« ForrigeFortsett »
aided. It was rather a mistake of fact than of law by which
the road was exempted, and the inaction of the Post Office
during the long period furnishes no estoppel. Id.
III. The provisions in the land-grant acts of February 9, 1853, 10
Stat., 155, and July 28, 1866, 14 Stat., 338, that all property
and troops of the United States" shall be transported at the
cost, charge, and expense of the company owning or operating
the road, include empty mail bags and can not be restricted
to impedimenta or property appertaining to the Military
Establishment of the Government. St. L., I. M. & So. Ry., 45.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Section 1034 of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia,
providing that a tenant from year to year holding over shall
become a tenant by sufferance, with the limitations attending
that character of tenancy, does not abridge the freedom or
contract; and where the United States executes a lease for
property in the District of Columbia, by the terms of which
it is agreed that the continued use and occupancy of the
premises after the 1st day of July in any year, in the ab-
sence of the giving of a written notice to terminate the same
three months prior to July 1 of the year in which it is to
terminate, shall operate as a renewal of the lease for the
following 12 months, it breaches its contract by vacating in
January. Blair, 457.
Can not maintain an action for patent infringement under act of
June 25, 1910, 36 Stat., 851. E. W. Bliss Co., 47.
See CONTRACTS, XX.
See STATUTES, I, VI, VII, XI et seq.
See CONTRACTS, V, VIII, XVIII, XIX.
Under Section 1493 R. S., and Section 1505 R. S., as amended
by the act of March 1, 1912, 37 Stat., 73, the act of June 18,
1878, 20 Stat., 165, and the act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat.,
892, plaintiff was not promoted in grade or rank pursuant to
law, and is illegally in the service. (Downes' case, 52 C.
Cls., 237, Toulon's case, 51 C. Cls., 87; 52 C. Cls., 333; Crapo's
case, 50 C. Cls., 337, reaffirmed.) Hooper, 90.
I. The erection of certain Government dams in aid of naviga-
tion in the Monongahela River caused increased and more
prolonged flood heights and more frequent overflows than
theretofore of certain country roads. Held, on a review of
the authorities, that such is not a taking of private property
within the purview of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, and that to the extent that the roads in question were
injured or destroyed the damages were consequential. Co.
Ct. Marion Co., 120.
II. Where the operation of a movable dam constructed by the
United States in aid of navigation overflows the lands of a
citizen at pool level, thereby rendering the same unfit for
cultivation, the owner is deprived of substantial enjoyment
and his property has been taken within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, even though the dam
is not operated during the whole of any one year. Chapman,
III. Where the Government appropriates a portion of an entire
tract of private land for public purposes, it is also liable, in
ascertaining the just compensation prescribed by the Fifth
Amendment, for the damage to the remainder resulting from
such taking, embracing injury due to the use to which the
part appropriated is to be devoted. Archer, 405.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IV, V.
I. The act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat., 851, granting jurisdiction
to the Court of Claims in the matter of claims for infringe-
ment of patents subsequent to its passage did not disturb
the prior jurisdiction of cases involving patents where the
claim was based upon contract, nor did said act obliterate
the distinction between actions based upon contract and ac-
tions for infringement. E. W. Bliss Co., 47.
II. An important distinction exists between actions for the re-
covery of royalties for the use by the United States of a
patented article under an express or implied contract and
those for an infringement, in that defenses open to the Gov-
ernment when sued for infringement are not permitted when
the action sounds in contract. Id.
III. Where the facts alleged show an unauthorized use and a dis-
regard of plaintiff's claims there may be an infringement, but
no contract can be implied therefrom. If there was an ele-
ment of tort in the transaction, that fact can not be made
the basis of an action ex contractu. Id.
IV. Where the Government uses a patented invention with the
consent and express permission of the owner and does not
repudiate the title of such owner, an implied contract to pay
a reasonable compensation for such use arises. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 348.
V. Where the Government conducts experiments with certain
regularly patented devices to ascertain their value with a
view to the adoption of one of them in the manufacture of
ordnance and does not attempt to construct a device of its
own, the presumption arises that the Government intended
to use the property of another and to make payment to the
lawful owner for its use. Id.
VI. Where an inventor by the combination of old elements produces
a new and useful device, he is not restricted to the exact
language employed in the patent claims where he has re-
ferred to a specific drawing which in fact exhibits the real
functioning element of the mechanism but omits its com-
VII. In a suit upon an implied contract to pay for the use of a
patented device, in order to bind the defendants the proof
must connect them with the use of the device in such a way
as to show a recognition of title in the plaintiff to the patent
and to its use by them under such circumstances as to indi-
cate an intention to pay for such use. Haupt, 591.
