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for the person elected, and yet prefer him over the third individual, also a candidate? Is it not the wish of the people, earried out by the legislature, that, if in the first choice a majority cannot be had, that that man shall be elected upon whom, under all the circumstances of the case, the majority of the people concur in electing, and the representatives, indicating the popular will correctly, under ordinary circumstances, bring about that result? Is not, after all, the great principle-for I insist upon calling it a principle-none the less because you cannot always apply it, but must resort to some other rule or principle, but still throughout, from beginning to end, the great doctrine of the right of the majority to govern, most effectually carried out?

It was my purpose, originally, briefly to notice the third position taken by the gentleman from Pitt-field, (Mr. Briggs,) but I will not trespass too long upon the time of the Convention. But let me say one word farther, before concluding my remarks. Gentlemen who come forward in support of the contemplated changenot all, but a majority of them-do so with fear and trembling as to the result. They intimate that they come to this conclusion against all former prepossessions and opinions, that a recent change has been wrought upon their minds during the course perhaps of the last half dozen years. Let us all guard-even those who protest most strongly-against the influences unperceived by ourselves, of, I will not say party, but of very recent events; and let us take care that we do not abandon life-long principles, which we have maintained as important to the welfare of the government, in consequence of disappointments which may have resulted to ourselves, and the opinions which may have been formed in the lapse of a few years. Let us rather rely upon the opinions which were formed in our youth, which we retain even to gray hairs, rather than upon those formed hastily, and to which we yield our protesting assent under the bias of influences and circumstances unfavorable to the correction of opinions so long formed, and unfavorable to the establishment of new principles which are to govern, not to-day, to-morrow, but during all the future.

Mr. HALL, of Haverhill. I do not rise to discuss this question, but merely to make an explanation. I am reported by gentlemen here as being in favor of the plurality system upon the second ballot. If my remarks yesterday in the Committee gave them to understand that such was my opinion, then I desire to correct that statement. I thought, however, that I was clear and explicit in answering the question proposed by the gentleman from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker,) when he presented the grand question, to wit, Who shall goyern. My answer to that question was, that when the state of parties in the Commonwealth was such that the fullest expression and the fullest vote of the people could not elect their candidates by a majority, that the greater number should elect, and this I contended was upon the first ballot. This I believe will universally be found to be the case. same ground with the gentleman from Boston, who favored this principle in this hall, in 1850, except so far as a vote upon the second trial was concerned, which is now the law in reference to the election of representatives to congress. I advocated then, as now, elections by plurality, and upon the first ballot. This is no new matter, no

I took the

new notion lately formed, but I have always been in favor of an election by the people of as many public officers as practicable, and that the election should be had upon the first ballot.

Mr. ABBOTT, of Lowell. I trust the Committee will not suppose, by the pertinacity with which I have endeavored to get the floor, that I am about to inflict a very lengthy specch upon them. I must say that I did not intend to open my mouth upon this amendment, but upon farther reflection, and after listening to the debate which has taken place here, I feel constrained to say a few word--and they shall be as short as I can possibly make them-upon a matter which it seems to me to be so exceedingly important in reference to our action as members of this Convention. I do not agree with my colleague, (Mr. Butler,) in his expression of opinion, or any other member of the Committee who has taken similar ground, that this question is not one of principle. It seems to me, that if ever there was a question of principle addressing itself to a Convention assembled for the purpose of making and framing a government for the people, it was that rule of action upon which the people were to act for all time to come, until that frame of government had been altered in the selection of agents through whom their laws were to be made. It seems to me, that if you can make it stronger, it is even more than a principle; and I ask the members of this Committee here, if, when they speak of our form of government-the government of this Commonwealth-they do not inculcate the very idea that the majority shall rule. I undertake to say that this is the general idea-that it is something which pervades the people of the whole Commonwealth. It is the atmosphere in which we live and breathe for all governmental purposes. Why do you give up the rule of your own conscience, the rule of your own judgment? Why do you defer to the law of the land? Is it because a part, less than a majority of the whole, have a different opinion, and different rule of action, and a different conscience? No, Sir. You defer your judgment, you give up the rule of action prescribed by your conscience, and so it is with the whole people, because the majority of the people, and not a part, have prescribed a different rule of action. This is something more than a mere matter of expediency. It is the principle upon which our form of government is based, which every man knows and feels, with us, if nowhere else, that the majority shall rule, and not a part less than the majority. I understand, as far as I have been able to gather from the discussion, that there is not a man in the whole Convention who dares to raise his voice, and say that this is not the true rule of action. Where is the man who will get up and say to the people that the true rule of action is not that the majority shall rule. Every body acknowledges it. The gentleman from Pittsfield, (Mr. Briggs,) and the gentleman from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) admitted it, but they tell you so inconvenient is it indeed in carrying out this great rule, this great principle, that you must abandon the very principle upon which our government is formed.

