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and in any way to interfere with the unrestrained freedom of religious opinion, I should like to know what it is. I would like to know what that danger of misconstruction is, or how it may happen that any man in Massachusetts may be restrained, or curtailed, or deprived of any freedom of religious opinion and action consistent with the rights and interests of others, under the present Bill of Rights. When I know what it is, I will go as quick, and as far as any one, to redress it, and to provide against the evil. Therefore, I wish to have my friend say what this danger of misconstruction is, that will give a different interpretation to the old form of expression, which, he says, by a liberal construction, means the same as the other. If, by this alteration any such liberty is intended to be given as the gentleman from Salem (Mr. Lord) argues may be given; if by the language of the present Bill of Rights, which gives to every man freedom of religious opinion, he would not be permitted in language, in words, in actions, or by pictures, to ridicule and bring into disrespect, and treat with ignominy, the Christian religion, and this new mode of expression gives that right, or gives that liberty, I will not go for the change. If there is anything which will give a man who has no religion, who mocks at religion and its Author, who scoffs at the Creator, and tramples under foot all forms of Christianity,-if this amendment will give any man that privilege unrestrained, then I cannot vote for it. But, I say sincerely, I am in doubt. I do not know what different idea is intended to be introduced, and therefore I ask my friend to say what danger there is under the present Bill of Rights, of doing violence to any man's religious opinions, and what new security is given by the new form of expression? I ask with a sincere desire to be informed. If necessary, I go for it freely; but if not necessary, I should not think it wise to change the present form.

Mr. KEYES, for Abington. The gentleman for Marshfield having once answered that question, and that not being the first question before us, I wish to make a remark on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Greenfield, which is to substitute the word "man" for the word "subject." I suppose that the word "man," is intended to be used in its most comprehensive sense, and to include the whole race. But, it is not always held to mean so much, and the fact that it has been used with other meanings than that, has led the world into some difficulty heretofore. If it is necessary for the harmony of the sentence, I would prefer that the word "individual" should be introduced instead of the word "man," although it does not sound quite as well. I think the Convention ought to decide to change the word "subject," for one or the other of the words named. We have no subjects of government here, we are all partners. We have subjects of other things, of parties and powers, but not of the government. I had the impression that the word subject was stricken out, in most cases, by the Convention of 1820, but it seems it was not. I trust that we live at a period when we shall use no such unmeaning term as the word "subject." I would prefer the word "individual," rather than the word "man," which properly construed, I suppose would mean all mankind. But that word has been so construed heretofore as to deprive a portion of the people of a portion of their just rights.

Mr. DANA. I was not in when the question was propounded; but, if I understand it, it is on striking out the word " subject," and inserting the word "man." The gentleman for Abington proposes to insert the word "individual." I do beg that we shall not call it "individual." Every scholar has an aversion to that word, where it can be avoided. I would rather see all the rust remain, than put the word "individual" into our organic law.

Mr. KEYES. I do not object to the word "person."

Mr. DANA. There is a difficulty about that, because it will occur twice in the same sentence. I am decidedly in favor of the word "subject." We discussed the matter in Committee, and there was, at first, a little natural pride exhibited, like that which the gentleman for Abington has manifested with regard to using the word "subject." We came to the conclusion, finally, that our ancestors who had as much pride as we-understood the matter perfectly well when they called themselves subjects. I do not believe that John Adams, or Samuel Adams, or James Bowdoin, made any mistake when they called themselves subjects. They understood perfectly, quite as well as we do, that they were not subjects of any king; but they took a proper pride in acknowledging that that they were subject to the law. They took a proper pride in saying that every Massachusetts man, while he was a sovereign as a law-maker, was -the proudest of us-a subject to the laws when made.

Now, I am happy to be able to say, that whenever the people of Massachusetts pass a law, I am subject to that law. I take pride in saying that, while I am one of the sovereigns, as a law-maker, yet, as a law-obeyer, I am one of the subjects. For one, I desire to have this term remain, that the idea of duty may remain somewhere in our laws and Constitution. We are too much in a state of feeling which can recognize nothing but power in ourselves. The duty of obedience seems to be almost lost sight of. Now, my pride is not at all affected or hurt by calling myself a subject of the laws, or of the State. I should not wish to be the subject of any one man; but I am quite willing to be the subject of the State, and to recognize the fact that in one aspect we are all kings, but in another aspect we are all subjects. I submit whether this is not running the matter a little too fine to refuse to acknowledge this relation. Our ancestors acknowledged it in 1780, John Adams, and all the rest; and, in 1820, there was a discussion on striking out the word "subject," and inserting the word "citizen," or 'person.' It was opposed, and was rejected by a vote of two hundred and eight to two hundred and twentyseven in committee; and afterwards, when it came up in Convention, it was rejected without a count, and the term "subject" remained. Let it be declared that every man-the proudest and wealthiest is still a subject of the State. I hope, therefore, the word may still remain in the Constitution.

