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a provision as is proposed by this Report. If it takes but half a day to attend the polls, that, at a dollar per day, would amount to half a million of dollars, which have been lost for the want of the plurality system in this Commonwealth.

Again, Sir, in relation to the election of electors for president and vice-president. In 1848, there was no election by the people, and the legis lature of Massachusetts was convened, at an expense of six thousand dollars, simply to vote for presidential electors. This same thing would again have occurred at the last election, had not the legislature, in the mean time adopted the plurality system, as regards that election.

Now, Sir, let me refer gentlemen to the subject of the election to general court-and upon this subject I have not been able to provide myself with statistics—and to the election of members of the legislature. Under the Constitution of Massachusetts, we have the right to ballot for four days. Now, Sir, I should like to know how many ineffectual trials have been made for the election of members of the legislature, since the adoption of the Constitution, and how many days time have been wasted? A hundred or a thousand will not tell it, but hundreds of thousands of days have been lost, and a great deal of money expended in these ineffectual trials. So that if you only look upon it in this view-and this, perhaps, in some aspects of the case, is the weakest point of the argument-if you look at it merely in the light of consuming the time of the voters of the Commonwealth, it becomes an argument of great force in favor of adopting the plurality system, so as to avoid subjecting the people to these repeated trials.

Then comes the matter of the election of governor, lieutenant-governor and the senators of the Commonwealth, when they are not elected by the people. This comes under the same head, because, according to the provisions of the Constitution, whenever they are not elected by the people, they are to be elected by the legislature. Now it is well known, that five, six, seven, eight and sometimes ten days are taken up in organizing the government. And what is the cause of this delay? It is caused mainly by the fact that no choice of governor, lieutenant-governor, and of many of the senators, is made by the people, and in such cases it becomes necessary to consume several days of the session of the legislature, in balloting for those officers. Here there is another matter of time and expense, important to be considered in this argument.

Now I am willing that a proper degree of time should be spent in balloting for officers, and that a provision should be inserted in the Constitution. by which the voters of the Commonwealth should be guaranteed as much time for that purpose, and as repeated elections, as is proper under all the circumstances of the case, but unless there is some overpowering necessity to prevent it, unless it is a violation of some great first principle of government, we ought to have some easy and economical system of electing our officers. So much for the argument as to time and expense.

In the next place, allow me to say, that to me it appears that the adoption of this Report will have the tendency to allay the asperity of party spirit in the Commonwealth. I do not know what may be the opinion of other members of this Convention, but so far as my observation goes, I am convinced that these repeated elections have a

[May 26th.

rancor which is infused into the canvass as it goes on. I am willing to go to the polls at all proper times for the purpose of voting, and to take my position in relation to the principles of the party with which I co-operate, and to take all proper and fair means to carry them into effect, but it seems to me to be a wrong principle to incorporate into the Constitution a provision which will tend to keep up this spirit of animosity in the Commonwealth, by repeated and ineffectual clections. I think if we adopt a plan which will produce a result upon the first trial, we shall assuage and do away this violent party spirit, and produce a wholesome effect upon the community.

In many cases the moral effect of these elections and political controversies is directly of an opposite kind from that pointed out by the gentleman from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker.) I like holidays and anniversaries, and I wish we had more of them, where all met upon one common level, and upon one common platform, to exchange the courtesies of life, and throw off the cares and burdens of the week and year. That would be some relief to every person, but these are quite a different affair from our political meetings, for I have not found, from my experience and observation, that we come out from these election days with any such refreshing vigor of soul or body; but on the contrary, that we come out of them languid, exhausted, and not unfrequently, it is to be feared, injured in a moral point of view.

I say, therefore, that so far as the mere matter of party spirit is concerned, and its effects upon the morals of the community, I believe the adoption of this Report would be beneficial in its results.

In the third place, another argument is--and, perhaps, the most important one-it will secure a full representation in the legislature, and in congress, and in every part of the government to which the principle will apply. Now, Sir, what is the actual effect of the operation of the majority principle which you now have incorporated in the Constitution? The necessary and practical operation is to deprive certain towns and districts of their just share of representation. Gentlemen who cling to the majority principle forget that there is a principle which lies deeper than the majority principle-and that is the right of representation. It is not of so much importance whether the representative should have a majority or a plurality of the votes, as it is that the town and district should be represented. But your majority system in the Constitution deprives towns and districts of their just share of representation.

