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out. Unless you allow at least this trial, you really tie the hands, and completely manacle the individual; you close his mouth, you palsy his action, so that he cannot express even for once, his own choice or his own desire. But give him these trials, and it will afford him one opportunity to vote for the one whom he prefers. Mr. Chairman, is it for the highest interest of this Commonwealth, to bind these different parties? I do not believe it is, and I hope, therefore, that this question will be maturely considered before any definite action is taken upon it. I hope some modification in the Report of the Committee will be made, and I shall certainly myself move some modifications, if it is not done by some other member, before the subject is finally disposed of.

Sir, I hope the majority principle will be adopted by this Convention. I know nothing of the effect it may have on party, and I care nothing about the subject, as far as party measures are concerned; not a fig, although I am a party man. I know not what party it would benefit, nor do I know what party it would injure most, I only look at it as a matter of principle.

It has been argued that other States have adopted the plurality system. Well, Sir, that may all be, but it does not prove conclusively that it is best for Massachusetts to adopt it after all. Why, Sir, some of the other States have adopted laws, (I will not call any names,) that I can tell you old Massachusetts would not adopt. Gentlemen may as well say of a thousand laws which have been adopted by States south of Mason and Dixon's line, that Massachusetts should adopt similar laws because they have adopted them. Certainly the argument is good, as far as it goes, but then we are not to adopt all these States have done, as precedents, nor are we to adopt this plurality system, because other States have adopted it? No, Sir, let old Massachusetts stand upon the principle of the majority; if she must stand alone, let her stand alone, but let her stand upon the great principle that the majority shall govern.

Mr. SARGENT, of Cambridge. Mr. Chairman, I shall ask the indulgence of the Committee but for a very few moments on this occasion. I have listened with great attention and with deep interest to the remarks which have been made upon this subject. It has seemed to me that those gentlemen who have opposed the adoption of these resolutions, have taken a false view of the effect of their adoption by this Convention. It has been argued that by the adoption of these resolutions, and by engrafting the principle contained in them, into your Constitution, you were abandoning one of the vital principles of republican government, that of the majority. Upon that question I take issue.

Now, Sir, I wish to call the attention of the Committee to the Constitution as it now stands. I ask gentlemen to examine and see whether the majority principle has ever been laid down as one to which we were to adhere inviolably. Such is not the case. But I do not ask any man to violate that principle, and no man by voting for these resolves does violate it in the least.

Suppose you provide in your Constitution that your officers shall be elected by plurality, do you thereby provide that the people shall not elect by a majority? No, Sir, you simply declare that when the majority system fails, a different remedy shall be adopted from the one you now adopt. Instead of placing the power in the legislature of

ELECTIONS BY PLURALITY. SARGENT.

Massachusetts to select a man for the governor of Massachusetts, who does not receive five hundred votes, you say you will retain that power in the hands of the people, where it, without doubt, properly belongs. You say if you cannot obtain the voice of the majority of the people in favor of any particular candidate, you will then adhere to the principle approximating the closest to that of the majority, and you declare that the candidate who receives the greatest number of votes, and who consequently represents most nearly the wishes, the views, and the feelings of the majority of the people, shall be taken and elected.

Now, Sir, what does the present Constitution provide with regard to the election of governor? I think it would be well if gentlemen would see what are the provisions of our existing Constitution, and what are the changes it is proposed to effect. The present Constitution provides that the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall lay before the Senate and House of Representatives, on the last Wednesday in May, the returns of the election for governor, to be by them examined, and in case of an election by a majority of all the votes returned, the choice shall be by them declared and published. Now, suppose you adopt the plurality system, and your candidate for governor receives a majority of all the votes cast, is he not elected by the majority as much as under the present system, and is not the principle precisely the same?

But suppose no man has received the majority of the votes cast, then I ask you to mark the changes we propose to make in the present Constitution, for this is the point to which we should chiefly direct our attention. Look at the provision in your Constitution for cases where you fail to elect your governor by a majority. It reads:

"But if no person shall have a majority of votes, the House of Representatives shall, by ballot, elect two out of four persons who had the highest number of votes, if so many shall have been voted for; but if otherwise, out of the number voted for, and make returns to the Senate of the person so elected; on which the Senate shall, by ballot, elect one who shall be declared governor."

