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whether we shall jump off to the plurality system, when we can remedy the evil existing in the present system, by adopting a new mode of electing senators, and by making the represent 1tive system such that the people will be fairly represented, and one which will never give the minority the power to rule the maj »rity.

As an illustration of the anti-democratic character of this plurality principle, bear in mind that efforts have been made in some parts of Massa chusetts to get a ten hour system of labor. Now, under the plurality system, I would like to know what power the party that advocates that system can secure. To what party will they go for assistance? It will be of no use to go to either. Neither party will care anything about them, since one or the other will certainly have a plurality without their help. So it will be with any small party struggling for what they regard as an important interest. They will be entirely powerless.

With regard to the amendment now pending, I will say only a few words. What does the amendment propose? Simply this; to substitute for the resolution of the Committee, a resolution providing that the governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives, shall be chosen by the majority, and that all other officers, the scoretary of state, treasurer, auditor, county officers, &c., &c., may be chosen by the plurality, provided the legislature shall so determine. Does not that leave the question just where it ought to be left? It provides that those who are to govern the State shall be chosen by a majority, and then the legislature have power to order all the other officers, not named in the amendment, to be chosen by a plurality, if they choose to do so. It seems to me that is a fair compromise; that it is as just a proposition as can be made; and I may say that, because I did not originate it. It originated with my very worthy friend from Worcester, (Mr. Knowlton,) whose judgment we all respect. It appears to me that that is precisely what this Convention should donamely, preserve intact the old mode of electing the governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives; and then leave the mode of electing the other officers to the wisdom of the legislature.

Mr. HATHAWAY, of Freetown. I am rather inclined to the belief that I had better do as the gentleman from Warren said he was about doing on a former occasion, which was, holding his tongue. But there are certain views which I have taken of this matter which have not been fully presented here, and I am rather inclined to present them to the Convention.

Another reason, or rather, perhaps, the principal reason, why I had better hold my tongue is, that I find by a reference, that was pointed out to me by a friend, to some remarks made by me when we met in the Music Hall, in some portions of them I am made to say everything that I did not say, and to utter propositions exactly the reverse of those which I did maintain— precisely the opposite, and there is no mistake about it. I never should have known it-for I have not taken the trouble to examine the reports -had it not been pointed out to me by friends who took the pains to show it to me, and who at the same time said that they understood me to say precisely the reverse of what the reporter understood. I am certain that I never made the

remarks, for the propositions which were put into my mouth I never thou; t of maintaining for a moment. But probably the mistake occurred in consequence of the eco, of which something was said, and the reverberations, or perhaps, as the gentleman said with reference to the gentleman | for Wilbraham, some spirit rappings caused it. If it was so, be it so.

But to the proposition. And before I proceed I should like to know precisely what is meant by this proposition in the resolution and the propo sition of the gentleman from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker). It is necessary, perhaps, that we should understand each other, and know what are the precise propositions, in order that we may discuss them understandingly and with profit to ourselves. If I understand the original proposition, Sir, it is this, that all the officers that are named, or rather it is in these words-" that it is expedient so to revise the Constitution that in all elections by the people of officers named in it, the person receiving the highest number of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected.”

I suppose that the proposition must refer to the Constitution as intended to be presented to the people by this Convention, and to such Constitution as they may adopt. The amendment, if I understand it, which is proposed by the gentleman from North Brookfield is this-to substitute, instead of the resolution, the proposition that all civil officers, except the governor, lieutenantgovernor, senators and representatives, shall be elected by a plurality, and that these officers shall be elected by a majority.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will read the proposition :-"That in all elections of governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives, a majority of all the votes cast shall be necessary for a choice; and the election of all other civil officers shall be by a majority or a plurality of votes, as the legislature shall determine, unless otherwise specially provided for in the Constitution."

Mr. HATHAWAY. I did not go through with the proposition, but as far as I went I merely reversed the position of certain officers. But still the principle is there as I said. That is to say, the governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives are to be chosen by a majority of votes. And when I use the word majority I do not mean plurality, I do not mean minority; I mean the old fashioned sense in which we used to take the word majority, that the individual elected shall have more votes than all other persons voted for on that occasion. I do not believe the words majority and plurality are synonymous, as the member for Manchester, (Mr. Dana,) has argued this afternoon. I go for the good old principle of majorities-for what the people understand by the word majorities.

