Trials of others, 1817. those of 1794, which had been undertaken under similar circumstances. James Watson, Arthur Thistlewood, Watson and James Watson the younger, Thomas Preston, and John Hooper, were indicted for high treason, arising out of a riotous meeting in Spa Fields, which they had called together, and other riotous and seditious proceedings, for which none will deny that they deserved condign punishment. They were entitled to no sympathy as patriots or reformers; and the wickedness of their acts was only to be equalled by their folly. But the government, not warned by the experience of 1794,-indicted them, not for sedition and riot, of which they were unquestionably guilty, but for treason; and so allowed them to escape with impunity.1 Derbyshire 1817. 1 In the month of June disturbances, approaching the character of insurrection, broke out in Derbyshire; insurrection, and the ringleaders were tried and convicted. Brandreth, commonly known as the Nottingham Captain, Turner and Ludlam were executed: Weightman and twenty-one others received His Majesty's pardon, on condition of transportation or imprisonment; and against twelve others no evidence was offered by the attorneygeneral.2 Lord Sid mouth's cir 27th, 1817. When the repressive measures of this session had been passed, the government commenced a more rigorcular, March ous execution of the laws against the press. Lord Sidmouth addressed a circular letter to the lordslieutenants of counties, acquainting them that the law officers of the crown were of opinion, that a justice of the peace may issue a warrant to apprehend any person charged on oath with the publication of a blasphemous or seditious libel, and compel him to give bail to answer the charge; and desiring them to communicate this opinion to the magistrates at the ensuing quarter sessions, and to recommend them to 1 St. Tr., xxxii. 1, 674; Lord Sidmouth's Life, iii. 158. 2 St. Tr., xxxii. 755-1394; Lord Sidmouth's Life, iii. 179-183; Reports on the state of the country; Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxvii. 568, 679. Its lawfulness May 12th 25th, 1817. act upon it. He further informed them that the venders of pamphlets or tracts should be considered as within the provisions of the Hawkers' and Pedlars' Act, and should be dealt with accordingly, if selling such wares without a license. Doubts were immediately raised concerning the lawfulness and policy of this circular; and the questioned, question was brought by Earl Grey before the and June Lords, and by Sir Samuel Romilly before the Commons. Their arguments were briefly these. The law itself, as declared in this circular, was ably contested, by reference to authorities and principles. It could not be shown that justices had this power by common law: it had not been conferred by statute; nor had it been recognized by any express decision of the courts. But, at all events, it was confessedly doubtful, or the opinion of the law officers would not have been required. In 1808, it had been doubted if judges of the Court of King's Bench could commit or hold to bail persons charged with the publication of libels, before indictment or information; and this power was then conferred by statute. But now the right of magistrates to commit, like the judges, was determined, neither by Parliament, nor by any judicial authority, but by the crown, through its own executive officers. The secretary of state had interfered with the discretion of justices of the peace. What if he had ventured to deal, in such a manner, with the judges? The justices had been instructed, not upon a matter of administration or police, but upon their judicial duties. The constitution had maintained a separation of the executive and judicial authorities; but here they had been confounded. The crown, in declaring the law, had usurped the province of the legislature; and in instructing the magistrates, had encroached upon an independent judicature. And, apart 1 May 12th, 1817 (Lords); Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxvi. 445. See also Lord Sidmouth's Life, iii. 176. 2 Ibid., June 25th (Commons), 1158. 8 48 Geo. III. c. 58. from these constitutional considerations, it was urged that the exercise of such powers by justices of the peace was exposed to grave abuses. Men might be accused before a magistrate, not only of publishing libels, but of uttering seditious words they might be accused by spies and informers of incautious language, spoken in the confidence of private society; and yet, upon such testimony, they might be committed to prison by a single magistrate, possibly a man of violent prejudices and strong political prepossessions. On the part of ministers it was replied that magistrates, embar rassed in the discharge of their duties, having applied to the secretary of state for information, he had consulted the law officers, and communicated their opinion. He had no desire to interfere with their discretion, but had merely promulgated a law. The law had been correctly expounded, and if disputed, it could be tried before a court of law on a writ of habeas corpus. But, in the meantime, unless the hawkers of seditious tracts