Now, I ask you, if, by that proviso, after the first trial, when the governor shall have failed to be elected by a majority, the majority principle is not entirely abandoned, according to your present Constitution. I ask you if that proviso does not put it within the power of the legislature, if they choose, to elect a man who has received but three votes, provided he is one of the four candidates, when perhaps he could not have received twice that number of votes in the Commonwealth. Now what do these resolves propose? In the first instance they leave the provision, in effect, precisely where it stands now. They provide, that if any person shall have received a majority of all the votes cast, (for if he has a majority, he will, of course, have the highest number,) he shall be declared elected. Have you abandoned the majority principle in that? Not at all. It stands there precisely where it stands in your present Constitution. The only change we propose to make is to provide a different remedy where the majority principle fails. Now, I ask you, which adheres nearest to the principle of the majority, to leave it in the hands of the people, when they are

[May 26th.

unable to elect by a majority, and to provide that the man who represents nearest the opinions and wishes of a majority of the people shall be elected, or to place it in the hands of the legislature, with the power to select any one of four minority candidates, if there be so many voted for.

My friend from Wilmington, (Mr. Durgin,) says he chooses to stick by the old eltarter. He asks me to stick to it. He knows that under its operation we have not had a governor chosen by a majority during the last six years. We have had a minority governor twice, and cannot have a majority for the governor unless you provide in your Constitution, that the people shall continue to vote for a governor until they effect the election by a majority vote. Such a thing was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and I doubt very much whether the members of this Convention will be willing to adopt such a system.

Then, again, take the Senate; has the majority principle been adhered to in the choice of senators in every emergency? Not at all. The people vote once; and if they elect their senators by a majority, very well. If they do not, what follows? That portion of the Senate which is elected, together with the House of Representatives, select either the plurality or the minority candidate, as they please. Is it more democratic to select a minority candidate under the present system than to provide that, when an election is not made by a majority, a plurality may step in and remedy the evil? It strikes me that it is not. It is no abandonment of the principles of the Constitution, as regards these officers, to adopt, to that extent, the plurality system. Such, too, will be the case with regard to all officers elected on a general ticket by the people.

With regard to the House of Representatives, we have had a different system heretofore; but if the principle holds good in the one case, it is equally good in the other. If it is necessary to have a system by which the governor shall be elected by the people without repeated trials, or that the senators shall thus be elected, the principle holds good when applied to the election of the members of the House of Representatives. True, a different system has been adopted, but that does not necessarily alter the principle.

My friend from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker,) said, the other day, that it was very pleasant to have repeated elections. I suppose he referred to the elections of members of the House of Representatives, when he said that those elections were regarded by the people in the country as holidays, at which time they could meet and swap oxen and have a very fine time indeed. I would ask that gentleman if it would not be as pleasant a holiday, if they met once a month to vote for a governor, as it would to meet once a month to vote for representatives; if they could not swap oxen to just as good advantage? I do not doubt. It then follows, that by adopting this system, you do not deprive any citizen of Massachusetts of the privilege of electing any officer by a majority of votes, but simply change the mode provided, when that system fails. Instead of placing the power in the hands of the legislature to be exercised by the election of a minority candidate, or a plurality candidate, it will be retained in the hands of the people; and the man who is elected by them will be the man who has received the greatest number of votes, and, consequently represents the wishes

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of a greater number of people than any other man. It seems to me the change is demanded, in order to retain, as much as possible, the majority principle, which gentlemen regard as so essential, and which I regard so highly.

Again, I believe, there is no question which will come before this Convention, in which the people are more united, than the adoption of the plurality system. I believe it is demanded by a large portion of the people of Massachusetts, that if adopted by this Convention, it will be sanctioned by as large a vote as any measure which shall emanate from the Convention. I believe it is the will of the people that the principle should be adopted. And, although some gentlemen did come here prepared to vote for such a change, and have changed their minds since they came, they will find on their return, that the people have not changed their minds. I hope, therefore, that the resolutions on the table will be adopted.

Mr. MORTON, of Taunton. Mr. Chairman, in contemplating heretofore the several subjects which would come before this Convention since it has been ordered, no one has excited in my own mind, originally, so much doubt, as the one now before the Committee. There is no one in the examination of which I find so many old prejudices and early formed opinions standing in the way of an impartial investigation of it. But I have reflected upon it, and I have finally come to a conclusion; and I now ask the indulgence of the Committee while I submit, as briefly as I may, the several thoughts which have been presented to my mind. I may be permitted to say, in the outset, that one circumstance has come to my knowledge which I exceedingly regret; because I fear that in some form or other it may impede our examination of the subject, and be somewhat of a hindrance to our coming to a right result. When we came to this Convention, I trust that we all came with a determination to leave all party predilections behind us, and to look entirely to what is commonly called the good of the Commonwealth, and the people of the Commonwealth; and to do what we thought best for them and promotive of their interests. It is with sincere grief that I have heard members of this body, out of doors, discussing the effect which our action upon this question would have upon particular parties hereafter. I do not intend to say that I think any individual member of this body will suffer himself to be influenced in the slightest degree by considerations of this kind; but I know from my own experience how very liable we are to suffer preconceived opinions, party associations and party commitments to influence, without our knowledge, the results to which our minds are brought. I trust that we shall alland I endeavor to apply it to myself-endeavor to discard everything of this kind.