VIII. The fact that Congress directed the work to proceed in accord
with plans and specifications adopted by the contracting com-
pany, to whom plaintiff had granted a free license to use his
patent, is too conjectural upon which to rest a contractual
obligation to pay for the use of a patent, in the absence of some
specific language or the mention of plaintiff's device from
which the court may infer an intent to make a contract with
the inventor to use a patented right.
See ASSIGNMENT, I, II.
Plaintiff's contract was entered into through coercion of the
defendants and if carried into effect would have destroyed
plaintiff's business, hence such charges as were paid there-
under were not voluntary payments. Holland-America Line,
See PLEADINGS, II, III; ACTIONS, I, II.
I. This court is not bound by special rules of pleading, and will
take notice of an assignment or transfer of a claim sued upon,
whether brought to its attention by a plea in abatement or
under the general issue. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107.
II. The rules of this court are sufficiently liberal as not to require
the strict rules of pleading, and all that is necessary in set-
ting out a claim is to so state it that the court is properly
advised as to what it is. Denver & Rio Grande R. R., 155.
III. A petition seeking to have a suspension of the contract held
fraudulent need not be amended to enable the plaintiff to
question the propriety of charges against his account for
work and materials used by defendants in completing the
contract. S. R. H. Robinson & Son Con. Co., 536.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, III; CONTRACTS, IV, IX, X, XI ; Depart-
MENTAL CONSTRUCTION; ESTOPPEL, II; LAND GRANTS, I, II, III.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, III; CONTRACTS, IV, IX, X, XI. XXVII,
XXVIII; ESTOPPEL, II; LAND GRANTS, I, II, III.
See ESTOPPEL, I; CONTRACTS, XXIV.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
See CONTRACTS, V, VII, VIII, XVIII, XIX.
See DEPARTMENTAL REFERENCES, II.
See CONTRACTS, XVI.
RULES OF COURT.
I. There are three elements necessary to a salvage claim: (1) A
marine peril to the property rescued; (2) service voluntarily
rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a
special contract; and (3) success in whole or in part, or that
the service rendered contributed to such success. It is un-
necessary to show that escape from danger by other means
was not possible, provided the danger was real and im-
minent. Manchester Liners, 449.
II. Courts of admiralty usually consider the following circum-
stances as the main ingredients in determining the amount
of the award to be decreed for a salvage service: (1) The
labor expended by the salvors in rendering the service; (2)
the promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering
the service and saving the property; (3) the value of the
property employed by the salvors in rendering the service
and the danger to which said property was exposed; (4) the
risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from
the impending peril; (5) the value of the property saved;
and (6) the degree of danger from which the property was
I. Congress by the act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat., 1335, in pro-
viding that no pay shall be allowed for the use of "wooden
full railway post-office cars run in any train between ad-
joining steel cars" did not intend that this provision should
apply to cars with steel underframes. Mo. Pac. Ry., 12.
II. It is only where the language of a statute is not clear or is of
doubtful construction that the court may consider the evil
intended to be remedied. Id.
III. The railroad acquired no title under the act of March 3, 1875,
18 Stat., 482, to tops of trees from which the tie slash was
made, and hence could confer none on plaintiffs. Caldwell
& Dunwody, 33.
IV. An official of the General Land Office had no authority to be-
stow upon plaintiffs such tie slash as a gift, as no such
authority is lodged in anyone to give away the property of
the Government. Id.
V. Under the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat., 1095, residents of
the States therein named were not authorized to traffic in
timber upon the public lands, no matter what use may have
been the purpose to make of it. Id.
VI. Section 4002, Revised Statutes, lodges in the Postmaster Gen-
eral the discretion of determining the details to be followed
in the weighing of the mails "not less than once in every
four years," and he alone was to determine the average
weight of the mails carried and how such average should
be obtained. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 222.
VII. Sections 3962 and 4002 Revised Statutes, and the act of
June 26, 1906, 34 Stat., 467, contemplate the transportation
of the mails with due frequency and speed with especial
reference to the published time tables, and the Post Office
Department in entering into contracts for the carrying of
the mails is not precluded from asserting its right to have
the mails transported accordingly and to make deductions
from the pay of contractors for failure to perform service
according to contract and impose fines upon them for their
delinquency. L. & N. R. R., 238.
VIII. The failure for a number of years of the Postmaster General
to exercise an authority granted to him by law does not
abrogate the power. Id.
IX. Applying the cardinal principle of statutory construction. of
ascertaining the legislative intent by reference to all cir-
cumstances surrounding the passage of the law and the
history of the subject matter thereof, to the act of January
11, 1915, 38 Stat., 791, it is clear that the Congress intended
to grant to inhabitants of the United States the same rights,
and nothing more, that were given to citizens of the United
States by the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat., 851. Rex, 320.
X. Section 16 of the act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat., 898, 903,
does not obligate steamship lines transporting alien immi-