If the amendment should prevail, let us see how we should stand in reference to the present Con、 stitution. The words "civil officers," I suppose are intended to cover and reach all the officers except the military officers, that are elected ; whether they be magisterial, executive, judicial, or otherwise, all except military officers, and all except the governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representatives, may be elected by a plurality vote, if the legislature so choose. If the gentleman intended to cover by the words "civil officers" every judicial officer, let him say so. If he means to exclude them, let him say so, and then

May 31st.

we shall know what we are discussing. That is one of the difficulties in discussing this question, that we do not know how far the proposition reaches, nor where it stops. But I shall proceed as though the judicial others were to receive their offices under an appointment, for I think this the appropriate course, and not the appointment at the polls by a plurality. But if they are to be appointed at the polls, I would by no means have a judge upon the bench, unless he had a majority of the votes of the whole people.

But let us see what the proposition, as now presented, applies to. We have heard a great deal, and great complaint, in reference to election of members of congress, and the convenience of the plurality rule, growing out of the great number of town meetings for the election of members of congress. I put it to the Convention, what in the name of heaven are we to do with that subject. Do gentlemen propose here to incorporate a certain organic law in reference to members of congress? Sir, there is a higher law than all that, if I may be permitted to use the expression. I speak now of the organic law, the Constitution of the United States. What can this Convention do, and what have they to do on that subject? No matter how much the people may have suffered with reference to that subject, can we cure it, can we touch it? Can we prevent those inconveniences growing out of the right of representation and the choice of representatives in congress? Complaint has come from all quarters; from the gentleman from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) who opened this debate in favor of the plurality system, to the mover of this amendment, (Mr. Walker,) and from that gentleman down to almost the last person who spoke in favor of it, certainly down to the time that the gentleman from Newburyport, (Mr. Kinsman,) spoke in reference to this matter. I wish, gentlemen, to turn to the fourth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, and see if this Convention have any right to touch this matter, or to lay their finger upon it, and whether, if they do amend the Constitution in reference to the plurality system, we can touch that clause at all. I say you may incorporate as many principles of plurality as you please, and after all, if the legislature choose, they may incorporate the majority principle into the laws for the choice of members to congress; they are to judge, and not we, nor the people of this Commonwealth.

The language of that fourth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, is this:

"The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in cach State by the legislature thereof;

ture.

Now, can anything be more certain? And be

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cause the people in this Commonwealth have experienced great inconvenience in consequence of the numerous town meetings which have been held for the election of members of congress, is it a fair and legitimate argument that in consequence of this inconvenience, you should incorporate into this system-what? That you will avoid your town meetings for the election of representatives to congress? Is it so? Can you do it? Is it a fair matter of argument here? Not at all. That matter is settled, and settled by a law paramount to any law that we or the people of this Commonwealth can make about it.

There is no question about it; it is settled beyond all question. Hence the argument that may be derived from that matter, as it seems to me, is illegitimate upon this occasion. The question has been asked here, why this Convention was called, and various answers have been given to that question. I suppose that what may have influenced my mind, and what may have influenced the minds of the constituency whom I represent here, may not have influenced the minds of other gentlemen or of other constituencies. I suppose that the great reason of calling this Convention was on account of the inequality of individual portions of this Commonwealth, in administering the legislative branch of the government. I presume that is the principal reason of the calling of this Convention, although other reasons may have operated in connection with that. I will illustrate the inequality to which I refer by an example. By the provisions of the Constitution, in 1840, and every once in ten years thereafter, a census was to be taken, and your Senate and House of Representatives were to be based upon that census; but under the Constitution, you could not put the knife into the cities-you could not district them; and the consequence is that if I happen to be a resident of the city of Boston, which is entitled to forty-four representatives, in the course of ten years, I vote for four hundred and forty representatives; but if I should happen to live in Hull, according to the operation of this decennial census, I should have a chance to vote for only one representative in ten years. Thus my individual power in controlling the legislative departments in this Commonwealth, if I happen to live in the town of Hull, is only 1-440 of what it is if I happen to live in the city of Boston; my individual power is entirely dependent upon the locality where I reside. I presume this consideration had great influence with the people of this Commonwealth in determining them to call a Convention to revise the Constitution. That was what influenced me, and I have no doubt that was the prominent reason in the minds of my constituency. Gentlemen have said that we stood here as upright, plain-spoken men-that we have come here for a high purpose-that we have come here as statesmen, &c.