Mr. KEYES. I wish to say, that if we maintain these two characters of sovereign and subject, that perhaps we may as well introduce the word "sovereign" instead of the word "subject," because, according to the gentleman's own statement, we are just as much sovereign as subject. When that discussion, in 1820, took place, they were not so far advanced as we are by thirty-three

[July 26th.

years, and the men who then voted in favor of the change expressed the almost universal sentiment of this day, while the men who voted against it expressed sentiments that are outlawed. Mr. WILSON, of Natick. I find the word “individual," the word "man," and the word "citizen," used in the Constitution in the same sense in which this word "subject" is used. In most of the Constitutions of other States, I find the word "person" is generally used. In the new States, the word "person" is used instead of the word "subject." This is the only State that retains the word "subject," unless it be one or two of the older Southern States. I do not feel degraded by it; I agree with the gentleman for Manchester, that there is nothing derogatory in it. We are all sovereigns, and all subjects to our own government. But at the same time, I do not like the word very well, and I should prefer to see the word "person" used throughout, as it is used in the Constitutions of most of the new States of the Union.

Mr. CHAPIN, of Webster. I hope this whole resolution will be voted down; but, if it must pass, I prefer to have the amendment prevail. I think it is evident that this change which has been proposed, is not presented for the mere purpose of improving the phraseology of the Constitution. There is, evidently, a design behind that, and, for one, that design is very evident to my mind; and I hope that before the Convention vote upon this matter, gentlemen will study a little upon the phraseology of this resolution, and they must be able to see the real object of the change proposed. I wish the chairman of the Committee was present to make an explanation. I think we are not sufficiently acquainted with the matter. I hope we shall not impose upon courts of justice the necessity of receiving evidence of persons who disbelieve in a Divine Being. I think this amendment paves the way for such a result. I hope the Convention will be prepared to vote upon the subject understandingly.

Mr. BIRD, of Walpole. This amendment, which is proposed by the gentleman from Greenfield, (Mr. Chandler,) is a very grave matter, and I think there is reason for regret that it should have been introduced at this late stage of the session, when the fifteen minute's rule is in operation. It should have been brought in when the hour rule was in force, so that we could have had some speeches that would have opened up the whole question. I only want to say, that if gentlemen are disposed to make any more speeches upon the matter, as to whether we shall use the word "man," "person," or "individual," I shall feel constrained to move that the whole matter be referred to a Special Committee.

Mr. HILLARD. I am sorry, Sir, that the gentleman who represents Wilbraham, (Mr. Hallett,) is not here; this whole matter is a child of his begetting, and I regret that he is not here to look after it. It will be observed that my name is at the bottom of those who propose it; and I will tell the Committee how that happened to be so. The gentleman for Wilbraham introduced a large number of propositions for the consideration of the Committee. We had a great many meetings and a great many discussions, and I was obliged to oppose almost all of these propositions. Upon one occasion, when the matter before us was under discussion, it so happened that the fact whether it should be re

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jected or adopted, would depend upon my vote. I had very little choice about the matter, one way or the other; and so I said to my friend who represents Wilbraham, that, having been so often obliged to go against him from conscientious motives, now, when I could, with a little straining, go for him, I would willingly do so, and I did so; and, accordingly, the proposition was adopted. My hand being there to it, I am bound to stand up and explain what I suppose was the real motive that induced the minority of the Committee to submit the proposition. This whole matter grew out of a single memorable trial in this Commonwealth-the trial of the Commonwealth against Kneeland-and, were I addressing my friend from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,) I should say

