plain. They yield to the exercise of this right in all its rigour. But, they deny that we have any right at all; they deny that we have a pretence to any right to stop their vessels upon the high seas, and to take out of them any persons whatever, unless, indeed, military persons in the service of our enemy; and, I repeat it, Sir, that I know of no usage of nations; that I know of no ancient usage of our own even; that I know of no law, maxim, principle, or practice, to sanction that of which the Americans complain, and in resistance of which they are now armed and at war; and, therefore, I am of opinion, that to abandon this practice would be no dishonour to England.

Lord Castlereagh talks of our right to "impress British seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state." Impressment may take place in our ports and harbours; and, there, if confined to our own seamen, America does not object to it. It is upon the high seas that she objects to impressment; because there the matter must be left to the discretion of the British officer. It is there a matter of power. There is no one to appeal to; there is no umpire; there is no judge to look into proofs, and to decide. The searching officer may, under his discretion, take out as many men as he pleases; he may leave the ship destitute of the hands necessary to conduct her a league; and he may take out American citizens as well as English subjects. That this may be done is quite certain, because it has been done in countless instances. Thousands of native Americans, thus impressed, have been released by our Admiralty on the official application of the American agents; and, who can doubt that many thousands remain unreleased? General Lyman, late American Consul in London, once stated, in a report to his Government, that there were about fourteen thousand native Americans then on board our fleet, who had been impressed from on board American ships on the high seas. He might possibly exaggerate; but it is not to be doubted that the number was, and has constantly been, very considerable. And, I beg your Royal Highness to take a serious view of the great hardships experienced by Americans thus impressed. Taken from their lawful and peaceable pursuits; dragged into a service and forced under a discipline so little congenial with their habits and their prejudices; wafted away to sickly climates, exposed to all the dangers of battle, taken, perhaps for ever, from the sight and the knowledge of their homes and friends; and, if, by chance (for it can be nothing more), restored at last, restored (as has often been the case) with the loss of health or of limbs, and at the very least, with the loss of time, and that, too, in the prime of their lives; and carrying about them, for the remainder of their days, feelings towards. England which I need not attempt to describe.

Your Royal Highness's heart will tell you, I hope, much better than I can, not what is, but what must be, the effect of such a practice, carried on against a people, who are not only the children of Englishmen, but of those Englishmen who preferred freedom in a wilderness across the ocean to slavery in their native land. This it is, Sir, that has, at last, kindled the flame of war in a country where the very name of war was too hateful to be endured.

But in answer to all this, it is said, by Lord Castlereagh, that "the naval strength of the empire mainly depends" upon the continuation. of this practice of impressment. That is to say, if we take the whole of the facts into view, our naval strength mainly depends upon a practice which exposes so many of the American citizens to misery and ruin. The

plain meaning of our perseverance in the practice is this: that, if we do not continue it, our seamen will desert to the American ships in such numbers as to leave us without the possibility of obtaining a sufficiency of men to man and fight our fleet. Supposing this to be the fact, it really forms no justification of the practice; for, we can have no right to put America to any inconvenience whatever merely for our own benefit, or to save ourselves from loss or danger. The President, however, in order to show, that he does not wish us to receive any injury in this way, and in order, if possible, to put an end to the war, has made a voluntary offer of a law to be passed in America to prevent our seamen from being admitted into American ships, upon condition, that we will first abandon our practice of impressment, and give up, that is, restore to their liberty, those native Americans whom we have already impressed. Mr. Russell, in his letter to Lord Castlereagh, says:

"While, however, it regards this course as the only one which remained for it to pursue with a hope of preserving any portion of that kind of character, "which constitutes the vital strength of every nation, yet it is still willing to "give another proof of the spirit which has uniformly distinguished its proceedings, by seeking to arrest, on terms consistent with justice and honour, the ca"lamities of war. It has therefore authorized me to stipulate with his Britannic Majesty's Government, an armistice to commence at or before the expiration "of sixty days after the signature of the instrument providing for it, on condi"tion that the Orders in Council be repealed, and no illegal blockades to be sub"stituted to them, and that orders be immediately given to discontinue the impress"ment of persons from American vessels, and to restore the citizens of the United "States already impressed; it being morcover well understood that the British "Government will assent to enter into definitive arrangements as soon as may "be, on these and every other difference, by a Treaty to be concluded either at "London or Washington, as on an impartial consideration of existing circum"stances shall be deemed most expedient. As an inducement to Great Britain "to discontinue the practice of impressment from American vessels, I am autho"rized to give assurance that a law shall be passed (to be reciprocal) to prohibit "the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the "United States."

