HON. GEORGE WILLIAM BROWN.

ON. GEORGE WILLIAM BROWN, a distinguished lawyer of Baltimore, was elected Mayor of that city, in the autumn of 1860. For a number of years previously, the city had been entirely under the control of the Know Nothing party.

After that party came into power, it so mismanaged public affairs that it fell largely into the minority; but, having the appointment of all the officers, including the judges of election and police force, it succeeded in carrying every election by a system of organized fraud and violence at the polls, which, up to that time, was without a parallel in the history of the country.

This state of things led to the formation of the Reform party. After a strenuous and determined, but ineffectual resistance at the polls, the leaders of the Reform movement applied for and obtained from the Legislature of the State, a system of laws, very carefully prepared by them, which provided for the creation of a Board of Commissioners by the State, with power to appoint and control the police, and also appoint the judges of elections.

Under the operation of these laws, there was held, in the autumn of 1860, the first fair and peaceable election which had taken place in the city of Baltimore for many years, and Mr. Brown, as the nominee of the Reform party, (of which, from the beginning, he had been a prominent member,) was chosen Chief Magistrate of the city by a very large majority.

One of the cardinal principles of the party was to keep the affairs of the city carefully separated from national politics, and this principle Mr. Brown steadfastly adhered to throughout his administration, notwithstanding the difficul ties interposed by the breaking out of the war.

Mr. Brown's opinions on national affairs were, however, very decided, and were freely expressed. He was opposed to slavery, and earnestly desired to see it abolished by constitutional and legal means, but by those only. He did not think that a State had a constitutional right to secede from the Union, but he believed that the constitutional rights of the Southern States had been persistently violated by the Northern States, on a point which the former had always regarded as fundamental the rendition of fugitive slaves; and that not only was the General Government both unable and unwilling to afford redress, but that the advent of the Republican party to power on the basis of the Chicago platform, and with its avowed hostility to slavery, clearly boded additional aggres sions on the rights of the slaveholding States.

On these grounds, while he deprecated secession as an unwise step, he thought that the North should either guarantee to the South its constitutional rights, or let it depart in peace, and he was therefore opposed to the war, which he believed to be waged for the purpose of subjugation.

Maryland being a Border State, it was natural that the sympathies of her people should be divided, but it is undoubtedly true that the feelings of the large majority, both in the State and in the city of Baltimore, were strongly enlisted on the side of the South. When, therefore, the President, by his proclamation issued in April, 1861, called out a volunteer force of seventy-five thousand men, who were to assemble in Washington, a violent feeling of indignation was aroused. It was regarded as an attempt to overrun and subjugate the South.

The first detachment of troops came from Pennsylvania, and were without arms. They were escorted through the city by the police, who protected them from violence from the angry crowd who followed them.

The next day, the memorable 19th of April, a body of troops fully armed and equipped, arrived from Massachusetts. The police authorities had previously, but in vain, endea vored to ascertain the precise time of their arrival, in order

that proper arrangements might be made for their reception, and had kept the whole police force for many hours in readiness, so that they were almost worn out from fatigue. But the authorities of the United States kept back all information, until about an hour before the troops actually arrived, and then gave instructions which proved to be most injudicious.

The police authorities were directed to receive the troops at the Camden or Washington Station, although they were to arrive at the other end of the city, at the Philadelphia Station. They were not to march through the city, but were to be carried through on the cars. The first cars came safely through to the Camden Station, where the police were drawn up in force, but the last were not so fortunate. A mob tore up the rails near the Philadelphia Station, and a force, consisting of several companies, was compelled to leave the cars and march.

The mob was unarmed, except a few pistols, and attacked the soldiers with stones and such missiles as they could lay hands on. The Mayor had left the Camden Station, suppos ing that all the troops had safely arrived there, and that the danger was over, and was walking to his office in the direc tion of the advancing companies, when information was brought to him of the attack. He immediately hastened to the spot, and sent an order to the Marshal to follow with a body of the police. He met the troops rapidly marching, the crowd following. He placed himself at the head of the troops and marched with them, but his presence did not avail either to protect them from attack or the citizens from their indiscriminate fire.