Mr. BRIGGS, (interposing). I did not mean to place my argument upon the ground of convenience alone. The argument with respect to members of congress, to elections for the House of Representatives, and Senate of this State, was that the principle could not be carried out.

[May 27th.

Mr. ABBOTT, (resuming). I will come to that directly; I will endeavor to answer any objection of that sort directly, if the Committee will give me their attention. I think I am right in this, that every man, under the principle of action that the majority shall rule, feels safer and obeys a law more willingly, because he is sure and certain that he shall not be called upon to yield his assent to a law which the united judgment of a majority of the people has not passed and enacted into a law. Why, I do not believe, unless it had been for this feeling, that you would have ever heard of that maxim which we hear so often preached, that "the voice of the people is the voice of God." I believe it was never intended to put the voice of God in connection with anything short of the voice of the majority of the people, and in connection with that of a part of the people. You would never have heard those two terms in connection unless it had been the universal policy of all those who favored our form of government, that it was the rule of action established by the majority which was to prevail, and not the rule of action established by any part less than the majority. For when you abandon this great rule; when you say that the will of less than a majority shall prevail, why, it is only a question of where you shall stop. Stop at a plurality! What is a plurality? My friend from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker,) has told you that in a constituency of twenty the plurality may be two. Nobody can tell what a plurality is, and nobody knows where you are to stop if you abandon the great sheet anchor of the will of the majority. Stop at a plurality! Why we say that one man or one set of men, few in number, shall exercise and carry on the functions of government. There is no safety in abandoning the principle, because when principle is gone then it is a matter of mere expediency. You take one step in this direction, and then you take the next step in the same direction, because it will cost less. The arguments which have been advanced here in favor of the plurality system, as far as I can understand them, have been arguments of the inconveniences attendant upon carrying out the majority principle of action in our government. Let us look at this argument for a moment. The gentleman for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,) yesterday, as I came into the House, was presenting to the Committee an array of figures in reference to the cost of these repeated elections, and the failure of elections on account of the operation of the majority principle. There is a favorite expression that figures will not lie, but I believe the very opposite is true-that figures will lie. They will, at any rate, lead us in the wrong direction. A million of dollars annually was the estimated cost of failures to elect. They cost money, and I believe every man known and feels it. It costs money and time for the people to exercise the right of governing themselves. Will the gentleman for Erving be so kind as to tell me what business is more important and more valuable to be attended to than the business of governing one's self and the rest of the community? Will he be so kind as to say whether it is the business which he and I are now engaged in, of going into court to speak upon one side or the other of every little miserable question which may be litigated by parties who will indulge in the luxury of the law? Is that the business more important to be attended to than the great business, which should

address itself to every human being who has a right to live in this government, whether he should properly and rightly govern himself and his fellow citizens about him. Dollars and cents upon the one side, and the great principle of selfgovernment upon the other. Why did not the gentleman go farther? If we are to settle this question by figures-and the ablest mathematician would be the best man to settle it-why did he not give you the cost of the governments of Europe; for the most despotic government therethat of Russia-may cost less than the government of these United States. Why, we meet once a year in our little republics-I do not know how many times-at a cost of fifty or one hundred thousand dollars, more or less, to vote for our governor, representatives, and other officers of government, and to do what? To spend our time idly, and do nothing? Why, no; we meet to exercise the highest right which is given us by the laws--and that is, of governing ourselves, in common with our fellow citizens. The other States meet together for the same purpose. Once in four years three millions of the citizens of this country meet together to vote for president, at a cost of three millions of dollars perhaps. Only think of it! What president was ever worth three millions of dollars? [Laughter.] Add the cost of your presidential, your congressional, and your gubernatorial elections, and that of the election of town and county officers, together, and put the sum total in dollars and cents, and if you look to the argument of dollars and cents, based upon mere arithmetic alone, it would be an argument which would overwhelm and crush this Convention, and they would rise as one man and say how foolish and ridiculous were our forefathers, who really fought and not only spent their money but their blood for the right of spending this immense sum of money, when they could have referred it to one man, who would have done the work cheaper, and no man would have been asked to leave his work and go to town meeting to say whether he wanted it done this way or that. It would have been an argument as strong and unanswerable as the argument that my friend has made here against the exercise of the majority principle. Why he might carry it further. This body is a costly machine for doing the work which we are sent here to perform. Here are four hundred and eighty persons, whose work in the market would bring a dollar a day. They are met together for the simple business of devising plans and proposing them to the people, by which they may spend the people's money. Go homeyou are spending four, five, six, seven, or eight hundred dollars a day, and you had better be at home, for it costs money. Everything costs money; and I hope that the argument will never be addressed to this Convention, that they should give up anything which strikes at the foundation of rights which we have always enjoyed, and in which we all believe, because it costs money. If it costs double, treble, or any amount more, for one I do not believe that I would be willing to give up the right for any such consideration as the expense that will be incurred.