Really, Sir, it is not possible, it appears to me, to suggest anything more reasonable than this. I can form an idea of nothing more strongly expressive of a desire to put an end to the war. What! shall it be said that England wages a war, when she might terminate it by such means? I trust not, and that we shall not have to weep over a much longer con. tinuation of this unfortunate contest.

I know, that there are persons who treat the idea of a law, passed by the Congress, with contempt. But, if this is to be the course pursued, the war will not soon have an end. We must treat America with respect. We must do it; and the sooner we begin the better. Some of the impudent hireling writers in London, affect to say, that no credit is to be given to any act of the American Government; that our officers ought not to believe the passports and certificates produced by the American seamen. If this is to be the tone, and if we are to act accordingly, there is no possibility of making peace with America. Peace implies treaty and confidence; but, what confidence are we to have in a nation such as our hirelings describe America to be? This arrogant, this insolent tone must be dropped, or peace is impossible.

The fact of our impressing of native Americans is affected to be denied, and Lord Castlereagh does not notice the proposition to restore those whom we have already impressed. But, Sir, if the fact were not perfectly notorious, that thousands have been released by us, the letter of CAPTAIN

DACRES, of the Guerriere, removes all doubt upon the subject; for, in that letter, intended to account for his defeat by the Constitution, he says, that PART OF HIS CREW WERE NATIVE AMERICANS, and, they not choosing to fight against their country, he suffered them to be inactive spectators. Now, here we have the fact clearly acknowledged, that we had Americans unwillingly serving on board. And, what a lamentable contrast do we find in the same letter, with regard to some English seamen said to have been on board the Constitution; to which I beg leave to add, for your most serious moment, the fact (if a fact it be) that part of the crews of the victorious American ships, the Wasp and the United States, were English. Nay, it is stated in the Courier newspaper, upon what is asserted to be good authority, that two-thirds of the crews of the American ships of war are English seamen. If this be true, it is another, and a most cogent reason, for acceding to the terms of America, and putting an end to the war; for, the longer the war continues the longer will continue a connection from which such fearful consequences may ensue.

At any rate, it appears to me, that our own safety, if the war is to be continued, will dictate the discharging of all the impressed Americans whom we may have on board of our ships. Fight against their country they will not, unless they be forced, and who is to foresee and provide against the contagion of such an example? Against this evil, however, and against numerous others, which I forbear to mention, the measure proposed by the President would completely guard us; and, the respect. which it is my duty to entertain towards your Royal Highness, bids me hope that that proposition will finally be accepted.

Botley, 29th December, 1812.

I am, &c., &c.,

WM. COBBETT.

AMERICAN WAR.

(Political Register, January, 1813.)

THIS war, which was spoken of by the hireling of the TIMES newspaper and others, with such ineffable contempt, has now assumed a very formidable mien; and those who were so eager for the war, begin to revile each other with regard to the conducting of it.

There are, at this time, three political factions in the country; the one that is in possession of the distribution of the public money; the Whig faction; and the faction of the Wellesleys and Cannings. The two latter would join if they could; but, each aims at the possession of the power of giving places and pensions, and, in short, at being the ministry.

These two, therefore, cannot agree wholly; but, they both attack, though upon different occasions and different grounds, those who are in possession of the paradise of Whitehall.

Amongst other objects of attack is that of negligence as to the American War. The Chronicle and the Times are equally bitter against the

ministers upon this subject; they revile them for having plunged the country into a war with America without providing a sufficient maritime force to cope with that new enemy. A sufficient force! Why, the Times newspaper spoke of the navy of the United States as a thing not worthy of the name; it laughed at "Mr. Madison and his navy;" it predicted that a few months would add that navy to our own; it, in short, spoke of it in a tone of contempt which I should in vain attempt to describe.

And yet, it now blames the ministers for not having provided a sufficient force to cope with that contemptible navy; that navy which was an object of the most cruel ridicule.

