this decision there is no property held
erty of the company invested and used in the by the Gloucester Ferry Company which can
State. In giving its decision the court said that be the subject of taxation in Pennsylvania ex-
it had been repeatedly decided and was settled cept the lease of the wharf in that State.
law that a tax upon the capital stock of a com- Whether that wharf is taxed to the owner or to
pany is a tax upon its property and assets (cit- the lessee it matters not, for no question here
ing to that effect a large number of decisions); is involved in such taxation. It is admitted that
that it was undoubtedly competent for the it could be taxed by the State according to its
Legislature to lay a franchise or license tax upon appraised value. The ferry-boats of the Com-
foreign corporations for the privilege of doing pany are registered at the port of Camden in
business within the State, but that the tax in New Jersey, and according to the decisions in
that case was in no sense a license tax; that the Hays v. Steamship Co. and in Morgan v. Parham
State had never granted a license to the Stand- [supra], they can be taxed only at their home port.
ard Oil Company to do business there, but According to the decision in the Standard Oil
merely taxed its property-that is, its capital Company case, and by the general law on the
stock-to the extent that it brought such proper- subject the Company has no domicil in Penn-
ty within its borders in the transaction of its sylvania, and its capital stock representing its
business; that the position of the Common- property is held outside of its limits. It is sole-
wealth-that a foreign corporation entering the ly, therefore, for the business of the Company
State to do business brought its entire capital-in landing and receiving passengers at the wharf
was ingenious but unsound; that it was a fun- in Philadelphia that the tax is laid; and that
damental principle that in order to be taxed the business, as already said, is an essential part of
person must have a domicil in the State, and the transportation between the States of New
the State must have a situs therein; that persons Jersey and Pennsylvania, which is itself inter-
and property in transitu could not be taxed; state commerce. While it is conceded that the
that the domicil of a corporation was in the property in a State belonging to a foreign cor-
State of its origin and it could not emigrate to poration engaged in foreign or interstate com-
another sovereignty; that the domicil of the merce may be taxed equally with like property
Standard Oil Company was in Ohio, and when of a domestic corporation engaged in that busi-
it sent its agents into the State to transact business, we are clear that a tax or other burden im-
ness it no more entered the State in point of fact posed on the property of either corporation be-
than any other foreign corporation, firm or in- cause it is used to carry on that commerce, or
didual who sent an agent there to open an of- upon the transportation of persons or property,
fice or branch house, nor brought its capital or for the navigation of the public waters over
there constructively; that it would be as reasona- which the transportation is made, is invalid
ble to assume that a business firm in Ohio and void as an interference with and an ob-
brought its entire capital there because it sent struction of the power of Congress in the regula
its agent to establish a branch of its business, as tion of such commerce. This proposition is sup-
to hold that the Standard Oil Company by em- ported by many adjudications. Thus, in Gib-
ploying certain persons in the State to transact bons v. Ogden, the earliest and leading case upon
a portion of its business thereby brought all its the commercial power of Congress, it was held
property or capital stock within the jurisdiction that the Acts of New York giving to Living-
of the State; that there was neither reason nor ston and Fulton the exclusive right, for a cer-
authority for such a proposition; that the com-tain number of years, to navigate all the waters
pany was taxable only to the extent that it within its jurisdiction with vessels propelled by
brought its property within the State; and that steam, were unconstitutional and void. Making
its capital stock, as mentioned in the Act of the the navigation of those waters subject to a
Legislature, must be construed to mean so much license of the grantee of the State—that is, to
of the capital stock as was measured by the such a tax or other burden as they might levy-
property actually brought within the State by was an obstruction to commerce between the
the company in the transaction of its business. States and in conflict with the laws of Congress
The justice who delivered the opinion of the respecting the coasting trade. 9 Wheat., 1.
court added, speaking for himself, that he con- Although the sole point in judgment was wheth-
ceded the power of the Commonwealth to ex- er the State could regulate commerce on her
clude foreign corporations altogether from her waters in the face of such legislation by Con-


In Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S., 259 [Bk. 23, L. cd. 543], an Act of the State of New York requiring the owner or consignee of a vessel arriving at the Port of New York to give a bond for every passenger in a penalty of $300, with two sureties, each a resident and freehold er, conditioned to indemnify the Commissioner of Emigration, and every county, city and town in the State against any expense for the relief or support of the person named in the bond, for four years thereafter, but allowing in commutation of the bond a payment of one dollar and a half for each passenger within twenty-four hours after his landing, and imposing a penalty of $500 for each passenger if such payment were not made within that time, the penalty to be a lien upon the vessel, was held to be unconstitutional and void. In its decision the court said that the State imposed a tax on the shipowner for the right to land his passengers, and that it was in effect a tax on the passenger himself, since its payment was required as part of his fare. The transportation of a passenger from Liverpool to the city of New York," it added, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, "is one voyage. It is not completed until the passenger is disembarked at the pier in the latter city. A law or a rule emanating from any lawful authority which prescribes terms or conditions on which alone the vessel can discharge its passengers is a regulation of commerce; and, in case of vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations.' 92 U. S., 259, 271 [Bk. 23, L. ed., 543, 548].