could be arrested, while engaged in their pernicious traffic, they were able to set the police at defiance. Whatever the results of these discussions, they at least served as a warning to the executive, ever to keep in view the broad principle of English freedom, which distinguishes independent magistrates from prefects of police. Threatening, indeed, were now the terrors of the law. The press, 1817. Powers exer the press. While every justice of the peace could issue his warrant against a supposed libeller, and hold him cised against to bail; the secretary of state, armed with the extraordinary powers of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, could imprison him upon bare suspicion, and detain him in safe custody without bringing him to trial. The attorney-general continued to wield his terrible ex-officio informations, holding the accused to bail, or keeping them in prison in default of it, until their trial.1 Defendants were punished, if convicted, with fine and imprisonment, — and, even if acquitted, with ruinous costs. Nor did the judges 1 48 Geo. III. c. 59. spare any exertion to obtain convictions. Ever jealous and distrustful of the press, they had left as little discretion to juries as they were able; and using freely the power reserved to them by the Libel Act of 1792, of stating their own opinion, they were eloquent in summing up the sins of libellers.1 66 from Eng William Cobbett, who had already suffered from the severities of the attorney-general, was not disposed to Cobbett's brave the secretary of state, but suspended his withdrawal "Political Register," and sailed to America. "I land. do not retire," said he, "from a combat with the attorneygeneral; but from a combat with a dungeon, deprived of pen, ink, and paper. A combat with the attorney-general is quite unequal enough. That, however, I would have encountered. I know too well what a trial by special jury is: yet that, or any sort of trial, I would have stayed to face. But against the absolute power of imprisonment, without even a hearing, for time unlimited, in any jail in the kingdom, without the use of pen, ink, and paper, and without communication with any soul but the keepers, against such a power it would have been worse than madness to attempt to strive." 2 Ministers had silenced and put to flight their most formidable foe; but against this success must be set their Trials of utter discomfiture by an obscure bookseller, who Hone, 1817. would never have been known to fame, had he not been drawn out from his dingy shop into a court of justice. William Hone had published some political squibs, in the form of parodies upon the liturgy of the church; and for this pitiful trash was thrice put upon his trial, for blasphemous and seditious libels. Too poor to seek professional aid, he defended himself in person. But he was a man of genius in his way; and with singular ingenuity and persistence, and much quaint learning, he proved himself more than a match for the attorney-general and the bench. 1 Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, vi. 517. 2 Political Register, 28th March, 1817. In vain did Lord Ellenborough, uniting the authority of the judge with the arts of a counsel, strive for a conviction. Addressing the jury, "under the authority of the Libel Act, and still more in obedience to his conscience and his God, he pronounced this 'to be a most impious and profane libel." But the jury were proof alike against his authority and his persuasion. The humble bookseller fairly overcame the awful chief justice; and, after intellectual triumphs which would have made the reputation of a more eminent man was thrice acquitted.1 These proceedings savored so strongly of persecution, that they excited a wide sympathy for Hone, amongst men who would have turned with disgust from his writings; and his trial, in connection with other failures, insured at least a temporary mitigation of severity in the administration of the libel laws.2 Trials in M'Lareu and 5th, 1817. At this time some trials in Scotland, if they remind us of 1793, afford a gratifying contrast to the administration of justice at that period. Alexander Baird, March M'Laren, a weaver, and Thomas Baird, a grocer,3 were tried for sedition before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh. The weaver had made an intemperate speech at Kilmarnoch, in favor of parliamentary reform, which the grocer had been concerned in printing. It was shown that petitions had been received by Parlia ment, expressed in language at least as strong; but the accused, though defended by the admirable arguments and eloquence of Francis Jeffrey, were found guilty of se dition.1 1 Mr. Justice Abbott presided at the first trial; Lord Ellenborough at the second and third. Lord Ellenborough felt his defeat so sensibly, that on the following day he sent to Lord Sidmouth the draft of a letter of resignation. Lord Sidmouth's Life, iii. 236; Hone's Printed Trials; Mr. Charles Knight's Narrative in Martineau's Hist., i. 144. 2 Lord Dudley's Letters, 199. 8 So stated in evidence, St. Tr., xxxiii. 22, though called in the indictment "a merchant." 4 St. Tr., xxxiii. 1. |