party will come in to inquire how this principle will operate upon this party or that party. These parties change so often in their relative positions that it is not worth while to make any very definite calculations as to what will be the state of parties next year. I am a little surprised to find members of a certain party, who believe that in the nomination of a candidate even for the highest office in the Union, two-thirds of the votes should be cast in favor of the nominee, should be here 30 very great sticklers for a plurality. It seems to me to be slightly inconsistent. If it is necessary to have a two-thirds majority assent to a nomination, even before the people shall be asked to vote for the highest officer in the Union, it seems to me, that in the election of the highest executive officer of the State, it might be as well to require a majority of the people at first, even if we agree upon a plurality in the event of a failure on the first trial.

I have, in these observations, submitted what I desire to say to the Committee on this subject.

Mr. HALE, of Boston. I desire to say a few words on this question, because I have not heard the views which I have in regard to it, expressed exactly by any gentleman. I do not agree with the gentleman who has just spoken, that what is called the majority principle, is not a principle. I believe it is a principle and a very sound one, one which has been always recognized in the Constitution of this Commonwealth. It has operated very successfully for a long series of years. It is a principle which has been recognized in all assemblies in this country where a majority can be obtained. It results necessarily from the very foundation on which elective bodies are represented, and in which the delegation of power is complete so far as it can be made so. But it is obvious, that there are cases in which it is impossible to obtain an absolute majority of votes in favor of any one individual. In such a case, it is necessary that there should be some mode substituted, by which a person may be elected. Under the Constitution a designation has been made as to the manner in which the election can be made, by delegating the election to some other body. In the case of the executive, the power has been delegated to the legislature, who are supposed to represent the opinions of the majority. In municipal corporations, in town meetings, it has been usual, when a majority was not obtained on the first vote, to have another vote taken either at the time, or on a subsequent day, so that there has been no difficulty in obtaining a majority. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution it was not expected that the community would be divided into three distinct parties at any future time. The Constitution was based upon the supposition that there would be no parties, or that there would be only two parties, because that was the state of things at that time, and had existed for a long time in the Commonwealth. Then there was no party, and so long as there were but two parties, the elections took place very satisfactorily under the existing Constitution. This principle has operated, I believe, almost universally in accordance with this fact. Wherever an election has failed for want of a majority, on a subsequent occasion the election has generally been in accordance with the opinion of a very large plurality of the constituency.

But it must be evident that the result must be different in the case where the community is di

vided into three distinct parties. The difficulty is not in the principle, but in the state of things; it is that there is no choice in favor of any one individual, and it is necessary to resort to another expedient, so as to obtain the nearest approach to the principle of electing by a majority; and that principle is contained in the amendment which is now proposed.

The difficulty, in my mind, as to the principle to be adopted, is only whether it shall apply in all cases, or only in those cases where the second trial cannot be had. Ordinarily, in the elections in towns, especially in elections which are not of a political character, where there are various divisions of opinion which would make it impracticable to obtain a majority, it will be seen that the provision which has been applied heretofore, should still be applied. But in the case of State elections, as in the choice of governor and lieutenant-governor, and senators, where you vote by districts, it seems to me indispensable that we should abandon the principle which has been adopted heretofore. In the choice of representatives and political officers, as the inhabitants of almost all the towns are divided into three parties, forming three bodies for the selection of candidates, and where there is a probability that there will be no election, instead of a certainty of an election, the same reason for a change exists. Therefore for the election of all political officers, it seems to me there should be a change, in accordance with the state of things which has existed for a number of years, and which we have reason to suppose may continue. Although I have been of the opinion that it was premature to make the change, especially in cases where the election could be made by the legislature; and I thought it was inexpedient, because I thought it it should not be attempted until it was necessary. But on the present occasion, when we are about to place the Constitution on the basis of the present state of things, it does appear to me that it is expedient to adopt the plurality principle.