Then the argument-the pressing argument with regard to our elections-is advanced here by gentlemen upon the other side, and that is what I promised to come to presently in answer to the gentleman from Pittsfield, (Mr. Briggs,) that by carrying out and insisting upon the majority rule

you get the plurality rule. That is the statement. I deny that you do any such thing, and if the Committee will give me their attention for a few minutes, I think I can show that this would not be the case. By the present rule of action the question is proposed to the whole people, will you, or a majority, have this or that man for governor, or will a majority of you say to your constituted agents, to wit, the legislature, that they shall choose the governor. If the people say by their votes, the choice being before them, and a majority not combining together upon any one man, that they will give the election of their governor to their constituted agents, I pray you is that governor a minority man or a plurality man. By no means. The people at each particular election have the right and do decide upon the question-whether they thus directly by their vote will elect their governor, or whether they will give the right to certain constituted authoritiesand I undertake to say, that that most respectable gentleman representing Pittsfield, (Mr. Briggs,) was just as much the governor of a majority of the people of this Commonwealth when he was chosen by the legislature, as when he was chosen directly by the votes of the people, because the question did go to the people and they did act upon it, whether they themselves would elect by a majority vote, or whether they would delegate that choice to another body elected by the majority principle. And so it is with senators. By the Report now before the Committee you propose to change this system, and say, for all time to come, until the Constitution which you may frame is altered, that at each election the majority of the people shall not have their choice-that a plurality less than a majority shall control at all hazards. You do not give the choice at each election, as the exigency may arise, to the people to determine themselves, but you say that the voice of less than a majority shall at each election of officers under this Constitution control. Under the present system of the majority rule this whole matter is before the people. No one can deny that. Will you unite, and by your direct votes give a majority to one man, or will you delegate the power to choose that man to constituted agents which a majority have chosen? I say that the man chosen by these constituted agents is just as much the choice of the majority, as if he had received the ballot at the ballot-box. All our laws are made in this way. Laws are the voice of the majority, not directly or immediately, but through the constituted agents, delegated for that purpose. But I am taking up too much time, and I must hurry over what I intended to say. I desire to call the attention of the Committee to another argument, for a moment, which has been pressed here by my friend for Erving, and by other gentlemen, as the reason above all others, why the plurality system shall be adopted, and why we should abandon the majority principle. My friend gave us a very eloquent description of some of the evils which might arise in congress because a district here was not represented. What is the evil of non-representation, and who is responsible for it? Why, nobody but the people themselves; and shall we here, acting for all future time, undertake to be wiser than the very people who are acting at the very occasions when they are to choose their representatives? Are we beforehand to be wiser than they? If the people are not represented the reason is that they

[May 27th.

did not want to be represented, or because they did not vote. If the evil was a pressing one, of such a magnitude that we are here bound to provide against it in framing the fundamental laws of our government, do you not believe that the intelligence of the people, at every election when that evil arises and presents itself, would guard against it. Are you afraid to trust the people on each and every occasion, with all the light of the occasion about them, to guard against the evil of non-representation, or are you going to say beforehand that the fundamental laws of the land must provide that the evil should be guarded against? I apprehend that this evil of non-representation has been magnified. I have never seen any very great trouble arising from it. If men were non-represented, it was because they did not object to it. Let them go unrepresented if they choose to do so, and if it is an evil let them guard against it, and provide a remedy for it. One election will remedy it. I do not think it wise or prudent, on account of that evil, to say that less than a majority of the people of the Commonwealth shall have the right at all times to control your representatives; that less than a majority of the people shall be represented, or in other words, that a majority of the people shall be misrepresented.

I apprehend, Sir, that these are the main objections to the present majority rule; and I do not believe that these objections-I would agree with the gentleman from Pittsfield, if I believed it— are such as to address themselves to the hearts and to the judgments of the people of this Commonwealth. I do not believe that these inconveniences are such that the people of the Commonwealth are prepared to-day to give up that great sheet anchor of our government, that no man is bound to relinquish the right which his own conscience, and his own judgment demand for him, unless the majority of the people decide that his own judgment and his own conscience must give way to the united judgments and the united consciences of a majority of the people.