But there is another aspect in which I have still more fear. I fear that, by some combination of circumstances, we may present to the public a state of facts which will lead them to draw an inference one way or the other; and although we may all be perfectly pure, such an inference would be unfavorable to the reputation of this Convention, and unfavorable to the adoption of the measures-the wise measures, I trust-which we shall present to the people.

Sir, I endeavored unsuccessfully to present my views at an earlier period, and some of the arguments which I intended to suggest have been

ELECTIONS BY PLURALITY. — MORTON.

already presented. I shall now, as far as I am able, endeavor to avoid a repetition of arguments which have been presented by others. In the examination of this subject, I propose to look at it, first, as a matter of principle, and see where the principle of right and justice lies; and, in the second place, look at it as a practical question, and see how it will operate upon the community. We have all grown up with a respect—a vencration, I may say-for the majority principle. We think there is somiting, if not magical, almost sacred in it; and without inquiry into the nature of that principle, or the foundation of it, we seem disposed to adopt it and follow it wherever it leads.

Mr. Chairman, in discussing the questions that come before us, assembled as we are to make a Constitution, we necessarily have a regard to the self-evident proposition, the principle of natural right; and therefore I hope I shall be excused for looking into the nature of these rights. We all say that the majority must govern. Why shall a majority govern? Has a majority any natural right to govern: I deny it. In a state of nature, if two men meet, one has no right to control the other. If two men meet another they have no right to control that other person, execpt in a case of necessity, where their lives depended upon immediate joint action. Then it is a matter of necessity that the stronger party shall control. Why is it necessary that a majority shall govern? It is founded in compact; it is not founded in natural right, but because a majority agree that a majority shall govern. What is the principle of this government and of all free governments? The government itself derives its power from the assent of the governed, and in consequence of that assent all your laws are made. I only repeat what I said on a former occasion, but did not have time to carry out, that the laws derive their force from the assent of those by whom they are to be carried into execution, and that no man is bound by the law to which he does not give his assent. That may be a startling proposition. It is true there may be laws upon your statute book to which neither you, Mr. Chairman, nor I, have given our assent personally; but politically we have assented to every one, and that political assent constitutes their binding force. How did you do it? It is done because you form a part of an association, and have agreed that a majority of that association shall govern. And although you may act against a particular law, yet this principle lies at the bottom, that a majority shall govern, and you are therefore bound. You have authorized the majority to make the laws, and thus you give your assent to every one. It is on that principle that all laws have their binding force; and that binds every one of us to aid in the execution of those laws, because we have agreed to those laws; not directly, but through an instrumentality which we have established and agreed upon. This is the foundation of the right of the majority to govern, a right under our Constitution, which, so far as it applies, I hold sacred, and intend to abide by.

But, we are here acting for the people, in their sovereign capacity, to establish principles which shall govern their action hereafter; and if the people say they choose to be bound by a plurality, they give their assent as much as if they say they will be bound by a majority. We have no oflicers of a majority or a plurality yet, but all our officers are the officers of the whole people; be

[May 26th.

cause we have agreed that we will assent to the appointment of men to office in a particular form. I apprei end it is a matter of more political regulation whether a plurality or a majority shall preval. I have come to the conclusion, in consideration of all things bearing upon the subject, that I prefer that the plurality system shall prevail rather than the majority system. If we choose to adopt that course, I trust I have shown that we assent just as much to the principle of a plurality as we do to that of a majority. Why do I advocate a; pointinent by a plurality? I agree that although it is no natural right that a majority shall govern, yet it is reasonable and proper wherever you can ascertain the will of the majority. I maintain that the true rule is to adopt that system which will give you the voice of the greatest proportion of the whole people. If a plurality will give you the voice of the greatest proportion of the whole people, then I hold that that shall be adopted; if the majority shall do it best, then that shall be the rule. Looking at all experience in our own State, and elsewhere, I think that the plurality system ensures, to a greater degree, the expression of the voice of the whole people, than the majority system does. The majority, it is very apparent, cannot always be obtained. We have seen instances, almost without number, in which we failed to get majorities, and we were obliged to resort to some other course; and I doubt exceedingly, whether, when you have had to resort to the polls three, four, five, and perhaps twenty times, you approach any nearer to the voice of the whole people than you do when you take the man who has the greatest number of votes on the first or second trial. Oftentimes it happens that the man who has a very large vote on the first trial, through the inattention of the people on future trials, fails to receive the same number, and the man who is finally elected is one who on the first trial did not receive more than five or six votes. The man who got ten at first, is superseded by the man who had only five. A better illustration cannot be given than by an examination of our own Constitution and history ; and we may determine the question by the practical result. The government, when it was established, was thought to be the wisest; but the State has grown, the population has increased, the relations of the people have changed, and it is necessary to adapt the Constitution to these changed circumstances, and perhaps the changed views of the whole community.