Now, Sir, it is not for me to judge whether these declarations are in good taste or otherwise. It is not proper that I should say that all this is in very bad taste, and that we would better leave our neighbors to say this of us than to say it ourselves; but, Sir, there is one thing that I will say. I do not come here to represent any party; my election happened to be rather owing to the good-will-not to say good sense-of my constituency, and against the combination of almost all parties, perhaps; and I came here for the purpose of endeavoring to amend this Constitution, if

possible, and to do it in such a manner that its principles should correspond to those principles which I have every reason to believe are the foundation of our American system of government; and one of those is the majority principle. The gentleman from Taunton the other day, when this debate was opened, gave us a very instructive lesson in reference to the origin of government. He went back to the foundation of the matter, and said that in a state of nature we were all equal; if two men meet in a state of nature, one has no right above the other. Nobody controverts that proposition, Sir. If you should put the question to twenty millions of people, you would not probably find the first man who would deny that. But the gentleman went on and said that if three men were to meet in a state of nature, they would all be equal; that is true, Sir; but when you come to put these three men together, it is necessary that there should be a government, and what does he say follows next? When men are to be governed, the next thing is a compact; and those who are governed, are governed by their own consent. Well, Sir, that was the old doctrine, I confess; but it is the doctrine of tyrants, after all. Let me ask that gentleman what we were discussing. We were discussing and are discussing the great American principle of the right of self-government; and in forming our Constitution, we are to base it upon the principle of selfgovernment. Let me tell the gentleman that even in England they have the elective franchise, they have the right of suffrage, and choose their electors; but would gentlemen call that a democratic republican government? Not at all. Why, Sir, even the wily Frenchman, Louis Napoleon, recognized the right of suffrage. He was in favor of the right of suffrage when it answered the purpose of electing him, and admitted the right of the people to alter or change their government; but when he became Emperor, one of his first acts was to send his army into Italy to put down the people there. When the people of Rome took away the civil power of the Pope, Louis Napoleon sent his army there to restore it to him. There is the doctrine of the consent of the governed ! But, Sir, that is not the system which we are discussing here; we are discussing the question of Amercan rights, upon which we are to base our action in revising the Constitution. I have been brought up in this old-fashioned doctrine respecting the American system, that government is instituted by the governed and for the use of the governed; and I have not yet learned that it is an erroneous doctrine. We were all equal in a state of nature; but when men came to be gathered together in communities, as the population increased and they were extended over a larger extent of territory, it became inconvenient for them to assemble in their primary capacity there to administer and make laws for themselves. What was the next step? When they could not matters connected with the administration of their go into their primary assemblies to arrange all the affairs, they then delegated power to form a Constitution. They delegated powers to their agents to institute the different branches of government. They thus insfituted the executive department, and the legislative department, and the judicial department of the government, and to each of these branches they delegated certain powers; and these powers are liable to be recalled whenever those who delegated them think proper to

[May 31st.

recall them. That is the old doctrine of the American system, as I understand it.

The question of the sovereignty of the people now comes up; and in whom does that sovereignty rest? The bare proposition that the sovereignty of the people does not rest in the majority, but that it rests in the minority, is and must be a contradiction in terms. I have always been taught to believe, and until this discussion came up I always did believe, that there was a principle as well as a rule involved; and that that was the great American principle, upon which all our governmental machinery is based. In fact, it is the great motive power that carries us along. Our ancestors adopted the principle; and having adopted it, what complaint has ever been made in reference to this matter until very lately? Let us take it as far as they extended it in the Constitution. I will say, in the first place, that we have nothing to do, in the consideration of the subject before us, with the election of members of congress; that is a matter which belongs to the legislature. They have exclusive control of the time, place and manner of the elections of members of congress; and if the people of this Commonwealth wished to take the direction of that matter, they could not do it. Then, I say, Sir, the people first delegated power; and what is the first machinery which they used in the delegation of this power? I will remark, that when I say "people" in this relation, I mean every living human being within the limits of the jurisdiction of government. In the first delegation of power, authority is given in trust to certain individuals who are to be electors for the whole people; all those who are not electors have delegated the power to act for them, to those who are electors, and this power is held in trust for all those who do not go to the polls. That is the first portion of the machinery of government; and what is the next? These electors represent the whole people, and they hold the power that is conferred upon them, in trust for the whole people; and they go to the ballot-box and endeavor to elect a governor, senators and representatives, to carry out the Constitution which has been made. Well, Sir, do they elect them? In most instances they have elected them. Has there ever been any complaint from the people because they did not make an election? Really, Sir, I have never heard any. Allow me to say here, for I may as well say it here as in any other place, that the Constitution of 1820 provided that the legislature should have power over all special matters in case the people were not satisfied, and could propose any amendments which they might find expedient; but has there been any dissatisfaction in relation to this matter? Who ever heard of there being any complaint or petitions presented to the legislature because the people had failed to make their elections? Who ever heard that they wanted any change in their organic law, which was manifested by a petition to the legislature or anything of the kind? If the legislature had had any reason to believe that the people were dissatisfied on account of a failure in making choice of their officers, or dissatisfied with the decision of the legislature in reference to these matters, they might certainly have sent their complaints to the legislature, and the legislature would have made a proposition to the people for an amendment of the Constitution in that respect, and thus introduce the plurality system. Has there ever been

