« ForrigeFortsett »
power of taxation, however vast in its character
borders, or to impose a license tax so heavy as
In the recent case of Pennsylvania v. Stand-
In Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S., 259 [Bk. 23, L. cd. 543], an Act of the State of New York requiring the owner or consignee of a vessel arriving at the Port of New York to give a bond for every passenger in a penalty of $300, with two sureties, each a resident and freehold er, conditioned to indemnify the Commissioner of Emigration, and every county, city and town in the State against any expense for the relief or support of the person named in the bond, for four years thereafter, but allowing in commutation of the bond a payment of one dollar and a half for each passenger within twenty-four hours after his landing, and imposing a penalty of $500 for each passenger if such payment were not made within that time, the penalty to be a lien upon the vessel, was held to be unconstitutional and void. In its decision the court said that the State imposed a tax on the shipowner for the right to land his passengers, and that it was in effect a tax on the passenger himself, since its payment was required as part of his fare. The transportation of a passenger from Liverpool to the city of New York," it added, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, "is one voyage. It is not completed until the passenger is disembarked at the pier in the latter city. A law or a rule emanating from any lawful authority which prescribes terms or conditions on which alone the vessel can discharge its passengers is a regulation of commerce; and, in case of vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports, is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations.' 92 U. S., 259, 271 [Bk. 23, L. ed., 543, 548].
These cases would seem to be decisive of the character of the business which is the subject of taxation in the present case. Receiving and landing passengers and freight is incident to their transportation. Without both there could be no such thing as their transportation across the river Delaware. The transportation, as to passengers, is not completed until, as said in the Henderson Case, they are disembarked at the pier of the city to which they are carried; and, as to freight, until it is landed upon such pier. And all restraints by exactions in the form of taxes upon such transportation or upon acts necessary to its completion are so many invasions of the exclusive power of Congress to regulate that portion of commerce between the States.
The cases where a tax or toll upon vessels is allowed to meet the expenses incurred in improving the navigation of waters traversed by them; as, by the removal of rocks, the construction of dams and locks to increase the depth of water and thus extend the line of navigation, or the construction of canals around falls-rest upon a different principle. The tax in such cases is considered merely as compensation for the additional facilities thus provided in the navigation of the waters. Kellogg v. Union Co., 12 Conn., 7; Thames Bank v Lovell, 18 Conn., 500; McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, 447.
Upon similar grounds, what are termed harbor dues or port charges exacted by the State from vessels in its harbors, or from their owners, for other than sanitary purposes are sustained. We say for other than sanitary purposes, for the power to prescribe regulations to protect the health of the community and prevent the spread of disease is incident to all
gress, yet the argument of the court was that
In Steamship Co. v. Porticardens, 6 Wall., 31
In Reading R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, sometimes called the Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232 [82 U. Š., bk. 21, L. ed. 146], it was held that the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania requiring railroad companies to pay to the state treasurer, for the use of the Commonwealth, a tax on each two thousand pounds of freight carried, was unconstitutional and void so far as it affected commodities transported through the State, or from points without the State to points within the State, or from points within the State to points without it, as being a regulation of interstate commerce.  The court said that the imposition of the tax whether large or small was a restraint upon the privilege or right to have the subjects of commerce passed freely from one State to another without being obstructed by the intervention of state lines. Its payment was a condition upon which the prosecution of that branch of commerce was made to depend, and its imposition therefore was in conflict with the power of Congress over the subject.
