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Every town of less than one thousand inhabitants, may elect one representative every other year; one-half of such towns to elect representatives one year, and the other half on the following year. Or any two or more towns of less than one thousand inhabitants respectively, by consent of a majority of the legal voters present at a legal meeting in each of said towns respectively, called for that purpose, and held previous to the first of July in the year in which the decennial census of the State shall be taken, may form themselves into a Representative District, to continue until the next decennial census of the State, for the election of one representative; and such districts shall have all the rights, in regard to representation, which would belong to a town containing one thousand inhabitants. Every town containing one thousand inhabitants may elect one representative. Every town containing four thousand may elect two representatives; and four thousand inhabitants shall be the number which shall entitle it to an additional representative.

Resolved, That the mayor and aldermen of every city in the Commonwealth, shall, as soon as may be, after the Senate shall have apportioned the number of representatives which each city or town is entitled to elect, divide said city into Representative Districts, as near as may be of an equal number of inhabitants, and consisting of convenient and contiguous territory; and shall cause to be filed in the offices of the Secretary of State, and clerks of their respective cities, a description of such Representative Districts, specifying the number of the population thereof, respectively, according to the last preceding enumeration: provided, however, that every city, containing one hundred thousand inhabitants, or less, shall have at least four Representative Districts; and every city containing more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, shall have at least eight Representative Districts; and the mayor and aldermen of said city shall also apportion the number of representatives which said city is entitled to elect, as equally as may be, among the several Representative Districts; and the inhabitants of each Representative District, so formed, shall elect as many representatives as said district is entitled to

elect.

On motion of Mr. BRIGGS, of Pittsfield, the Convention resolved itself into

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Upon the subject of the

Basis of Representation.

The question was upon the amendment offered by the member from Boston, (Mr. Hale,) namely, to substitute the Report of the Minority for the Majority Report.

Mr. SARGENT, of Cambridge. It has been said, Mr. Chairman, and very truly, that this is not only the most important, but the most difficult subject that will be presented to this Committee, or to this Convention, for their consideration. It has been found to be surrounded with difficulties whenever it has been considered by any body of men, since the adoption of the first Constitution. But, Sir, I do not consider it a subject so surrounded with difficulties that we cannot, if we will unite our best energies and talents to produce that result, resolve it into a system corresponding with the principles of our government, and divest it of much of the difficulty which has heretofore surrounded it.

In the remarks which I propose to make at this time, I do not intend to go into any labored argument upon the principles of government, or to answer in detail the arguments presented so ably, yesterday, by the chairman of the Committee which made this Report.

I have deemed it of the utmost importance that before the discussion of this question had proceeded too far, that the attention of the Convention should be drawn particularly to consider the provisions now existing in the Constitution, to examine their practical details, and to ascertain, if possible, what the difficulties are which arise under that system, and what shall be the proper remedy to remove those difficulties.

The present system was adopted upon mathematical principles. For instance, the framers of this Constitution made 1,200 inhabitants the number which should entitle a town to one representative; they made 2,400, twice that number, the mean increasing ratio. You then have a fraction running from 1 to 2,100, which, mathematically considered, was equal to one-half the number, or 1,200. If, then, you add to 1,200, the number established as the basis, half the increasing ratio, you will have 2,400 as entitling to one representative. You then start with 3,600, the number necessary for an additional representative, and if you add to that number again 1,200, half the increasing ratio, it gives 4,500 for two representatives. For the third you start with 6,000 and adding 1,200, half the increasing ratio, you have 7,200, or three times 2,100, for three representatives; and thus you proceed, with the same ratio, no matter what the number of representatives to which a town shall be entitled. The fractional towns were given an annual representation for 1,600, the divisor being 160, giving ten years representation on 1,600.

The principle, when it was established, was supposed to give a representative for every 2,400 inhabitants in all towns having 1,200 or more, and one for every 1,600 in the towns having less than that number.

We are now called upon to adopt a system which shall furnish a more equal representation of the people. Well, Sir, let us look and see what the evils complained of under the present system are. First, it is alleged that a portion of the people are deprived of an annual representation. This is not true, constitutionally, because the Constitution provides that the citizens of every town in this Commonwealth may have an annual representation, if they shall see fit to make the necessary arrangements to obtain it. But practically, it is true, for a portion of the people have only a fractional representation. Practically, then, under this system, this is a complaint which is to be met.

Another evil is that one portion of the people vote for only one representative in a year, or one in several years, while another portion vote for many representatives every year. This is true,

and I hold it to be an evil, though not so great, perhaps, as some others.

