[642] remand the cause at any time when the fact is It is suggested, however, that a suit on a FORT LEAVENWORTH RAILROAD v. PERCIVAL G. LOWE, Sheriff of the (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 525-542.) Constitutional law-jurisdiction over lands, within a State, occupied by the United Stateswhen exclusive in United States-conditional grant to United States. 1. The legislative power of Congress is exclusive over lands within a State purchased with its consent by the United States for a constitutional purpose. 2. Where the United States acquires lands within a State in any other way than by purchase with its consent, forts, arsenals or other public buildings ment, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. But, when not used as such instrumentalities, the legislative power of the State over the places acquired will be as full and complete as over any other places within its limits. It is observable that the removal of the cause was not claimed on any such broad ground as this; but so far as the character of the case was concerned, only on the ground that the defend-erected thereon for the use of the General Governant had a defense under section 739 of the Revised Statutes, specifying what the defense was; and we have already shown that that ground of removal, as stated in the petition, was insufficient. But, conceding that the defendant is now entitled to take its position on the bro der ground referred to, is it tenable and sufficient for the purpose? 3. The cession of lands by a State to the United States may be upon such conditions as the State may see fit to annex not inconsistent with the free and effective use of such lands for the purposes in tended. 4. After the admission of the State of Kansas the United States retained only the rights of an ordiReservation; except as an instrument for the execution of the powers of the General Government, that part of the tract, which was actually used as a fort or military post, was beyond such control of its use for those purposes. The clause of the Act of the State, by taxation or otherwise, as would defeat the Legislature of Kansas of February 23, 1875. to cede jurisdiction over said Reservation to the United States, saving to the State" the right to tax railroad, bridge and other corporations, their franchises and property, on said Reservation" is valid, and a tax upon a railroad paid to the State cannot be recovered back. What is a judgment, but a security of reword showing a debt due from one person to another? It is as much a mere security as a treasury note, or a bond of the United Sites. If Anary proprietor in the Fort Leavenworth Military brings an action against B, trover or otherwise, for the withholding of such securities, it is not therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, although the whole value of the securities depends upon the fact of their being the obligations of the United States. So if A have title to land by patent of the United States and brings an action against B for trespass or waste, committed by cutting timber, or by mining and carrying away precious ores, or the like, it is not therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States. It is simply the case of an ordinary right of property sought to be en forced. A suit on a judgment is nothing more, These considerations show a wide distinction, Without pursuing the subject further, we The judgment of the Supreme Court of New True copy._Test: [No. 243.] Argued Apr. 9, 10, 1885. Decided May 4, 1885. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. This action was brought in the District Court of Leavenworth, Kansas, by the plaintiff in error, to recover certain taxes paid under an alleged illegal assessment upon property situated within the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation. The court rendered judgment on demurrer, for the defendant. This judgment having been affirmed, on error, by the court below, the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The facts of the case are stated by the court. Messrs. E. E. Cook, Thos. F. Withrow and M. A. Low, for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. Hallett Phillips, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff, a Corporation organized under the laws of Kansas, was in 1880, and has ever since been, the owner of a railroad in the Res ervation of the United States in that State, known as the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation. In that year its track, right of way James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. franchises, road bed, telegraph line and instru Cited-115 U. S., 257. ments connected therewith on the Reservation, ed by the board of assessors of the * and a tax of $394.40 levied thereon, paid by the Railroad Company unorder to prevent a sale of the The present action is brought to reack the money thus paid, on the ground -property, being entirely within the was exempt from assessment and the State. treaties with the United States, which provided stituting the Reservation was raps, or overconfidence that sach jurisdiction could be had no such stipulation or exade. The United States, therefer the admission of the State, an ordinary proprietor; extent for the execution of the teral Government, that part of Was actually used for a fort or beyond such control of the or otherwise, as would depurposes. So far as the the Reservation was not used 24poses, the possession of the only that of an individual The State could have exercised, it, the same authority and she could have exercised over bed by private parties. This ction of the United States ertion of the government in that year the Secretary of munication to the Attor* papers touching the Resating for his official opinion ber, under the Constitution, the land for a site as a milic buildings took it out the law of March 3, 1859, and if so, what action would the part of the Executive or the land to the exclusive >nited States. The Attor that the Act admitting Kan the Union had the effect to feral insdiction all the terridanes of the new State, al of the Indians having The question as to the right of the plaintiff to recover back the taxes paid depends upon the validity and effect of the last saving clause in this Act. As we have said, there is no evidence before us that any application was made by the United States for this legislation, but, as it conferred a benefit, the acceptance of the Act is to be presumed in the absence of any dissent on their part. The contention of the plaintiff is that the Act of cession operated under the Constitution to vest in the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the Reservation, and that the last saving clause, being inconsistent with that result, is to be rejected. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have pow er to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square), as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Goverment of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings." Art. 1, § 8. The necessity of complete jurisdiction over the place which should be selected as the seat of government was obvious to the framers of the Constitution. Unless it were conferred, the deliberations of Congresss might in times of excitement be exposed to interruptions without adequate means of protection; its members and the officers of the government be subjected to insult and intimidation, and the public archives be in danger of destruction. The Federalist, in support of this clause in the Constitution, in addition to these reasons, urged that "a dependence of the members of the General Government on the State comprehending the seat [528] [529] of the government for protection in the exercise | tion of forts and other buildings for the defense in which they were situated was obtained for their acquisition, such consent should carry with it political dominion and legislative authority over them. Purchase with such consent was the only mode then thought of for the acquisition by the General Government of title to lands in the States. Since the adoption of the Constitution this view has not generally prevailed. Such consent has not always been obtained, nor supposed necessary, for the purchase by the General Government of lands within the States. If any doubt has ever existed as to its power thus to acquire lands within the States, it has not had sufficient strength to create any effective dissent from the general opinion. The consent of the States to the purchase of land within them for the special purposes named is however, essential, under the Constitution, to the transfer to the General Government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion Where lands are acquired without such consent the possession of the United States, unless po litical jurisdiction be ceded to them in some othe way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor The property in that case, unless used as means to carry out the purposes of the govern ment, is subject to the legislative authority an control of the States equally with the propert of private individuals. The necessity of supreme legislative authority over the seat of government was forcibly impressed upon the members of the Constitutional Convention by occurrences which took place near the close of the Revolutionary War. At that time, while Congress was in session in Philadelphia, it was surrounded and insulted by a body of mutineers of the Continental Army. In giving an account of this proceeding, Mr. Rawle, in his treatise on the Constitution, says of the action of Congress: "It applied to the executive authority of Pennsylvania for defense; but, under the ill-conceived Constitution of the State at that time, the executive power was vested in a council, consisting of thirteen members, and they possessed or exhibited so little energy, and such apparent intimidation, that the Congress indignantly removed to New Jersey, whose inhabitants welcomed it with promises of defending it. It remained for some time at Princeton without being again insulted, till, for the sake of greater convenience, it adjourned to Annapolis. The general dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the executive authority of Pennsylvania, and the degrading spectacle of a fugitive Congress, suggested the remedial provisions now under But not only by direct purchase have th consideration." Rawle, p. 113. Of this proceed- United States been able to acquire lands the ing Mr. Justice Story remarks: "If such a les-needed without the consent of the States, bu son could have been lost upon the people, it would have been as humiliating to their intelligence as it would have been offensive to their honor." 2 Story, Com. Const., § 1219. it has been held that they possess the right eminent domain within the States, using thes terms, not as expressing the ultimate dominic or title to property, but as indicating the rig Upon the second part of the clause in ques- to take private property for public uses whe tion, giving power to "exercise like authority." needed to execute the powers conferred by th that is, of exclusive legislation "over all places Constitution; and that the General Governme purchased by the consent of the Legislature of is not dependent upon the caprice of individua the State in which the same shall be, for the or the will of State Legislatures in the acquierection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock- tion of such lands as may be required for th yards, and other needful buildings," the Fed- full and effective exercise of its power eralist observes that the necessity of this au- This doctrine was authoritatively declared thority is not less evident. "The public money Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S., 367 [Bk. 23, L. e expended on such places," it adds, "and the pub- 449]. All the judges of the court agreed in t lic property deposited in them, require that possession by the General Government of th they should be exempt from the authority of right, although there was a difference of opi the particular State. Nor would it be proper ion whether provision for the exercise of t for the places on which the security of the en- right had been made in that case. The cou tire Union may depend to be in any degree de- after observing that lands in the States are nee perdent on a particular member of it. All ob- ed for forts, armories and arsen els, for na jections and scruples are here also obviated by yards and light-houses, for custom-houses a requiring the concurrence of the States con- court houses, and for other public uses, sai cerned in every such establishment." "The pow-" If the right to acquire property for such us er," says Mr. Justice Story, repeating the sub-may be made a barren right by the unwillin stance of Mr. Madison's language, is wholly ness of property holders to sell, or by the acti unexceptionable, since it can only be exercised of a State prohibiting a sale to the Federal Go at the will of the State, and therefore it is placed ernment, the constitutional grants of power m beyond all reasonable scruple." be rendered nugatory, and the government is pendent for its practical existence upon the w of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen The right to acquire property in this way. condemnation, may be exerted either throu tribunals expressly designated by Congress, by resort to tribunals of the State in which property is situated, with her consent for t purpose. Such consent will always be sumed in the absence of express prohibiti U. S. v. Jones, 109 U.S., 513, 519 [Bk. 27. L. This power of exclusive legislation is to be exercised, as thus seen, over places purchased, by consent of the Legislatures of the States in which they are situated, for the specific purposes enumerated. It would seem to have been the opinion of the framers of the Constitution that, without the consent of the States, the