The gentleman from Abington seemed to dwell upon the idea that it was a wonderful provision of the Constitution, which put it in the power of a few men to hold the balance of power, and to prevent representatives from being chosen. In clinging to that favorite theory, the gentleman forgets altogether the other great doctrine, which lies deeper, and which is of more importance, that every portion should be represented in the legislature, and in congress.

The mind of the gentleman from North Brookfield, seemed at various times to run upon the subject of human slavery.

Let me suppose, Mr. Chairman, that the question of human slavery is being agitated at your

anced; that the question of whether human slavery is to be extended upon the virgin soil of our acquired territory is to be decided, and that the parties are so closely balanced that it may be decided by a single vote. Every Southern State has a plurality law, by which every Southern delegation is full; but Massachusetts, clinging to her old majority principle, leaves one or two districts unrepresented, and this great question, which is to chain thousands of human beings, and subject them to bondage, slavery and death, is carried, for want of a single vote from Massachusetts, and that vote is lost for want of a plurality principle in your Constitution and laws. And this want of a full representation in congress from the State of Massachusetts, has occurred not unfrequently, when, if the question of slavery has not been up, there have been other questions before congress, which were vital to the interest and prosperity of the State. You want every delegate there.

I now ask the Committee to look at one other fact, which I think has not been alluded to by any other gentleman, Here, in your House of Representatives of Massachusetts, I suppose from thirty to fifty towns each year fail to be represented, because they are unable to elect any candidate under your majority system. They want a plurality law. But gentlemen may say that the different parties might agree upon some man in the course of four days balloting; the facts, however, show that such is not necessarily the case. We must take the world as we find it. We must take the majority as we find it. We must take the constitution of society and of individuals as we find it; and we must adapt our Constitution to the state of society as it now exists, and as it has existed from year to year. Then, if we find that our Constitution as it now exists, deprives from thirty to fifty of the towns of the Commonwealth of their represensation in the popular branch of your legislature, it becomes a matter of great magnitude, and it is for us to inquire whether there is anything in this majority principle, so sacred and so inviolable that it must be adhered to, when these results are certain to follow. Why, look at the very Convention now assembled to revise the fundamental law of the Commonwealth. In consequence of the majority principle upon which the members were elected, there are several towns in the State that are unrepresented in this body, and no gentleman has been able to see the way clear, either by parliamentary law, or any other law, by which they can now be represented. For want of a plurality law, therefore, several towns-and it might have been fifty just as well—are now denied a voice in this body, convened for the purpose of framing the fundamental law of the State, which is to stand for generations yet to come, perhaps, and which is to regulate and affect, the character, the life, the reputation, and the prosperity of every individual, and of his descendants after him, in these towns. And it is this majority principle which gives them no right and no power to sit and take part in our deliberations, which are so momentous to themselves and those who are to come after them. Well, Sir, unless we see something in this majority principle which is sacred; something which we have no right to touch, it seems to me that its practical operations upon each individual and upon the Commonwealth at

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large, in the waste of time and money, in engendering and keeping alive party spirit, and especially in depriving towns of any voice in the government of the State, or in the government of the United States, is working constantly an evil of so great magnitude, that unless there is some overpowering reason to prevent, there should be some change in this respect.

Allusions have been made to other States in reference to this subject. Now, I would not be governed in my conclusions or my conduct by the precedents of other States altogether, but then gentlemen cannot wink out of sight the fact that every other State in the Union has adopted, to a greater or less extent, the plurality system in their elections.

Well, Mr. Chairman, these are the substantial arguments in favor of adopting the plurality principle. But we are met here with the remark or the argument that it is anti-democratic, that the majority principle is the fundamental principle of a democratic government, and that that of the plurality is in utter violation of republicanism.. Well, Sir, I take it that the general statement of "the majority should rule" must be taken with many qualifications and limitations. My learned friend from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) went back to the very first principles of the whole of it and proved to the Committee that it did not exist in the nature of things originally; that it is not a law of nature or of God, but that, so far as government is concerned, it is a mere matter of contract, and that its binding force and its sacredness exist only from the fact of its existence as a part of a government contract. But without going back precisely to that point, I deny that, as an absolute proposition, the majority under all circumstances should rule. If you will take the Constitution of Massachusetts and go back to its elements, you will find that every step we have taken from the state of nature is a departure, to a greater or less extent, from the democratic principle of the majority should rule. I suppose no one here would go back to the principle of the Athenian democracy that the majority of the people over a certain age should rule in a body. I suppose no one would go back to the customs of those who landed on Plymouth rock, where all laws were passed by the mass of freemen assembled. The question has been pretty well discussed in this Convention, of who the people are, and I suppose when that is settled we shall know also who the majority are. Why, Sir, the very first step we take in human government is a departure from the mere majority principle, for by the common consent of mankind women, minors, idiots, insane and perhaps paupers or persons under guardianship, are excluded from any active participation in the formation or administration of government. Then here is another violation of your democratic principle if strictly applied. To carry out that principle, a majority of the voters should take part in the administration of the government, while the fact is that but very few out of the large number of voters are concerned in it. But if you will come down still further, you will find the democratic principle is violated by those who are selected to make and a minister the laws, at every stage of proceeding. For instance, the House may pass a bill unanimously, but it is in the power of the Senate to defeat it; it may be defeated there by a single vote or a bill may pass the Senate unanimously and be defeated in the House by a single