Again, it is contended that the majority of the people living in large towns and cities have only a partial representation,-that the representation is unequal. That, I presume, every member of the Committee will admit.

Again, it is contended that the power is taken from the many and placed in the hands of the few by the same process.

Fifth, the number of representatives is too large and should be diminished.

To meet these difficulties and defects is the duty which is presented to us here; and to remove them by the decision which we shall make. Do they then all exist? Let us look at the sys

[June 15th.

tem for a moment in order to ascertain the fact. Let us consider it in reference to counties.

The following table will show the apportionment of representation to the several Counties under the present system :—

Counties.

Suffolk, Essex,.

145,7 46 4-10 or 1 for 3,140 55 7-10 9 3-10 127,700 44 7 10 ** 1 ** 2,544 43 6 10 4 1-10 Middlesex,. 155,726 58 4-10" 1" 2,667 59 6 10 1 3-10 Worcester,. 126,565 55 6-10 * 1 * 2,276 434-10 172-10 Hampshire, Hampden, . Franklin, 30,88% 16 2-10 " 1" 1,907 11 8-10. Berkshire, . 48,933 21 9-10 " 1 2,234 1× 7-10 Norfolk, 77,441 28 ** 1 ** 2,765 7 6-10, Bristol, 74,979 26 5-10" 1" 2,864 29 6-1921-10 Plymouth,. 54,509 21 4-10" 1" 2,672 20 8-10 Barnstable, 33,997 13 3-10 " 1 ** 2,556 13 Dukes, 4,416 24-10" 1" 1,840 17-10 Nantucket,.1 8,779 3 "1" 2,925 3 3-10

34,290 15 6-10 ** 1" 2,198 '13 1-10 50,224 19 3-10" 1" 2,602 19 2-10

25-10

1-10

Disregarding the fractions, we thus find that, by the apportionment of 1850, six counties in the Commonwealth, to wit: Hampden, Norfolk, Plymouth, Barnstable, Dukes, and Nantucket, have each their equal proportion of representation, according to their population. Suffolk loses nine, Essex loses four, Middlesex loses one, and Bristol two; total sixteen. Worcester has seven more than her proportion, Hampshire two, Franklin four, and Berkshire three; total, sixteen.

Thus, you perceive, looking at this matter in reference to counties, that the simple change of sixteen representatives, out of three hundred and seventy-two, from four of the counties of the Commonwealth, to four others, would leave your representation, as far as counties are concerned, perfectly equal.

I find again, from an examination of this system as it relates to different classes of towns, that it is as equal to-day, as it was when it was proposed in 1820, or as it was when it was adopted in 1840. I find that in 1820, there were one hundred and twenty-eight fractional towns. These towns were then entitled to elect a representative for every 1,632 inhabitants. There were one hundred and six towns, with a population varying from twelve hundred to twenty-four hundred, which were entitled to elect one representative for every 1,646 inhabitants; being a difference of only fourteen. In the larger towns it required about one-third more. I find that the same classes of towns were relatively nearly in the same position, when the Constitution was amended by the adoption of the present provision in 1840.

We have now one hundred and thirty-nine fractional towns, entitled to one representative for every 2,206 inhabitants, and one hundred and seventeen towns, with a population varying from 1,560-the number now required to entitle a town to one representative-to 3,120, entitled to elect a representative for over 3,234 inhabitants, being a difference of only twenty-six, and in the larger towns, forty per cent. more of population is required to elect a representative.

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This comparison shows that the system is nearly as equal now in its operation as it regards these different classes of towns, as it was when first proposed by the Convention of 1820, or when it was adopted in 1840. From what source then arises the great inequality which we see exists in its practical operation? It arises mainly from two causes: first, from the fact, that the smaller towns had awarded to them, under this provision of the Constitution, a power one-third greater than was awarded to the larger towns; and, secondly, and mainly, from the fact that the fractional towns have not united into districts sufficient to elect one annual representative. If your fractional towns were now united into districts, they would form some fifty or sixty districts, and your House of Representatives would be reduced to about three hundred and fifty members, and the inequality which now exists would be greatly reduced. Yet, that would not obviate the difficulty which is inherent in the system itself. It would still leave the power in the hands of the minority, though a minority much larger than that which now exists. But, instead of uniting and sending some fifty or sixty representatives annually, those one hundred and thirty-nine towns have the right to send, for two years, one hundred and thirty-nine representatives; the third year, one hundred and thirtyfour; the fourth year, one hundred and twentyfour; the fifth year, ninety-eight, thus gradually reducing the number, but still keeping the power for the first six or seven years in that branch of the government, in the hands of the minority of the people, who reside in the small towns, and then sliding gradually over, and placing it for the last two years in the hands of a minority of the people residing in the large towns. And thus, for only one or two years, do the majority of the people of this Commonwealth exercise the controlling influence in this branch of your lawmaking power.