local municipal authority, however much such intercourse between the United States and forregulations may interfere with the movements eign countries. No sort of trade, he adds, can be of commerce. But independently of such carried on between this country and another to measures the State may prescribe regulations which the power does not extend; and what is for the government of vessels whilst in its har- true of foreign commerce is also true of combors; it may provide for their anchorage or merce between States over the waters separatmooring, so as to prevent confusion and col-ing them. Ferries between one of the States lision; it may designate the wharves at which and a foreign country cannot be deemed, therethey shall discharge and receive their passengers fore, beyond the control of Congress under the and cargoes, and require their removal from commercial power. They are necessarily govthe wharves when not thus engaged, so as to erned by its legislation on the importation and make room for other vessels. It may appoint exportation of merchandise and the immigration officers to see that the regulations are carried of foreigners-that is, are subject to its reguout, and impose penalties for refusing to obeylation in that respect; and if they are not bethe directions of such officers; and it may im-yond the control of the commercial power of pose a tax upon vessels, sufficient to meet the Congress, neither are ferries over waters sepaexpenses attendant upon the execution of the rating States. Congress has passed various regulations. The authority for establishing laws respecting such international and interstate regulations of this character is found in the ferries, the validity of which is not open to  right and duty of the supreme power of the question. It has provided that vessels used exState to provide for the safety, convenient use clusively as ferry-boats, carrying passengers, and undisturbed enjoyment of property within baggage and merchandise, shall not be required its limits; and charges incurred in enforcing the to enter and clear, nor shall their masters be reregulations may properly be considered as com- quired to present manifests, or to pay entrance pensation for the facilities thus furnished to the or clearance fees, or fees for receiving or cervessels. Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow., 351. tifying manifests; "but they shall, upon arrival in the United States, be required to report such baggage and merchandise to the proper officer of the customs, according to law" (R. S., § 2792); that the lights for ferry-boats shall be regulated by such rules as the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels shall prescribe (R. S., § 4233, Rule 7); that any foreign railroad company or corporation whose road enters the United States by means of a ferry or tug-boat, may own such boat, and that it shall be subject to no other or different restrictions or regulations in such employment than if owned by a citizen of the United States (R. S., § 4370); that the hull and boilers of every ferry-boat propelled by steam shall be inspected, and provisions of law for the better security of life, which may be applicable to them, shall, by regulations of the supervising inspectors, be required to be complied with before a certificate of inspection be granted; and that they shall not be navigated without a licensed engineer and a licensed pilot (R. S., § 4426).
Should such regulations interfere with the exercise of the commercial power of Congress, they may at any time be superseded by its action. It was not intended, however, by the grant to Congress to supersede or interfere with the power of the States to establish police regulations for the better protection and enjoyment of property. Sometimes, indeed, as remarked by Mr. Cooley, the line of distinction between what constitutes an interference with commerce and what is a legitimate police regulation is exceedingly dim and shadowy, and, he adds, "it is not doubted that Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to the most minute directions if it shall be deemed advisable; and that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions, the exercise of state power is excluded. Congress may establish police regulations, as well as the States, confining their operations to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitution; but as the general police power can better be exercised under the provisions of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in the National Congress, the regulations which are made by Congress do not often exclude the establishment of others by the State covering very many particulars." Cooley, Coust. Lim., 732.
It is true that from the earliest period in the history of the government the States have authorized and regulated ferries not only over waters entirely within their limits, but over waters separating them; and it may be conceded that in many respects the States can more advantageously manage such interstate ferries than the General Government; and that the privilege of keeping a ferry, with a right to take The power of the States to regulate matters toll for passengers and freight, is a franchise of internal police includes the establishment of grantable by the State, to be exercised within ferries as well as the construction of roads and such limits and under such regulations as may bridges. In Gibbons v. Ogden [9 Wheat., 203], be required for the safety, comfort and conChief Justice Marshall said that laws respecting venience of the public. Still the fact remains ferries, as well as inspection laws, quarantine that such a ferry is a means-and a necessary laws, health laws regulating the internal com-means-of commercial intercourse between the merce of the States, are component parts of an States bordering on their dividing waters, and immense mass of legislation, embracing every- it must therefore be conducted without the imthing within the limits of a State not surrendered position by the States of taxes or other burdens to the General Government; but in this language upon the commerce between them. Freedom he plainly refers to ferries entirely within the from such imposition does not of course imState, and not to ferries transporting passengers ply exemption from reasonable charges as comand freight between the States and a foreign pensation for the carriage of persons, in the country; for the power vested in Congress, he way of tolls or fares, or from the ordinary taxaBays, comprehends every species of commercial tion to which other property is subjected, any
more than like freedom of transportation on | below, by the appellee, to secure the convey.
The facts of the case are sufficiently stated
Messrs. Delinzo A. Walden, in person, John M. Thurston, L. M. Colby and Alfred Hazlett, for appellant.
Mr. J. M. Woolworth, for appellee.
That freedom implies exemption from charges other than such as are imposed by way of compensation for the use of the property employed, or for facilities afforded for its use, or as ordinary taxes upon the value of the property. How conflicting legislation of the two States on the subject of ferries on waters dividing them is to be met and treated is not a question before us for consideration. Pennsylvania has never attempted to exercise its power of establishing and regulating ferries across the Delaware River. Any one, so far as her laws are concerned, is free, as we are informed, to establish such ferries as he may choose. No license fee is exacted from ferrykeepers. She merely exercises the right to designate the places of landing, as she does the places of landing for all vessels engaged in commerce. The question, therefore, respecting the tax in the present case is not complicated by any action of that State concerning ferries. However great her power, no legislation on her part can impose a tax on that portion of interstate commerce which is involved in the transportation of persons and freight, whatever be the instrumentality by which it is carried on.
Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:
The questions presented in this case are similar to those considered and decided in Van Wyck v. Knevals, reported in 106 U. S. Reports [bk.27, L. ed. 2011. By the Act of Congress of July 23, 1866 [14 Stat. at L., 210], there was granted to the State of Kansas, for the use and benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver Railroad Company, in the construction of a railroad from Ellwood in that State to its junction with the Union Pacific Railroad or a branch thereof, not further west than the 100th meridian of west longitude, every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for ten sections in width on each side of the road, to the point of intersection. The grant was accompanied, however, with this qualification—that in case it should appear that the United States had, when the line or route of the road was "definitely fixed," sold any section or part thereof thus granted, or that the right of preemption or homestead settlement had attached to the same, or that it had been reserved by the United States for any purpose whatever, then it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause an equal quantity of other lands to be selected from the odd sections nearest to those designated, in lieu of the lands thus appropriated. The main question here, as in the case mentioned, is, When was the route of the road to be considered as "definitely fixed" so that the grant attached to the adjoining sections. In the case mentioned we held that the route must be considered as "definitely fixed" when it had ceased to be the subject of change at the volition of the company; that until the map designating the route of the road was filed with the Secretary of the Interior the company was at liberty to adopt such a route as it might deem best after an examination of the ground had disclosed the advantages of different routes. But it was held that when the route was adopted by the company and a map designating it was filed with the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by that officer, the route was established. In the language of the Act, it was "definitely fixed" and could not be the subject of further change so as to affect the grant except by legislative consent; and that no further action was required on the part of the company to establish the route. It then became the duty of the Secretary to withdraw the lands granted from market, and the court said: "If he should neglect this duty, the neglect would not impair the rights of the company however prejudicial it might prove to others. Its rights are not made
It follows that upon the case stated the tax
James H. McKenney, Clerk. Sup. Court, U. S.
DELINZO A. WALDEN, Appt.,
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit-dependent upon the issue of the Secretary's or-
SHERMAN W. KNEVALS.
(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 373–376.) Land-grants to railways, attach when-route definitely fixed when subsequent entry, void.
1. Under the Act of July 23, 1866, the land-grant of the St. Joseph and Denver Railroad Company attached to the adjoining sections when the route was adopted by the company, and a map designating it was filed with the Secretary of the Interior and accepted by him.
2. A subsequent entry by one without notice created no interest in him, and the patent issued upon that entry passed none. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 108 U. S., 360, affirmed.
[No. 220.] Submitted Apr. 1, 1885. Decided Apr. 13, 1885.
All other questions presented in this case are fully considered in Van Wyck v. Knevals, and we see no ground to change the conclusions then reached. For the reasons there stated, the decree of the court how must therefore be affirmed.
which possesses the absolute power of aliena- | wards created no interest in him, and the patent
True copy. Test:
James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. &
PENN NATIONAL BANK, Appt.,
It appears from the agreed statement of facts
JAMES T. FURNESS, FRANCIS BRIN
(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 376-381.)
Partnership-neither retiring member nor ola firm liable for loans to new firm used in pay ment of his capital and debts of old firm.
PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit
Aed States for the Eastern District of Penn
The bill in this case was filed in the court be low by the appellant, to charge the defendant with certain moneys upon an accounting.
The court below having entered a decree dis missing the bill the complainant appealed to this court.
The facts of the case are stated by the court Mr. Nathan H. Sharpless, for appellant Mr. Charles Hart, for Furness et al., ap pellees.
Messrs. Samuel Dickson and E. G. Platt for Francis Brinley, appellee.
Mr Justice Field delivered the opinion o the court:
This is a suit by the Penn National Bank to charge the firm of Furness, Brinley & Co., o Philadelphia, with moneys obtained from the Bank by the firm of Furness, Ash & Co., 01 that city, in a discount of its paper, and used in payment of the debts of the first firm; an also to charge the defendant Edward L. Brin ley with the moneys thus obtained by Furness Ash & Co., which were used to pay its debt to him.
It appears from the record that for many years preceding January 1, 1878, the firm of Furness, Brinley & Co. was engaged in busi ness as auctioneers in the City of Philadelphia and was in good standing and credit. It con sisted, up to October 1, 1878, of James T Furness, Edward L. Brinley, Joshua P. Ash, William H. Ash, Henry Day and Dawes E. Fur