Have we suffered in practice from the evils that exist under the Constitution as it is? I trust that every gentleman will concur in the proposition that we have. I believe there are many evils in the present system, but before I go into an examination of that branch of the subject, although I must repeat what has been said by the gentleman who preceded me, I cannot examine this question without looking a little into the practical operation of the present system. The practical question is, whether as to the election of the governor and the legislature, we shall take the present system or the plurality system. As respects the present system, I have seen men put into the office of governor, who had received but a few. hundred votes from the people; and I have seen senators appointed, who had received from the people only three votes. In the Senate, by the rules, a quorum is composed of sixteen members, and a majority of them may act for the whole

forty who compose the Senate. Then nine members, being a majority of a quorum, may pass the most important measures, in a body which should consist, constitutionally, of forty. How is it in the House of Representatives? What constitutes a majority in that body? Sixty members constitute a quorum in the House of Representatives, a body which at some periods has consisted of seven hundred members, and which now has more than four hundred. And yet sixty members may constitute a quorum to do the most important business; and less than forty, less than the representation of a single corporation in your Commonwealth would control that number. Thus it might happen, under the present system, which is dignified and extolled so much as being the majority system, the representatives of a single corporation would control the most important action of the House of Representatives.

But, Mr. Chairman, as I have said before, this question in relation to a portion of these resolves seems to me to stand upon a somewhat different basis from what it does in relation to another portion. I think the necessity for a change in the choice of a governor, and in the choice of senators, is much greater than it is in that of the members of the House of Representatives. Where your corporation can meet again and again and vote again and again, there is not that objection which arises in cases where you can have but one ballot without great inconvenience.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to look a little at the practical results and inconveniences of this system. To be sure, I would never sacrifice principle; I would adhere to that, let the practical result be what it would, let the labor, the expense, be what they might. But if no principle is involved in a question, then the practical result should have great weight in deciding the point at issue. We have tried this system for a long time in this Commonwealth. The result has been that we have been unrepresented in the congress of the United States; the result has been that in our own legislature we have sometimes had a large portion of the whole people entirely unrepresented during the whole session of the legislature, which I apprehend is entirely contrary to the whole theory of our government. Then look at things less important; how much time has been consumed in these repeated attempts to elect officers? I do not know how many trials have been had in certain cases, but I think I have understood that some sixteen or twenty have been had in some cases, until every body was tired out; and if they did not get a most unsuitable man to represent them, it was a mere accident.

Then again, there is another argument which has not been presented. I like to derive the votes of the people fresh from the people themselves, uncontrolled by any influence of caucuses or conventions or any influence of that kind; and as far as you can get it from the source, pure, you are more likely to get it the first time than at any subsequent trial. The fact that you may have repeated ballots, I think opens the door for intrigue and management. On the first trial, a large class of people will have expressed their opinions, and will not feel so great an interest in the election as to be present again, and the active politicians, perhaps intriguing and designing men, who have an interest of their own to subserve, will take charge of the business, and sway the minds of the people.

Again, I mean no allusion to parties or any combination whatever. The majority system opens a pretty wide door to persons who have perhaps lost their standing with the people and partly to form collateral issues and get up combinations on questions which are unimportant, so that they can bring their clique, section or party to exert the balance of power upon the one side or the other wherever they can make the best bargain. If they find it necessary to combine in this way, they may elect a man to office who is not only a minority candidate but a very small minority candidate.