These cases would seem to be decisive of the character of the business which is the subject of taxation in the present case. Receiving and landing passengers and freight is incident to their transportation. Without both there could be no such thing as their transportation across the river Delaware. The transportation, as to passengers, is not completed until, as said in the Henderson Case, they are disembarked at the pier of the city to which they are carried; and, as to freight, until it is landed upon such pier. And all restraints by exactions in the form of taxes upon such transportation or upon acts necessary to its completion are so many invasions of the exclusive power of Congress to regulate that portion of commerce between the States.

The cases where a tax or toll upon vessels is allowed to meet the expenses incurred in improving the navigation of waters traversed by them; as, by the removal of rocks, the construction of dams and locks to increase the depth of water and thus extend the line of navigation, or the construction of canals around falls-rest upon a different principle. The tax in such cases is considered merely as compensation for the additional facilities thus provided in the navigation of the waters. Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Conn., 7; Thames Bank v Lovell, 18 Conn., 500; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447.

Upon similar grounds, what are termed harbor dues or port charges exacted by the State from vessels in its harbors, or from their owners, for other than sanitary purposes are sustained. We say for other than sanitary purposes, for the power to prescribe regulations to protect the health of the community and prevent the spread of disease is incident to all


gress, yet the argument of the court was that
such attempted control of the navigable waters
of the State was an encroachment upon the
the power of Congress independently of that

In Steamship Co. v. Porticardens, 6 Wall., 31
[73 U. S., bk. 18, L. ed. 749], it was held that a
Statute of Louisiana declaring that the master
and wardens of the port of New Orleans should
be entitled to demand and receive, in addition
to other fees, the sum of $5 for every
vessel arriving at that port whether called on
to perform any service or not, was unconstitu-
tional and void, as imposing a burden upon
commerce both interstate and foreign. The
exaction was in effect a tax for entering the
port-that is, for the navigation of its waters.
The control of the navigable waters of the port,
and of all public waters constituting channels
of communication between the States and for-
eign countries, is embraced within the com-
mercial power of Congress, and equally beyond
the interference of the States. It was claimed
that the tax was for compensation to the master
and wardens for the performance of certain du-
ties required of them, and that the law for its
collection stood, therefore, on the same consti-
tutional grounds as the laws authorizing the
collection of pilotage; but the court answered
that no Acts of Congress recognize such laws as
that of Louisiana as proper and beneficial regu-
lations, whilst state laws in respect to pilotage
are thus recognized. The court also added
that the right to recover pilotage and half-
pilotage prescribed by state legislation rested
not only upon state laws but upon contract,
observing that pilotage was compensation for
services performed, and half-pilotage was com-
pensation for services which a pilot had put
himself in readness to perform by labor, risk
and cost, and had offered to perform; whilst in
the case in Louisiana the state law subjected
the vessel to the demand of the master and
wardens whether called upon to perform any
service or not. The case therefore was simply
one of a tax imposed upon the vessel for the
navigation of the public waters of the State,
and as such was a regulation of commerce
and an illegal encroachment upon the power of

In Reading R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, sometimes called the Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232 [82 U. Š., bk. 21, L. ed. 146], it was held that the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania requiring railroad companies to pay to the state treasurer, for the use of the Commonwealth, a tax on each two thousand pounds of freight carried, was unconstitutional and void so far as it affected commodities transported through the State, or from points without the State to points within the State, or from points within the State to points without it, as being a regulation of interstate commerce. [213] The court said that the imposition of the tax whether large or small was a restraint upon the privilege or right to have the subjects of commerce passed freely from one State to another without being obstructed by the intervention of state lines. Its payment was a condition upon which the prosecution of that branch of commerce was made to depend, and its imposition therefore was in conflict with the power of Congress over the subject.