Can we then fully and satisfactorily remedy all these evils, without resorting to some other system. I think not, for if you classify your fractional towns, you will still have the power residing in the minority of the people, and if you reduce your mean increasing ratio sufficiently to guard against that evil, you will have then a House of five or six hundred, and while you are thus remedying one evil, you are at the same time increasing the other. I have no doubt that the present system, by a classification of the small towns, is as perfect a system as can be adopted, retaining in any considerable degree town representation without increasing the number of representatives. If you wish to retain town representation and restore the power of legislation where it belongs, you must then have a House nearly double what you now have. Let us look now to the principles of the government, for I hold that this is the body which is to decide upon the principles which are to govern us in our action. Our frame of government is based upon the idea that power is vested in the people, and is only delegated to their representatives as their agents, and therefore, if we are to preserve and adhere to this principle, we must adopt a system embracing it. If we would retain in our frame of government the principles of popular representation based upon the rights of the people, we must so frame our organic law that the majority of the people shall at all times have the power of

exercising a controlling influence in this branch, as well as in every other branch of the government. This, I hold to be the true theory of a republican government, and this should be the basis of our organic law, with such provisions as are rendered necessary to meet those cases of emergency which have often arisen, and which will continue to arise under the practical operation of our system of government. Two systems have been presented for your consideration by the Committee. I shall ask your attention first to the system presented by the majority. What is that system? It is a system which abandons all our preconceived opinions of the right of the people, of the principles of self-government, of popular representation, and adopts in its stead a system of mere corporate representation. I say, mere corporate representation, because, I hold, that when we look at the practical operations of this system, it will result in the representation of corporations instead of the people. The question for us now to decide, is, whether the right of representation is a popular right or a corporate right? That is the question which we ought first to decide, and here let me call the attention of the Committee to a provision of the Bill of Rights, which reads as follows:

"All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with authority, whether legislative, executive or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them."

I would ask my friend, the chairman of the Committee who reported this plan, does he propose to strike that provision out of the Bill of Rights? If he does not, we must stand upon it, under whatever system we propose to adopt. I will also call the attention of the Committee to a provision of the Constitution which is as follows: "There shall be, in the Legi-lature of this Commonwealth, a representation of the people annually elected, and founded upon principles of equality." Do gentlemen propose to strike that provision from the Constitution? If they do not, then whatever system we adopt, must be a system carrying out the provisions of that article in the Constitution. Let us look at the system proposed by the majority of the Committee, and see whether that system carries out the principles ingrafted into the Bill of Rights, or the Constitution to which I have referred, and also, whether it removes the difficulties which we have been called upon to remove from the present system. The system proposed by the majority of the Committee, will give a House of four hundred members, or one for a population of two thousand four hundred and thirty-four. The following table will show how representation will be apportioned to the several counties: [See next column.]

Let us now make a comparison between the several counties, and test the equality of this system by that method. I will ask pardon of my friend for Erving, (Mr. Griswold, of Franklin,) the chairman of the Committee, if I commence with that county. I find that county to be the meridian of this system, from which we are to calculate both our longitude and latitude. Franklin County has a population of 30,888, and under this system she is to have twenty-six representatives. She would be entitled to twelve, as her

[June 15th.

Bristol

proportion of four hundred members. County has 71,979, nearly twice and a half the number of population that Franklin County has, and she gets twenty-six representatives also, just the same number. Barnstable County, with a little more than 3,000 people more than Franklin County has, gets thirteen representatives, just half the number. Berkshire County, with a thousand less than Hampden County, gets thirty-three representatives, while Hampden gets twentythree, being nearly 50 per cent. more. Middlesex County, also, is fortunate under the present system. My friend for Erving, has been kind enough to give her as many, into one, as under the present system. Worcester County, with 30,000 less population than Suffolk County, gets just as many again. Let us look at this matter a little more closely, because I like to look things directly in the face. Suppose Franklin and Barnstable Counties constituted the Commonwealth, and they were about to adopt a Constitution, and when they assembled to draft its provisions Franklin should say to Barnstable, "I know you have 3,000 more population than we have, but then we must have twice as many representatives as you have." I ask you if such a proposition would be submitted to, or would be made under any circumstances. Suppose Franklin and Bristol comprehend the Commonwealth, and they were framing a Constitution. Bristol County, having twice and a half as much population as Franklin, under this system would have just as many representatives as Franklin, do you suppose the citizens of Bristol would listen to such a proposition? And, Sir, what difference does it make whether you apply this principle to the whole State, or portions of the State? If it is unjust in the one case, is it not equally unjust in the other? Let us take another view of this system, for it is capable of having a great many changes rung upon it. The five western counties of Worcester, Hampden, Franklin, Hampshire and Berkshire, with a population of 290,907, will have one hundred and sixty-eight representatives, or one for every 1,721 inhabitants, and the balance of the State, with a population of 682,808, will have one for every 2,943. Those five counties would have 70 per cent. more, in proportion, than the balance of the State. If you take out Hampden County, which has only three more than her proportion, the other four counties would have 74 per cent. more