The defeat and capture of the Guerriere, the Frolic, and the Macedonian must, of course, be matter of astonishment to those, who listened to the language of these presumptuous and foolish men; but, in what respect are the ministers to blame for it any more than they were for the evacuation of Madrid, and for all the consequences of the unexpected retreat of our army in the Peninsula? The ministers had a great abundance of ships, of all sizes, on the American station; and what were they to do more? I recollect, and so must the reader, that, at the time of the rencounter between Commodore Rodgers and Captain Bingham, the words in the mouths of all these writers were: "Let one of our FRIGATES meet with Rodgers, and we ask no more." This wish; this challenge, was repeated a thousand times over; the public cannot have forgotten the fact; nay, the sentiment was universal. Upon what ground, then, are the ministers now to be blamed? Are they to be blamed, because, upon trial, it has been found, that our Frigates are not a match for those of America? Are they to be blamed, because they did not entertain a meaner opinion of our Frigates, compared with those of America, than any other man in England entertained, or, at least, dared to say that he entertained?

We are told, by the writers in the interest of the two OUT factions, that the Republican Frigates are bigger, longer, have heavier guns, and the like, than our Frigates have.

"The varlet's a tall man," said Bobadil when he had been cudgelled. But are these new discoveries? Were the facts not all well known before to all these writers, when they so boldly challenged out the American Frigates to combat with ours? When Rodgers attacked Bingham, the size of his ship was well known and particularly described; and, yet, no one then called for heavier ships to be sent out to the American coast.

Why, then, are the ministers to be blamed for not sending out heavier ships?

Besides, they have heavier ships upon the station, and it cannot be their fault if those ships do not fall in with the American Frigates. What are they to do with our Frigates? If ours are unable to face the American Frigates, what are, I ask, the ministers to do with them? Are they not to suffer them to go on a cruise, lest they should fall in with a tall Yankee? In short, it is another of the tricks of faction to blame the ministers for these misadventures of the navy; and, the attempts made by the ministerial prints to account for our defeat upon the ground of our inferiority of force is another of the means made use of to deceive the people, and to encourage them in the continuation of the war.

When, until now, did we think of disparity of force? When, until now, did we dream of an English ship surrendering to a ship, the superiority of the force of which it required a minute calculation to show? When, until now, did an English Captain hesitate to attack a ship of a few guns more than his own?

Instead of all the calculations that we have seen in the newspapers ; instead of those swelled out accounts of the vast force of the American Frigates, we should be plainly told, that we have now an enemy to cope with equal to ourselves as far as his numbers will go.

Amongst all the calculations and computations, however, that we have heard, I have not perceived it any where taken into account, that we have experience, which the Americans have not. Where did Isaac Hull gain his naval experience; and where Mr. Decatur? There are two Decaturs, the father and son. They were my neighbours, in the country, in Pennsylvania. They were farmers more than seamen, though the elder went occasionally to sea as commander of a merchant ship. If it be the father who has taken the Macedonian, he must be upwards of threescore years of age; and, if it be the son, I am sure it is the first battle he ever was in; for, twelve years ago, he was but a mere lad. The father was a man of great probity and of excellent sense; and, I have no doubt that the son is the same; but, I'll engage, that both have had more experience in raising Indian corn than in naval tactics.

Something, therefore, in our estimates, should be allowed for our superiority in point of experience. We have no officer of the navy, who has not passed a great part of his life on actual service; we have scarcely one who has not been in numerous battles; and, in the unfortunate cases above spoken of, one of the Captains appears to have been of long standing even in that rank.

When we are speaking of the naval preparations of Napoleon, we always dwell upon the difficulty of his forming naval officers; but here we see, in the case of America, that that is attended with no difficulty at all; we here see gallant and consummate commanders start up in a trice; and, in a moment, is dissolved the charm which bound us in ignorance as to this important species of information.

The truth is, I believe, that, amongst the first qualities of a naval commander, are sobriety, vigilance, and consideration for his crew; and these qualities are within the reach of every man. The American Government, too, has a wide range for choice; with it no intrigues, commonly called" interest," is likely to prevail; because the possession of the powers of the state depend solely upon the will of the people, and the government, having such support, is not reduced to the necessity of seeking support from any individuals; and, of course, is not exposed to the danger of being compelled to employ as commanders, or as officers of any rank, persons not recommended by their own good qualities.

This is a very great advantage possessed by the American Government; an advantage to which, perhaps, it owes those successes, which we so sorely lament, and which seem to be very likely to form an era in the naval history of the world.

But, let what will be the final result of these transactions, I really can see no good ground for accusation against the ministers on account of the misfortunes that have befallen our Frigates. Blamed they may be for the war. There, indeed, there is matter for blame; because, if my reasoning upon the subject be correct, they might have avoided the