vote. What then becomes of your majority principle, when by your constitution it is in the power of a single man in one branch of your legislature to defeat a measure which has passed the other branch unanimously, and thus enables one man to overrule the will of a large majority of your legislature?

But still further, a measure may pass the House and pass the Senate, without opposition. It then goes to your governor-and there is the most anti-democratic provision of your whole constitution-the one man power. You have a constitution which places it within the power of one man to defeat a measure which has passed both branches of the legislature unanimously. Yet with a provision so anti-democratic as that, so contrary to the principle of "the majority should rule," where the governor of Massachusetts or the president of the United States, can by the exercise of his veto defeat a measure which, judging from the legislature, was desired by a majority of the people, and thus thwart the will of the majority of the people. I say with such a provision in your Constitution, where is the man who will suggest or vote to expunge the veto power from the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts or of the United States? I know a very respectable party in the country, did, at one time, break the ground upon that subject; but it was only upon the stump and in the newspapers. I do not believe there is a man in this Convention or in this State who would consent to expunge that provision from the Constitution of the State. Not one.

-a

Well, then, suppose a measure passes both Houses of the legislature, and receives the sanction of the governor, you have then in your Constitution, beyond that, a Supreme Court, seven man power, who have the right to set aside that law as unconstitutional, although your House, Senate, and governor have each passed upon that question. Here, then, you have all these anti-democratic elements in your Constitution, notwithstanding the principle of which we have heard so much, that the majority should govern.

Mr. Chairman, you cannot carry on any government purely upon that principle. Your Constitution has provided, and rightly provided, that where the governor, lieutenant-governor, or any of your senators fail to receive a majority of votes, a minority or plurality candidate shall be elected, otherwise your government would come to an end, or the old officers would hold over in perpetuity, which would perhaps be worse than no government at all, and this brings me to the point which I desire to bring to the especial attention of the Convention. A government cannot exist, you cannot frame a government, nor can you carry on a government, unless you adopt the principle that where the people fail to elect their officers, plurality or minority candidates must be chosen. But the reason why it is said that the majority elect in these cases, is this: your Constitution and laws were adopted by a majority of the people; your Constitution provides that when a majority of the people fail to elect certain officers of the government, they shall be elected by another body, and though the men elected may be minority candidates, yet, as the manner in which they are elected is sanctioned by a majority of the people, they may in this way be said to be elected by the majority. Well, Sir, if a majority of this Conven

[May 26th.

tion and a majority of the people, put a provision into this Constitution that a plurality shall elect, then the man who receives a plurality of votes will be elected by the majority, just as your governor, lieutenant-governor and senators now are, precisely.

The gentleman from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker,) suggested the extraordinary illustration of nineteen candidates where there were twenty voters. Well, Sir, that was a wild illustration and ought not to influence any member of this Committee; but after all it was not a much more extraordinary illustration than the very one provided for by our Constitution, which is that when the governor is not elected by a majority of the people, the House shall select from the four candidates receiving the highest number of votes, thus placing it in the power of that body, in connection with the Senate, in some cases, to elect a man as governor of the Commonwealth who has not received 100 votes of the people. Yet that is a constitutional provision.

Well, Sir, the amount of it is, that it is an antidemocratic provision, but it goes to prove the great principle, that all the elements of government are necessary to its existence. They are the opposing forces in a government, which hold it together. They are like the opposite forces in electricity, which must be united before they will produce any positive result. They are like the blending of opposite colors to produce a ray of light. They are like the opposing forces in nature which hold the solar system together, and move the planets in their proper orbits. The government of Massachusetts is like an engine of tremendous power. You watch a particular part of its complicated machinery when it is in motion, and to all human appearance its operation and effect is to carry the machine in an opposite direction from that in which it is intended it shall move; but, nevertheless, the combined operation of all its complicated forces, is to carry the machine forward in its proper course, So it is in our government, however at variance with its legitimate end particular elements may be when considered separately; yet the effect of the combined operation of its forces, is to move it on in its proper direction.

