then a chance to prefer the best. I think they will prefer justice to power. It is sweeter than power. Politicians and moralists all concur to teach the duty of guarding, of comprising in our care, the whole body of the State alike; and that justice is its one transcendent concern. A greater than politicians and moralists has said, more authoritatively and more comprehensively," All things whatsoever ye would that men do unto you, do ye also unto them-for this is the law and the prophets."

Mr. MIXTER, of North Braintree, moved that the Committee rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

The motion was agreed to.

The Committee accordingly rose, and the President having resumed the Chair of

THE CONVENTION,

The Chairman, Mr. Wilson, of Natick, reported progress, and asked that the Committee have leave to sit again.

Leave was granted.

Orders of the Day.

On motion of Mr. MORTON, of Quincy, the Convention then proceeded to take up the Orders of the Day for consideration.

The PRESIDENT stated the first business in order to be the motion of the gentleman for Manchester, (Mr. Dana,) to reconsider the vote by which the third resolve reported by the Committee on so much of the Constitution as relates to Secretary, Treasurer, &c., was passed.

The resolve was read by the Secretary.

Mr. WESTON, of Duxbury, suggested that as the gentleman for Manchester, (Mr. Dana,) upon whose motion the business was now before the Convention, was absent, it would be better to allow the motion to be passed by in the Orders of the Day.

No objection was made, and the motion was accordingly passed over, and then

On motion by Mr. HALE, of Bridgewater, the Convention adjourned until 3 o'clock, P. M.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The Convention reassembled at 3 o'clock.

Suffrage.

On motion by Mr. WILSON, of Natick, it

was

Ordered, That the Committee on Suffrage be instructed to consider the expediency of incorporating into the Constitution the following provision, to wit:

1. No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the Commonwealth, by reason of his absence, either on business of this State or of the United States.

2 No idiot, or insane person, or persons convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to vote in any election.

On motion of Mr. PHINNEY, for Chatham, the Convention resolved itself into

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE,

Mr. Wilson, of Natick, in the Chair, and resumed the consideration of the Report of the Committee on so much of the Constitution as relates to the House of Representatives.

The Chairman stated the pending question to

be on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Hale).

Mr. BOUTWELL, for Berlin. My acknowledgments are due to the gentleman from North Braintree, (Mr. Mixter,) who made the motion that the Committee rise, this morning, and has now been kind enough to waive his right to the floor in my behalf.

I rise, Sir, as a Conservative-an unsual character for me. My friend, the learned gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Choate,) has taken his seat a Progressive he will pardon me—a still more unusual character for him. This morning, the Committee was instructed and delighted with the learning and opinions which he was pleased to place before them. But I, Sir, speak under the exhaustion which by a uniform rule of nature follows pleasure, and is proportionate to its degree. No man is more sensible than I am, that I shall fail to equal the gentleman from Boston, in all respects but one; and that is devotion to the opinions I entertain.

I am aware that in the discussion of the subject before us, the friends of the Majority Report, or of the substance of that Report, must admit what they can neither refute nor deny, that that system, in whatever form it may be presented, is unequal as regards men. In speaking of that Report, I do not intend to advocate, as indispensable, any particular plan. But in what I say, I desire to be understood as defending and advocating, so far as I am able, a general system of town representation, against the Report, or anything analagous to the Report, brought forward and advocated by the minority of the Committee. I take my position there, and there I mean to stand.

The inequality of the system of representation proposed by the majority, has attracted the attention and received the animadversion of various gentlemen upon this floor. At that I am not surprised; but I beg to ask them in the outset, whether they have examined the existing system of representation; and whether they have instituted any comparison between that and the system proposed by the majority of the Committee? And if in answer to such inquiry, they say that both systems are unequal, as regards men, and that there is not any substantial difference between the two in this particular, then I beg further to ask those gentlemen, when they made the discovery in regard to the inequality of representation existing in Massachusetts? Am I mistaken, or are these the same gentlemen who contended before the people, that there was no necessity for calling a Convention to amend the Constitution of the Commonwealth? I think I am not mistaken upon that point; but that the existing system of representation, not differing materially in the matter of equality, from the one recommended by the majority of the Committee, is the one which they thought so just that it was not advisable to call a Convention to change it. Sir, this system has been in operation more than one decennial period, and yet not a word of remonstrance or indignation, that I have heard, has gone up from the lips of these men. Two wrongs do not make a right, but the existence of a wrong for a series of years, unrebuked, is a reason why gentlemen should not be loud in their denunciations of a system not materially

different.