Mr. SCHOULER, of Boston. I wish to ask the attention of the Committee to a few facts, chiefly in answer to the remarks made by the gentleman from Worcester, (Mr. Allen,) in reply to the gentleman from Pittsfield, (Mr. Briggs.) If I understood his argument aright, he said that the reason why there was a smaller vote on the second trial, when gentlemen were elected a few months ago, than there was at the trial in November, was, that the plurality law had been passed in the meantime, and the first trial was had under the majority law while the second trial was under the plurality law. I have not had time thoroughly to examine the document which was printed by order of the House of Representatives in 1852, but I have looked it over sufficiently to take one case. I have, in the short time which has been allowed me, examined the result of several elections which have taken place in the Fourth District for members of congress, within a few years past, and I shall proceed to show the Committee, that, instead of the plurality system causing a smaller vote, on the last trial there were almost as many votes as at the original vote in November, while at intermediate trials upon the majority principle there was a much smaller number of votes, and in some cases only about half the number. I have the figures before me, and I will read them. At the first trial in November,

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1848, there were 14,110 votes cast; at the next trial, which was in the January following, there were 9,075 votes cast, being a falling off of about five thousand. The next trial was at the March meeting, which is usually almost as well attended as the November meeting, and at that time there were 10,605 votes cast, being a falling off of between three and four thousand from the November preceding. Then came the trial in June, when there were 8,233 votes cast; at the trial in the September following, there were 9,423 votes cast. But at the next trial, which was in November, 1849, at the annual meeting, the vote came up to 13,794, which was within a few hundred votes of the original number cast the year before. Then there was another trial on the 5th of next January, and the number of votes cast was 10,416; at the March meeting there were 11,296; in May there were 10,468; then came the August trial, and then there were only 7,119 votes cast-just about one-half of the original vote of the district at the first meeting in November, 1818. At the next meeting, in November, 1850, there were 14,239 votes cast; still there was no choice. The next trial took place in January, when there were 8,905 votes cast; then came the April meeting, when there were 8,866, and then came the final struggle on the 26th of May, under the plurality law, when the number of votes cast was 13,394, or about as many as were cast at the original November vote. I merely state these facts, and if gentlemen will take the trouble to examine the printed document, and the returns at the Secretary's office, they will find that all the other districts show similar results. Every one knows that the contest in that district was warmer than in any other district in the State; and therefore it is a fair sample of what the results are under the plurality and under the majority rule. I think the figures show that the statement made by the gentleman from Pittsfield was correct.

Mr. ALLEN. I will ask the gentleman whether he is using the same tables which the gentleman from Pittsfield used, or whether it is another set of tables.

Mr. SCHOULER. I have simply given the result in district No. Four, for the purpose of illustrating the position taken by the gentleman from Pittsfield. The principle laid down by that gentleman, was, that under the plurality system we could get out as full a vote as under the majority system, if I understood him correctly. In May, 1851, for instance, the vote in the Tenth District was ten thousand; while in May, 1852, under the plurality system, it was thirteen thousand, showing that this view is correct, where these repeated trials are held. The reason is obvious. Where there is a contest that lasts through a whole year, and where there is no probability of a choice, the people will not go to the polls; but when it is known that the plurality law is in force, and that the first trial will determine the result, then they will go, and give their vote, because their vote in that case amounts to something; but it is not at all strange that people do not wish to leave their employment to go and vote when they think there is no probability of a choice. So they stay away from the polls and let the election go by default. I understand the gentleman from Lowell, to say that the people do not wish to have this plurality law. If they do not wish it, then they will reject it; but let us give them a chance to say whether they wish it or

not. If they reject it when it is sent to them, ! we shall have just what we have now; if they reject it, they will leave us the majority principle -but if they should choose to adopt it, we shall have the plurality principle with the approval of a majority of the people of the State. I think that is a sufficient answer to the gentleman; but I presume he is afraid to let the question go to the people for fear that they will adopt the plurality principle. In my view, there is no question which will come before this Convention in which the people feel more deeply interested than they do in this; and if we give them an opportunity! to say whether they want the plurality law or not, I think the response of the people of the Commonwealth will be very largely in favor of the law.

But I rose principally, and almost entirely, for the purpose of showing by these figures that under the majority system of voting, when an elec. tion is held in mid-summer, at a time when elections are not generally held throughout the State, for the mere purpose of electing members of congress, and not for the electing of State offcers or any general business, the vote falls off nearly one-half; but when we have elections under the plurality system, so far as we can judge from the experience which we have had under that law, which has now been in force for nearly a year and a half, we find that we have a full vote whether it be taken in November or in any other part of the year.