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any such thing? Not at all. The matter comes here for the first time. But who are the officers to whom it is proposed to apply the plurality principle? All your municipal officers may be elected by the plurality system as the Constitution stands now. As I understand the Constitution, there is nothing there forbidding the legislature to enact a law whereby the whole of the municipal officers of the several towns and cities may be elected by the plurality rule. The members of congress you cannot reach if you want to; and the municipal officers and county officers can be reached without any amendment of the Constitution of this kind; and now what is it proposed to amend the Constitution for, unless you intend to reach judicial officers, who are now appointed by the governor ?

I confess, Sir, that upon re-examination of the Constitution, I cannot but admire the symmetry and beauty of that system which our fathers have bequeathed to us for our guide. What is that system? It is that a majority of the whole people shall, in the first instance, eid avor to elect a governor and lieutenant-governor. Suppose they fail to make an election, what is to be done next? Then it is the representatives of the people-not the representatives of these municipal corporations, but the representatives of the people -who are to make these elections. These districts for the elections of members of the House of Representatives are made and appointed for the purpose of convenience and nothing more. The representatives still remain the representatives of the Commonwealth; they legislate for the whole Commonwealth. The representatives of the city of Boston do not legislate for the city of Boston alone, but they legislate for the whole Commonwealth. There is no representative from any town who undertakes to legislate for that town, instead of legislating for the whole Commonwealth. Well, Sir, there is the beauty of the system. These small districts choose a representative for the whole people, because it is convenient; and it is nothing more than a mere matter of convenience. The districts are reduced in size, in order to be certain of their representation. The next step is that your House of Representatives, who represent the whole people, and who are the most numerous branch of the legislature, are rerequired to select two from the four highest candidates who have been balloted for, for the office of governor or lieutenant-governor, and send them to the Senate for an election. In doing this, the House, who are the delegated agents of the people through their electors, virtually say, "The people desire that one of these two men shall be Governor, and ask you to choose which of them it shall be." And what comes next?

Well, gentlemen will tell me, in the first place to fill up the Senate before you make the election of governor. And how are the senators chosen? By districts, and why? Because it is convenient to choose them by districts. But are the senators of those districts, when chosen, the representatives of those districts, or representatives of the people? Are they the senators of the people or of the district? They are the senators of the whole people, and the Constitution so calls them. They legislate for the people, but in a different chamber from the House of Representatives, and that is the reason why, when there is a vacancy in the Senate, it is required that a selection be made from those candidates who have the highest

number of votes in the districts where there have been no elections, amounting to twice the number of senators wanting, and that the senators be chosen from that number, in a joint convention of the Senate and House. Here you have the whole people, through their delegated authority, making choice of these senators, who, in fact, represent the people. It is nothing more or less than the action of the people throughout, from beginning to the end, and it is the action of the majority of the people, too. Such is the principle, such the theory, and such the fact.

Well, Sir, what next? Why, after the House send up to the Senate two candidates for governor, from the four highest, the senators make the selection. And how is it done? Why, the majority of the people, through a majority of the senators, say that such a man shall be governor, The people do it through a delegation of their power. It is the people who do it, just as much as if they decided it at the polls by an election there. Just as much precisely, and no more; and it is a majority of the people throughout, and ever has been.