Now let me ask, as an inquiry not unimportant to this discussion, What is government? Is it a

[June 16th.

proposition in mathematics, in arithmetic, in geometry? Is it an exact science? I should think so, by the argument which has been presented, that no just government could exist unless it was based upon the arithmetical equality of men. But even that will not suffice. My friend from Boston, (Mr. Choate,) goes still farther, and says that the plan proposed by the minority of the Committee is not only based upon men, but upon women and children; upon the natural right of all to participate equally in the government under which they live. I would ask, when the women and children in this Commonwealth have been consulted, in regard to any system of government?

Government, as I understand it, is the application of the experience of history, the best wisdom and the highest human reason, to the existing institutions of a country, or people.

One word more with regard to the equality of which the gentleman speaks. The Constitution of this State, of the United States, and the Declaration of Independence, all declare, in some form or other, the equality of the people. None of us stand here to-day to deny the principle of the equality of men; but the relations of society are such, the civilization of this country and of every country is such, that it very seldom happens -indeed, I may say it never happens-that any government is founded upon the single idea of the equality of men. And I take it the solution of that great difficulty is to be found in the very law of our nature, which renders government necessary. I mean the law that all men are fallible. They are not perfect, and, Mr. Chairman, when you or your fellow citizens succeed in establishing a government that shall be perfect and equal in all its relations, in all its parts, I venture to say that the necessity for any government will have passed away.

The doctrine of checks and balances comes from the same principle of the fallibility of man. Government, so far as I know, rests upon three elements or principles, and it is the duty of wise statesmen and legislators to approximate, as nearly as they can, to these principles. But it also rests upon usage, and, to some extent, upon fiction; and the government of Massachusetts is not an exception in this last particular; inasmuch as it declares that all just power is derived from the consent of the governed, when, as a matter of fact, the consent of a great majority of the governed has not been obtained.

Now, one word in regard to the point which has been much discussed here, that the House of Representatives, if constituted in a certain way, would represent only a minority of the people of the State. That I admit; but I beg the gentleman from Boston to bear in mind, and I beg the Convention to bear in mind, that the proposition which the Convention will recommend, is to be submitted to the people of the Commonwealth. Their judgment is to be taken upon it; and if a majority are opposed to it, it fails to become a part of the organic law of the State; but if, on the other hand, a majority of the people adopt it, then it is of the Constitution. And if a majority of the men in the various towns in the Commonwealth adopt the system recommended by the majority of the Convention, the House of Representatives will represent a majority of the people of the State in the same manner as do your judges in your courts. And if you adopt this plan for

Thursday,]

the House of Representatives, it is upon precisely the same principle as that on which your courts

now rest.

I think further, Mr. Chairman, that a government of a State like ours has some peculiarities. One of these deserving of notice, is the peculiarity expressed in the word "Commonwealth." I maintain that the organization of this State is not simply a barren political organization, having reference solely to the political rights of the people who may be within it; but it has reference to all the great interests and institutions of the State.

I think that history and experience teach three things. First, that governments do not rest upon any single principle. Second, that every government needs checks; and third, that those have acted well who have accepted the existing institutions of their country as the basis of new ones. In regard to this last point, I wish to make a reference to our own history. If you consider the Constitution of the United States, it is but a declaration of pre-existing truths. It is an application of the principles of government to the existing institutions of the country, not the creation of new institutions or the application of new principles to old institutions. And so as regards our own State. Our fathers accepted the institutions which were among them. It was within their minds, undoubtedly, from the principles that they declared, to establish an equal system of representation in Massachusetts. Why did they not do it? They were as thoroughly imbued with the principles of liberty as we are at this day. Why did they not give to the Commonwealth and posterity an equal system of representation? Because they chose to avail themselves of the existing institutions of the land, and apply the principles in which they were educated, and to which they clung with fond affection, as well as they were able. Now what is our position? We stand at the present moment with the light of two centuries upon this question. It is immaterial to the discussion whether the House of Representatives has been of one size or another, at different periods of our history. It is sufficient for this moment that Massachusetts has had a House of Representatives, and that the basis of that House has been the municipalities of the Commonwealth. Upon that doctrine we stand to-day, and it is for those gentlemen who propose a change to maintain the propriety and expediency of such change. There are two plans before us. One is to make the municipalities of the Commonwealth the basis of representation; therein following the history of the State, and the lead of our ancestors, and the experience of the Commonwealth, for two hundred years. On the other hand, it is proposed to divide the State geometrically into districts, giving to each an equal number of representatives, and it is for those who advocate this plan to show conclusively the advantages which it has over the existing basis. Now I take it that municipal representation was not instituted, and has not been maintained, for two centuries without some reason? What was that reason? I have here a resolution passed by the town of Lincoln, May 22d, 1780, upon this subject. That town objected to the provision of the Constitution of 1780, which allowed towns having 225 ratable polls in addition to 150, an additional representative. And they did it upon this ground:

"Because," they say, "we think the mode of

representation pointed out in this article is not founded upon the principles of equality, as provided by the preceding article. We apprehend that all circumstances ought to be taken into consideration to determine a representation founded in equality, and that neither the number of ratable polls, nor any other circumstance, singly considered, determines such a representation. This State is constituted of a great number of distinct and unequal corporations, which are the immediate constituent parts of the State; and the individuals are only the remote parts in many respects. In all acts of the legislature which respect particular corporations, each corporation has a distinct and separate interest clashing with the interests of all the rest. And so long as human nature remains the same as it now is, each representative will be under an undue bias in favor of the corporation he represents; therefore, any large corporations having a large number of representatives, will have a large and undue influence in determining any question in their own favor. Should the number of ratable polls in any particular corporation increase till they overbalance all the others, they would completely tyrannize over all the rest, and every degree of inequality gives power for the same degree of tyranny."

This resolution, I think, truly presents the idea which was entertained of this matter of representation in 1780. How does the State deal with the town corporations? In the first place, your taxes are levied on and through the towns. They are required by the legislature of the State to maintain your system of public instruction. They have the authority, and it is one of the highest acts of sovereignty in any State, to establish highways and take private property for public uses. Have you not established, in the whole history of the State, a policy which regards municipalities and recognizes their independence to some extent, at least? I say, then, that while one branch of the government of this Commonwealth is based upon the single idea of the equality of men, if we follow the theory of our institutions, and the usage of two hundred years, the other branch should, to some extent, be based upon municipalities, as communities of the people having separate and distinct interests which ought to be represented in the legislature. With these municipalities the government strictly deals, and this system of representation most certainly is of some value to the towns. In the first place, it is a means of educating the people. It is not necessary for me to go into details or illustration upon this point, because it is apparent to every-body that the opportunity which each municipality has of sending one delegate to the general court, is a means of giving to that town information upon the great opinions and affairs of State; and that if you take from the individual town the right of representation, you deprive its citizens, in a great degree, of the means of self-education; an education necessary to them as men, in order that they may understand the wants and character of the State; an education necessary to them as citizens of the town, in order that they may, from time to time, discharge the essential duties which must devolve upon some of its citizens.

The value of this right, if vested and suffered to remain in the town, is of very great importance to the public, as a whole. In the first place, it is an accurate means of ascertaining and testing the public sentiment upon any question which may arise, and hence your government is more directly a representation of the will of the people. It makes our population homogeneous in character,

[June 16th.

it gives to it that unity which is so desirable, and it deprives all parts of the Commonwealth of any right to complain, that they are in any respect neglected by the State. And in addition to this, it gives you a representation that is personally responsible to the people. Compare, at this moment, or at any other period of your history, the relation which senators and representatives sustain to the people. If it happens that in any small town in this Commonwealth, an individual is selected to the Senate, do the inhabitants rely upon him for information? Is he made the channel of communication between the government and the people? By no means, unless in some unusual and extraordinary case. The channel of communication between the people and the government, is the representative of the town. I have further to say, that municipal respectability and strength are the chief elements of freedom and power in a State, and have ever been so. In the earliest periods of the history of civilization and freedom, we see that municipalities took the lead, and that they were always fortresses of liberty. I ask my friend from Boston, if it is not true, that the municipalities established by the Saxon government in England were the chief means of resistance against the Norman invasion? And if, from the close of the eleventh century to the commencement of the thirteenth, liberty was not actually restrained in England, under the oppression and annihilation to which the municipalities of that country were subjected by the Norman invader? And if what was in the outset a war of races, did not finally, under the pressure of circumstances, become on the part of the invaders, a war for the extermination of the municipalities of that country? I take it that this is the true state of the case, so far as history throws any light upon the subject.