I will detain the Committee but a moment longer. The gentleman who was last up alluded to the long usage in the Commonwealth of this majority system. Now, Sir, I am one of those who feel a due respect for precedents where they have worked well. Where long usage is in accordance with my own views, I am willing still to see it continued; but because a principle has been in operation in this Commonwealth from one to two hundred years, when there is a necessity for making a change, that long usage will not prevent me from making the change, and I think the gentleman who last spoke in favor of this Report, has shown abundant reasons why this change should be made in our Constitution.

A single word as to the effect of this measure upon the community. Allusion has been made to the effect it would have upon political parties. I do not propose to follow up that subject at all. I do not believe that we can take into consideration, in the formation of an organic law, which is to last perhaps for several gencrations, its effect, present or propective, upon the political parties, which are so constantly changing. New combinations are being constantly formed, and you cannot

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tell to-morrow or the next year what will be the precise condition of parties from their present position and aspect. In the formation of an organic law, which is to operate upon the whole people, we should have reference solely to the wants, wishes and welfare of the whole people of the Commonwealth, and not what would be its effect in the present or the future, upon political parties. Even if I were looking at the subject in that light, and were influenced by such considerations, I doubt very much, whether I would change or alter my course of action upon this subject. I believe you will find that in States where the plurality system exists, in New York, for instance, that a small portion of the voters of the State, like the Anti-Renters, or any other party-I take that party as an illustration-can exert an influence, and bring other parties, and other men to the support of their candidates with as great facility and effect as they can where you have a majority principle. One word more in relation to the voice of the people upon this subject, and I have done. I would not be governed entirely by what I suppose to be the wish of the people upon this subject, unless it corresponded with my own views. I apprehend that a large majority of the people of this Commonwealth are desirous that this principle should be incorporated into the Constitution, and I believe that they are heartily and totally sick of these constant and repeated elections. They are willing to go to the polls at proper times and upon proper occasions, cast their votes, spend as much time and money as is necessary to elect the proper officers; but to live under a Constitution which shall call them out from their labors and homes to enter into political broils or excited party contests one day in every week or month, is not what they desire. I believe if we fail to incorporate this plurality principle into the Constitution, that it will disappoint the expectations of a large majority of the people of this Commonwealth.

Upon the other point, as to whether this principle is universal or whether some exceptions should be made, is a matter upon which I nave expressed no particular opinion. I certainly, as far as my present convictions go, am in favor of extending it to the length recommended in the Report. But if gentlemen disagree with me, and it is thought best to apply it only to a portion of the officers of the State, and make some exceptions, why then, perhaps, it might be done and prove more acceptable to the wishes of this Convention. Upon that point I have nothing to say at this time. These are my reasons, briefly given, for supporting the Report of the Committee. I am sorry that I have detained the Committee so long, especially at this late hour of the morning session.

Mr. BATES, of Plymouth. I rise for the purpose of moving the following amendment. To insert after the word "it" in the second line, the following, "except the Governor, LieutenantGovernor, Secretary, Treasurer, Attorney-General, and Auditor of the Commonwealth, provided those officers shall be made elective." So that the section will read :

"Resolved, That it is expedient so to revise the Constitution, that in all elections by the people of officers named in it, except the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary, Treasurer, AttorneyGeneral, and Auditor of the Commonwealth, provided those officers shall be made elective, the person receiving the highest number of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected."

I now move that the Committee rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

Mr. OLIVER, of Lawrence. I understand this resolution applies to the officers named in the Constitution. In article 10, chapter 2, there are certain military officers named. I wish to inquire if it is the intention of this resolution to comprehend that class of officers, or whether it is strictly confined to the civil officers alone. The wording of the resolution is a little obscure; it is not as definite as I could wish. If it is intended to apply to the class of officers named in the article of the Constitution to which I have referred, the propriety of adopting it might be questionable, and it would come properly under the eognizance of another Committee. I merely ask for information.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is unwilling to arrest any debate, or answer to the inquiries of gentlemen, but the gentleman is not strictly in order at this moment. The question before the Committee is, shall the Committee rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again. That is not debatable.

The question was then taken upon Mr. BATES' motion, that the Committee rise, and it was decided in the affirmative.

IN CONVENTION.

The PRESIDENT having resumed the Chair, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole reported that that Committee had had the subject of plurality in elections under consideration, made some progress therein, and asked leave to sit again.

Leave was granted.

Census.

