ed or carried before some other justice, or desire the aid of some other justice being present. 3 Burn's Justice. The mayor of Hereford was laid by the heels for setting in judgment in a cause where he himself was lessor of the plaintiff in ejectment, though he, by the charter, was sole judge of the court. 1 Salk. Rep., 396. By which, it is presumed, is to be understood that he was removed from office.

An order of removal of a poor person from Great Chart to Kennington was quashed, because one of the justices who made the order was an inhabitant of Great Chart at the time, and charged to the poor rate there. And, by the court: no rule of law or reason is more established than that a judge ought to stand disinterested. Burn's Justice, 25.

Yet, in some cases, if the justice should act in his own cause, it seemeth to be justifiable; as, when a justice shall be assaulted, or (in doing his office, especially) shall be abused to his face, and no other justice present with him, then it seems, he may commit such offender until he shall find sureties of the peace or good behavior, as the case shall require. But, if any other justice be present, it were fitting to desire his aid. 3 Burn's Justice, 25. Neither should justices of the peace, in any part of their office, meddle (if they can avoid it) where any relation is concerned, for it brings a suspicion upon their proceedings; but, if they must needs meddle, as it is not always in their choice, that they carry themselves uprightly herein. For one Carew (a justice of the peace of Devon) was censured, he going to view a riot, and the rioters being escaped before his coming, he refused to go to the place where they were, although but a little way off, and the peace being required against them, he took recognizances to keep the peace against others that demanded it not, and granted supersedeas, and procured the peace to be released the next day; and all this in favor of his brother. Dalt. Justice, 590.

There was an order of two justices for the removal of a poor person from the parish of Pancras to Rumbald, within three days, the justices reciting that they were surprised, superseded it, and commanded the church-wardens to return the former order to be cancelled. It was insisted that the justices could not issue a supersedeas. But, by the court: the supersedeas is well sent by the justices, and to prevent the charge of an appeal. And the last order was confirmed. 3 Burn's Justice, 26. And the same justice of the peace, after surety for the peace taken, may make the party a supersedeas to discharge him from any other arrest, or deliver him, being in prison for the peace, at any other man's suit. Cromp., 237. But Mr. Lambert thinketh it not in the power of any one justice of the peace to grant such supersedeas at this day, but that it must be done by two justices at the least. Mr. Dalton says, nevertheless, for that I find the old precedents to run in the name of one justice of the peace alone, I have

drawn mine accordingly. He also says, that a supersedeas to a capias upon an indictment for a trespass or a transgression (and so of an exigent) may be granted by the justice of the peace out of sessions; for, otherwise, it were mischievous for the party, as well by reason of his imprisonment, as, also, for that he may be outlawed before the sessions, if the justice of the peace might not take sureties of him for his appearance, and all is but to appear to answer the indictment. Dalt. Justice, 611. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law, 46.

If a justice exceed his authority in granting a warrant, yet the officer must execute it; but if it be a case wherein he hath no jurisdiction, or in a matter whereof he hath no cognizance, the officer ought not to execute such warrant; so that the officer is bound to take notice of the authority and jurisdiction of the justice. Cro. Car., 394. 1 Co., 76. Thus, if a justice send a warrant to a constable to take up one for slander, or the like, the justice hath no jurisdiction in such cases, and the constable ought to refuse the execution of it. 3 Burn's Justice, 26.

A writ of mandamus issues to the judges of any inferior court, requiring them to do justice according to the powers of their office whenever the same is delayed, for it is the peculiar business of the court of King's Bench to superintend all inferior tribunals and therein to enforce the due exercise of those judicial and ministerial powers with which the crown or legislature have invested them, and this not only by restraining their excesses, but, also, by quickening their negligence and obviating their denial of justice. 3 Bl. Com., 110. Upon information exhibited by the officers of customs upon a seizure of brandy, wherein justices of the peace may make their determination, the fact appeared not to warrant the seizure, but the justice, in favor of the officer, refused to dismiss the information, so as the owners might have their brandy again. A mandamus was moved for to compel him to determine the matter, which was granted accordingly. Str. Rep., 530. And, by statute, it is provided that two justices may summon any person to take the oaths before them, and, if they do not appear, then, on oath of serving such summons, the justices are to certify the same to the quarter sessions, where, if the party so summoned do not appear to take the oaths, he shall stand convicted of recusancy. The defendants were justices of the peace and issued their summons according to the statute, but coming afterwards to understand that the party was a gentleman of fashion and not suspected to be against the government, lest a transaction of this nature should be an imputation upon him, they refused to give the prosecutor his oath of the service of such summons, that the matter might go no further. And now, upon motion against them for an information, the court declared, that the justices had no discretionary power

to refuse to put the act in execution, and, therefore, granted an information against them. Str. Rep., 413.

In summary convictions, the party ought to be heard, and, for that purpose, ought to be summoned in fact; and, if the justice proceed against a person without summoning him, it would be a misdemeanor in him, for which an information would lie. 1 Burn's Justice, 413.

A justice of the peace is strongly protected by the law in the just execution of his office.

And it is said that a judge is not answerable, either to the king or the party, for the mistakes or errors of his judgment in a matter of which he has jurisdiction; for it would expose the justice of the nation, and no man would execute the office upon peril of being arraigned by action or indictment for every judgment he pronounces. 1 Salk. Rep., 396. In the case of Miller v. Seare, 2 Bl. Rep. 1141, De Gray, Ch. J., says, It is agreed that the judges in the king's superior courts of justice are not liable to answer personally for their errors in judgment. In courts of special and limited jurisdiction, having power to hear and determine, a distinction must be made. While acting within the line of their authority, they are protected as to errors in judgment, otherwise they are not protected.