Mr. HILLARD, of Boston. I do not propose to take any part in this discussion. It is not within my power to add anything to the considerations which have been so ably urged upon the one side and the other, but I simply desire to ask the indulgence of the Committee to allow me to state, that I propose, in case the amendment of the gentleman from Plymouth, (Mr. Bates,) should not be adopted to offer another amendment. I make this statement now, because the amendment which I desire to propose may influence the action of the Convention upon the particular amendment now before them, and therefore, with your leave, and that of the Committee, I will state, that at the proper time, I shall move to amend the resolution by striking out all after the word resolved" and insert the following:

"That it is expedient so to amend the Constitution as to give the legislature the power of enacting that in all elections by the people of officers under the Constitution, the person receiving the highest number of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected."

I have listened to this debate in a mood of mind in which I suppose debates are not often listened to, for I think it is very rare that any man's opinion is changed or essentially modified by a debate; but I have been a secker of light, and I have listened to the arguments with great

[May 27th.

attention in order that I might make up my mind, or at least, that I might justify to myself the course to which I might finally be led, and my mind has inclined from one side to the other, according to the arguments which have been adduced upon this question by the various gentlemen who have spoken. But if I were compelled to decide between yes and no upon the resolution now before us, I should vote for it, partly because my mind is just now obeying the impulse given to it by the sensible and strong speech of the delegate for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,) but I should do it with hesitancy and misgiving; and I confess, that the preponderance of considerations in my mind which lead me in that direction are very slight. In the convention of my own mind, the majority in favor of that conclusion is very small indeed. Now what is the question before us? I agree with the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) and am therefore constrained to differ with my colleague who has just taken his seat, (Mr. Hale,) and whenever I differ with him I doubt whether I am right-that this is not a principle but a rule. To be sure this is a verbal distinction of words, but as you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have said in another place, "words are sometimes things," and I assent to the proposition. I call a principle the expression of an ultimate truth, as that taxation and representation go together, that the right of rulers and magistrates in our institutions rests upon the consent of the governed. I call this mode of electing by a majority a rule and not a principle. It is a rule which may be varied and applied in one case successfully and in another unsuccessfully. The gentleman from Plymouth, (Mr. Bates,) seems to sanction that definition because he proposes to apply this rule to one class of officers and not to another. We have had this mode of clection for some sixty or seventy years, certainly for sixty years, and no public man in Massachusetts has, till recently, raised his voice against it. It met with universal favor, and I presume that if the gentlemen who are here assembled in Convention, had been here ten, nay, six years ago, that a very considerable change would have taken place, and the men who might vote to-day upon this question would have voted differently at those periods. We are here called upon to decide upon rule which has worked well for sixty years, under the pressure of recent inconvenience. I admit it to be a strong pressure, because I am constrained to yield to it, but still I do think that we are not in a state of mind to come to a correct conclusion upon an issue of such vital inportance. Impassioned legislation is not often wise. For instance, I think the legislature of Connecticut were not in a proper state of mind to legislate upon the subject of protection to railway passengers the day after the late fearful accident at Norwalk, for I think that men's reason for the time was overborne by the storm of recent passion and feeling. We propose to make this change, incorporate it into our Constitution and throw around it all the solemnities and protections which belong to an organic law, and plant it where it cannot be reached by the hand of ordinary legislation. I ask gentlemen of the Committee if they are prepared to take a step of such vital importance and consequence as this. The amendment, which I beg leave to propose at the proper time, offers a sort of middle ground where men of all views and my views upon this subject

who have some prejudice against the best man, to defeat his election because their votes are necessary in order to make a choice. It is in this way that the Commonwealth is often deprived of the services of the best representatives; and the adoption of the plurality system will entirely obviate that difficulty.

Now, Sir, there has been one argument presented here, which is worthy of consideration. That argument is the one that was advanced yesterday by the gentleman from Worcester. The very fact that the plurality system has prevailed in so many States of the Union for so long a time; that it has been found to work so well; that in the repeated conventions to revise their different constitutions, not a particle of discussion has arisen as to a change of that system; that their public affairs are managed as well and satisfactorily to the people as are our own, and with infinitely less trouble and expense; these simple facts stand out as an unanswerable argument in favor of this change.