My friend who represents Wilbraham, was much exercised in his mind with regard to that trial, and I must say that, to some extent, I went along with him. I was one of a certain number of persons, who, under the lead of my revered and beloved friend, the late Dr. Channing, petitioned the executive to pardon that unhappy man. I understand that the doctrine upon which that conviction was obtained, was this: that although the Constitution said-[Mr. Hallett at this moment entered the hall]-I can now say, as Othello said, "Here comes the lady; let her witness it!" [Laughter.] I understand that the conviction was obtained upon the ground that, although a person could not be called in question for his religious sentiments-he might utter any sentiments whatever respecting religion, or respecting Christianity, so long as they were religious sentiments, but the moment he uttered irreligious sentiments he made himself amenable to punishment. From the principle involved in this construction, I must respectfully dissent. It seems to me, that upon this whole subject of religion, or more properly, of Christianity, for that is what is meant here, there are two rules. One of these is the rule of the Romish Church, which denies entirely the right of private judgment. They say that the Church, being a body of wise and learned men, running through all periods of time, have construed the Bible, and have agreed upon certain doctrines and tenets which are not only to be received as true, but all others are false. No person shall preach or maintain any doctrine opposed to them; and, not only that, but no person shall think or hold, within the sanctuary of his own conscience, except on sufferance, any other doctrines than those which the Church approves and teaches. That is the Romish rule or principle, and is consistent and intelligible; the Protestant doctrine, on the other hand, gives the right of private judgment, without limitation, and without restriction. Between these two, I cannot see any principle on middle ground; and I do not think it is ever wise to punish a man for his sentiments or opinions concerning religion. I humbly think that the trial of Kneeland was unwise as a matter of policy, and that the friends of Christianity can never wisely and judiciously ask that the arm of law shall be stretched forth to silence discussion. So long as a person utters his sentiments, supposing them to be irreligious and opposed to Christianity, so long as he utters them with decency and decorum, I would not have him punished. Among

the petitions presented to the Committee, was one from an individual bearing the name of Le Barnes; I do not know who he is, but his argument was, indirectly and by inference, rather against Christianity; and, so far as it went, the language was perfectly decorous. His arguments were addressed to the reason; but the difficulty is, that in almost all cases, those who oppose Christianity are left, by the very infirmity of mind and heart which leads them to do so, to use language which is indecorous, and which should not be tolerated. The difficulty in Kneeland's case was, that there were some expressions which he used, that were outrageous and indecent; and it was for that reason that the sympathies of the community were not excited in his behalf. Here is the difficulty about this subject. While I would not, on the one hand, restrain or punish any person who should utter irreligious or unChristian sentiments in decent language, which did not lead to a breach of the peace, I do think that society has a right to punish the man who assails our religious convictions, and wounds our religious sensibilities by indecent, contemptuous, and sarcastic language, such as, from the infirmities of humanity, leads inevitably to a breach of the peace. Here is a practical difficulty in legislation which I hardly know how to meet. On that account, for one, I never would have stirred in this matter; I never would have presented it to the Convention; and, frankly, I must confess that I have very great doubts about the wisdom or propriety of submitting it to the action of the people.

Mr. CHANDLER, of Greenfield, When I first read this resolution, I supposed that it was intended to throw open the whole area to free and perfect competition, and not that any consequences would be likely to follow, such as have been suggested by the gentleman from Salem, and by the gentleman from Pittsfield-gentlemen who are versed in the law, and who are more capable of judging than I am. I suppose it was not designed to give countenance to any such thing; and if such an abuse was to be made of it, I presume it would be actionable at law. It would come under the proviso that the legislature have a right to pass all wholesome and reasonable laws; but I trust that no man, for undertaking to propagate his sentiments concerning religion, will be subjected to any pains or penalties whatever. I do not know but that my friends will think that I am taking a very strange course for a man in my position; but what I am about to state I have held for years-I have declared my views in the private circle, I have declared them publicly in my own pulpit, and I am ready to declare them in this assembly. I have no sympathy with the Atheist, who denies the God who made him; I have no sympathy with the Deist, who denies the Savior who bought him with his blood; and least of all have I any sympathy with the professed Christian minister, who acknowledges Jesus as his highest ideal of human greatness and virtue, and in the same connection proves him guilty of falsehood. No, Sir! but I hold to free competition. I never feel that the citadel of truth is safe, while it is surrounded by bulwarks of human erection; but, in maintaining the cause of the Bible, I will retreat into the citadel, and open every door, and there I defy the world. It appears strange to me that men should often seem to be so afraid of the consequences of certain