A justice of the peace is not punishable at the suit of the party, but only at the suit of the king, for what he doth as judge in matters which he hath power by law to hear and determine without the concurrence of any other; for, regularly, no man is liable to an action for what he doth as judge. But, in cases wherein he proceeds ministerially rather than judicially, if he acts corruptly, he is liable to an action at the suit of the party, as well as to an information at the suit of the king. 3 Burn's Justice, 30.

In the case of the King against Young and Pitts, Esquires, justices of the peace for Wiltshire, which was upon an information moved for against the justices for arbitrarily and unreasonably refusing to grant an alehouse license, Lord Mansfield, Ch. J., declared, that the court of king's bench hath no power or claim to review the reasons of justices of the peace upon which they form their judgments in granting licenses, by way of appeal from their judgment, or overruling the discretion in that behalf intrusted to them. But, if it clearly appears that the justices have been partially, maliciously, or corruptly influenced in the exercise of this discretion, and have (consequently) abused the trust reposed in them, they are liable to prosecution by indictment or information, or, even, possibly, by action, if the malice be very gross and injurious. If their judgment is wrong yet their heart and intention pure, God forbid that they should be punished. And he declared that he should always lean towards favoring them, unless partiality, corruption, or malice shall clearly appear. Mr. Justice

Denison, also, expressly allowed the discretionary power of justices in granting licenses, without appeal from their judgments or having their just and honest reasons reviewed by any body. But, yet, an improper and unjust exercise of their discretion, he said, ought to be under control. But it must be a clear and apparent partiality or wilful misbehavior to induce the court to grant an information, not a mere error in judgment. Mr. Justice Foster concurred in the same general principles; and Mr. Justice Wilmot was, also, very explicit, that the sole discretion of granting licenses is in the justices of the division; which being so, the rule is invariable, that this court will never interpose to punish a justice of the peace for a mere error in judgment. Therefore, even supposing the justices in the present case to have been mistaken from beginning to end; yet, there is no ground, from any of the affidavits, to infer any partiality, malice, or corruption. And the court being unanimously of opinion that the justices had acted in this affair with candor and impartiality, discharged the rule to show cause, with costs. 3 Burn's Justice, 31. In 12 Co., 25, is stated the case of one Nudigate, who was a justice of the peace and had recorded a force upon view, which he did as judge of record, and a bill was exhibited against him for this, that he had falsely made a record when, indeed, there was not any force; and, by the opinions of Catlin and Dyer, justices, it was resolved, "that that thing that a judge doth as judge of record, ought not to be drawn in question."

And a justice of the peace is not to be slandered or abused, as appears by the case of Aston v. Blagrave. Str. Rep. 617. The plaintiff declared that he was a justice of the peace, and that, upon a colloquium of him and the execution of his office, the defendent said, you are a rascal, a villain, and a liar. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved, in arrest of judgment, that these words are not actionable. It was urged for the plaintiff, There is a great difference between magistrates and common tradesmen: words of the latter must affect them in their particular way of dealing; but any thing that tends to impeach the credit of the former, is actionable. And, although an indictment might not lie for these words, as, perhaps, not tending to a breach of the peace; yet, nevertheless, they are actionable, for, in, many cases, words are actionable which are not indictable. After consideration, Pratt, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: that, though rascal and villain were uncertain, yet, being joined with liar, and spoken of a justice of the peace, they did import a charge of acting corruptly and partially, and, therefore, there ought to be judgment for the plaintiff.

In the case of Kent v. Pocock, Str. Rep., 1168, these words spoken of a justice of the peace in the execution of his

office and relating thereto, viz., Mr. Kent is a rogue, were held actionable.

In the case of the King v. Revel, Str. Rep., 420, the defendant was indicted for saying of Sir Edward Lawrence, a justice of the peace in the execution of his office, You are a rogue and a liar. It was moved, after verdict for the king, in arrest of judgment, that, though the justice might have committed him for the contempt, yet the words were not indictable, since it is not presumed they would provoke the justice to a breach of the peace, which is the reason why indictments have been held to lie for words. But, by the court: the allowing he might be committed, shows they were indictable. It is true, the justice may make himself judge and punish him immediately; but still, if he thinks proper to proceed less summarily, by way of indictment, he may. The true distinction is, that, where words are spoken in the presence of the justice, there he may commit; but where it is behind his back, the party can be only indicted for a breach of the peace. Judgment for the king.

In the case of the King v. Pocock, Str. Rep. 1157, an information was moved for against the defendant, on account of words spoken of Mr. Kent, a justice of the peace, and the affidavit stated that, in a conversation about a warrant granted by Mr. Kent, the defendant asked if Mr. Kent was a sworn justice, and, being answered, to be sure he was, else he would not act, the defendant replied, If he is a sworn justice, he is a rogue and a fores worn rogue. To this it was objected, that the words were not spoken to him in the execution of his office, but only in relation to what he had formerly done; and, by the court: there ought to be no information: it is not the same insult and contempt as if spoken to him in the execution of his office, which would make it a matter indictable. Although an information or indictment might not lie in the last case, yet, it doth not follow but that the words were actionable; and so it seemeth to have been held in the case of Kent v. Pocock above mentioned, which appears to have been no other than an action brought for this very same offence, after it had been determined that an information would not lie. 3 Burn's Justice, 30.

If a justice will not, on complaint to him made, execute his office, or shall misbehave in his office, the party grieved may move the court of King's Bench for an information, and, afterwards, may apply to the court of chancery to put him out of the commission. 2 Atk., 2.

In the case of the king v. Symonds, an information was moved for against the defendant for assaulting and beating the mayor of Yarmouth, being a justice of the peace in the execution of his office. On showing cause, the question was, whether the defendant could justify, the mayor having struck him first. By Lord Hardwick, Ch. J., He may justify it,