Mr. HALLETT. It is not my purpose to enter into any lengthy remarks upon this question; but I desire simply to state a few plain truths, as they present themselves to my mind. As a politician I would be in favor of the plurality system as the more expedient of the two; but as a propounder of organic law, I am opposed to it. The question in my mind, therefore, is whether I am acting here as a politician, or as far as I may be able, as a statesman; and I think that I am bound to act upon principle, and to be guided by that, in the formation of organic law. In looking at the fundamental principles of our Massachusetts government, I find that the two earliest principles engrafted upon it were, the majority principle in all the forms of law, and the representation of towns. This goes back to the year 1631, and runs through your political history from thence until now. It is proposed here in Massachusetts, for the first time in our history, to make an organic law that shall give up the right to control the government to less than a majority of the people. Can that be sustained upon republican principles? That is the question which we are considering to-day. My friend from Boston, whose mind, somewhat like my own, seems to be in doubt as to the vote which he shall give, suggested that this was a rule, as to the majority, and not a principle. Now my difficulty in this case is, that I consider it a principle and not a rule. In short, it is the sole principle of republican government. Is there any principle in republican government except that a majority shall govern? The moment you depart from that principle and place the government in the hands of one man less than a majority, you have no republican government. Now, Sir, permit me to refer, as I am in the habit of doing when I find any difficulty upon this point, to the republican fathers-to the great doctors and expounders of this American law, for that is the law which I go by.

{May 27th.

"The will of the majority is in all cases to prevail."

That was said by Thomas Jefferson in his first Inaugural to the people, in March, 1801. In 1853, shall we say that the will of a minority of the people shall prevail?

"Governments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of the people and execute it."

So said Jefferson in his Cabinet Opinions, at a later period. Can you embody the will of the people in less than a majority?

“It is essential to a republican government, that it be derived from the great body of the society."

So said Madison, in the Federalist. Can you get the great body of society in less than a majority?

"A majority of the community hath an indubitable right to reform, alter or abolish government."

So said the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Can we get that right from less than a majority? "This is the language of democracy, that a majority of the community have a right to alter their government.”

So said Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention. These are the opinions of our own statesmen, and those too, of the highest conservative school.

"The great body of the people is the source of all legitimate authority, nor less of all efficient power."

So said John Adams, in his reply to the Address of Congress, in November, 1800. Do we find any other principle engrafted into our government than this? The very able gentleman from Pittsfield said, if I understood him correctly, that the people had a right to prescribe, numerically, how their governors should be chosen, and how their rulers should be chosen. Do I understand that gentleman to say that the people anywhere have a right prescribe that a minority shall rule? If that be so, I take issue with him upon that point. That is not republican doctrine. I say, Sir, that the people never have the right in any capacity-organic, legislative, or social-to undertake to prescribe that less than a majority shall govern. The moment you give a minority the right to govern, you take away the right of the people to make and institute government, which must alone emanate from the majority. Hence, if the people anywhere have made laws which exclude others from the participation in government affairs, whether by qualifications of voters or otherwise, it puts the voting power into the hands of a minority of the people; and the moment they adopt that course, revolution is justifiable-peaceable or physical, I care not which. That is not a republican form of government; and therefore the people have a right to change it. Now, my difficulty is, in this proposition you admit the necessity of this principle, and put it into your Constitution, that less than a majority may govern. That is, you say that your governor, lieutenant-governor, and the entire legislature may be chosen by a minority of the people of the Commonwealth, and therefore, you put the government into the hands of a minority. Have you any right to do that? Your answer to that is, that it is expedient. The argument you use is that of inconvenience. I will not touch upon that point, because it has been exhausted by the very able and admirable com

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ments of the gentleman from Lowell. The republican, the democrat, who cannot exercise this great principle of the majority system, and carry it out, because of the expense, should certainly relieve himself of that inconvenience by a more limited form of government than ours. Why, Sir, it is simply saying that a republican government has become so expensive and inconvenient that you cannot carry it on, and ought to abandon it. Are we to say that, to-day? If we are not here, to-day, to say that, we shall never incorporate into the Constitution the principle that the minority shall hold the reins of government. If expediency is to govern, how long will other great principles of private rights, of the trial by jury, for instance, last? How inconvenient, in practice, is the principle of trial by jury! Some years ago, when the fifteen gallon law was contested in our courts with so much ardor, you could have raised a majority in this Commonwealth in favor of abolishing the principle of requiring unanimity in the verdict of juries. Why? Because in cases which were litigated before juries, they would not agree, and the law fell to the ground. How easy would it have been on that occasion to have called a Convention of the friends of temperance, and either have abolished the jury system, or to have said that the verdict of a majority of the jury, as in some other countries, should govern and settle property questions, and other questions affecting the personal rights of individuals. Then that is no argument. No man would stand here to-day, and say abolish the unanimity of jurics. Will any any man say abolish the majority principle in the government? Why, Sir, we submit our matters to the jury, and send them out, if they cannot agree, we keep them out, and if they finally fail to agree, we submit the matter to another jury. Let us try the people in the same manner. If they cannot agree in the first instance, try them again; and if they do not agree at all, put the case upon the docket, and let it stand. [Laughter.]