[July 26th.

things. It was but a year or two since, that I was conversing with a gentleman high in civil society, of education, and in an honorable profession, who expressed great fears that geology was going to disprove the Bible; and with another one who was mightily afraid that the science of phrenology would overthrow the Bible. It appears to me that they really did not believe the Bible. I have such a conviction in the truth of the Holy Scriptures, that I say, only leave the Bible free, and leave its friends free to defend and advocate its truth, and you may leave all the opposition in the world free to attack it; I have no fears as to the result. Let them come into free competition; let every kind of error and delusion speak, only let truth be free to speak in turn, and I fear not. For this reason I approve of this resolution, and hope that it will pass.

Mr. FRENCH, of New Bedford. I will merely say, Mr. President, that my mind preponderates in favor of the word "person," and I should like to have that word inserted in preference to any other word that I have heard mentioned. There is a national odor about it which I like.

Mr. SUMNER, for Marshfield. I should like to ask the gentleman if he observed that the word "person" occurs in the second line. I presume he would not desire to have the word occur twice in the same sentence, used in different senses.

Mr. FRENCH. There might be some difference of opinion with regard to that; it would not be a very strong objection to my mind. As I was saying, there is a kind of national odor about this word "person"; I find that it is frequently used in the Constitution of the United States. I am in favor of that instrument, let me here remark, although so many persons suppose that I am opposed to it. I find, on a single page of the book before me, that the word "person occurs three times: "No person shall be convicted of treason," &c. Then again: "A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime," &c.; and again: "No person held to service or labor," &c. It is a term that is plain and simple, and at the same time most comprehensive. If we turn over, we find in the United States Constitution, in another place, the following: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime," &c. As the word "person" covers the whole ground, I am decidedly in favor of it.

Mr. HALLETT. I was unavoidably detained from the Convention until after the hour of meeting, and am indebted to my colleague on the Committee, the gentleman from Boston, for giving an explanation of this proposition; nevertheless, I desire to offer a word or two in order that the Convention may fully understand the views with which this amendment was suggested. I understand that the proposition is now to amend by substituting the word "person" instead of 'subject." I will only say in regard to that, that the Convention of 1820, containing men of all sorts of views and feelings, applied their criticisms to it, and after all, concluded to let it stand. The truth is, there is no word in the English language, applicable to a proposition of this kind, which you can substitute for it. It embraces every human being, who can by any possibility be within the Commonwealth; and whoever is within the Commonwealth must be subject to general laws of some kind or other. As that is the original word, I propose to leave it as it

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stands; if the Convention think proper to change it, they can do so, but I will remark that this change will render it necessary to make a great many alterations throughout the Constitution.

The gentleman says he regards the words proposed to be changed as comparatively slight and unimportant; because no man shall be called in question for his religious sentiments or opinions. It is in vain to deny that the practical construction of that is, that a man must have some religious sentiments or other. He shall not be called in question for his religious opinions or sentiments, but he may be for his irreligious opinions. Who is to determine whether his opinions are religious or irreligious? Your court, and therefore it is an ecclesiastical tribunal. That is the rule of law as it now stands. Let me refer, simply to show the operation of your Bill of Rights in this respect, to the case of the Commonwealth vs. Kneeland, as laid down in 20 Pickering's Reports, 206: "The Universalists believe in a God which I do not, but believe that their God, with all his moral attributes (aside from nature itself) is nothing more than a chimera of their own imagination." This language, which Mr. Kneeland published, was blasphemy, as the judges said, because he did not put a comma after God, although the author of it declared that he intended to have put a comma there. If we put in a comma it will read: "The Universalists believe in a God, which I do not "—that is, they believe in a kind of God which I do not, and it is no blasphemy at all. But the judges read it right on, The Universalists believe in a God which I do not"that is, I do not believe in any God at all-" but believe that their God, with all his moral attributes (aside from nature itself) is nothing more than a chimera of their own imagination; " and then it was blasphemy. The court also held that the law was not designed to prevent the simple and sincere disavowal of belief in the existence or attributes of a Supreme Being, upon suitable and proper occasions, but to punish a denial of God, made wilfully, and with a bad intent; and the question was very well put, how on earth is a man to deny God at all unless he does it wilfully? If he does not believe in a God, he must do it wilfully; and yet the judges say that he may deny God, provided he does not do it wilfully; and they did not punish him for denying God, but merely because he denied him wilfully! This brings us back to the question, have we arrived at this point in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, I arrived at it a good many years ago, but perhaps I am as much in advance on this point as I am in some others; I do not know how that may be, have we arrived at this point in religious freedom, to say in our Constitution that no man shall be molested or called in question for his opinions or sentiments concerning religion? As to the manner in which a man shall conduct, that is a very different question. I do not say that he should be allowed to go about the streets and proclaim his doctrines, for you do not allow Father Lamson to go into the streets and proclaim orthodox doctrines, or Mrs. Folsom to go about proclaiming abolition doctrines. Whatever doctrines are proclaimed in the street, if they are likely to create a mob or a riot, so as to disturb the public peace, that is quite another matter; it makes no difference what doctrines they are. The question for us to decide is, shall we go forward, or shall we go back to the old times in 1637,