Well, Sir, if this be so, and you have a judiciary, appointed in the manner in which it is now appointed, this resolution cannot apply, so far as a plurality principle is concerned, to any officers except those enumerated in the amendment. It can apply to no other, because, under the present Constitution you have the right to elect your municipal officers by a plurality vote. You have the right to elect all county officers by a plurality vote, only let the legislature will it. But, if you change the Constitution at all, the plurality system must apply to senators and representatives.

Now, Sir, as to the frequent town meetings which gentlemen have spoken of. You can have but one meeting in the year for the election of governor, under the Constitution. Do gentlemen want any less than that? Do they want a meeting only once in ten years, or would they have it annually?

How is it in reference to the election of senators? You can have only one meeting each year for that purpose. I have never heard any complaint about the Constitution, in this respect. If other gentlemen have, they have heard more than I have.

But, Sir, there have been some propositions maintained here, which struck my ear rather singularly, that is, in reference to the expense of these town meetings, and the consumption of time.

Why, Sir, these meetings are the schools

of the democracy. In former times, and before the days of the Revolution, and when that matter was in embryo, where did the people learn the principles of freedom? Was it not in these meetings? Was it not in Faneuil Hall that James Otis electrified the people in the doctrines of popular government?

And what impropriety is there in these frequent elections, if the people do meet together often and canvass the merits of the several candidates? As to their demoralizing influence, I never heard of it before.

Because a little spirit may be arous

ed, in the discussion of the various principles involved in the election, and of the merits of the various candidates for office, are these meetings thereby rendered demoralizing in their effect? The people go there to learn, and there they have the right to examine into the fitness or unfitness of the candidates for office.

[June 1st.

Mr. Chairman, I hope every part and parcel of the old Constitution may remain, unless it be in those parts which have worked evil in the community, and where the community demand a change, and properly demand it. For my own part, I fail to see the requisition or demand for a change in this case, so far as respects your execu tive and legislative branches of the government. I know of no demand for a change of the principle upon which the courts are established. If there is anything in the Constitution which requires an amendment, while I by no means would lay violent hands upon the Constitution, yet, I would not lay a trembling hand upon it, but would take care that it was amended in those respects. But, Sir, I do not deem this a matter in which the people have required an amendment.

Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell. I move that the Committee rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again. At this late hour, (six o'clock and fifteen minutes, P. M.,) it is evident that there is not time to take the question, even if the Committee were so disposed.

The question was then taken, and the motion was agreed to.

The Committee accordingly rose.

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the subject which has been so much debated here of late, and which is now the subject of consideration in Committee of the Whole. I mean the subject of elections by plurality of votes. An order was passed yesterday, on the motion of the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) that all debate on that question shall cease in Committee of the Whole at twelve o'clock to-day. I beg leave to say, that so far as I am concerned, I have no objection that the vote shall be then taken. I have been indulged in my fair share of debate certainly. I have no complaint to make on that score; and while I am always ready to hear other gentlemen, I have no desire to debate the question any further myself; but I apprehend, at least I am not clear, that when we have voted to stop debate in Committee of the Whole, it will not also preclude the offering of amendments. I understand the rule and the practice in congress to be, to stop debate in Committee of the Whole at a given time, but not to prohibit the offering of further amendments; and these amendments are adopted or voted down, as the case may be, without debate. I will inquire, therefore, whether the Chair gives that construction to the rule, that is, whether other amendments may be offered after the debate is terminated, or whether all further amendments will be precluded.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair understands that when the Convention orders debate to cease in Committee of the Whole, the amendments pending are to be disposed of, but it must be done without debate.

Mr. GRAY. May other amendments be moved.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair understands that others may be moved and voted upon without debate; the rule of congress gives to the mover the privilege of speaking for five minutes in support of his amendment, and any gentleman who gets the floor is allowed five minutes to speak in opposition to such amendment. The Convention has adopted no such rule, and, the danger is, that when amendments are adopted without any debate at all, they may be adopted without a proper understanding of them, and the Committee will thus preclude itself from giving the best consideration to the subject presented.