I have said that our Constitution was not based, throughout, upon the majority principle. But it is not based anywhere, in any part of it, upon that principle. There is not an election mentioned in your whole Constitution, nor one referred to, in which a majority of the voters is required. Why should not those who are away from the polls be represented as well as those who go to the polls. It has been maintained, that we represent only those who go to the polls. How do you know that men who are necessarily detained from the polls would agree with the majority of those who are present? There has never been an instance since the formation of our government, where a governor had a majority of the voters. In the seventy-four or seventy-five elections which have been held in this State, not one gov ernor ever had a majority of the voters. In the three hundred elections for senators of this Commonwealth, very few individuals have ever had a majority of the whole number. After all, this majority, about which so much has been said, when you can exercise it, is nothing but a plurality, and scarcely that. It is merely a majority of those who choose to exercise the influence, and not a majority of the whole, who are interested, because they seldom take the trouble to exercise their influence. To be sure, by staying away they assent that the action of others should bind them, of which they have no reason to complain, but in point of fact we never require and rarely get a majority of the voters in favor of any one officer, for any office whatever. I apprehend, that some light may be had upon this subject by reference to the experience of other States. I have a great respect for old Massachusetts, which I think is not inferior to that of any other individual, but I am not prepared to say that all the wisdom is confined to the old Bay State. I think we are in some danger of being a little too selfcomplacent upon this subject of placing our State a little higher than she deserves. Other States have produced wise and great men, and have grown and prospered in wealth and population, and why should we not consult them? It may be that we may derive wisdom from their history and example. Three-fourths of the States adopt the plurality system. Seven-eighths adopt the system in the whole or in part. There are but three or four States in the Union which have not adopted this system in a greater or less degree. Even here in the State of Massachusetts, in several things we have adopted the plurality system, and if it works well in one thing, may it not in another?

I would lay it down as the first principle, that the agents of the people should be appointed by the people. That is what I call the democratic principle. I mean by it no party allusion, but that is the true principle upon which our govern

[May 26th.

ment is based. The people themselves, under our government, appoint all our officers, from the highest to the lowest, sometimes directly and sometimes through agents, sometimes through the executive, and sometimes through the legislature. I think it is best for us as far as practicable to let the people appoint their officers themselves, and not through agents. There may be cases where, practically, you cannot have the people act directly, but the principle should be laid down, that a man should do for himself what he can, rather than substitute another. His agent may be unfaithful, may make mistakes, but let him do his business himself, and then he has nothing in the world of which he can complain.

Without intending to occupy any considerable time, I wish to say that I am in favor of the plurality system. I have come to that conclusion after much thought, and the more I have reflected upon it, the stronger have been my convictions that it is a system which we should adopt. In some cases, I would be satisfied with it after making one or two trials first, before we should resort to it. I would apply it wherever there is direct action.

But, I will not any longer trespass upon the time of the Convention. I only wish to say in conclusion, that I am in favor of the plurality system, because it is the most democratic doctrine, because it gives the people the best possible chance of expressing their individual opinions, because it tends to take away the temptation to combination and intrigue, and, because it will save a great deal of time to the people of the Commonwealth without at all defeating their wishes in any respect. I am in favor of it for another reason, given by the gentleman from Haverhill, (Mr. Hall,) because, if we reject this system we will lose a great many provisions in relation to other officers, which I hope to see approved by the people.

Mr. ALLEN, of Worcester. Mr. Chairman, I fear the attempt which is now made to abandon and lay aside a great principle is, for the purpose of curing an evil, if it be one, which is at most, of a temporary character.

Gentlemen who are in favor of the change which is now contemplated, agree in two things. In the first place, that the majority principle is the principle which ought to prevail in free governments. With, but one exception, if it can be called an exception of the gentleman who last addressed the Committee, and who seemed at times to maintain the doctrine that the majority should govern, not as a principle of right, but merely as a matter of expediency, resulting from compact and having no foundation in the fitness of things. With that exception, I believe every gentleman who has sustained the Report of the Committee, has admitted, that the doctrine that the majority should govern, lies at the foundation of free governments. I need not ask, as the member from Taunton has done, whether it exists in the nature of man. Much as this Convention, or some portion of its members have seemed disposed to run into metaphysics, I prefer to take a more practical view of this subject. Whether it be founded in the nature of man or not, I maintain that it is founded in the nature of free representative governments, that it is essential to their existence, and should be maintained at all times by its friends. It is the great question, whether the many shall govern, or the few. In some