when Governor Winthrop with his Councilthat very Council that sits in that secret room-called up that poor woman, Ann Hutchinson, for blasphemy, because she said that the ministers of Boston preached the doctrine of works, and not the doctrine of grace? When she said it was matter of conscience, the reply of the inquisitor, Governor Winthrop, was, you must keep your conscience right, or we shall keep it for you. And, accordingly, they did undertake to keep her conscience. They banished her; and, as history tells us, she went from here into the wilds of Connecticut; and the court of Massachusetts pursued her even there, and demanded that Connecticut should drive her out from their borders; and she was driven out and went into Rhode Island among the Indians, and herself and whole family were afterwards massacred. Now, Sir, that is a black stain upon the history of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts--a stain which has remained upon it to this day—and I hope that by our action upon this amendment, we will to-day wipe out that stain. Why, Sir, even as late as 1811, a man could not worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. He was obliged to contribute to the support of the parish minister. Among the earliest things that I can remember was the tythe man coming to the house of my father, who then contributed some $200 a year for the support of a Baptist minister. The tythe man came and seized his cow, and sold it for the payment of his parish taxes, because his conscience would not let him pay them. That circumstance made an impression upon my mind which I have felt ever since; and from that hour to this, I have thought it wrong to put any restraint upon any man's religious sentiments. With the belief, therefore, that God himself will take care of his own religion, which is worth preserving and sustaining, I think we should leave all men to the free exercise of their opinions on matters of religion, with the full liberty to worship God or not to worship him, as they may see fit.

Mr. WHITNEY, of Boylston. I should like to say one word upon this subject, and also to offer an amendment. I want to give my adhesion to the remarks of the gentleman on the left of the Chair, (Mr. Chandler,) and simply to say that I hold to that Protestantism which says that every man has a right to read and judge, and decide for himself, in all matters of religion; for, if we have not this right, then we might as well go back to Catholicism at once. Sir, if I were asked to give a reason to-day why it is that Catholicism, in this and other countries, is gaining ground, I should say that it was because Protestants had departed from their own Protestantism, and that we need another revolution in this matter; that every man has become, himself, a sort of pope, on a small scale, and actually verifies what one of the popes once said-that the Protestants denied the divine authority of the pope, in order that they might set up themselves as popes.

It seems to me, Sir, to be the worst of infidelity to bring the Word of God to sanction crime. He who brings forward the Bible to sustain the fugitive slave law, is, in my opinion, among the greatest blasphemers in the world; yet some of the clergy seem to think that they have a right to blaspheme in this way. Sir, I repeat it, that if they do so, they are among the greatest blasphemers that have ever been seen on the face of the

[July 26th.

earth. I am, therefore, in favor of this amendment; but I want to offer an amendment to it, because there is an exception that I want to show. I want to say that no man shall be molested for his religious opinions, except those whose opinions forbid the taking of human life. That exception is already made, in fact, and I want to have it acknowledged. The first best thing that a man can have is his rights, and the next best thing to that is to have his wrongs acknowledged. I do not mean to complain here or anywhere else of the action of the Convention. Why should you require that an oath or affirmation should be taken, by which every person by himself or his agent shall accede to the principle of taking away human life? Myself and five or six hundred others cannot take that oath. We have remained outside of the government for more than fifteen years, and men in all ages of the world have stood upon this objection, and I think our sentiments will not die out for some generations to We have had an existence since the days of Jesus Christ, and even before his days; and all we have asked for is a peaceable acknowledg ment that our religious opinions in this respect shall not deprive us of our civil rights.

come.