We, on the other hand, have gone on with our restricted system, and we have seen men lay hold of it to effect certain purposes of their own. I do not say they are not legitimate purposes-purposes which they have not a perfect right to avail themselves of this principle to accomplish. But, Sir, it is the means which men use to block up the the wheels of the election, for the purpose of holding on to the people while they address to them certain arguments, and spread before them their peculiar doctrines. It is the means of holding men by the button-hole, and saying to them that your machinery of government shall not go on, until you have heard our argument, and until you take men who represent our views. Though these views may, perhaps, relate to subjects of the highest importance, yet they are views not necessarily connected with the institution of government, and may not have anything to do with carrying on the affairs of the State, but entirely remote from them. The argument is used that this is a means of arresting the attention of the people, and of indoctrinating them in reference to questions, which it is possible could not be brought to their consideration in any other way. But then the question is, is that a good and sufficient counterbalance to all the inconvenience, trouble and expense which arises from it? My opinion is, that it is not, and that the same end may be accomplished in another way. I do not wish to be understood as opposed to free discussion. I believe that the freedom of speech and of the press should not be trodden down. They are the bulwark of our liberties, and any party that strikes at them, strikes at the foundation of our liberties. But while I admit this right to the utmost extent, I do not believe that this mode of exercising it is necessary to advance any cause or any party. I believe that the very causes which some gentlemen have availed themselves of this means to advance, were advanced just as well before these measures were resorted to. Take, for instance, the abolition opinions of Massachusetts. When were they most rapidly advanced, and extensively carried forward? Was it before, or since these third parties were formed? In former times the candidates of either party were questioned as to their views upon those particular subjects, and they answered in the most satisfactory manner. So strongly were the people indoctrinated in these subjects, that some men, after

the new parties were formed, began to complain that these parties were stealing their thunder. I believe they carried forward their views faster when there were but two prominent parties; and, hence, I believe that this existing provision is not necessary in order to aid them. The power of argument, and the force of truth, will be sufficient for their purpose.

It strikes me that this is the only argument which has been brought against this change. There are, however, prejudices to overcome. We are apt to cling to things old, and to which we are accustomed, and there is a feeling which often causes us to cling to the past, and even to suffer under evils rather than take the trouble to reform them.

A word in reference to another consideration. Parties have been alluded to here. How a change may effect the existing parties, I cannot say, as I have gone into no calculation upon the subject, and looked into no return to ascertain upon what party it will operate favorably, and upon what unfavorably, and I would as soon undertake to follow the course of a man by tracks which he last year made upon the beach of the sea shore, as to undertake to predict what will be the state of future parties from anything which has appeared in the past. That is a matter which lies entirely with the people. It may have an injurious effect upon the party with which I am associated. I fear that there is a class here who fancy that it will have a favorable effect upon their party, judging from the unanimity with which they support it. They may be disappointed. Be that as it may, I do not stand here as a party man. I go for establishing a Constitution which shall last when the present parties shall be dissolved into their original elements. I desire to vote for a Constitution which shall meet the wants of the people, and one which shall subserve their best and highest interests. And when I have done that I shall have satisfied my own convictions of duty, and the rest I am willing to trust to the future.

Mr. BRIGGS, of Pittsfield. I concur in the sentiment of many gentlemen who have spoken upon this subject, that this is a very grave and important question-perhaps one of the most important that we shall have to meet and discuss during our official labors here. It is a proposition to change the organic law, and that, too, in reference to a point which has existed from the origin of the government. Whether you call it a principle, or a rule, it matters not; it has existed from the origin of any government for the Commonwealth. It is proposed to change it in regard to certain officers specified, and not as a general change, applicable to all officers. As the law now stands, the candidates for those offices must command a majority of the whole number of votes cast, or they are not elected. The proposition now before the Committee is, that, of the number of different candidates up for governor, senators, or representatives for congress, he who obtains a plurality of votes, or more than any other man, shall be considered chosen for that office. That is the proposition, as I understand it. Now, Sir, my opinion in reference to changes of this Constitution is, that we have no right-I mean moral right-no right to change it, except in those points which have admitted evil into our system of affairs, and in place of which we can propose a better system. Let me say here, once

[May 27th.

for all, as to one general subject, that the power which sent us here, called the people, have the power and have the right to have any of these matters just as they please. We are a part of them, and when we speak of the people, we speak of ourselves.