Mr. EARLE, of Worcester, offered the following resolution:

Resolved,, That the Constitution of the State ought to be so amended as to provide that the next census of the State shall be taken in the year 1855, and in each subsequent decennial period thereafter, so as to make the State census intermediate between the periods of the National

census.

On motion of Mr. EARLE, the resolution was referred to the Committee on the Frame of Government.

Business Corporations.

On motion by Mr. WILSON, of Natick,

Ordered, That the Secretary of the Commonwealth be requested to furnish, for the use of the Convention, a statement showing the number of business corporations that have been created by the legislature, since the last abstract upon the subject, furnished from the Secretary's office for the use of the legislature, the purposes for which they have been created, the capital granted to each, the aggregate capital of each class, and the aggregate capital of all; also, a similar statement of corporations created the present year; and acts for the increase of the capital of existing corpora

tions.

Also, a statement of the Acts increasing the capital of existing corporations since the abstract referred to of the present year.

Also, the aggregate number of the different classes of corporations, and the aggregate capital of the same, as contained in the two statements heretofore furnished from his office for the use of the legislature.

Communication.

[May 26th.

In compliance with an order of the Convention of the 19th instant, the Secretary laid before the Convention the Abstract Returns of the Population in 1840 and 1850; the Number of Names borne on the Check Lists of the several Cities and Towns; and the Number of Votes cast for Governor, in November, 1850; and the Number of Delegates to the Convention, under the Act of

1852.

On motion of Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell, the foregoing communication, with the accompanying papers, were laid upon the table and ordered to be printed.

Mr. CROWELL, of Dennis, moved that when the Convention adjourn, it be to meet at three o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. GRAY, of Boston, moved in amendment, that when the Convention adjourn it be until tomorrow at ten o'clock, A. M.

Mr. GRAY said he certainly thought the Convention would gain nothing by attempting to hurry the business of the Convention at the present moment. He did not suppose there was any difference of opinion as to the desire to expedite the business, but it would be perceived that the Committees and he thought it might be said for them, that they had made unusual progress in their reports-had still before them several matters for consideration. Their labors were not yet completed, and he therefore thought it would be injudicious to deprive them of the time which was requisite to enable them to bring the business before them to a conclusion; and there was also a Committee, of which he himself was a member, that had under consideration this particular subject of expediting the business of the Convention; their report was in course of preparation; what the report would be, was not for him to say, but whatever course the Committee might recommend, he thought the holding of afternoon sessions at present, instead of expediting, would be an interruption to business.

Mr. WILSON, of Natick, said he was very glad the gentleman from Dennis had made the motion to meet here at three o'clock this afternoon, and he hoped the amendment of the gentleman from Boston would not be sustained by the Convention. They had already been here about twenty days, and had made very little progress indeed. There were several items now on the calendar for the Convention to consider, and dispose of; there was as much business, perhaps, as the Convention could dispose of for the next ten days, and it would be of but little importance whether the Committees meet any more for a week to come, or not. He hoped the Convention would meet at three o'clock in the afternoon, and they would fix upon the hour of eleven in the morning, which would give the Committees two hours previous to the meeting of the Convention each morning, and it would be amply sufficient to enable them to dispose of the business before them.

Mr. HOOD, of Lynn, said he was sorry to differ with his friend from Boston. It appeared to him that unless they held two sessions a day the result would be that they should inevitably prolong the session three or four months. The gentleman from Natick had anticipated, to a great extent, what he had intended to say in reference to this matter. His experience had been, so far as the legislature was concerned, that when two sessions a day were held, the committees performed

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The

more work than when they held but one. reason was, that there was a better attendance of the members generally when two sessions were held; whereas, in the other case, members were in the habit of going home for a part of the day. A general rule, applicable to bodies of this kind, as well as to individuals, that the more work they had to do the better they would attend to it. He hoped the original motion would be adopted, and the Convention would meet at three o'clock.

The question was then taken upon the motion of the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Gray,) that when the Convention adjourn it be until tomorrow, at ten o'clock, and it was, upon a division, ayes 137, noes 131, decided in the affirmative.

On motion by Mr. HALE, of Bridgewater, the Convention then, at two o'clock, adjourned.

FRIDAY, May 27, 1853. The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock. Prayer by the Chaplain. The journal of yesterday was read and approved.

State Loans.

On motion of Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell, it was

Ordered, That the Committee on Loan of State Credit inquire into the expediency of providing that the credit or moneys of the State be not loaned to the prosecution of any private enterprise after the 1st day of July, which will be in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five.

Claims.