local municipal authority, however much such intercourse between the United States and forregulations may interfere with the movements eign countries. No sort of trade, he adds, can be of commerce. But independently of such carried on between this country and another to measures the State may prescribe regulations which the power does not extend; and what is for the government of vessels whilst in its har- true of foreign commerce is also true of combors; it may provide for their anchorage or merce between States over the waters separatmooring, so as to prevent confusion and col-ing them. Ferries between one of the States lision; it may designate the wharves at which and a foreign country cannot be deemed, therethey shall discharge and receive their passengers fore, beyond the control of Congress under the and cargoes, and require their removal from commercial power. They are necessarily govthe wharves when not thus engaged, so as to erned by its legislation on the importation and make room for other vessels. It may appoint exportation of merchandise and the immigration officers to see that the regulations are carried of foreigners-that is, are subject to its reguout, and impose penalties for refusing to obeylation in that respect; and if they are not bethe directions of such officers; and it may im-yond the control of the commercial power of pose a tax upon vessels, sufficient to meet the Congress, neither are ferries over waters sepaexpenses attendant upon the execution of the rating States. Congress has passed various regulations. The authority for establishing laws respecting such international and interstate regulations of this character is found in the ferries, the validity of which is not open to [215] right and duty of the supreme power of the question. It has provided that vessels used exState to provide for the safety, convenient use clusively as ferry-boats, carrying passengers, and undisturbed enjoyment of property within baggage and merchandise, shall not be required its limits; and charges incurred in enforcing the to enter and clear, nor shall their masters be reregulations may properly be considered as com- quired to present manifests, or to pay entrance pensation for the facilities thus furnished to the or clearance fees, or fees for receiving or cervessels. Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow., 351. tifying manifests; "but they shall, upon arrival in the United States, be required to report such baggage and merchandise to the proper officer of the customs, according to law" (R. S., § 2792); that the lights for ferry-boats shall be regulated by such rules as the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels shall prescribe (R. S., § 4233, Rule 7); that any foreign railroad company or corporation whose road enters the United States by means of a ferry or tug-boat, may own such boat, and that it shall be subject to no other or different restrictions or regulations in such employment than if owned by a citizen of the United States (R. S., § 4370); that the hull and boilers of every ferry-boat propelled by steam shall be inspected, and provisions of law for the better security of life, which may be applicable to them, shall, by regulations of the supervising inspectors, be required to be complied with before a certificate of inspection be granted; and that they shall not be navigated without a licensed engineer and a licensed pilot (R. S., § 4426).

Should such regulations interfere with the exercise of the commercial power of Congress, they may at any time be superseded by its action. It was not intended, however, by the grant to Congress to supersede or interfere with the power of the States to establish police regulations for the better protection and enjoyment of property. Sometimes, indeed, as remarked by Mr. Cooley, the line of distinction between what constitutes an interference with commerce and what is a legitimate police regulation is exceedingly dim and shadowy, and, he adds, "it is not doubted that Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to the most minute directions if it shall be deemed advisable; and that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions, the exercise of state power is excluded. Congress may establish police regulations, as well as the States, confining their operations to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitution; but as the general police power can better be exercised under the provisions of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in the National Congress, the regulations which are made by Congress do not often exclude the establishment of others by the State covering very many particulars." Cooley, Coust. Lim., 732.

It is true that from the earliest period in the history of the government the States have authorized and regulated ferries not only over waters entirely within their limits, but over waters separating them; and it may be conceded that in many respects the States can more advantageously manage such interstate ferries than the General Government; and that the privilege of keeping a ferry, with a right to take The power of the States to regulate matters toll for passengers and freight, is a franchise of internal police includes the establishment of grantable by the State, to be exercised within ferries as well as the construction of roads and such limits and under such regulations as may bridges. In Gibbons v. Ogden [9 Wheat., 203], be required for the safety, comfort and conChief Justice Marshall said that laws respecting venience of the public. Still the fact remains ferries, as well as inspection laws, quarantine that such a ferry is a means-and a necessary laws, health laws regulating the internal com-means-of commercial intercourse between the merce of the States, are component parts of an States bordering on their dividing waters, and immense mass of legislation, embracing every- it must therefore be conducted without the imthing within the limits of a State not surrendered position by the States of taxes or other burdens to the General Government; but in this language upon the commerce between them. Freedom he plainly refers to ferries entirely within the from such imposition does not of course imState, and not to ferries transporting passengers ply exemption from reasonable charges as comand freight between the States and a foreign pensation for the carriage of persons, in the country; for the power vested in Congress, he way of tolls or fares, or from the ordinary taxaBays, comprehends every species of commercial tion to which other property is subjected, any





more than like freedom of transportation on | below, by the appellee, to secure the convey.
land implies such exemption. Reasonable ance to him of the legal title to certain prem-
charges for the use of property either on water ises alleged to be held in trust by the defendant.
or land are not an interference with the freedom The court below having entered a decree for
of transportation between the States secured the complainant, upon an agreed statement of
under the commercial power of Congress. facts, the defendant appealed to this court.
Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S., 80 [Bk. 24, L.
ed., 377]; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S., 423
[Bk. 25, L. ed., 688]; Vicksburg v. Tobin, Id.,
430 Id., 690]; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105
U. S., 559 [Bk. 26, L. ed., 1170]; Transporta-
tion Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 691 [Bk. 27,
L. ed., 584].