This question has been argued here, as the gentleman from Pittsfield said, with great candor. I have never seen a question presented, where less of party lines ran through the debate, than upon this occasion, and I think it is because we are looking, on the one side at principle, and on the other at expediency. I am always afraid of expediency. But in applying the majority principle, we are met with the suggestion, that if we do not adopt the plurality system, the practical result is that the minority after all govern. Well, Sir, is that so? If it were so, I would yield the argument. But, Sir, I look at it in this point of view. Take the operation of the plurality system in reference to the governor. Your proposition is that the plurality vote of the people shall elect the governor. You may have five hundred candidates, and no one man may get more than five thousand votes, and still if he has more than any other man, he is declared governor. What sort of governor would he be I believe the people would rather be without a governor. Instead of a state of things which may produce that effect, you have the prevailing system, which can be rendered expeditious and effective, even supposing this triangular state of parties still to continue. The people go to the polls and cast their votes for the chief magistrate. If their votes do not give a majority to any one candidate, then by

the provisions of the Constitution, the question goes before the legislature, who are to elect from the four candidates having the highest number of votes. How much choice do the people then have in the choice of governor? Can you elect a governor in this House, unless the majority have acted here? I think not. I think the number of representatives in this House, who are to choose two candidates from the four having the highest number of votes, and send them to the other body, must result in an expression of the will of the majority of the people.

And if you amend this provision in order to avoid the machinery by which the two Houses act separately, and to bring them together so that your senators and representatives shall act together in the choice of governor, what will be the result? It will have this effect. The people of the Commonwealth, failing to elect any one man, have nominated two men for governor, and the great body of the legislature confirms one of them. And hence you perceive, that in either case, one or the other of two leading candidates will be confirmed by the legislature. This is the action of the legislature, and it is the action of the people. I ask if that does not more nearly express the will of the people, than a plurality vote would?

Again, do not the people act, having agreed in their form of Constitution, that, when they themselves shall fail to give a majority of votes to any one of the candidates for governor, that they will refer that subject to their delegates and agents in general assembly. Why, Sir, we have the right so to change the Constitution as to provide that the governor shall be elected by the legislature in the first instance. Is there anything anti-demoratic in that? Surely not. Do we do more than that when the people say that out of three men, the legislature shall elect one? Surely not. Then this action is within the majority principle of government, but the effect of the other system is not anywhere within that principle.

Now, upon the point of discrimination which has been suggested by the amendments which are now pending. If I have to adopt either of them, I desire to see the amendment of the gentleman from Plymouth modified by that of the gentleman from Worcester. The result of the majority principle is, that this House of Representatives, constitute it as you may, must express the will of a majority of the people. Does not this Convention to-day represent a majority of the people? Does not the legislature which has vanished represent the majority of the people? You can never have a legislature which does not represent a majority.

But when you come to another class of casesto the election of your county commissioners, your city boards, your mayor, aldermen, and other officers, no part of whose duty it is to make laws, then you may apply what principle you please. But the power which is to make your laws should never represent anything less than the majority of the whole.

These are the principles which will govern me, and if it be desirable to make that discrimination in the manner of electing those who make your laws, and those who do not, I shall be perfectly willing.

Mr. WILSON, of Natick. I would suggest that, as this question has been discussed for several days with eminent ability, on both sides, we had better take the question now. I had intended

[May 27th.

to throw out a few suggestions in relation to it, but I do not consider that it is of the slightest importance to any one out of this House, and to but very few within it, as to what I may think upon the subject. I do not suppose I can shed any new light upon it, and I suggest that we now take the vote upon the various propositions before us, and thereby settle the question.

Mr. DAVIS, of Worcester. I have risen to trouble the Committee but for a very few moments. I wish simply to call the attention of the Committee to the extent of the proposition which is now before us. I wish the Committee to understand the latitude and longitude of this proposition. A more ridiculous one, I hold, has never been attempted to be incorporated in any free government whatever.

It is a proposition that all the officers mentioned in the Constitution shall be elected upon the plurality system. It applies to every officer that we may, by the change in this organic law, decide shall be elected by the people. It may go to the extent of electing every military officer by a plurality of votes.