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countries, the people may be said to assent to the dominion of one man. In another government there is an apparent acquiescence of the popular mind in the government of the few, known as the nobles of the land. But, in all free governments which deserve the name, the people have jealously and tenaciously adhered to the great principle, that, not in the few but in the many, not in one only, but in the majority, shall the governing power reside. The gentleman from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) to show the difficulty of carrying out the principle of the majority, supposes a case where it is impossible, as he thinks, to apply it. For instance, where a portion of the people themselves, do not see fit to exercise their power by giving their suffrages. Still, in this case the right of sovereignty remains, and the principle is unshaken, that to the people belongs the power. In all the instances which have been adduced, by different speakers, tending to show that the principle is not carried out in every instance, it is the result of necessity and not of choice; and while we admit that, in some circumstances it is impossible to carry out to its fullest extent in its practical operation upon elections, the great rule for which we contend, yet, its friends do not depart any further from the principle than necessity compels them to do; and a relinquishment to necessity, a yielding to an emergency which presents no other alternative, is no proof that the principle itself is not of the highest value. On the other hand, the refusal to depart from it except in cases of absolute necessity-the adherence to it in this Commonwealth in all practicable cases show, how dear to the people themselves, is the long-tried system from which, nothing but necessity could induce them to turn aside. Gentlemen who favor the Report of the Committee, appeal for their justification to experience-admitting, in the main, the correctness of the principle which lies at the foundation of the choice of officers in this Commonwealth-to find there, the necessity for a change. I also, appeal to experience, and I ask the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Gray,) who ably sustained the Report of the Committee, how it happens that, in order to illustrate the inconveniences of the present system, he should go back no further than to the year 1831. How happens it, in order to show the inconvenience which has resulted from the failure of the people to choose their governor, that that gentleman, with all his research, should go no farther back than to the last five years. Does he not remember, that the Constitution of the Commonwealth has been in force seventy-two years. No man understands the history of the State better than the gentleman from Boston. When, therefore, he looks back to the experience of the past, what does it in fact, teach? Does he not find in the experience which the people of Massachusetts have had under their Constitution for more than sixty out of the seventy years, an argument against change? I have looked into the records of the proceedings of the Convention of 1820, to see what discussion was had upon that subject, and I could not find a single line or word in relation to it. I appealed to one venerable gentleman, whom, we have the happiness to see sitting in the midst of us, and who was a member of that Convention. and whose memory is never at fault in regard to the political history of the Commonwealth-to know if the subject was discussed at all in the Convention of 1820, and the reply was, that he had no

ELECTIONS BY PLURALITY. — ALLEN.

recollection, even of the subject having been introduced. And yet, the people had at that time lived under the Constitution for forty years, and experienced no inconvenience from the operation of the majority principle under that Constitution, so that no one member of that numerous body presented it to the view of the Convention as an evil, or sought to find its remedy in a change from the principle that the majority should govern. Does that fiet teach anything?

Do gentlemen who look to experience for lessons of instruction disregard the experience of so many years, during which the existence of t' at evil which now so alarms them, was not perceived for a single moment? Trace matters from 1820, for almost thirty years, down to within five years of the present time, and we find that the same experience has been had by the present gencration as to the workings of their Constitution, which was had by their fathers. No purpose was manifested in any part of the Commonwealth, in favor of a change; no desire was expressed by any public man to that effect. Now, Sir, I hold the very fact that for more than sixty years after the formation of our Constitution the evil has not been felt in a single instance, to be the teaching of experience upon this subject—to be a strong argument, and one which should be weighed well before we undertake to make any change in the Constitution which so much experience has shown to be unnecessary. We are undertaking to do away with an important principle, for the purpose of meeting a temporary evil, or obviating a temporary inconvenience. We are changing that

Constitution under which we and our children may hereafter live as happily as we and our fathers have dwelt in times past, merely to meet an evil which is temporary in its character, as the history of the past proves, and which, from the nature of things, must be temporary in future. It has only been within a few years past that throughout this Commonwealth men have been divided into more than two great parties. In the ordinary state of affairs, as existing in the Commonwealth and through the country heretofore, some great questions of peace and war, or some questions having relation to the industrial pursuits of the country, have divided the inhabitants into two great classes, when the whole body of the community was ranged either upon the one side or upon the other; and it is admitted that in such a state of things as that, no evil has resulted from the provision now incorporated into the present Constitution. But, Sir, within a few years, another party has sprung up in the Commonwealth; some great questions have agitated a large portion of the public mind, and very many of the voters of the Commonwealth did not see fit to enlist, or, as it is proper to infer, believed that they could not enlist under the banners of either of the previously existing parties. In consequence of this, there has, in some instances, been a difficulty of making a choice of officers at elections by the people. But this evil, I repeat, if it be one, is of a temporary character; the tendency, as I think gentlemen will generally admit, is for the people to range themselves upon the one side or the other, on some great predominant question before the country; and if they depart for a time and take ground upon a different position, and upon a separate principle, the tendency in all cases is to reach, by some means or other, a less complicated arrangement of parties, and go on

(May 26th.

again according to the usual course of affairs. If a question arises in the Commonwealth, inducing any large portion of the people to go out from the associations with which they have heretofore been connected, that state of things must be of short duration, provided the question is one of small practical importance; but if, on the other hand, it is one of magnitude, one upon which the people are justly aroused, in the course of a few years, at the farthest, other large portions of the people will adopt that principle which comparatively few maintained at first, and the result will be that parties will once more resolve themselves into their original number. If the principle maintained by the third party is one which will not bear the test of examination and experience, it soon passes away, and is forgotten; but it sometimes happens that some new question arises in the community, attracting the earnest attention of a large portion of the people, yet not a majority, where there is a solid foundation for popular action; where there is an evil which seeks some remedy, and which at list finds it.