Men were killed and wounded on both sides. Soon, however, the Marshal of Police, at the head of about fifty men, rushed forward from the direction of the Camden Station, passed to the rear of the troops, threw themselves across the street, and, with pistols presented, kept back the advancing mob.

The scldiers, thus protected, marched to Camden Station,

were placed in the cars, and sent forward to Washington, and but for this timely succor would have suffered severely. The effect of the collision on the people was instantaneous and prodigious. Citizens not engaged in the strife had been killed. Scenes of future bloodshed were apprehended; the passions of the young and excitable were fearfully aroused, and the most sober-minded, and even those of the strongest Union sentiments, for a time shared in the excitement.

The people appeared to have come to the unanimous de termination that no more troops should pass through the city. But other troops were known to be on the way, and might arrive at any moment, and their arrival would have been the signal for the renewal of the strife.

The authorities of the city telegraphed to Washington, but received no reply. In this dilemma, the Mayor and Police Commissioners, with the approbation of Governor Hicks, who was then in Baltimore, caused certain bridges on the Northern Central Railway, and the Philadelphia, Wil mington and Baltimore Railroad, to be disabled; and this was done just in time to prevent a body of unarmed troops, from Pennsylvania, entering the city.

On Sunday morning, April 21, at about 3 o'clock, Mr. Brown received a telegram from President Lincoln, requesting him and Governor Hicks to go to Washington, and stating that a special train would be provided for the purpose. Governor Hicks had gone to Annapolis, but Mr. Brown, accompanied by several friends, proceeded at once to Washington, and had a long interview and frank explanation and interchange of opinions with the President and Cabinet, and also with the Commander-in-chief, General Scott, who was present at the meeting.

The substance of the interview was published at the time in the following card, which appeared in the papers :

"BALTIMORE, April 21, 7 o'clock P.M. "Mayor Brown received a telegram from the President of the United States, at 3 o'clock this morning, directed to himself and

Governo Hicks, requesting them to go to Washington by special train, in order to consult with Mr. Lincoln for the preserva. tion of the peace of Maryland. The Mayor replied that Governor Hicks was not in the city, and inquired if he should go alone.

"Receiving an answer by telegraph in the affirmative, his Honor, accompanied by George W. Dobbin, John C. Brune, and S. T. Wallis, Esqs., whom he had summoned to attend him, proceeded at once to the station.

"After a series of delays, they were enabled to procure a special train, about half-past seven o'clock, in which they arrived in Washington about 10. They proceeded at once to the Presi dent's House, where they were admitted to an immediate inter view, to which the Cabinet and General Scott were summoned. A long conversation and discussion ensued. The President, upon his part, recognized the good faith of the city and State authori ties, and insisted upon his own.

"He admitted the excited state of feeling in Baltimore, and his desire and duty to avoid the fatal consequences of a collision with the people. He urged, on the other hand, the absolute, irresistible necessity of having a transit through the State for such troops as might be necessary for the protection of the Federal Capital.

"The protection of Washington, he asseverated with great earnestness, was the sole object of concentrating troops there, and he protested that none of the troops brought through Maryland were intended for any purpose hostile to the State, or aggres sive as against the Southern States. Being now unable to bring them up the Potomac in security, the Government must either bring them through Maryland, or abandon the Capital.

"He called on General Scott for his opinion, which the General gave at length, to the effect that troops might be brought through. Maryland without going through Baltimore, by either carrying them from Perrysville to Annapolis, and thence by rail to Washington, or by bringing them to the Relay House, on the Northern Central Railroad, and marching them to the Relay House, on the Washington Railroad, and thence by rail to the Capital.

"If the people would permit them to go by either of these rontes uninterruptedly, the necessity of their passing through