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representatives than the rest of the State. Such is the illustration of this beautiful system by counties. Let us bring it down a little closer in its application to towns. I find there are two hundred and one towns, which, by the census of 1850, contain 253,042 inhabitants, a little less than one-third of the population of the State. They will be entitled to elect two hundred and one representatives, while the balance of the State, with a population of 720,673, will be entitled to elect one hundred and ninety-nine. I find, also, that there are one hundred and forty towns in the Commonwealth that have a population of 138,809, and that Boston has a population of 138,788, only 21 difference. Boston gets twenty-eight representatives, and these towns get one hundred and forty, or five to one. There was another system presented here, by the gentleman from Worcester, which I will just notice in passing, because it was a system more unequal than the one presented by the Committee. That would give Boston nineteen, while these towns, with the same population, would have one hundred and forty. Boston would have one in eight.

But to proceed. Let us see how this system operates in different towns in the same county. For instance, take Middlesex County. Waltham has a population of 4, 183, and she will be entitled to one representative. There are seven other towns in the county, whose population combined, is twenty-seven less than that of Waltham, and they will be entitled to send seven representatives annually. Lowell will be entitled to send one representative for 4,661 inhabitants, but these towns will send seven for 4,456, being a population of 205 less than is required to elect one in Lowell. Let us look at Worcester County. Blackstone has a population of 4,122. There are five other towns whose aggregate population is only 4,085, being 337 less than that of Blackstone, and they are entitled to send five representatives and exercise five times the legislative power that the town of Blackstone will exercise. Take the case of Hampshire County. Northampton has a population of 5,191. There are seven other towns in that county that have, in the aggregate, a population of 4,926, 168 less than that of Northampton, and they will be entitled to seven representatives.

These facts show the practical operation of this system thus far, and its effect under the census of 1850. We are adopting a Constitution, in the language of the chairman of the Committee, not for to-day, not for the present year, but for generations to come, and we are, therefore, when we are about to ingraft into the Constitution any great fundamental principle like this, to look forward, and see what its effects are to be hereafter. I hold in my hand a document prepared by the late Secretary of State, Mr. Walker, in which he gives us an estimate of the population for 1860 and 1870. Mr. Walker estimates the population of the State in 1870, to be 2,006,161. If you do not increase the number of your towns, you will then have, as you now have, seventy-nine representatives to be apportioned upon the population. Having three hundred and twenty-one towns in 1850, leaves only seventy-nine of your representatives to be apportioned upon the population. There will be twenty-six towns entitled to elect more than one representative. There will then be two hundred and one towns, with a

population of only 318,279, less than one-sixth of the population of the State, and they will be entitled to elect two hundred and one representatives, giving them a clear majority of two in this branch of the legislature.

That is, 318,279 of the population will elect two hundred and one, and 1,687,835, will elect one hundred and ninety-nine. But, Sir, the evils of this system rest not here. We are every year incorporating new towns. I find that since 1840 we have incorporated twenty-two; and since and including 1850, we have incorporated twelve. Now, if we proceed at the same rate, incorporating three towns every year, in 1877, only twenty-four years hence, you will have incorporated eighty-one new towns, and you will have in the whole, four hundred and two towns, being two towns more than you will have representatives to supply; and I suppose that in order to e qualize it, Hull and Boston will be struck off. But, that I may not be charged with taking an extravagant view of this subject, let us suppose that we incorporate only two towns every year, and that is very nearly the average number for the last thirteen years; and I think that in view of the important changes that are going on in the State, by the building up of manufacturing villages, and by the use of railroads, every gentleman will admit that this system of incorporating towns will increase rather than diminish. Then I say, let us take that view of the subject, and in 1870 you will have incorporated forty towns, and you will have thirty-nine representatives to be apportioned upon population. There will then be thirteen cities and towns entitled to more than one, which will have a population as follows:

If there are no new towns incorporated in the county of Franklin-and that depends, I suppose, altogether upon the question whether the tunnel succeeds or not-Franklin will have at that period her twenty-six representatives, and she will have a population of 38,977. Chelsea, with a population of 48,900, will have three. Lowell, with a population of 78,000, twice as large as that of Franklin County, will have four. Worcester, with a population of 81,000, more than twice as large, will have four. Berkshire, with a population of 79,000, will have thirty-four, and Lowell, with a population of 78,000, will have four. Roxbury, with a population of 88,000, being 9,000 more than Berkshire County, will have five. Newton, with a population of 13,824, will have one, and Boxborough, with a population of 342, will have one. Ware, with a population of 11,947, will have one, and Goshen, with a population of 227, will have one. Springfield, with a population of 12,020, and Tolland, with 551, will each have one. Adams, with a population of 16,681, will have one, and New

[June 15th.

Ashford, with 178, will have one. Danvers, with a population of 19,098, will have one, and Rowley, with 951, will have one. Fitchburg, with a population of 19,048, and Phillipston, with 686, will each have one. Danvers and Fitchburg with an aggregate population of 38,146, will have two, and Franklin County, with a population of 38,937, will have twenty-six.

But, Sir, it may be asked, why I continue to hold Franklin County up to view in this comparison. It is because of the exorbitant proportion of power which she claims. She is not satisfied with her true proportion; not with twice her proportion, but she claims more than that. Sir, Franklin County is the most prominent feature in the picture; it stands out in bold relief upon the canvas, leaving everything else in perspective. It is the first object that meets the eye when you approach, and it is the last upon which it lingers as you recede. [Laughter.] Thus we see by this most favorable view of this system presented by the majority of the Committee, that if you incorporate but two towns in a year, in thirty-seven years from this time your system of popular representation will be entirely subverted by a system which, to say the least, contains no more of the elements of popular rights or republican principles than those of the rotten borough system of England.

Sir, I would ask the attention of the Committee to an extract or two from a speech made by the gentleman for Wilbraham, the other day, in the sentiments of which I heartily concur.

He says "Is there any principle in republican government except that a majority shall govern? The moment you depart from that principle and place the government in the hands of one less than a majority, you have no republican govern ment."

And, again, in reply to the gentleman from Pittsfield, (Mr. Briggs,) he says:

"Do I understand that gentleman to say that the people anywhere have a right to prescribe that a minority shall rule? If that be so, I take issue on that point. That is not republican doctrine. I say, Sir, that the people never have a right in any capacity-organic, legislative or social-to undertake to prescribe that less than a majority shall govern. The moment you give a minority the right to govern, you take away the right of the people to make and institute government, which must alone emanate from the majority. Hence, if the people anywhere have made laws which exclude others from the participation in government affairs, whether by qualifications of voters or otherwise, it puts the voting power into the hands of a minority of the people; and the moment they adopt that course, revolution is justiliable-peaceable or physical, 1 care not which."

Now, Sir, I ask what do you propose to do if you adopt the Report of the majority of the Committee. Why, Sir, you propose not only to take the power from the hands of the majority, by an express provision of your organic law, and place it in the hands of the minority, but, Sir, you propose to place it in the hands of a mere fraction of that minority. I ask, Sir, if the argument of the gentleman for Wilbraham, which I have just quoted be correct, if such a step would not “justify a revolution, peaceable or physical?"

Sir, have they removed the evils of which we complain? First, have they given to every citizen a representative? This they have done. Have they equalized the representation, and furnished

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a system such as the people demand, based upon equality? Certainly not. They have increased the inequality a thousand fold. Have they restored the power to the hands of the majority? Far from it, Sir. For at that time it will rest in at least one-eighth of the population of the State. Have they given to every citizen in the State the right to vote for an equal number? This they have done, most unquestionably. For it makes no difference at this period of time, under this system, whether the elector resides in a porate town of ten inhabitants, or a million; every man will vote for one representative and no

more.