The question which should be applied to this proposition, as to every other one which we shall discuss, is, do the people of this Commonwealth wish this change? Are they so dissatisfied with the existing state of things, that they desire a change? That is the precise question, and I am glad that in this instance, gentlemen on the one side and the other, seem to address themselves to it. I feel a conscious pride and satisfaction in feeling that the discussion upon this subject, for the last two days, has been more relevant, pertinent, and courteous, than I ever heard in any deliberative body, and I hope that our moderation, and our sense of the importance of place, will preserve this state of things throughout the whole discussion of this Convention.

Now, in regard to the point before us, my friend from Taunton said one thing which expressed entirely my feelings: "I shall go for the proposition before us; but in coming to that conclusion, I have had to struggle more against long-settled and deepseated opinions, than upon any other subject." Sir, I have been in the habit of feeling and saying that this great principle, that the majority shall govern, must not be given up. This discussion has thrown light into my mind upon this subject of principle. I agree with the gentleman from Lowell, that this is not a principle, in the sense in which I use that term, and in the sense in which I treat it here. Is it a great principle, or rule, which cannot be violated without doing a wrong?—a fundamental right, that must be adhered to, and one which, if you violate, you do a wrong to somebody? I do not think so. The people have a right to say that one-third of the people voting shall elect an officer. And nobody can gainsay them, if they so decide. They have a right to say that two-thirds shall be required. Now the question is, whether, under the operation of this majority rule, evils have grown up so great as to require this change, for I agree that if they have not, we ought not to change.

Now I address my remarks in reference to three classes of officers, those of governors, senators and members of congress. How has the present system operated for the last ten years in reference to them? My friend from Worcester said yesterday that the Convention of 1820, never mentioned the subject of plurality. The question is not what they did then, but what would they do were they sitting here to-day? Would they not now name it? For the ten years preceding the time of their Convention had there been nine years in which the people had failed to elect a governor, and in which he was elected by the legislature? I think there had not been one year. Had a large portion of the Senate failed to command a majority of the popular vote? As to the governor, it seems to me that of all officers of the Commonwealth, the chief magistrate should be elected by the people. Now let me say, that however necessary it may be to have frequent elections at home, for ore among other reasons stated by the gentleman from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker,) that the people might meet to swap oxen, I would avoid giving the people an opportunity to swap oxen.

Now, Sir, is it best to elect the governor by the

Friday,]

largest number of votes, though that may come short of a majority, or to elect by the legislature, which legislature, on failure of an election, by the people, must be filled up by different and differing parties? Which is the best, to have the people settle it by a plurality vote, or to have the representatives of the different parties, coming here, settle it by arrangement? For it must be settled by arrangement-I use the word in no disreputable sense-and does it not open the way to improper management and arrangement? Does it not expose the representatives who come here to improper temptation? Can any gentleman doubt that? No matter to what party he may belong, a man elected to the legislature will be a man subject to all the passions and infirmities of man, and it seems to me that it is the part of wisdom to remove from them every unnecessary temptation, that may beset them in the path of official, duties. I believe so, and I believe the people would say so, and that is a powerful considera- | tion with me. I believe if the question were put | to the people of Massachusetts, to-day, they would decide, that instead of throwing the election into the legislature-first in one branch and then in the other-they would take the matter into their own hands, and decide the matter by a plurality vote.

And let me tell you, Sir-and this applies to other officers-that the very settling of this question in favor of plurality, tends very strongly to produce majority elections at home. And why is this? Sir, the different parties and the different divisions of parties, which under the present arrangement must compromise when they come here, will go into that compromise at home. The people would take the matter into their own hands. In my opinion, the result very often would be majority elections, when, if left as it is now, only a plurality vote would be obtained, and the election would be sent to the legislature.