Mr. GRAY. I am anxious, Sir, for no other object than that the Committee may not be preeluded from doing that which they intended to do in substance, by any difficulty which may arise on points of order. It appears to me, and the opinion has been confirmed by the suggestion of the Chair, that it might be well to allow a little time for gentlemen to offer their amendments, and I am sure that the Convention would readily indulge gentlemen in a word or two of explanation. I think I am equally warranted in saying that there is no member of the Convention who would wish to trespass upon its indulgence, or take one moment more of time to consider the question than is strictly necessary. Now if it be in order to offer a resolution which I will read to the Convention, I will offer it, and I trust it will be adopted; but if it be not in order, I hope the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr.Butlef,) will consent to reconsider the vote fixing the time for taking the vote upon this question at twelve o'clock in order that my proposition may come within the rules of order. The proposition which I wish to offer is, that debate shall cease at half past eleven o'clock, and that amendments may then be pro

--

posed, which amendments shall be disposed of without further debate than a short explanation of such amendments.

The PRESIDENT. Before the question upon the proposition of the gentleman from Boston can be taken, it will be necessary that the vote ordering that debate in the Committee of the Whole upon the subject cease at twelve o'clock, be first reconsidered.

Mr. GRAY, of Boston. I do not differ with the Chair upon that point and I am perfectly willing to substitute the hour of twelve for half past eleven, or any other hour which the Convention may decide upon. I will move, therefore, a reconsideration of the vote of yesterday by which the Committee fixed the hour of twelve for the termination of the debate.

Mr. HILLARD, of Boston. It appears to me that the interval of half an hour is of very little consequence, and I hope the Convention will not reconsider its determination because many gentlemen no doubt have made arrangements to be here at twelve o'clock for the purpose of voting upon this question who would be disappointed were the vote to be taken at half past eleven. Under these circumstances, I think as half an hour only intervenes, that we had better adhere to the original resolution.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair understands the effect of the order to be simply this, that at the hour of twelve the debate must cease, but that any member of the Committee may have the privilege of offering amendments at and after that hour, which amendments, however, must be disposed of without debate. The order does not preclude the offering of amendments, but simply precludes debate after that hour.

Mr. GRAY. I had no intention to disappoint those gentlemen who may be in expectation that the vote will be taken at twelve o'clock, and am perfectly willing to substitute that hour. My desire was merely to make the rule conformable to the rule of congress, as I think it will facilitate the business of the Convention.

Mr. SARGENT, of Cambridge. I simply wish to inquire whether, if we adopt the order as proposed by the gentleman from Boston without reconsidering the other, it will not close the debate upon the present amendment at half-past eleven, and leave gentlemen half an hour to submit other amendments and debate them up to the hour of twelve, when the question is finally to be taken. If this is the case, I think there will be no conflict between the two orders. The only question in my mind is whether in case no further amendment should be offered after half-past eleven the question would nevertheless be taken at twelve o'clock.

The PRESIDENT. It is not quite within the province of the Chair to explain the effect of an order which is to take effect only in Committee of the Whole, but in the opinion of the Chair the course of the Committee will be this: At the hour appointed debate will cease, and if no other question be presented, the sense of the Committee will be taken on the main proposition. Amendments may be proposed after the hour named, but must be decided without debate. The Convention cannot stop debate before the hour named but by a reconsideration of the vote adopting the order.

Mr. GRAY. I am obliged to the Chair for the suggestion. Points of order are intricate ques

[June 1st.

tions and should be settled for the general convenience of the Convention. What I meant to imply by my proposition was that any gentleman might, after the general debate had ceased, offer an amendment but not debate it, and that what remarks were made would be by the indulgence of the Committee.

Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell. If I understand the suggestion of the Chair, it is this: that when the debate shall cease at twelve o'clock, it will still be in order to move amendments without debating them. That being so, I do not see any occasion for reconsidering the order on this subject already adopted. Let the debate stop at twelve o'clock and if any gentleman has an amendment to offer before that time, let him offer it if he can get the floor; if not he can offer it afterwards without debate. I am also opposed to a reconsideration for the reason that the action of the Committee of the Whole is not final in its character. We afterwards go into Convention when we can reject or adopt any amendment as we feel disposed.

Mr. GRAY. As I understand the Chair to decide that the order for closing debate as it stands at present does not preclude the offering of amendments, but only precludes debate upon them, I will withdraw my motion.