Our system of representation, as it exits in Massachusetts, has been compared to the borough system of England. It may, in some respects, have a slight analogy to that system; but, in most particulars, it has none whatever. Those boroughs were instituted by charters from the monarchs, without any reference to the people. They did not include, to any considerable extent, the population of England, and many of them were entirely without inhabitants, being composed of unoccupied territory, which was represented in parliament by the agents of nobles and other land proprietors. At the same time, the important places of Manchester, Leeds, and some portions of London, had no representation at all. I ask if in the borough system of Great Britain, there is any considerable analogy to the system of representation which exists in Massachusetts? The system of representation in Massachusetts, I venture to say, is not the representation of place, as the gentleman from Boston informed us this morning; but it is a representation of men formed into distinct communities, having separate and distinct interests, which, in their estimation, are important to be preserved and maintained. I might refer to Switzerland, where free municipalities have existed for five centuries, which have been the seat of power in the Swiss race, and the means of maintaining freedom against all attacks, which, from century to century, have been made upon it.

Now, I do not say that you propose to destroy the municipal system of Massachusetts, by depriving each town of the right of representation as a town, but I do say, that you weaken its power,

you destroy the vital clement of the life of these municipalities, when you take from them the right of representation. What remains of a small town after this right has been taken away? Nothing of any importance. It has the power to choose a school committee, to carry out the will of the central government; the power to levy taxes for the support of its institutions of learning, and its pauper establishment; the power to choose overseers of the poor, and selectmen of the town. But these powers are unimportant when the right of representation is taken away. This is the only element of municipal existence that is worth preserving, the only antagonist principle to the tendency to centralization, which, notwithstanding it has been exposed to some ridicule, I shall attempt to illustrate and prove. What is proposed as a substitute for the annihilation of the municipal system of this Commonwealth? A division of the State, as I understand it, into eighty representative districts, giving to each district three representatives. What is the first objection to this plan? It is that you have to elect your representatives upon a general ticket. And what precedes the election of men upon a general ticket? Of course a committee of delegates. And what is the effect of such a committee? It is that you take the power from the hands of the people, and put it into the hands of conventions, committees and organizations. This, certainly, is one of the evils of which the people of Massachusetts have complained, and is the chief reason why some gentlemen on this floor desire that the cities in this Commonwealth should be districted, that the power may be given to the people to nominate as well as elect their representatives in the general court. And what is the effect with regard to the men who will hold scats in the legislature, under the general ticket system? It is that a large body who have been here, of the solid men of the State, not active perhaps in the administration of affairs, but always safe and reliable in the disposition of every question that arises, will be excluded from the legislature. Altogether excluded will such be, because the action of these conventions and committees will inevitably point to the nomination and election of a different class. Men, no doubt, very proper to be elected as representatives in the general court; but the system proposed works the exclusion of the solid men of the country from any part or participation in the affairs of the State.

Nor do I agree at all in the statement made yesterday by my friend from Boston, (Mr. Schouler,) if I understand him correctly, that a large House of Representatives, or the election of four hundred men to the general court, was a nuisance. I cannot agree to any such statement. There may have been exceptional cases in the Commonwealth of the election of men who ought not to have been elected; but as a general rule, I am prepared to say, after seven years' experience, that the House of Representatives has, almost without exception, been composed of honorable and respectable men, and from first to last, there has been safety in the administration of the affairs of this State, and particularly has that safety had its base in the character and number of the men composing the House of Representatives.

It is said, too, by those who favor the district system, that it will be more economical than the present system, or than that which is proposed by the majority of the Committee. Of that I can

not speak absolutely; but if the proposition to limit the session to a period of a hundred days shall prevail, I think the average expenses of the legislature, for the next ten or twenty years, will not exceed the sum which it has averaged for the last ten years. And although there may have been some complaint in various parts of the Commonwealth, that the cost of the legislature has been too great, it is not a difficulty which the people have much considered. They would rather pay the sum which a large House of Representatives will cost, than be deprived of their right of representation in that branch. Nor is the principle of a thing to be decided by the cost chiefly, because it may happen that if you have a small House of Representatives the appropriations will be large, inasmuch as the men who compose it will entertain different ideas of economy; for the system you propose necessarily excludes the economical voice of Massachusetts from the administration of its affairs.

I have to say further, that it is the duty of government so to determine the political power of communities as to secure an equality of political, civil, religious, and business rights among men; and that if by basing every department upon the single idea of personal equality, you violate this doctrine, then it is wise to base one department a least on a different principle. And I stand here to say that such is the civilization of Massachusetts at this moment, and the tendency of the age in which we live, that the proposition to base this branch of the government upon the doctrine of the simple equality of men, necessarily works an inequality of political, civil, religious, and business rights among the people of the Commonwealth. I proceed to prove the statement in this way; that the power which a particular portion of this Commonwealth may have in the affairs of the government, is not derived altogether, nor chiefly, I may say, from the number of the votes it is able to give at the polls or in the legislature.