But how do we arrive at that result, when the election is sent to the legislature? Is it by a majority of those elected by the people? No, Sir! During the last few years, from sixteen to thirty members of the Senate have been elected by the legislature; and as was very truly said yesterday, without a single exception, so far as I can recollect, these vacancies in the Senate are filled from candidates agreeing in politics with the majority of the legislature, without any reference to the popular vote. Then, Sir, no matter how large the popular vote in the great county of Middlesex, or that of Worcester, Suffolk, or Essex; no matter how large the plurality, in those counties, if it falls short of an absolute majority, the minority candidates are placed in the Senate by the majority of the legislature. This has occurred and it will occur again; it is a part, and a necessary result, of the system. You cannot separate it from the system. And this procedure is not applicable to any one party alone. Every party, so far as I know, has acted upon the same principle. I would, therefore, certainly go for that part of the resolve which provides for the election of the governor and lieutenant-governor by a plurality. I have no doubt that the man who comes up here directly from the people, having received the highest popular vote, whether it be a majority or a plurality, will enter upon his duties with a higher sense of their dignity and importance, than when he is obliged to wait here day after day, the result of a mere arrangement upon the part of the legislature.

no more votes than they had received upon the first trial. Are gentlemen aware that in the elections of 1852 there were three vacancies to be filled for members of the last congress, and eleven elections to be made for the present congress, and that in these three vacancies, every man who was elected upon the second trial had fewer votes than he had upon the first trial? And that in the nine instances which occurred of plurality elec

One word in regard to members of congress— and here we have had experience from which I think we should learn lessons of wisdom. This majority principle has been applicable to those officers of the government until within a few years, and as has been said, the evil has been severely felt. Session after session of the national legislature has passed by, when the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has been wanting in a full representation. Within a few years, an entire congress passed away and the respectable old fourth congressional district was without a voice in its deliberations. And the people of that district were summoned, time after time, as often as they could be brought together, to go to the polls for the useless purpose of casting their votes.

Now let me allude to the argument of the gentleman from Worcester before me, (Mr. Allen.) He says that one objection to this plurality system is that it takes from the third party, or rather from any third party-for I do not allude to any particular party-the power of having their votes tell in an election. Well, suppose it does. Take the case of Middlesex, for instance. There was some third party there; some class of citizens who, in the exercise of their rights,--precisely what it was right and proper for them to do-did have that power which my friend from Worcester says ought to be retained to them. And what was that power? It was to disfranchise a whole representative district, and to strike from the State of Massachusetts one-tenth of her legitimate power in the national legislature. But when we bring up this argument, what is the reply? Why, that "we have only exercised our votes so as to make them tell." How tell? "By stopping, so far as our voice is concerned, the wheels of government."

But the gentleman says that in adopting this rule, it is a question whether the many or the few shall rule. Why, Sir, how large a majority will it take to control the elections in the various towns, counties, or congressional districts of the Commonwealth, upon the majority principle? Supposing the two great parties are nearly equally divided, and 500 votes out of 15,000 will control the election, that 500 votes will accomplish precisely what was accomplished in the district to which I have just alluded, and what has been accomplished in many repeated trials in other districts. Who rules-who governs in that case? the many, or the few? The fact speaks for itself. But under the plurality system all these difficulties are obviated. But I need not speak of the majority system in reference to congressional elections, because we have remedied the evil, as we suppose. We have passed the plurality law.

But it has been stated here that upon second elections, in many cases men were chosen with

exception, received fewer votes upon the second trial than he had received upon the first? I have the facts before me, and without going into detail, I will state the aggregate results of that election. In the three districts where vacancies were to be filled for the last congress, the aggregate vote at the first trial (I speak in round numbers) was forty thousand, while in the second trial the ag gregate vote was but twenty-seven thousand; so that in filling these vacancies there were thirteen thousand votes less, cast at the second trial than were cast at the first, while every candidate who received the most votes upon the first trial was elected at the second by a diminished vote.

In the nine districts which elected by plurality for the present congress, the aggregate vote upon the first trial in November was 115,638, while at the second trial there were cast in the same districts but 74,234, it being 41,424 less votes given by the people upon the second trial than when they failed to elect on the first trial. In every case save one, the candidates who received the largest vote upon the first trial were elected on the second, and elected by a much smaller vote than they received on the first trial. One candidate only, was elected on the second trial by a larger vote than he had received on the first, but this candidate was elected by a vote six hundred and odd smaller than the one who received the highest number upon the first trial. The aggregate vote received by all these eight persons who were elected upon second trial, less than that received by them upon the first, was 10,210.