Gentlemen come up here and cite the other States of the Union as samples for us. I deny any such parallelism. It is not so in any State of the Union. That the majority are to govern, is a principle which lies at the basis of every government where the sovereignty is in the people. As good is the basis of all morals, or as the beautiful is the basis of the fine arts, so if justice lies at the foundation of free governments, it is just that the majority should rule, and not the minority. It cannot be said that our government is founded upon the eternal principles of justice if the minority is to rule, and is to elect the officers of the government. Do gentlemen say that in all the States of the Union, except New England, the plurality system elects? I deny it. Have gentlemen brought the evidence of it? In all their popular assemblies, in all their primary meetings, in all their conventions, as we all know who have attended their meetings, they go for even more than a majority. They are sticklers for a strong expression of the people's will. And dare we, selected from the whole people, recommend that less than a majority shall govern? Are we to present a proposition to the people, which should be in direct conflict with, and in violation of, the authority of all the fathers who laid the foundations of this government? I challenge gentlemen to find in the history of all the fathers who have written upon our government a principle like this, that the minority is to govern, And are we to establish that principle here without a solitary exception?

I trust that this resolution will be voted down. I am ready to go for the principle that in some cases, some proper cases, the plurality shall elect, but that shall be an exception to the general rule. It should be a general rule by which the people in all time, by which our children and our children's children should be governed.

Sir, we lose our faith, we lose our confidence, we lose our trust, in any government or any form of government, the moment it comes to be made the government of the few. We have confidence in our republican government, because we know that it is made by the many; and here consists the beauty and strength of republican governHere the people speak with power and majesty. Here the people respect the government

ments.

Friday,]

and bow in submission to it, because it is the government of the majority; but will the people bow in submission to see that government change ? Will they submit to be ruled by a government which is that of a minority? Every man bows in submission to the majority, but not to the minority. Why, Sir, how is it in our assemblies, when a man, through accident, comes in elected by less than a majority? We all know he is despised because he comes there in violation of a fundamental principle, which if not respected, subverts the very foundations of our government,— that of the "majority should rule." Is it not so? I submit it to gentlemen whether the history of our very institutions does not show that this is one of the fundamental principles of the government? It has been shown here that the teachings of our fathers are to maintain this principle.

But I do not desire to go into the discussion of these matters which have been so ably illustrated by other gentlemen. I simply rose for the purpose of controverting the point that the constitutions of all the other States are in accordance with this plurality principle. Is it so? Gentlemen, I ask you to look at it. I ask you, gentlemen, who have been with men from the South, in conventions, to tell this Convention whether the men from that section of country usually go for the plurality or for the majority principle? Why, Sir, they are the greatest sticklers that can be found for the will of the majority.

But a great deal has been said here about the cost of this and the cost of that. Gentlemen are afraid that this majority principle is going to cost something. Well, Sir, our liberties cost us something. They cost much blood, much treasure, and many valuable lives; but they did not cost half what they are worth. And to carry out these liberties and transmit them to our children and our children's children, will also cost something; but what if it does? Talk about the cost of our elections, I tell gentlemen they cost nothing compared with what the elections in the Southern and Western States, where the plurality system prevails. I have been in some of those States and know something about their elections, and how different are they from those in our own. Why, Sir, from the commencement of our existence, even before the Revolution, our fathers laid the foundation for schools, and made it a matter of attention upon the part of the government that every child should be educated; that every man in the Commonwealth should know how to read and should be able to understand the principles of government, and hence we are in the habit of nominating our men and of allowing the voters to read and judge of them, and of the principles which they advocate, for themselves.

Now compare this with the mode adopted in the elections in the States to which I have referred. There, some man sets himself up for a candidate, and goes through every county in the State, if it is a State election, or through every town and neighborhood, if it is a county election; he visits every family, holds meetings, and explains to the voters individually, and in bodies, the great principles of government, and the great questions upon which the election turns.

Now calculate

the cost of holding all these meetings in the various counties and towns in these States for the purpose of explaining the principle of government and the political questions of the day, by the various candidates for election, and then com