On motion by Mr. DANA, for Manchester, it was

Ordered, That the Committee on the Declaration of Rights consider the expediency of declaring the right of every person having a claim against the Commonwealth, to a judicial remedy therefor.

Compensation of Representatives.

Mr. CRESSY, of Hamilton, presented the following resolution, which, on his motion, was referred to the Committee on the Frame of Government:

Resolved, That it is expedient to insert into the Constitution (in the legislative department) the following, viz.:-Each member of the legislature shall receive from the public treasury a compensation for services which may be increased or diminished by law; but no increase of compensation shall take effect during the session at which such increase shall have been made.

House of Representatives.

Mr. GRISWOLD, for Erving, from the Committee on the House of Representatives, presented the following Majority Report:

The Committee to whom was referred so much of the Constitution as relates to the House of Representatives, and to whom was also referred the resolves of May 10th, May 11th, and May 23d; also the orders of 13th, 16th, 17th, 19th, scverally relating to the apportionment of the House of Representatives, have considered the same, and report, in part, the accompanying resolves.

Resolved, That it is expedient to alter and amend the Constitution of this Commonwealth, so that the members of the House of Representatives shall be appointed in the following manner: Every town or city may elect one representative. Every town or city containing five thou

sand inhabitants, may elect two representatives; and five thousand inhabitants shall be the number which shall entitle it to an additional representative: provided, however, that no town or city shall be entitled to more than thirty representatives.

Resolved, That the Senate, at its first session, after this provision of the Constitution shall have been adopted by the people, shall apportion the number of representatives which each city and town is entitled to elect, and shall cause the same to be published; and said apportionment shall be determined by the census taken under the authority of the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty.

Resolved, That the Senate, at its first session, after the census which shall be taken in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty, and at its first session after each decennial census thereafter, shall apportion the number of representatives which each town and city is entitled to elect, and shall cause the same to be published: and in the apportionment which shall be made by the Senate, at its first session, after the census to be taken in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty, and in every subsequent decennial apportionment, the number which shall entitle a town or city to elect two representatives, and the number which shall entitle a town or city to elect more than two representatives, shall be so increased as to make the whole number of representatives of which the House shall consist, as nearly equal as may be to the number of representatives of which the House shall consist by the apportionment to be made by the Senate, at its first session, after this provision of the Constitution shall have been adopted by the people.

On motion of Mr. GRISWOLD, the Report was referred to the Committee of the Whole, and ordered to be printed.

The same gentleman, from the same Committee, presented the following Minority Report on the same subject:

Minority Report.

The undersigned, members of the Committee to whom was referred so much of the Constitution as relates to the House of Representatives, beg leave to signify their dissent from the system of representation proposed by the majority of the Committee, and to recommend for the consideration of the Convention, the following substitute :

Resolved, That it is expedient so to alter and amend the Constitution as to provide for the equal division of the Commonwealth into Districts for the election of two hundred and forty members of the House of Representatives and for this purpose each of the forty Districts which shall be formed for the election of senators, shall be divided, according to population, as equally as it can be conveniently done, into two Representative Districts; and the inhabitants of each Repretative District, so formed, shall elect three representatives. (Signed)

NATHAN HALE,

ROBERT RANTOUL,
WM. SCHOULER,
RUFUS BULLOCK,
CYRUS WEEKS,
HENRY W. KINSMAN,
S. A. HULBURT,
WM. ASPINWALL,
JOHN SARGENT,
TIMOTHY W. CARTER.

On motion of Mr. RANTOUL, the Report of the minority was referred to the Committee of the Whole, and ordered to be printed.

Excused from Service.

Mr. WARNER, of Wrentham, on his motion,

[May 27th.

was excused from further service on the Committee to whom was referred the subject of Loaning the State Credit.

Vacancy Filled.

Mr. HALL, of Haverhill, was appointed by the Chair, to fill the vacancy upon the Committee on the University at Cambridge.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE.

On motion of Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell, the Convention resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, Mr. Sumner, for Marshfield, in the Chair, and resumed the consideration of the unfinished business of yesterday, being the Report of the Committee on Elections by

Plurality of Votes,

The pending question being on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Plymouth, Mr. Bates.