What is the process which is going on in Massachusetts at this moment? Is it not one of centralization? Is not the tendency to an aggregation of population and wealth in the great centres of the State? Have not Boston, Lowell, and Worcester rapidly increased in population in the last twenty years? And what is to be the result of this aggregation of men at a few points?

It is this: Taking the increase of the population in this Commonwealth, from 1840 to 1850, as a basis on which we may proceed, we shall find that in 1900 a majority of the people will be concentrated in twelve of the large cities. Boston, Lowell, Salem, Roxbury, Charlestown, Worcester, Fall River, New Bedford, Cambridge, Lynn, Springfield, and Taunton will have, in 1900, a population of 2,574,690; while all the rest of the State will have a population of 2,459,639, making the majority in favor of the twelve large cities, 115,051.

Now, then, in less than fifty years, if the amendment proposed by the minority of the Committee, be adopted by this Convention, and by the people, the political power of this Commonwealth, in all its departments, passes into these twelve cities and towns. And if the majority in these twelve towns had no other means of influencing the public sentiment than belonged to the rest of the country, it might not be so objectionable; you might say that the other towns had

[June 16th.

no right to complain if they were subjected to the authority of these towns. But there are other means of influencing public opinion than by the votes given either on the floor of the House of Representatives or at the polls. First, there is the aggregation of wealth, which has a powerful influence.

Boston now has about one-third of the property of the State, and most likely one-half; and in 1860 she will undoubtedly have one-half. Is that fact of no value in the consideration of a matter like this? Is it not a means of influencing public sentiment throughout the Commonwealth? And in addition to that, Boston has thirteen daily presses, through which and by which she influences the public sentiment of the State.

Is it of no importance to her and to towns so situated, that their interests can be represented in all these journals? Because, whatever difference of opinion they may have with regard to politics or religion, or social life, they will agree as one, with regard to the advancement of their institutions, and the rights of that society in which they exist. If, then, you put every department of the government upon the doctrine of the equality of men, you necessarily, through the operation of these extraneous influences, work out a result unequal, as regards the political, civil and social rights of the people of this Commonwealth. And more than that, the operation of this process of centralization, is to bring into these cities the talent of the country.

Is this fact of no value in determining power in the government? Things have changed in this respect within the last fifty years. If a young man in the country acquires a position at the bar of the county where he lives, what does he do? Does he remain there? Not at all. He comes to the metropolis. How is it with the clergy? Fifty years ago, if a town was so fortunate as to secure the services of an able clergyman, he remained there for life; and no man can estimate the importance of the state of things which then existed, or the value of the influences thus exerted. But how is it now? If there is an eminent clergyman in the country, he has a call and is away. These considerations ought not to be overlooked. It is the centralization of talent, of wealth, of numbers, of business, and social influences at these points, by which and through which the policy of the State is to be controlled, more than by the votes given at the ballot-box. And it is this intellectual impoverishment of the country which gives to this metropolis, orators, whose words come up to Shakspeare's perfect definition of music, the "concord of sweet sounds." Orators, who remind us, whether we will or no, of the fabled lyre of Orpheus, which it is said,

was strung with poet's sinews,
Whose golden touch could soften steel and stones."

It is this intellectual impoverishment of the country of which we complain; and shall there be no set-off for this? If this process of centralization is to go on, and I see not how we are to resist it, I appeal to gentlemen from Boston and other large places to say whether it is for their interest to put this government in all its departments upon a basis which necessarily works out an inequality of civil, political and religious rights among the people? And upon this point I stand, and say that it is a matter of justice that the country should be represented as regards men more fully than the city.

Thursday,]

But the power of the cities and the large towns in the Commonwealth is not confined to the men who are elected by these places, respectively, to seats in the legislature. Not by any means. This centralization of population is followed by a refluence of men into contiguous towns. And what are they? Not disrespectfully would I speak of them; but their political interest in the towns where they live, and in the House of Representatives, to which they are often sent, is precisely the same as if they immediately represented the city of Boston or Lowell. And this process of refluence which is going on about the city of Boston now, is soon to take place around Worcester, when she shall have 80,000 souls, and about Lowell when she, too, shall have an equal number.

Therefore, I say, when you propose to put all the departments of the government upon the equality of men, you set up a doctrine which necessarily works inequality as regards political rights. I ask whether there is force in this view with reference to men of talent? Unquestionably there is. Look over Massachusetts as she is today, glorious in all her proportions and in all her institutions, yet who can fail to see that this impoverishment of the country has wrought a great change in her character? The press is at a few central points; your men of talent are at a few central points. But in the country, you have a considerable population spread over a large extent of territory, with no means of combining their influence so as to bring it to bear upon the government; no opportunity for caucuses or for public meetings; no presses to speak for them; public men not numerous, nor acquainted with public affairs, as a general thing.