The motion was accordingly withdrawn.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair begs permission to make an explanation in reference to this subject. On a former sitting of the Convention, upon the motion submitted by the gentleman from Cambridge and by the general consent of the Convention, the Chair admitted a motion for the postponement of an order of assignment that a question might be taken at a particular hour. No objection was taken to this course at the time but upon reflection and reference to the proceedings of that body, from which the practice in this respect has been taken, the Chair thinks the motion to postpone the order of assignment is irregular. A motion to reconsider the vote making an assignment, in the opinion of the Chair, would be the proper motion. As the question may arise hereafter, the Chair wishes that it may be understood.

Mr. BUTLER, of Lowell. I now renew the motion that was made by the gentleman from Natick, (Mr. Wilson,) that the Convention proceed to the consideration of the Orders of the Day.

The motion was agreed to.

Oaths and Subscriptions.

The PRESIDENT stated the first subject in the Orders of the Day to be the resolves on the subject of oaths and subscriptions; the question being upon the final passage of the resolutions as amended. The question was taken and the resolutions were passed.

On motion of Mr. WILSON, of Natick, the Convention then resolved itself into

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE,

Mr. Sumner, for Marshfield, in the Chair, on the unfinished business, which was the Report and the resolves on the subject of elections by plurality, the question being on the adoption of the amendment offered by Mr. Walker, of North Brookfield.

Elections by Plurality.

Mr. HUBBARD, of Boston. Some days since,

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when the amendment of the gentleman from Plymouth, (Mr. Bates,) was under consideration, I gave notice of my intention to propose an amendment after that should be disposed of. A delegate on the lett of the Chair proposed an amendment to the amendment of the delerate from Plymouth, which the Chair ruled to be out of order, intimating at the same time that that amendment would be in order when the one then under consideration should be disposed of. Supposing that that amendment would come up immediately when the amendment of the gentleman from Plymouth should be disposed of, I did not then seek to obtain the floor. The consequence was, that the member from North Brookfield, (Mr. Walker,) obtained precedence of me and offered his amendment.

Mr. WALKER. I will withdraw the amendment which I offered.

It was accordingly withdrawn.

The question then recurred upon the adoption of the original resolution reported by the Committee.

The resolution was read, as follows:

Resolved. That it is expedient so to revise the Constitution that in all elections by the people of officers named in it, the person receiving the highest number of votes shall be deemed and declared to be elected.

A MEMBER. I would inquire whether there was not another amendment pending, of the gentleman from Lawrence, to the amendment of the gentleman from North Brookfield.

The CHAIR. The amendment of the gentleman from Lawrence was accepted by the gentleman from North Brookfield, and consequently made a part of his amendment.

Mr. HUBBARD, of Boston. I will now read the resolution which I propose to submit as a substitute for the resolution reported by the Committee. Strike out all after "Resolved," and insert as follows:

That it is expedient so to amend the Constitution as to provide that the persons respectively having the highest number of votes for Governor and Lieutenant-Governor shall be elected; but in ease two or more shall have an equal and the highest number of votes for Governor or Lieutenaut-Governor, the Senate and House of Representatives shall meet in convention and choose one of the said persons so having an equal and the highest number of votes for Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, and the person having the highest number of votes in the convention of the two Houses shall be elected.

Resolved, That it is expedient so to amend the Constitution as to provide that in the election of Senators, the person having the highest number of votes in each district shall be elected; but in case two or more shall have an equal and the highest number of votes in any district, the Senate and House of Representatives shall meet in convention and choose one of the persons so having an equal and the highest number of votes for Senator of said district, and the person having the highest number of votes in the convention of the two Houses shall be elected.

Mr. HUBBARD, of Boston. Mr. President, it will be perceived that the resolution I have proposed provides for three distinct officers recognized in the Constitution, and for these three officers, in regard to the election of whom so much difficulty has been experienced during the past few years, and at frequent former periods in the history of this Commonwealth.

My objection to the resolution proposed by the Committee is, that it is so uncertain as to what will be its practical o; er ition, that I, for one, am not prepared to vote for it. I wish to adhere to the majority principle in Massachusetts, as it has been understood m Massachusetts, and so far as the operation of that principle is practical and practicable. But where, by reason of change in the political condition of the Commonwealth, we find it impossible to carry out that principle in its practical and legitimate sen-e, I wish to get that system which, in my judgment, is the next best -that is, that the man that has the largest number of votes for any oflice shall be elected. I wish, when a substitute must be made for the majority principle, to take that course which practically is nearest to that principle.