Gentlemen may say, with flippancy, "All you have to do is to take the oath," that "it does not mean anything." But, Sir, to us it does mean something; it means as much to us as did that oath which was required of Daniel O'Connell, that he would support the Protestant succession, which oath he, as a Catholic, could not take; and he was refused a seat in parliament in consequence, until the people of Ireland and the Catholics of England knocked so loudly at the door of that house, that they were obliged to repeal the law, and pass the Catholic Emancipation Act. We stand out upon precisely the same principle.

Mr. President: I have an amendment to offer, and I will give you the reason why I offer it.

The PRESIDENT. An amendment is not in order at this time. There are already two amendments pending.

Mr. HILLARD. I wish to state, in reply to one or two questions that have been asked here, that I do not understand, nor was it the understanding of the minority of the Committee, that this proposed amendment had anything to do with the exclusion of witnesses on account of their religious belief. That issue was not before us. I do not understand how giving testimony in a court of justice can be said to be a privilege, or how any person can be said to be restrained in the exercise of his religious freedom, in consequence of being debarred from giving testimony. If there be anybody who is deprived of a privilege, it is the party who calls the excluded witness; not the witness himself. The former loses a privilege; not the latter.

Mr. HALLETT. This is a question of the ́most important character; and I should hardly conceive that, in this enlightened age, any court would so construe that provision as to impose any restriction in this respect at all.

Mr. HILLARD. It is no "molestation" to deny to a man the right to testify. We do not allow parties to testify for themselves. We seal their lips, though they know more about the matter than anybody else. If we exclude them, we may exclude any one else.

The question was then taken on the amendment

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to the amendment, which was to strike out the word " subject" and insert in place of it the word "man."

The amendment to the amendment was rejected. Mr. BUTLER. In order that there may be perfect unanimity in regard to this matter, I now move that the word "subject" be stricken out, and the word "one" substituted in its place. It will be better English, and will cover the whole ground. It will then read :- It is the right of all men to worship the Supreme Being," &c., and "no one shall be molested," &c.

Mr. DANA. I move to amend the amendment of the gentleman from Lowell, by substituting "two" for the word "one" [laughter]; and the question will, of course, be taken on the highest number first. [Laughter.]

Mr. BUTLER. The gentleman for Manchester is wrong on two grounds: first, in interrupting a gentleman who has the floor, [a laugh]; and secondly, that it is hardly worth while to attempt to meet argument by ridicule. I think, that on examining the matter, the gentleman for Manchester will see, that my proposition makes better English.

Mr. DANA. What! "one better than "subject."

Mr. BUTLER. Yes, "one" better than "subject."

Mr. DANA. I do not agree to that.

that

Mr. BUTLER. Well, let us see how it is. You first say, that all men shall worship God, as they please, and then you say, that no "subject" shall be "molested or restrained," &c. You thus make a distinction between men and subject. Now, it seems to me, that it is better to say, all "men" shall worship God as they please, and that no "one" shall be molested or restrained in the exercise of that right. I understand it to be better English, and I think it will meet the wishes of every-body, besides. It suits the feelings of my friend for Abington, and also of my friend for Manchester, who wants to be understood as being in favor of this law, although he wants to ridicule my proposition by substituting "two." [A laugh.] Mr. CHAPIN, of Webster. I am gratified that the gentleman for Wilbraham, has conceded the points which I made, and I think the Convention now fully understand the state of the case. I am glad that the attention of the Convention has been called to that particular concession. Mr. BRIGGS, of Pittsfield. I am gratified, that my friend for Wilbraham has thrown some light upon the subject

Mr. SUMNER, for Marshfield. Will the gentleman from Pittsfield allow me to say, that I would like to answer the question of the gentleman for Wilbraham, by stating, that I thought I had properly answered his question, before he took the floor. That suggestion was not made in Committee, nor did I hear it made by any gentleman before.