new government would not be able to acquire lands within them; and therefore it was provided that when it might require such lands for the erec Matter of Petition of U. S., 96 N. | chase must be by consent of the Legislature of the State, and then the jurisdiction of the these modes of acquisition, the United United States under the Constitution became ->sed, on the adoption of the Consti- exclusive. In that case the defendant was inmense domain lying north and dicted for murder committed in Fort Adams, the Ohio River, acquired as the result in Newport Harbor Rhode Island. The place a evolutionary War from Great Britain, had been purchased by the United States with was from Virginia, Massachusetts the consent of the State, to which was added t, and since the adoption of the the reservation mentioned, as to the service of they have, by cession from for- civil and criminal process within it. The main , come into the ownership of a questions presented for decision were, whether arzer, lying between the Missis- the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the ere and the Pacific Ocean, and out of place vested in the United States without a fores several States have been formed mal Act of cession, and whether the reservation nto the Union. The proprietor- as to service of process made the jurisdiction the United States in large tracts of land concurrent with that of the State. The first States has remained after their question was answered, as above, that the purThere has been, therefore, no neces- chase by consent gave the exclusive jurisdicthem to purchase or to condemn lands tion; and, as to the second question, the court States, for forts, arsenals, and said: "In its terms, it certainly does not conbildings, unless they had disposed tain any reservation of concurrent jurisdiction afterwards needed. Having the or legislation. It provides only that civil Leave usually reserved certain por- and criminal process issued under the aurands from sale or other disposi-thority of the State, which must, of course, ses of the government. be for acts done within and cognizable by the tement as to the different modes State, may be executed within the ceded lands, United States have acquired title notwithstanding the cession. Not a word is which public buildings have been said from which we can infer that it was inrve to explain the nature of their tended that the State should have a right to er such places, and the consist-punish for acts done within the ceded lands. est other of decisions on the sub- The whole apparent object is answered by conand state tribunals, and of opin-sidering the clause as meant to prevent these Attorneys-General. lands from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice for acts done within the acknow ledged jurisdiction of the State. Now, there is nothing incompatible with the exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction of one State that it should permit another State in such cases to execute its process within its limits. And a cession of exclusive jurisdiction may well be made with a reservation of a right of this nature, which then operates only as a condition annexed to the cession, and as an agreement of the new sovereign to permit its free exercise, as quoad hoc his own process. This is the light in which clauses of this nature (which are very frequent in grants made by the States to the United States) have been received by this court on various occasions on which the subject has been heretofore brought before it for consideration, and it is the same light in which it has also been received by a very learned state court. In our judgment it comports entirely with the apparent intention of the parties, and gives effect to Acts which might otherwise, perhaps, be construed entirely nugatory. For it may well be doubted whether Congress is, by the terms of the Constitution, at liberty to purchase lands for forts, dock-yards, etc., with the consent of the State Legislature, where such consent is so qualified that it will not justify the exclusive legislation of Congress there. It may well be doubted if such consent be not utterly void. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat, we are bound to give the present Act a different construction if it may reasonably be done; and we have not the least hesitation in declaring that the true interpretation of the present proviso leaves the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of Fort Adams in the United States." title is acquired by purchase by the Legislatures of the States, the is exclusive of all state audows from the declaration of that Congress shall have "like -er such places as it has over the the seat of government; that exclusive legislation in all Broader or clearer language d to exclude all other authoriress; and that no other aused over them has been the of federal and state tribunals Ay-General. which has usually accompa- [534] The case referred to in which the subject [535] was considered by a learned state court is that of Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass., 72. There [536] purposes of legislation and jurisprudence, with the single exception expressed; and consequently that no persons are amenable to the laws of the Commonwealth for crimes and offenses committed within said territory; and that persons residing within the same do not acquire the civil and political privileges, nor do they become subject to the civil duties and obligations, of inhabitants of the towns within which such territory is situated." And accordingly they were of opinion that persons residing on such lands were not entitled to the benefits of the common schools for their children in the towns in which such lands were situated. 1 Met., 580. In Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St., 306, the question came before the Supreme Court of Ohio, as to the effect of a proviso in the Act of that State, ceding to the United States its jurisdiction over lands within her limits for the purposes of a National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, which was, that nothing in the Act should be construed to prevent the officers. employees and inmates of the asylum, who were qualified voters of the State, from exercising the right of suffrage at all township. county and state elections in the township in which the National Asylum should be located And it was held that, upon the purchase of the territory by the United States, with the consen of the Legislature of the State, the Genera Government became invested with exclusiv jurisdiction over it and its appurtenances in al cases whatsoever; and that the inmates of suc asylum resident within the territory, being with in such exclusive jurisdiction, were not resident of the State so as to entitle them to vote, withi the meaning of the Constitution, wh ch con ferred the elective franchise upon its resident alone. the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that |