Mr. BATES, of Plymouth. When I offered this amendment yesterday, it was not with the intention or anticipation of participating in the debate at all, but it appeared to be called for by the course which the debate had taken. I happen to be one of those unfortunate individuals who always believed that there was some principle in the majority question, but from the course which has been taken in this debate, it would seem that it is not a matter of principle, but a mere matter of convenience only. And although I came into the Convention with the intention of voting against the abolition of the majority principle, yet in consequence of the remarks made yesterday, I was induced to offer this amendment, which I did without the suggestion of any person, simply that it might meet the case I had in view. If the amendment is adopted, it will obviate all the difficulty which has arisen with regard to the multiplicity of elections throughout the State, and, at the same time, will preserve in the Constitution of Massachusetts the majority principle. Sir, I do not believe what has been so often stated here, that the people of Massachusetts anticipate and desire so great and radical a change in the Constitution; but I am willing to meet the convenience of the people, if convenience it be, provided this majority principle can be retained in the Constitution. As I have said, I do not intend to debate the question, but wish simply, at this stage of the proceedings, to correct an error into which some gentlemen have fallen in asserting that all the other States in the Union have adopted the plurality principle. In no State in New England is the plurality principle in operation in the election of those officers who have been named in the resolution.

Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell. I had not intended, Mr. Chairman, to say anything upon this resolution, for I believe that, in a Convention constituted as this is, while speech is silver, silence is gold; and I now only wish to suggest to the gentlemen of the Committee who reported this resolve, whether they have or not contemplated what will be the exact and precise effect of it if adopted as the sense of this Convention. I understand, Sir, that if we adopt it, we tie up the hands of the people and the legislature for a series of years, as long as this Constitution, which we are about to propose, shall exist, so that they shall not adopt any other rule than the plurality rule; for I find the resolve is, that it is expedient so to revise the Constitution that in all elections, without excep

Friday,]

tion, (making it, therefore, imperative,) by the people, of the officers named in it, the plurality rule shall exist.

Now, Sir, of that provision I am a little fearful; and for the reason that while, as a matter of convenience, in some offices I would be quite ready to agree that a plurality shall eleet, yet, in other offices, I have my doubts whether it will be best to depart from our present majority principle. I beg pardon for using the term "majority principle," but I have heard it used so much that I, too, have fallen into the error; I insist there is no principle in the matter. It is simply a question whether or not we shall adopt one rule or another rule, by which to determine the will of the people. It is a question, not of principle, but of expediency. And while the rule would operate well in some cases, I doubt very much whether it would in others. In county offices it might be well to adopt the plurality rule, as a matter of convenience; yet, in some of the higher and more important offices of the government, I should think it would be injudicious, and I doubt very much whether the people are ready to commit themselves beyond recall to such a provision.

Now, Sir, for the sake of illustration, and not committing myself one way or the other upon the question, I will suppose that the Committee on the Judiciary make a report, providing that the supreme judges should be elected by the people, and that this should become the sense of the Convention, and be adopted by the people. Is there a person here, that upon a full, calm view of the whole subject, would be willing that the Supreme Court should be organized in this Commonwealth in a manner which could not command the assent of a majority of the people of the Commonwealth? Every one will say no! I doubt whether the most ardent lover of an elective judiciary is ready to say that he wants a judiciary which will not command the assent of a majority of the voters of this Commonwealth. Then, Sir, a fortiori, do we want an executive head, if we take the other ground, to appoint the judiciary of this Commonwealth, who cannot command a majority of the votes of the Commonwealth? If we are not ready, by our own individual votes, to elect the judiciary by a plurality, are we willing to have the man to whom we shall delegate the power of appointing that entire judiciary, elected by a simple plurality of votes? But my friend, the member for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,) and the learned member from Taunton, who has favored us with his great experience upon this matter, say that our governor is now elected by a minority in fact. From that position I beg leave, in one word, to dissent. The people go to the polls to vote for the governor, and they well know that in the Constitution there is a provision that if they do not elect him by a majority, then he is to be elected in another way-that is, by the legislature. Then take the doctrine of assent which the gentleman from Taunton so ably argued and illustrated yesterday; do we not assent to the election of the governor? And is he not then the governor of the majority? We know that if we do not agree in this matter, he will be elected by the legislature. Who are the legislature?