But, Sir, it is contended that this district system is to be equal. If the plan of the Committee be followed, it may be substantially equal; but that plan, as I have said, is liable to serious objection in itself. It provides for the election of representatives to the legislature by the general ticket system; and, to this, there are very serious objections. I care not, now, to go into any inquiry as to the character of this system; but, I say, it is liable to very serious objections; and, I believe, no man will stand up and defend it as an independent proposition; and ultimately, by the force of public sentiment, the general ticket system must give way. And then, upon this principle of personal equality, to what extremity are we driven? That the State is to be divided into single representative districts. What, then,

is your choice ? Either to divide the towns,

and constitute these districts, without any reference to town lines, which is an impracticable thing; or else, do as they have done in the South, where they have attempted to carry out this theory, and make the towns as they are now, substantially the basis of representation.

But I ask the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Choate,) who addressed the Committee this morning, where his precedents are for the course he invites this Committee to take? Is there any precedent except the one fatal precedent of the Constituent Assembly of France of 1790, which discarded all the ancient institutions of that empire, trampled under foot the provincial lines, divided the territory into eighty-four departments, and then into subordinate districts and cantons? The result of that experiment is, that there has been from that day to this no popular liberty in

France. And under the operation of this single idea of the equality of man, forty millions of people have been subject to despotism for more than half a century. There is no precedent in this country. There may be States whose in-titutions are somewhat coincident to those proposed by the majority of the Committee—that is, single districts, without reference to any other consideration than the basis of representation; but they are very few.

I have looked at the Constitution of Louisiana, where I thought that this equality, perhaps, had been acted upon. And what did I find? That the State had been divided into ten districts, for purposes of representation; that each district was to have a number of representatives proportionable to its ratable polls, but that the election was referred to the people of the towns and parishes in a ratio as equal as practicable. Is there a single instance in this country where a State has abandoned its municipal institutions, and set up such a system as is proposed by the minority of the Committee? I take it not one. It may happen, and it may well happen in the new States of the West, where the territory is large, where the people are planters or farmers on a large scale, and where there were few or no villages, that the State is divided into districts for the choice of members of the legislature; and that those districts have reference to the population which they respectively contain.

There was no other way, and all these States of the Union accepted the existing and necessary institutions which they found as the basis of the system of representation which they set up. If we follow their example, it will not lead to a division of the State into representative districts for the election of members to the general court; but on the other hand rather to accept our municipal institutions, as the basis of our system of government. Now let us look at Massachusetts; and if what I have said in reference to the tendency to centralization is true, or even true in any considerable degree, it must be apparent to every body that the only antagonistic force to that tendency is the preservation of our municipal system. Where else do we find it? Our counties are broken up; they were never of that character, however, which would give any considerable restraint. Our school districts-those little democracies as they were called by the gentleman for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,)-are quite broken up, and are passing away. The only barrier which remains is to be found in our town municipalities; and the character and reputation of our town municipalities depend altogether upon the preservation of the right of representation therein.

I think the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Choate,) said, this morning, that there was no hostility between the town and the country. I trust that there is none. I think there ought to be none. He said that the State is homogeneous in its character-that there is no diversity in its interests-the interests of the farmers, the mechanics, the merchants, and the manufacturers were all one and the same. Now I ask that gentleman if he cannot, out of the abundance of his generosity, grant the small towns the right of representation, which is endeared to them by the traditions and the usages of two centuries, and which is important to the preservation of their character as elemental parts of the government of

[June 16th.

the State? But if there is any diversity of interest -if they are communities, having separate rights and distinct interests from the rights and interests of the citizens of the large towns, I say it is essential to the preservation and to the progress of the whole State that you should give them a voice in the affairs of the Commonwealth. And, Sir, the right of the small towns to representation upon the floor of the House of Representatives has been discussed as though the House was the government. It is not so, by any means. The House of Representatives is but one department, and however constituted, the executive and Senate immediately and fully represent numbers in the State.

Now I ask, what are Constitutions for, if not for a protection to minorities? Majorities are safe in the irresistible power which they themselves possess; but Constitutions are established, and checks are placed upon the different departments of government for the protection of minorities. If there is no danger in giving to a majority of the Commonwealth all this unlimited power over the rights and interests of the minority, is there any danger in carrying the doctrine still farther?