Now, Sir, shall we, in consequence of this diversion of affairs from their ordinary and normal course at distant periods in the history of the Commonwealth-shall we lay aside a principle which has always been adhered to by the people, and which has always been found valuable in its operation wherever it has been applied? I admit that evils, to some extent, may be felt from the existence of such divisions among the people; that their public officers may not be at all times easily chosen; yet I think that so long as that state of things may exist, there is a great counterbalancing good, which will far outweigh any evils which may be supposed to arise, or which may actually be experienced. In the first place, this principle affords to every voter in the Commonwealth an opportunity of expressing his unbiased opinion on subjects of great importance to the State, without altogether destroying the force of his action upon political affairs. If I happen not to coincide in opinion with either of the two great political parties, and there are, throughout the Commonwealth, many others entertaining similar views with myself, I desire that I and they may have an opportunity to express that opinion without being reduced to the alternative of seeing that my action upon the political affairs of the State has not the slightest affect and influence, or upon the other hand, of being obliged to range myself with another portion of the people, whose sentiments on many subjects I discard, and whose leading, predominating principles are at war with my own. When it is considered that it is not here and there a few, but it is great numbers of the people who desire this privilege, we perceive a strong reason why the principle which has heretofore governed our elections should be be retained, in order that this privilege may granted, in deference to the rights, not of a majority, indeed, but of a numerous minority.

It is said by the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Gray,) that in order to effect such object there is no need of the formation of a third party; and he refers to a case wherein the sentiments of men have been felt in the action of other parties than that which has been formed for the purpose of carrying out a particular measure. The gentleman from Boston came very near the limits beyond which it is unsafe to tread; and I must decline going any further than he has ventured. Let

me say, however, that in the instance which he suggested, the temperance question, as well as in others which might be mentioned, the influence of the opinions of bodies of men has, without doubt, been felt without the formation of political parties upon the particular subject; but did it not occur to the gentleman to inquire how this difference happened? It is the necessity of the case which creates the difference in the mode of public action. Upon temperance, or most other moral questions, the political parties, as they existed before such questions arose, had no fixed party principles; and those who enlisted under the banner of temperance could exert themselves through these same parties. But suppose it should so happen in this Commonwealth-for we must go in our illustrations as far from the present time as possible-in the life time of ourselves or of our children, that attention should be aroused to some great principle vital to the well-being of the State. Suppose it should so happen-which is a case far more possible than some which have been supposed this morningthat the two great parties which already exist should have both laid down, as the corner stone of their political fabric, opposition to the very principle which he deems vital to the Commonwealth and to the nation; how then, let me ask that gentleman, is he to influence the public mind and to affect the politics of the State or of the country through these organizations, and how can he act with them? I know that the careful consideration which that gentleman always gives to subjects of importance, will suggest the difference in cases which may arise, and show to him that his argument has not that conclusive character which it at first would seem to bear upon its face. Now I contend for this right, so important to large bodies of the people, although they may not constitute a majority of the voters. It is important also to the safety of the Commonwealth that the right should be recognized-important to the majority, as well as to those who exercise it. When questions of deep import affect the public mind, it is of great consequence that we should see the whole extent of this influence by its action upon the surface-that we should afford opportunities for its manifestation, instead of precluding them-that there should be an open expression of public sentiment at the ballot-box as well as elsewhere. If any evil should threaten the Commonwealth-if a tempest should be gathering its forces which may injuriously affect its institutions or its interests, is it not desirable that you should be able to discern its progress, that you should be able to sound their depths and ascertain the height of the waves which may submerge you? Such questions have arisen touching national affairs, and should they arise in respect to the internal affairs of the State, as they have done, and may again at any time, the argument which I have submitted, as it seems to me, would be felt to have exceeding force. Do you prefer that the tempest which you fear, or the volcano, which is to send its contents over the land carrying desolation and destruction, should be concealed from your view in its origin and progress, until it is ready to burst forth with irresistible force upon the State. It is for the interest of the Commonwealth, if there should be grievances which any considerable portion of the people feel to be burdensome, that there should be an opportunity for the expression of that

sentiment at the ballot-box, in order that you may know, by the safest means, of the existence of discontent, and also know, at the same time, to what extent it prevails among the people. Then, Sir, it may be, that without adopting the particular measures which may be indicated by those who are first to point out the evil and the remedy, prudence and, conciliation, and a temperate exercise of the powers of government, may enable you to meet the crisis, and turn to the great advantage of the public that state of things which seemed to be fraught with danger to its safety and repose. In whatever light, therefore, you view this question, whether you are influenced by the consideration of the rights of the citizen, and the value to him of an opportunity to give a free and unrestrained expression of his wishes in regard to the principles which should predominate and the persons who shall fill the offices, or whether you look to the safety of the State in reference to internal discontents which have existed in the course of its history, and which may exist in yet more fearful forms in future, it is important that you should afford new facilities, instead of removing existing ones, for a free expression of individual opinion.