Here is a case in point, where the principle of retaining the majority system upon the first trial and of adopting the plurality system upon the second, has been tried, and the result is that every candidate, except one who had the highest vote in the first was elected in the second, though by a very much smaller vote than he had received in the first, and the one who constituted the exception was elected by a vote of 600 less than that of the highest candidate at the first trial.

Now, let me ask, if any one will say that you can any more fully develop the right of suffrage among the people at the second trial than it will be developed at the first? No, Sir; the contrary is the fact. And my own impression is, that if you will look back to the elections under the majority rule, for a succession of years, you will find almost invariably, that on the first vote, when the rally was made, when the excitement was up, when every man felt in the spirit of it, and went to the polls, there was a larger vote than at any succeeding trial. I think you will find that to be a pretty general rule, although there may be exceptions. Then let me ask if it is not worse than useless to apply this principle to the second trial and not to the first? Men do not want to go to the polls merely for the sake of going. But, Sir, this right of suffrage costs us something. It is worth all that it costs, but it is wisdom and true economy for us not to have it cost any more than it

needs. Why, Sir, in one of the instances to which I have alluded, in this second election, 74,000 citizens in the various districts spent a day in going to the polls to elect men who, with one exception, had received a larger vote at the first election. Sir, it is worse than useless; it is a waste of money; it is a waste of time-and time is money-without any good result.

Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to detain you and the Committee so long. I will only remark, that it seems to me the results which have followed the existing rule or mode of election, furnish a good reason for changing that rule and that mode of election. But if I could believe that those sovereigns who sent us here thought differently, my tongue or my vote should not be given for the change. I believe that a very great change has taken place in various parts of the Commonwealth within the last few years, in relation to this subject, not arising out of any party result, but arising out of the circumstances in which we live, which leads the people to desire a change.

Gentlemen have said they have no party feelings in relation to this subject. I concur entirely with them in all that has been said on this point. Sir, of what importance is all this talk about party-little, miserable, petty, time-serving party influences? Why, if these are the influences by which we are to be governed; if we are to vote for or against these amendments to the Constitution of the State with reference to that end, it may be that, before the object shall have been at all effected, the position of parties may have changed, and no such result will be produced as is anticipated. Sir, let us deliberate upon this subject without party spirit, as it has thus far been deliberated upon. Let us discuss it as if there were no parties, or rather as though we were all of one party, and that party the government and the people of the Commonwealth.

Mr. Chairman, it would be well for us to look for a moment at the importance of our, labors in this Convention. We are to make laws which shall bind ourselves and our children after us. We are to make laws which shall bind the sovercign people of Massachusetts, if they sanction them. Sir, what we shall do here, and our constituents shall sanction, the people of the Commonwealth are as much bound by, every one of them, as is any one single individual, and it is therefore a matter of the highest importance that we act wisely and discreetly; in such a manner that, when our work comes to be reviewed, every cool, deliberate judgment, will approve it. We should act in such a manner that an intelligent, liberal and generous constituency, who have sent us here, when they come to review and revise our work, and cast their judgment upon it, may be satisfied with it, so that they will believe it is made for the public good, and will sanction what we shall do.

Mr. ALLEN, of Worcester. I trust that you, Mr. Chairman, and the Committee, will excuse me for a few moments, whilst I reply to what has been said by the gentleman from Pittsfield, (Mr. Briggs,) when I promise both that I will occupy but a very short time.

The argument of my friend from Pittsfield seemed to be addressed particularly to that which I had the honor to present to the Convention yesterday. I beg leave to refer only to two or three points or positions taken in reference to that argument. My friend presents, in his tables, an

array of facts and figures which are supposed to be conclusive upon the questions now before the Convention. Let us again turn to those facts and figures, and see if the lesson to be derived from them is not one of an entirely different character from the one he draws?

Now let us see what these facts and figures relate to. He says, that a year or two since, in the election of members of congress, there was a failure to elect at the first trial in three specified districts; that there were 40,000 votes cast at this trial, and that on the second trial there were but 27,000 votes cast in the same districts.