The judicial department of the State is to represent the sovereignty of the State; but I think the gentleman from Boston would shrink from making the judiciary immediately dependent upon the people. Why? Because he desires a check upon the exercise of their sovereign authority in this respect. It can be for no other reason, As the sovereignty of the States is an antagonistic power in our federal government, to the tendency to centralization in this Union, so is the power of municipalities an antagonistic force to the tendency to centralization in the State.

Sir, it is in this State, and upon this continent, that the work of centralization is going on, and will continue to go on, with a rapidity and a power unparalleled in any age of the world. The division of Europe into separate states has had the effect of checking this tendency there in a great degree; but we see that a single city, like Paris, has wielded sufficient power to enable her to control forty millions of people. If gentlemen will look at the pages of history, they will see that the Roman Empire-extending from the Island of Great Britain, on the one hand, to Mesopotamia on the other, and comprehending the unknown provinces and states of Germany on the north, the Holy Land, Egypt and Northern Africa upon the south-was subject to the control of a single city in the Peninsula of Italy. Does history teach us nothing upon this point? I venture to assert that the government of cities --and I mean no disrespect to any city when I say it-that the government of cities is shown, from the history of the world, to have been universally and uniformly bad; but history furnishes no instance in which a government vested in the country, has ever been exercised for the oppression of the city. Never!

It is upon this continent that the work of centralization is to go on with more rapidity than it has ever elsewhere. Sir, look at the extent of our railways; look at our great depots of commerce and trade upon the Atlantic coast, in the valley of the Mississippi, and upon the Pacific

ocean.

The nine largest cities in the world, at this moment contain about fifteen millions of inhabitants; and taking the ratio of increase of our population from 1840 to 1850, as a basis, we

Thursday,]

may infer that the nine largest cities upon the American continent, will, in the year 1900, contain twenty-two millions of inhabitants. Therefore, this extraordinary fact stands before us, that within half a century America will have nine cities, whose aggregate population will exceed that of any nine cities in the world; and with this population, who shall estimate their commercial, civil, social and political power. Now, after two centuries' experience of the benefits derived from a government based, in part, upon municipal authority, a proposition is made to us -such as was never made to any other assembly, so far as I know, upon the face of the globe-to strike out from existence this conservative power in the little republic of Massachusetts. For one, Sir, I consent not to it; and if I cannot stand upon the doctrine of equality in the present, I will seek justification for the course which I take in the future-in that future which shall know by experience what now can be, to the best of us, only theory. I know not, Sir, but that this experiment may work well; but I pronounce it an experiment because it has not elsewhere been tried under analogous circumstances, or circumstances at all similar to those which exist here.

Blot out, if you will, those stars of liberty from the constellation of our little republic! blot them out, or give to them but a nebulous form, so that the wayfaring man cannot discern them more. It is only the eye which has been trained by science and learning that can discover the beauty of that principle which conflicts with the usages of our State and the habits of our people. Let us pause and consider, before we take this step, where it is to lead, and what are to be its probable results. Progress and reform are noble words; but Sir, if they tend to the destruction of our institutions, and jeopardize our liberties, we should hesitate to follow their lead. The municipal governments of the world have ever been barriers against oppression in every form. What is it to-day that enables Switzerland, with her twenty-one cantons, to stand fast and firm against the power of Austria, sustained as it is, no doubt, by that of the Russian Empire? It is her little municipalities confederated together, not upon the principle of the equality of men, but the equality of communities, by and through the agency of which she can summon to the battlefield one hundred thousand men from among three million hardy mountaineers. It is the form of municipal government which they enjoy that enables them to maintain themselves free and independent. And I say, Sir, that, as a general rule in the history of the world, the people who have been blessed with municipal institutions have been free, while the people who have not thus been blessed, have been, in comparison, slaves. Look at Greece; look at Italy; look at Great Britain, which have all had municipal institutions in some form or another. Look at Holland; look at some parts of Spain; look at Switzerland and Hungary, the latter of which has for three centuries maintained an unequal contest against Austrian oppression and power.

Break down your municipalities if you will; but look well to the result. For one, I enter not upon this experiment. Much as I respect the doctrine of personal equality, and much as I should delight to see this government, and every other government come up to the pute principles of liberty and equality, I will not forsake that

which I know to be sure and certain, for that which at best is uncertain if not, indeed, dangerous. The future has some claim upon us as well as the present, and we ought not to be unmindful of that claim. We should remember that a nation or a state which has been called from obscurity and weakness, to the enjoyment of refined civilities, and the exercise of intellectual sovereignty, has somewhat of inspiration in its history and its character; and for one, Sir, I will stand by the principles which have brought this ancient Commonwealth to her present position. If there be men who desire to earn the name of Progresionists or Reformers by the abolition of municipal authority and power in this Commonwealth, I stand not with them, whether it be for weal or for woe.