Some gentlemen who sustain the Report of the Committee, have undertaken to point out strange results, which might possibly happen if we retain the majority principle. They tell us it might so happen, that a governor would be elected by the votes of some fifty or one hundred electors. Ireply, in a word, that it is a sufficient answer to say that as the Commonwealth has never yet experienced such a calamity, and is not likely to, it is not very important to guard against that which has no existence except in the imagination of men. It is also answered by saying, in reference to the very illustration which is given, that almost, if not quite the very same thing, might happen, by the same possibility, but against a like probability, if you adopt the plurality principle.

But, Sir, we have often had occasion to observe, that nothing is gained by the supposition of occurrences which have not happened within the memory or tradition of man, and which, although they may by possibility occur, are yet not within the bounds of that reasonable probability against which prudent men should guard.

Sir, I have said all that I wish to say upon the present occasion. I do not wish to take up the time of the Convention by unreasonably extending my remarks. I concur in the wish expressed by the gentleman from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) -whose observation and experience leads him to see how undue influences may be used upon public bodies, and who has more than once kindly cautioned us against them. I concur with him in the expression of the wish that no combination, except combinations to promote the welfare of the Commonwealth, now and hereafter, may influence any of the members of this Convention. And I will also agree with him in the expression of my wish also, that no fear of combinations may at any time have the effect of producing combinations of an opposite character.

Mr. GRISWOLD, for Erving. I rise with reluctance to say a word upon a subject which has been so nearly exhausted by gentlemen more capable, who have preceded me; and if gentlemen will indulge me, I will endeavor, in the few remarks I have to make, to avoid, as far as possible, occupying ground which has been occupied by

[May 26th.

those who have preceded me, and will circumscribe my remarks within a narrow compass.

Before I commence to offer my views, I will notice the remark of the gentleman who has just taken his scat, when he referred to the Convention of 1820. It seems to me, that the fact that that Convention did not entertain an argument upon the plurality law, has no weight, as an argument, against the Report of this Committee; and I hope the committees of this body will not be governed by the conduct of that Convention. Why, Sir, the very first step we have taken in this Convention, is to upset the doctrine in relation to the basis of representation for the Senate— a doctrine which was maintained and carried through that Convention by the ablest minds of that body.

Many reasons have been adduced in favor of this Report, and there are direct and incidental arguments which might be brought in favor of it. It seems to me that the reasons in favor of the adoption of the plurality system may be embraced under three heads, to each of which I will briefly allude.

In the first place-which is no inconsiderable matter-is the saving of time and expense. This point has been alluded to already, but if the Committee will allow me, I should like to refer them to the congressional elections which have been held in this Commonwealth, in order to show the vast amount of time and money which have been expended by the voters of this Commonwealth since the organization of this government, for the want of this very law.

In the election of representatives for the second congress, in the District composed of Bristol, Dukes, and Nantucket, there were nine trials before a candidate was elected.

In the election for the sixth congress, in the First Southern District, there were five trials. In the election for the seventh congress, in the First Eastern District, there were five trials. In the election for the fifteenth congress, in the Fifth Eastern District, there were five trials, and in the Sixth Eastern District, six trials.

For the nineteenth congress, Worcester South District had four trials.

For the twenty-second congress, Bristol District had seven trials; and Essex North District thirteen trials.

For the twenty-third congress, District No. 9 had eight trials.

For the twenty-sixth congress, District No. 4 had four trials.

For the twenty-eighth congress, District No. 3 had seven trials; District No. 7 had six trials, and District No. 6, six trials.

For the twenty-ninth congress, District No. 9 had nine trials.

For the thirty-first congress, District No. 4 had seven trials.

Thus there were, from the first to the thirtyfirst congress inclusive, two hundred and one ineffectual trials for the election of members of congress; and the number of votes cast in those attempts, was 937,265-almost a million votes; and if we include the ineffectual ballotings since 1850, the number will amount to over a million. Now this is no inconsiderable matter. If it takes one day to attend the polls to vote for a member of congress, and that day is worth one dollar, there is a million of dollars which have been lost to the people of this Commonwealth for the want of such