In the first election, where there was a full vote, pray what principle governed it? Was it not the majority principle? In the second election, where there was a small vote, what principle governed it? Was it not the principle or rule of plurality? Does the gentleman see, when he presents these tables, he shows proof that the majority rule brings out the voters; that the plurality rule fails to do it; and that such is the experience throughout the whole country? We read of elections in the southern, western and middle States, to whose action we are referred in support of the change which is now contemplated, and we find that where there is a considerable plurality, and yet a great division among the people in respect to persons and principles, there is often but a small vote; and we know that that portion of the people which belongs to the plurality party cannot be rallied for the expression of opinion, for the vindication of a sentiment, where no effect is to be produced upon the elections. It is within the knowledge of every member of this Convention, that such elections are often carried by a small vote-by a small portion of the voters acting together at the polls. When has such a thing occurred in Massachusetts, under the operation of the majority principle? We have uniformly cast a full popular vote, and the expression of the people has been fully given at the ballot-box. I deem this important, inasmuch as men are elected to fill important offices, not for their own gratification, but as the representatives of great principles, that there should be a full vote, so that the persons elected should represent the voice of the people in their districts. It often happens in other States to whose action we are referred, that there is division in regard to individuals among those agreeing to the same great principles upon which the country may be divided, and yet in consequence of such division which would prevent an clection upon the first trial, if the majority principle was adopted, there is a choice of some one under the plurality rule not representing the views and sentiments of much more than one-third of the people of the district. The consequence of this state of things is, that the persons sent to represent the district in the congress of the United States, if the election has reference to congressional elections, actually misrepresent the people upon the great principles which divide the district, and this result is brought about through the operation of the very principle for which my friend con

tends.

One evil growing out of the majority system has been pointed out by gentlemen here, and that is, that under it there are failures to elect. It is said that several districts of the Commonwealth were unable to make a choice under the majority rule, and the result was, that in two or three instances, throughout a whole congress,

[May 27th.

there was no representation of the people from that district. Very well. Is it not better that there should be no representation than that there should be a misrepresentation. Is it not better that no representative should be sent than that one should be sent as from the people who is not chosen by them, and whose action, when he shall reach the seat of government, shall be in direct opposition to the popular will and those principles which are dear to the hearts of the people? If you examine this matter, I think you will find that the evil lies in false representation, and not because there is no representation at all. Why was it, that throughout the whole of a congressional term, in a certain district, there was no election. If the people believed it were better to have one that did not represent their opinions than that the district should go unrepresented, would they not have combined to elect such a man? It is in their power to do so, and for the reason they failed to do it, they preferred to have no representative rather than have one who should misrepresent their opinions.

I take notice for a moment, of another position which has been held by gentlemen in reference to the election of state officers. I desire that they should be elected by the people, and in all cases where they may be so united in sentiment, that a majority can be obtained to support any particular candidate, such will be the result; but when that fails, if gentlemen learn from experience that the evil to which my friend refers, is of the magnitude in which it is presented to his own mind, the choice goes to the legislature. And here, gentlemen say, there is room for intrigue and management; and doubtless there is. And yet the people do trust their representatives in ten thousand important matters, where selfishness may predominate, where undue influence may control, and where bribery may pervert the action of the representative. Still, the people trust them, and in the ordinary course of things, in all instances, so far as I know, they have trusted them wisely and for their best interests. But let me say to my friend, that even here, ordinarily the choice is made in coincidence with the wishes of the people; but not always. We cannot provide a rule, by any possible means, which shall work well in every possible instance; but yet ordinarily the election is in conformity to the wishes of the people. But my friend desires that we should forget party terms and feelings, and party modes of argument, in this hall. I trust we shall; and, casting these things out of view, is not this the result: There is a failure to elect at the popular election; no governor is chosen by the people, but he is to be chosen by the representatives of the people; and who is chosen? Not the man whom the majority of the people preferred, because it so happens, that that cannot be obtained. There is no majority. But he is the choice of a majority of the people; the first choice of a part, and the second choice of the great majority. Suppose there are three parties in the legislature, among the representatives of the people, and equally divided, and that there is no election of governor. The three candidates are before the legislature, which represents one-third of the popular vote, and that man may be elected by two-thirds of the representatives assembled in this and the other hall. Do they not ordinarily represent the people in this act; and do not those who did not vote orginally, give their suffrages