We

Mr. WALKER, of North Brookfield. have discussed this subject for so long a time, that I presume it is apparent to every-body, that it is one which is attended with a good deal of difficulty. It is a subject upon which I think we shall finally be forced into a compromise. Two great interests are brought into collision-the interest of large towns, and the interest of small towns; and one or the other must give way, or both must concede something. On the one hand, the small towns desire annual representation, every one of them, and I would that they all had it. It has been my earnest desire from the time when I came to this Convention, that all the towns in this Commonwealth should have a representative every year; but I saw, as every-body else saw, that this could not be done, if we give a full and proportionate representation to the large towns, without having an enormous House of Representatives. The general feeling throughout the Commonwealth is, that we are going to reduce the number of members of the House; and if by our course of procedure, we should enlarge instead of reducing the number of members, I have no doubt it would be a great disappointment to the people. If we give every town one representative, and the large towns a number of representatives in proportion to their population, we shall have an unwieldly House-a thing to be avoided if possible. I came here, Sir, with a plan in my head, to arrange this matter, but I have hardly dared to divulge it. I will now mention what it was-not for the purpose of presenting it to this Convention for their action, but to show that I have been laboring for a long time to bring about the desired result, viz., the representation of every town every year, and a House of reasonable size. The plan is this. Let all the towns in this Commonwealth having one representative, and all having a fractional representation, or less than one annually, constitute the first class of towns, having each a representative every year, of the first class, and that representative entitled to one vote. Let all the towns having more than one representative, including all the cities, be entitled to representatives of the second class, each representative having two votes. That is-Boston, for example, instead of having, as now, forty-four, would have twenty-two, members, each having two votes. Now, Sir, in this way, the number of the members of the House would be reduced about seventy, while every part of the State would be perfectly represented, and every town in the State would have its full power every year. There would be no detraction from the rights of any one, and no injustice done to any one; all

[June 16th.

would be fairly represented. When these representatives came into the House, the members of the second class could sit in divisions by themelves, and when they were counted all that would be necessary would be for the Speaker to double the number announced by the monitors for those divisions. You thus perceive, Mr. Chairman, that I had the plan all worked out with what ingenuity I could command; but the misfortune of this scheme is, the idea is so completely novel that it is not to be thought of, and I had about concluded not to mention it. The novelty of the thing is sufficient to condemn it; but if we do not resort to this scheme we must look for some other, with which to attain the desired result.

Well, Sir, as I said, one party or the other will have to give up entirely or else both parties must yield a little. We have either to force the matter through on one principle or the other, or else adopt a middle course. Feeling that we have arrived at that point, I have, ever since the Committee made their Report, been looking at the map to see what disposition could be made of the towns of the Commonwealth. We must look at the towns on the map, if we would see how they are located, and ascertain what can be done to obtain the best possible representation in the House of Representatives. With this view, and for this purpose, I took the map and placed upon it the population of every town, so that I could see how they were situated, and whether the small towns were contiguous to each other or not. After having done this, on looking over and endeavoring to arrange the towns, I find that there are one hundred towns in the Commonwealth, conveniently contiguous to each other, that have less than one representative each year. When I ascertained that fact, I proposed to myself, first, to put these hundred towns together so as to form districts, each district to be entitled to one representative each year. Then, secondly, that all the other towns should each form a district entitled to as many representatives as they now have. And then, in the third place, that the cities be divided into districts, by wards or otherwise-in other words, to make the whole State into one general district system. That, in brief, is my plan.

Now, I find that these hundred towns, of which I have spoken, have a population of about 95,000, so that I propose to classify less than onetenth of the whole population of the State. Then there are 600,000 of the population in our towns that will be entirely unaffected by this arrangement. They will be in the middling towns, i. e., those between the small towns and the cities, leaving a population of about 300,000 in the cities. Now, looking at this, it seems to me, that there is no way in which we can so fully satisfy the whole population of this Commonwealth as by the arrangement I have suggested; because, as I said before, nine-tenths of the population of the Commonwealth would be represented essentially as they are now, and the small towns that are districted will still have as large a representation as they have at present-just as many members, just as much influence in the aggregate, as they have now; because, some towns are entitled to have a representative three years in every ten years, others to four years, and others, again to five, and so on; and, by placing them together, I find that they will have just about the same representation that they have now. There will be a slight gain on the part of these towns.