Now, Sir, the resolution proposed by the Committee speaks of all officers named in the Constitution. I have taken the oppportunity of looking into the Constitution, for the purpose of seeing what officers are named therein, and I have found that there are some twenty different officers in all, and in regard to whose election, and the manner in which they shall be elected, the Constitution contains no provision-clerks of courts, sheriffs, coroners, registers of deeds, register of probate, selectmen of towns, &c.

Now, what is to be the practical operation of the principle introduced by the Committee? Are all these officers named in the Constitution to be elected by a plurality. Under the existing Constitution, a large number of these officers are appointed by the executive, others by the legislature, and still others by the courts. But, Sir, as the changes which may hereafter be made in regard to some of these officers, are not known, I prefer to wait until I see which of these officers are to be elected by the people, before we decide that a plurality system shall apply to them.

I suppose that, so far as there is any general agreement among members, in regard to any principle proposed by the Committee, they are probably more extensively agreed as to the three officers named by my resolution, than in regard to any other. If the Committee should adopt the amendment which I have proposed, it will be in order hereafter, if it is thought proper, to extend the principle to the House of Representatives, and to other officer's who may be specified in such proposed amendments, and whom it may be deemed expedient to bring within the operation of the rule. For one, I am not disposed to go further at the present time, than to apply the plurality principle in such cases only as the necessities of the case seem to require. When any other cases shall appear, in which this same necessity shall be found to exist, I shall be prepared to extend it to them also.

I have not arisen, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of discussing the merits of the question, but for the purpose of explaining the operation of the resolutions which I have had the honor to submit, in order that gentlemen, seeing the bearing of the subject, could act according to their own judgment. My attention has been called this moment by my colleague, (Mr. Gray,) to the fact that the resolution I have introduced introduces the plurality system. It provides, that from those who have the highest and an equal number of votes, the convention of House and Senate shall choose the governor, lieutenant-governor and senators. Now, Sir, it is not probable

[June 1st.

that it will often happen that any two will have an equal number of votes; but if that should happen, then the one who shall be elected will be elected by a ma'ority principle. If there should be three having an equal and the highest number of votes,—which is a remote probability,—then in the election from that three the plurality system would apply, and in no other case.

Mr. GRAY, of Boston. As my colleague has referred to something which I said to him, I de are to understand the exact meaning of his amendment. I understand it to be, that if there are two candidates before the legislature, because there is a tie in the popular vote, then, in the election by the legislature he requires a plurality of the votes cast, and not a plurality of the convention composed of the two Houses.

Mr. HUBBARD, A plurality of the votes cast, where there are only two candidates to be elected from, must be a majority of the whole. My colleague will admit that.

Mr. GRAY. Certainly.

can

Mr. HUBBARD. I do not go so far as to require a major part of the convention, but only that a plurality of the votes cast shall elect a ca didate; and if there are two, and only two, for whom the convention can vote, a plurality evidently must be a majority. But the plurality system, so termed, as distinguished from the majority, would apply only where there are three candidates having an equal and the highest number of votes; and if any of us expect that we, or our children's children for the next generation, will see such a contingency happen, it is necessary to make some provision to obviate that difficulty. But it is hardly within the range of probabilities, that such a state of things will ever happen; therefore, when the matter of election comes into the Convention of the two Houses, for all practical purposes, the majority rule operates.

Mr. CHURCHILL, of Milton. I do not propose to occupy more than five minutes of the time of the Convention at this late stage of the debate. I have listened attentively during the whole debate, and I do not find, in the first place, that it is contended by any body here on behalf of any system, that the majority rule is not a sound

and correct one.

If the plurality system is adopted, I do not see, from any arguments I have heard, how third or minority parties are to retain the rights and privileges which they have heretofore enjoyed in the Commonwealth.

As far as third and minority parties are concerned-I do not speak of those which exist at the present time only, but of such as may have an existence hereafter-the privileges, rights and liberties thus far enjoyed in this Commonwealth, will be abridged. Thus far we have had the right of voting for whom we pleased, and our votes have counted, whether we belonged to the dominant party or to the weakest party.

But adopt this principle and you virtually disfranchise third parties hereafter in this Commonwealth; because if you take away the effect of the vote of third parties, you might as well take away the vote itself.

If coalitions tend to corruption, then you force it upon third parties, for they must be forced into the ranks of the dominant parties in order to give effect to their votes, or they must cease to exist as third parties.

I believe it is the duty of all true governments