pare it with the cost of our elections here in Massachusetts. The governor of Massachusetts is not found going into all the towns and counties of the State to electioneer and enlighten the people of the Commonwealth and his constituents, upon the great principles of government, as is the case in some of the other States of the Union. We go upon the universal principle of learning every child in the Commonwealth to real and write, and to understand these principles of gov ernment for himself; and we provide the means, at the public expense, to every human being within the limits of the Commonwealth. Now, then, the question is, whether we, assembled in this Convention, shall put forth this proposition, that in all the elections to be held under the Constitution which we shall hereafter recommend to the people for their adoption, less than a majority shall govern. Do it, gentlemen, if you will; carry out that proposition, but the people will reject your Constitution, and all our work will be in vain. We might as well adjourn this day and go home, as to go on and form the organic law of the State, and then submit it to the people of the State, containing a provision that less than a majority shall be allowed to minage our affairs. Mr. ASPINWALL, of Brookline. Mr. Chairman, I have been exceedingly interested by the remarks made by the gentleman from Worcester, (Mr. Davis,) who has just taken his seat. But, Sir, I have heard a part of that speech before. That gentleman has referred us to the fathers of our Constitution. Now, Sir, I am not so well versed in the history of the rise and progress of our Constitution and laws as he is. I am not so old a man, and am not able to go so far back with my memory as he goes, but I have a memory which lasts for one year, at least. His seems to be of that quality which remembers the events of his youth, and forgets those of more recent occurrence. I cannot, therefore, refer the gentleman to the fathers-such as he would term fathers -of our constitutional law, but I will refer him to a document emanating from the Senate of Massachusetts, and signed by one of the fathers of our Constitution at the present period of its history. I refer to a document reported in the Senate last year, and signed by Whiting Griswold, Anson Burlingame, Moses Wood, Isaac Davis, and others. Of course I cannot know by any parliamentary rule, that the signature here is that of the member from Worcester, (Mr. Davis,) but I presume it is his.

Mr. DAVIS. I will very cheerfully relieve the gentleman from any embarrassment upon that ground. The document to which he alludes was signed by me.

Mr. ASPINWALL. The gentleman says the document was signed by him; I shall, therefore, in reply to the very eloquent speech just delivered by the gentleman, ask leave to read from this document one or two arguments which had great weight in bringing me to the conclusions which I shall announce in reference to this plurality principle. This document is one put forth to the people of the Commonwealth by the legislature, giving the reasons why a Convention of the people should be called for the purpose of revising the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and at the end of it is the Act of the legislature under which we are convened. It goes on to say:

"In the sixth place, we recommend the adoption

[May 27th.

of the plurality system in more of our elections. To what extent the Constitution should be revised upon this subiect, and how far the system should be carried, will, of course, remain for the Convention to settle. Nor do we now express any opinion as to which would be the most expedient, if the system is to be adopted, to apply it to the first, or only to the send or some subsequent election."

Now comes something rather material to a part of the gentleman's speech :

"Bat the time and money which are now expendel, and the party animisity which is engendered, by the numerous and ussu cessful attempts to elect the various s'ate, eɔunty, and then or city officers, have become griuak of rep red and bud complaints in all portions of tả: Commvar-alth. This part of the Constitution should undergo a thorough revision, and it should be done not rashly, but with great care and deliberation."

Now comes a portion which is very material to the gentleman argument:

"We are aware that the majority principle has long been considered the conservative element in our Constitution, and many sound and well balanced minds may take alarm at a proposition of this kind, but we think that a moment's reflection will satisfy the most fastidious that their fears are groundless. The practical operation of our Constitution, for the last ten years, has been, in very many instances, to place in the most important offices in the State men who have received, not a majority, but only a plurality, of the popular vote. Indeed, this result seems to be fast becoming the general rule, and not the exception. And in some instances these offices have been filled by men who have received not even a plurality of the popular vote.

"No one has a right to complain of these results so long as the Constitution remains as it is; and we only allude to them for the purpose of showing that the Constitution itself, in its practical operation, has partially destroyed a principle which, by many, has long been considered essential to the stability and perpetuity of our government. This subject was thoroughly discussed in all its bearings, in the popular branch of the legislature, during the sessions of 1849 and 1850, and although the most disastrous results were then predicted, should the plurality principle to any extent become a law, yet we believe that the Act of last session, providing for the election of members of congress by plurality on the second trial, is not only a just and safe, but very popular law."

I am sorry to trouble the Committee with so long an extract, but I shall allow it to take the place of an extended speech, which I otherwise should have made if I had not read this argument. It goes on to say :—

"VII. The present cumbersome, formal mode of organizing the government, we submit should be abolished. Eight or ten days are now usually occupied in this organization, which is nothing less than an annual waste of six or eight thousand dollars of the people's money. The election of secretary of the Commonwealth, treasurer and receiver-general, auditor of accounts, and executive councillors, by the people, with an application of the plurality principle to these officers, as well as to the governor, lieutenant-governor, and state senators, would do much to remedy this evil. These changes, with a few other slight modifications of the Constitution in the same direction, especially the establishment of a board of men to count the votes, declare the result, and notify the persons elected, would enable the legislature to organize the government, and be ready to proceed with the business of the session in two, or at the longest, in three days. This change alone would, in the course of ten years, nearly or quite defray the whole expense of the Convention."