cor

Mr. Chairman, we have had a great deal of discussion, for the last few days, upon the right of suffrage, and we have been told here that it was a right dear to the people-a right that should be sacredly guarded to every inhabitant of the Commonwealth. Well, now I ask, Mr. Chairman, of what value is the right of suffrage, when you say to one hundred men residing in one town, you may elect one representative; and to ten thousand men in another, you shall elect only one representative, and have an equal voice with the other town? Sir, the value of the right of suffrage rests, not in going to the polls and depositing in the ballot-box a piece of paper, but it is in the influence which every citizen thereby exercises in the law-making power of the government. You give to every man an equal right to vote; but the moment you say that the vote of every man shall not bear an equal weight in its influence upon the government of the country, you take away the whole value of that right. Why, Sir, what would be said, suppose you provided that one hundred voters in a certain town having just so many voters, should elect one representative; and then you provide that in another town, which has ten thousand voters, only one hundred of those ten thousand should vote for a representative. Sir, you have arrived at precisely the same point in either case. voice of the ten thousand voting is only equal to the voice of the one hundred voting.

The

Well, Sir, the minority of the Committeefeeling that they could not agree to a system which to them was a subversion of the Constitution, and believing that when we were called upon to devise a more equal system of representation, that there was meaning in the declaration of the people that they wished a more equal system of representation - felt called upon to devise, if possible, a system which should wipe out, if not all, at least as many of the evils of the present system as possible, and retain in it the principles laid down in the Bill of Rights, and in the Constitution. The system proposed by the minority of the Committec-and which is now upon your table as an amendment to the Report of the majority-provides that each senatorial district shall be divided into two representative districts, as nearly equal as can be conveniently done. Well, it so happens, Mr. Chairman, that by the census of 1850 there was no town living under a town organization in the Commonwealth, that had, at that period, more than half the requsite number of population to constitute a senatorial district. Therefore your representative districts, by this plan, can be formed very nearly equal, without dividing a town in the Commonwealth, and this the Committee regarded as of great importance. The chairman of the

Committee has stated very fully and very clearly the importance of retaining town organizations. We propose to retain them, Sir; we propose to retain every town organization in the Commonwealth, and to leave it to discharge all its corporate rights precisely as it will under the system which the gentleman presents, save that of electing representatives. And, Sir, I submit here that that has never been a corporate right, and that the right of representation has always been based upon the people; and the election of representatives by the towns has been a method by which to carry out the principle of popular representation.

It has never been a right; and I think the chairman of the Committee will find, if he will turn to the acts of incorporation, incorporating the towns in this Commonwealth, that there is not a single provision in any charter, conferring such a right; but that he will find in many of them a provision denying that right. It has never been a town right as a corporate right. The gentleman referred back to the laws of the colony; but unfortunately the very laws which he read prove conclusively that even then it was not a corporate right, for they provided for the election of one representative in some towns and two in others, showing clearly that it was based upon population, and not upon corporate right.

The gentleman referred to the Constitution of 1780 to establish his position, that it was a corporate right laid down under the Constitution of 1780, and that it was the system adopted and practised up to 1837. Sir, if the gentleman had read one sentence more in that Constitution, he would have found that it did not sustain his position at all.

It is provided in the Constitution of 1780, as follows:

“And in order to provide for a representation of the citizens of this Commonwealth, founded upon the principle of equality, every corporate town, containing one hundred and fifty ratable polls, may elect one representative; every corporate town, containing three hundred and seventyfive ratable polls, may elect two representatives; every corporate town, containing six hundred ratable polls, may elect three representatives; and proceeding in that manner, making two hundred and twenty-five ratable polls the mean increasing number for every additional representative.

"Provided, nevertheless, that each town now incorporated, not having one hundred and fifty ratable pells, may elect one representative; but

place shall hereafter be incorporated, with the privilege of electing a representative, unless there are within the same one hundred and fifty ratable polls."

This decides clearly that the right of representation was not vested in the towns as a corporate right, but that it was vested in the people as a popular right; and the town organization was made use of as a method best adapted to carry out these principles. Well, Sir, the Committee who presented that Constitution to the people felt it necessary to explain the reason why they went so far as they did in admitting towns, already incorporated, that had not one hundred and fifty ratable polls, to elect a representative. And they say, after speaking of the system which they had presented :

"We have, however, digressed from this rule in admitting the small towns now incorporated to

[June 15th.

send members. There are but a few of them which will not, from their continual increase, be able to send one upon the above plan in a very little time. And the few who will never probably have that number have been heretofore in the exercise of this privilege, and will now be very unwilling to relinquish it."

You see, Mr. Chairman, they say the exercise of this privilege, not this right; and they felt it necessary, in order to induce the people to adopt the Constitution, to explain the reasons why they ingrafted that provision into the Constitution. And we must understand that up to that time they were living without any constitution of government; they had framed one constitution and presented it to the people, and it was rejected; and it was necessary to make some concessions to be able to get any constitutional frame of government. The gentleman for Erving says this was the principle, down to 1837.