Mr. MORTON, of Taunton, rose to explain, and the floor being yielded to him, he said :— I believe, Sir, the gentleman entirely misunderstood my position and remark. I said, and repeat

ed it several times, that we often had a governor elected who did not receive a majority of the votes of the people. I agree with him fully that as our Constitution now stands, every man elected according to its provisions, has the assent, not only of the majority, but of the whole people. I do not mean to say that we ever have a governor elected who has not the assent of the people, but we have often had a governor elected who received much less than a majority of the votes of the whole people, in the first instance,

Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell. I may have done the position of the member from Taunton injustice, in not making my-elf understood. What I meant to say was this, that while he enforced the doctrine that whoever is elected by the modes pointed out by t'e Constitution, must be deemed to have received the majority; so that he can never say, if that doctrine is carried out, that any given elicí magistrate is a minority magistrate; and for this very simple and plain reason, as it seems to me, to wit, that the magistrate, if he does not receive a majority of the votes of the people, is voted for and elected in a way to which the majority assent. Now, I do not mean to express an opinion upon the question whether or not I would vote for the election of a governor by a plurality or by a majority; I only say that my position is this, that I do not want to tie up, by this constitutional provision, the hands of the people for all time to come, upon this subject. I do not want to tie the hands of the Convention, and therefore I shall vote against this resolution, intending at some time to vote that some of the officers, if I so choose, shall be elected by a plurality, and intending at some time to vote that other officers shall be elected by a majority, and intending a still other course, to leave the whole matter open to be regulated by the legislature, in accordance with the wish of the people, and the necessities of the case, from time to time.

The difficulty I find is this: if you pass this resolution, you tie up every member of the Convention, so that without doing injustice and violence to the resolution which we have adopted, no man can vote for any given officer to be elected by a majority, however much he may think the exigencies of the case may require it. And you tie up the hands of the legislature so that they cannot adopt the legislation which the necessities and circumstances of the people demand. Therefore, I wish to call the attention of every member of the Convention to the fact that unless he is in favor of adopting the principle, under all circumstances and at all hazards, of an election by a plurality, he cannot vote for this resolution. If he thinks there is a single officer who should be elected by a majority, and that election should be provided for by this Convention, then he cannot vote for this resolution. But if we do not adopt this resolution-as the sense of the Committeethen we are at liberty to apply the majority principle where we please, and to apply the plurality principle were we please, or leave the whole matter to the regulation of the legislature, which perhaps, after all, may be the better way. Why should we in advance, in the outset and upon the very threshold, before we have settled whether we will have a single officer, or what kind of officer he shall be? Why shall we tie our hands on this subject as to who shall be elected? What exigency calls for it? Nothing but convenience, it is said. Well, if it is convenience, let that

[May 27th.

convenience be expressed upon the election of any given otheer; let the question come up as the necessity exists. Let us first go through with the Constitution, and agree upon the officers which shall be elective; and when that is done, let us turn back and decide as to the manner in which they shall be elected, and not determine how they shall be elected first, and then determine what class of officers we shall have. I think we are a little premature in settling this as a principle; I think we had better wait for a little while, and not tie our hands on the subject. I think the gentleman from Plymouth will have many who will favor his amendment. But why provide that no other officer shall be elected by the majority? Many will contend, on the other hand, I have no doubt, that it is best to elect the governor, above all other officers, by plurality. Why tie our hands, and agree not to do it until the case comes up? I trust this iron rule will not be adopted, but that the matter will be left open to be acted upon when the exigency requiring it shall arise. There is no exigency and no occasion for declaring the principle now. There is one matter to which I wish to advert and which was considered as one of the strongest arguments presented by the member for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,) except that which arises from expediency. He says the whole majority system is anti-democratic, because the result of its application is that it runs into the one man power, so that one man in the House of Representatives can prevent the passage of a resolution or law which has been passed by the Senate, or one man in the Senate can prevent the passage of a resolution or law which has been passed by the House of Representatives, and both are vetoed by the single act of the executive. With great respect to the ordinarily clear perception of the member for Erving, I submit that he has fallen into a little confusion betwixt the idea of power and of resistance to power, and that one in the House or Senate cannot govern. He can do nothing; he can only be a point of resistance, he can only resist other people's action. He can pass no law, he can proceed with no action, he can only be a point of resistance, a clog, a break; and I submit that it is just as much a contradiction in terms, to say that a man who thus prevents the action of others, exercises the one man power, as to say that the breaks on the railroad train are the motive power. They are simply points of resistance. So the man who stands between the majority and the minority may prevent a law, but by no manner of means can he enact a law. And before any proposition is carried out, there must be a majority of the Senate, or a majority of what is deemed to be the Senate-a quorum of that body. I agree fully that sixteen members ought not to be deemed a quorum of the Senate, and that forty members should not be considered as a quorum of the House of Representatives. I think that a majority should be required to constitute a quorum. No law can be enacted unless a majority of the people consent to it by the action of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and unless the majority of the people represented by the governor agree. Otherwise it is sent back by a two-thirds vote of the representatives of the people, and also of the Senate, which has heretofore been supposed to have another basis. Now it is not for me by any means to say one word about parties, nor do I intend to do it. And I trust no