The facts of the case are sufficiently stated
by the court.

Messrs. Delinzo A. Walden, in person, John M. Thurston, L. M. Colby and Alfred Hazlett, for appellant.

Mr. J. M. Woolworth, for appellee.

That freedom implies exemption from charges other than such as are imposed by way of compensation for the use of the property employed, or for facilities afforded for its use, or as ordinary taxes upon the value of the property. How conflicting legislation of the two States on the subject of ferries on waters dividing them is to be met and treated is not a question before us for consideration. Pennsylvania has never attempted to exercise its power of establishing and regulating ferries across the Delaware River. Any one, so far as her laws are concerned, is free, as we are informed, to establish such ferries as he may choose. No license fee is exacted from ferrykeepers. She merely exercises the right to designate the places of landing, as she does the places of landing for all vessels engaged in commerce. The question, therefore, respecting the tax in the present case is not complicated by any action of that State concerning ferries. However great her power, no legislation on her part can impose a tax on that portion of interstate commerce which is involved in the transportation of persons and freight, whatever be the instrumentality by which it is carried on.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

The questions presented in this case are similar to those considered and decided in Van Wyck v. Knevals, reported in 106 U. S. Reports [bk.27, L. ed. 2011. By the Act of Congress of July 23, 1866 [14 Stat. at L., 210], there was granted to the State of Kansas, for the use and benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver Railroad Company, in the construction of a railroad from Ellwood in that State to its junction with the Union Pacific Railroad or a branch thereof, not further west than the 100th meridian of west longitude, every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for ten sections in width on each side of the road, to the point of intersection. The grant was accompanied, however, with this qualification—that in case it should appear that the United States had, when the line or route of the road was "definitely fixed," sold any section or part thereof thus granted, or that the right of preemption or homestead settlement had attached to the same, or that it had been reserved by the United States for any purpose whatever, then it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause an equal quantity of other lands to be selected from the odd sections nearest to those designated, in lieu of the lands thus appropriated. The main question here, as in the case mentioned, is, When was the route of the road to be considered as "definitely fixed" so that the grant attached to the adjoining sections. In the case mentioned we held that the route must be considered as "definitely fixed" when it had ceased to be the subject of change at the volition of the company; that until the map designating the route of the road was filed with the Secretary of the Interior the company was at liberty to adopt such a route as it might deem best after an examination of the ground had disclosed the advantages of different routes. But it was held that when the route was adopted by the company and a map designating it was filed with the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by that officer, the route was established. In the language of the Act, it was "definitely fixed" and could not be the subject of further change so as to affect the grant except by legislative consent; and that no further action was required on the part of the company to establish the route. It then became the duty of the Secretary to withdraw the lands granted from market, and the court said: "If he should neglect this duty, the neglect would not impair the rights of the company however prejudicial it might prove to others. Its rights are not made

It follows that upon the case stated the tax
imposed upon the Ferry Company was illegal
and void. The judgment of the Supreme Court
of the State of Pennsylvania must therefore be
reversed, and the cause remanded for further pro-
ceedings in conformity with this opinion.
True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk. Sup. Court, U. S.






APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit-dependent upon the issue of the Secretary's or-
ed States for the Dirtrict of Nebraska.
or upon of the withdrawal being
The bill in this case was filed in the court given to the local land officers. Congress,


(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 373–376.) Land-grants to railways, attach when-route definitely fixed when subsequent entry, void.

1. Under the Act of July 23, 1866, the land-grant of the St. Joseph and Denver Railroad Company attached to the adjoining sections when the route was adopted by the company, and a map designating it was filed with the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by him.

2. A subsequent entry by one without notice created no interest in him, and the patent issued upon that entry passed none. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 108 U. S., 360, affirmed.

[No. 220.] Submitted Apr. 1, 1885. Decided Apr. 13, 1885.