I will ask that gentleman how town representation and corporate right could have existed under that Constitution, when there is an express provision that no town hereafter incorporated should have any portion of that representation-not even a fractional representation,-until she had the requisite number to entitle her to an annual representation. I very well know that some towns were classified in this Commonwealth before the year 1837. But, Sir, I will pursue the investigation of the Report of the majority of the Committee no farther.

Sir, let us now look at the plan presented by the minority of the Committee and see what provisions are embraced in that.

It provides for dividing each of your forty senatorial districts which you propose to establish into two representative districts as nearly equal in population as can be conveniently done, and that the inhabitants of each of those districts shall elect three representatives. Well, Sir, what will be the practical results of this system?

1st. It will give to every portion of the people of this Commonwealth the right of annual representation.

2d. It will give to every voter of the State the right to vote for an equal number of representatives.

3d. It gives an equal representation and restores the power into the hands of a majority of the people where that power originally belonged.

4th. It will reduce the number of representatives.

And, Sir, were not these the evils most loudly complained of? Sir, let us refer to those complaints again.

1st. A portion of the people are deprived of an annual representation.

This system will remove that evil.

2d. A portion of the people vote for one representative a year or one in several years, and another portion for many annually.

This system will remove that difficulty. 3d. That another portion of the people living in large towns have only a partial representation at any time.

It will remedy that evil.

4th. The number of representatives is too large. It will remove that evil, for it proposes to reduce the number to two hundred and forty, and even if you give one more to each district, you would then have only three hundred and twenty, which would be a large reduction from your present

Wednesday,]

number, and the number will be fixed and definite and will not be affected by any future increase of population.

While this system adheres strictly to the principles of popular rights, and of the Constitution, it removes all difficulties complained of more completely than any other method that can be devised, and if there should be thought to be other evils which this does not obviate, I think they are rather imaginary than otherwise.

And, Sir, what are the objections which are brought against this system.

It was said yesterday by my friend for Erving, that towns knew the character of their own men better than the character of men of other towns, that they would make better selections, and that they would more readily obey and support the laws of the land made under such a sytem, than they would if made under the system of districts. Now I ask that gentleman if he thinks that is a serious objection to the plan proposed by the minority. I ask that gentleman if the citizens of Erving would object to occasionally voting for a representative who was not a resident of the town of Erving. I ask another gentleman of the Committee, in favor of this Report of the majority, who represents Montague, (Mr. Alvord,) if he supposes the citizens of Montague would consider that an insuperable objection, and that they would be less willing to obey the laws, if made by a citizen representing them who resided in another town, than they would if made by a citizen residing in their own town. Sir, if that be the case, I fear that the confidence of the people in the doings of this Convention will be very much shaken. Either the history of this Convention proves that there is no force in that argument, or it proves that the people will have very little confidence in what we may do here, because a portion of the members of this Convention are thus elected.

But, Sir, the chairman of the Committee has another objection. It takes from towns one of their dearest rights, and thereby endangers the liberties of the people. Sir, that gentleman, after having portrayed to us in characters of living light the benefits which had resulted from our system of town corporations and corporate representations; after having attempted to convince us that Massachusetts was indebted to these little local democracies for all her glory and prosperity; and, Sir, after having paid the highest eulogiums to your little town democracies, and declaring that upon their preservation, and upon their preservation alone, rests the safety of the liberties of the people, he suddenly soared into the fields of fancy and exclaimed, "What constitutes the glory of a State?" Sir, what do you suppose I expected would be the answer? Corporate representation; your little corporate democracies, scattered all over the Commonwealth. But, alas, for the gentleman's argument he replied-" Men, highminded men, men who know their rights, and knowing, dare maintain them." Did it never occur to that gentleman, when pondering over this system, which proposes to take from three-quarters of the people of this Commonwealth their political rights and give to the other quarter the absolute control of one branch of the government; that if this Convention, controlled as it is by the representatives of that minority, should agree to that proposition and that by any appliances which may be brought to bear upon the people,

it should be adopted by them and be ingrafted into the Constitution, I say did it never occur to that gentleman that when its injustice should be fully realized, that the day might not be far distant, when he would find in that majority of the people of Massachusetts, whose rights had thus been wrested from them, that "glory of a State," “Men, high-minded men, men who know their rights, and knowing dare maintain them."

But, Sir, I do not believe that there is in this Convention, any disposition to grasp power by the mere force of numbers, by the adoption of such a plan as that. I believe they will decide upon that plan which is the most judicious; and I am confident that the plan which we have proposed will remove more evils than any other which can be devised. I am confident also that if adopted by this Convention, it will be sanctioned and sustained by the people; and the evils of which we have so long complained being removed, we shall not soon be called upon for a revision of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.

Mr. GRAY, of Boston. Mr. Chairman, it was not my intention, nor my expectation, to have addressed the Convention at this time. Before rising, I waited until the last moment to see if any other gentleman desired to obtain the floor; and the remarks which I may make will, perhaps, be of a somewhat desultory character. I am happy to say that much which I might have said has been anticipated by the gentlemen who have preceded me, especially the gentleman from Middleborough, (Mr. Wood,) who spoke this morning. The subject admits of being presented in a great variety of views; it turns upon figures in a very great degree; for to figures and facts, perhaps, more than to argument-certainly more than to declamation-must we resort if we wish to arrive at an intelligent and just result. My friend for Erving observed, and I admit it, that whether this is unequal or not depends upon the manner in which we set out. If we set out upon a corporate basis exclusively, assuredly it is not unequal; for a system which operates very unequally, if considered as to population, would be equal if the principle that representation is to be based entirely upon the towns. Or we might take another basis, and assume that representation should be based upon extent of territory. It is said, that "the earth endureth forever," and some theorists have asserted that all power should be based upon land. If we base it upon the number of square miles in a township, the sequence would be that Newburyport would have scarcely any more power than that which has hitherto been assigned to Hull; for I believe that it is the smallest municipal corporation in the Commonwealth. One argument appears to me to be about a fair offset to the other, except for the gentleman's historical argument if it were well founded. How is that? He stated that the Constitution of 1780 established a corporate basis. If I may be pardoned a repetition,— for much that I say may be a mere repetition,that established a corporate basis, but it also established a popular basis. I think my friend from Cambridge has proved that the power of being represented was in no degree in fact, and was considered in no degree essential to a corporation. But, Sir, to state the argument as favorably as possible for the gentleman for Erving, what principle was mingled with that principle

[June 15th.

of corporation? Not exactly the principle of population, but still a popular principle, approximating, in a great degree, to population. Is there anything more than a simple statement of fact necessary to show gentlemen that they are going ahead too fast? If they consider it a pure corporate representation, it must have been brought here first from England, while we were provinces; and although I do not admit that it was even a republican, a just, or a democratic principle, to give the word democracy a meaning which belongs to it both from etymology and practice, I say it was less unequal in those times, because the towns were more equal in fact. But the moment we were emancipated, we set out upon a basis in a great degree popular, though not perfectly so; and, Sir, I think that there would have been a popular basis then, but that the great and wise men of those times, who, however, saw not all things, looked to a practice which then existed as a means of checking the members of the House. They saw that, with as much respect as they paid to this principle of equality, and which, Sir, I undertake to say, they would have revolted at the idea of not paying, the House would be too large; and what was their expectation of a check in that respect? Why, Sir, that the towns, as the practice had been, would pay their own representative; and so it stood for forty years, and the towns did pay their representatives. But they were not considered quite as sovereignties in their right to be represented, because the House of Representatives had power to compel any town to be represented-not the legislature, but the House of Representatives only-by means of a fine and with unlimited discretion. I think, however, that this part of the argument has been, in a great degree, disposed of by the remarks of gentlemen who have preceded me; and now I will proceed to look at the figures, and with all respect to my friend for Erving, I will say that this question of equality is not easily disposed of; and I think that this Convention will hardly be satisfied by the statement of that gentleman that mathematical equality cannot be obtained, and that it is a mere question of degree. Gentlemen may discard their calculations upon this inequality in regard to this town, or to this or that county, as soon as they please, because, forsooth, nobody pretends to make a representation exactly equal to

a man.

And now, Sir, I have prepared a scale; and to pursue, in some degree, the path of my friend from Cambridge, (Mr. Sargent,) I will begin with the county of Franklin, for the same reason that he does. The county of Franklin is here the central figure, and as that gentleman truly observed, it is the first meridian from which to start; and I think we cannot easily have too much of fact upon a question of this kind. What I say may be partly what has been in substance already said; but I shall present it in different form and order. I will begin, then, with the county of Franklin, and permit me to say, that in the computation of figures I am about to present, I shall speak in round numbers only, counting by thousands.

The county of Franklin, then, has a population of 31,000, and it is proposed that she should have twenty-six representatives. I will take this county as the touchstone and compare it with the others, and see what proportion of representa