All other questions presented in this case are fully considered in Van Wyck v. Knevals, and we see no ground to change the conclusions then reached. For the reasons there stated, the decree of the court how must therefore be affirmed.

which possesses the absolute power of aliena- | wards created no interest in him, and the patent
tion of the public lands, has prescribed the issued upon that entry passed none.
period at which other parties than the grantee
named shall have the privilege of acquiring a
right to portions of the lands specified, and
neither the Secretary nor any other officer of
the Land Department can extend the period by
requiring something to be done subsequently,
and until done continuing the right of parties
to settle on the lands as previously." 106 U. S.,
366 [Bk. 28, L. ed. 203]. Since the decision of
that case the court, in R. Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113
U. S., 629 [Bk. 28, L. ed. 1122], has reconsid-
ered the question and come to the same con-
clusion, the receipt of the map in the land-of-
fice without objection being considered as
equivalent to its acceptance.

True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. &





It appears from the agreed statement of facts
that previous to the 21st of March, 1870, the en-
gineers of the railway company surveyed and
staked out upon the ground the proposed line
of the road, made a topographical map of the
country through which the line ran, showing
the government surveys and the proposed route
with reference to the section lines, and the
towns, counties and rivers; that such map was
Certain members of a copartnership agreed to
on that day approved by the board of direc-pay a retiring member a fixed amount as his capi
tors, and on the 25th of the same month was tal, all erroneously believing the firm to be solvent
filed, together with a certificate of the approval The new firm borrowed on its own notes and ap
plied the proceeds in payment of part of the capita
indorsed thereon, with the Secretary of the In- so agreed upon and of some of the debts of the old
terior, who approved the same, and on the 28th firm. Upon the failure of the new firm the holder
of the same month transmitted it to the Com- of its notes cannot charge the old firm or the retir
missioner of the General Land-Office, with di- ing partner with the money loaned on said notes
although it was thus applied.
rections to instruct the proper local land officers
[No. 221.]
to withdraw from sale or other disposal all Argued Mar. 31 and Apr. 1, 1885. Decided Apr
the odd-numbered sections falling within the
limits of twenty miles on each side of the line
of the route. On the 8th of April following the
Commissioner transmitted by mail a copy of
the map to the register and receiver of the lo-
cal land office at Beatrice, in Nebraska, but it
was not received by them until the 15th of that
month. On the 8th of April, 1870, one Clark
Irvin entered the lands in question at the land
office in Beatrice, and on the 1st of November,
1871, a patent was issued to him. At the time
of his entry no instructions had been received
from the Land Department of the Government
that the lands were withdrawn from market,
and he made his entry without any actual
knowledge of the filing of the company's map
with the Secretary, or of his order to withdraw
the lands from market. Subsequently the com-
pany applied to the Land Department for a
patent of the lands, and tendered the necessary
fees and charges. The application was refused
on the ground that Irvin's right of entry had at-
tached to the lands and a patent for them had
been issued to him. The plaintiff deraigned title
from the railroad company, and the defendant
deraigned title from Irvin, by deed, for which he
paid a valuable consideration, without notice of
the claim of the plaintiff. It thus appears that
the defendant made his entry and therefore ac-
quired whatever rights he possesses after the
map of the company designating its route had
been filed with the Secretary of the Interior,
March 25, 1870, and the route had thereby be-
come definitely established. The title of the
company to the adjoining odd sections was then
fixed. No rights could be initiated subsequent-
ly which could affect that title. The entry of
the defendant being on the 8th of April after-

LEY, Administrator of EDWARD L. BRIN
LEY, Deceased, ET AL.

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 376-381.)

Partnership-neither retiring member nor ola firm liable for loans to new firm used in pay ment of his capital and debts of old firm.

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit

Aed States for the Eastern District of Penn


The bill in this case was filed in the court be low by the appellant, to charge the defendant with certain moneys upon an accounting.

The court below having entered a decree dis missing the bill the complainant appealed to this court.

The facts of the case are stated by the court Mr. Nathan H. Sharpless, for appellant Mr. Charles Hart, for Furness et al., ap pellees.

Messrs. Samuel Dickson and E. G. Platt for Francis Brinley, appellee.

Mr Justice Field delivered the opinion o the court:

This is a suit by the Penn National Bank to charge the firm of Furness, Brinley & Co., o Philadelphia, with moneys obtained from the Bank by the firm of Furness, Ash & Co., 01 that city, in a discount of its paper, and used in payment of the debts of the first firm; an also to charge the defendant Edward L. Brin ley with the moneys thus obtained by Furness Ash & Co., which were used to pay its debt to him.

It appears from the record that for many years preceding January 1, 1878, the firm of Furness, Brinley & Co. was engaged in busi ness as auctioneers in the City of Philadelphia and was in good standing and credit. It con sisted, up to October 1, 1878, of James T Furness, Edward L. Brinley, Joshua P. Ash, William H. Ash, Henry Day and Dawes E. Fur

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