Mr. BRIGGS. One thing is true. The gentleman for Wilbraham avows his opinion manfully and nobly; and now, it appears, that though the other gentlemen of the Committee did not apprehend anything of this kind, his opinion is, that the law should be changed on the subject of the admission of witnesses to testify. By the present law, as I understand it, no man who denies the existence of God, is permitted to take an oath in the name of that God whose existence he denies. Now, my friend for Wilbra

ham understands the effect of this to be, that the courts would so construe this, as that when a man presents himself as a witness, even if he were an Atheist

Mr. HALLETT. I did not say what the courts would do; but I spoke of the manner in which they ought to construe this provision.

Mr. BRIGGS. The gentleman avows plainly what he means, and what he thinks ought to be done. Now, if the Convention is prepared to say that there shall be no limitation in regard to the admission of witnesses, then we vote understandingly. I wanted to know more explicitly what are the evils complained of in the present Constitution, and what the remedy is to be. We now have something tangible. It is expected, that if this amendment is adopted, it will do away with all restraints upon witnesses produced in court, and that an Atheist is to be sworn in the same manner as the man who believes in the existence of that Supreme Being, upon whom he calls when he testifies.

Mr. HOLDER, of Lynn. Gentlemen are alarmed unnecessarily about this question. I cannot conceive a reason why a person who professes that he does not believe in the existence of a God, should, by that profession, be rendered unfit to give testimony in a court of justice. Suppose a man does believe in God; suppose that that man has no regard for humanity, no principle, perhaps, as good as we entertain; suppose he have a God in his imagination equal to Nero in cruelty, invested with everything odious to humanity, and nothing we could love, but everything to hate; I ask if that belief makes his testimony any better, whether it makes him more humane, more of a man that will tell the truth? Does not the very fact that a man, who disbelieves in the existence of a God, acknowledges that disbelief against the contrary prevailing sentiment, go to show that he is an honest and a truthful man? The idea which I hope we shall entertain of God, if we believe in one at all, is that of the being who has implanted himself in humanity at large.

When it was suggested to turn the word "subject" into the word "man," I thought that was the proper word. Man, understood in his rightful sense, gives power and efficiency to the word. I wish we all understood man as he was comprehended by that distinguished individual referred to by the gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Hillard). I would that we all understood him in the greatness and power which belongs to him. I hope the amendment will be adopted; for I believe one of the greatest manifestations of true religion is that which gives man his freedom, in every sense of the word.

Mr. JENKS, of Boston. I should like to inquire of the Chair, what the question is before the Committee? Is it not the motion to substitute the word "one" for the word "subject?" The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Mr. JENKS. The word "one," was proposed by the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler). Now, it seems to be very difficult, in this wise body, to find any sort of satisfactory synonyme for the word "subject." Some gentlemen suggest individual," others "man," others "one," others the word "citizen," and so on with others. Now, Sir, if they want to define the thing more nicely, they might as well take a definition which I have seen somewhere in print,

[July 26th.

and adopt that part of it which defines "man" to be "any intelligent, two-legged, featherless animal." [Laughter.]

Mr. GARDNER, of Seekonk. It seems to me, after all, that the word "subject" is the correct word, and one which is the most explicit. I hope, Sir, we shall not continue to debate this subject any farther. I hope the question will be put now, and the sense of the Convention taken upon the amendment offered by the gentleman from Lowell.

Mr. PARKER, of Cambridge. The Committee on the Bill of Rights, after listening to a discussion among themselves very much like that to which the Convention have listened this afternoon, came to the conclusion that it was best to retain so much of the rust of the Bill of Rights as was embraced in the word "subject."

The question recurring first upon the amendment offered by the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) it was put, and decided in the affirmative, upon a division, there being-ayes, 150; noes, 107.

So the amendment was adopted.

The question next recurred upon the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Webster, (Mr. Chapin,) to strike out the words "or restrain," and insert the word "or," before the word "molested," and being put, it was decided in the negative.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. SPOONER, of Warwick. I propose an amendment at the end of the clause, by adding the words "or any other subject," so as to provide that he shall not be molested for his sentiments, not only on the subject of religion, but on any other subject.

It may mean something, or it may not. I do not know whether it will. I think the gentleman for Wilbraham, (Mr. Hallett,) will recollect a subject to which it might have applied, some two or three years ago. If I recollect arightfor I was not deep in the subject of politics at that time-a governor of this Commonwealth-the goyernor who preceded the gentleman from Taunton, (Mr. Morton,)-proposed that a certain law be enacted, or rather that a certain law be applied to a certain class of persons who were very closely connected with a peculiar institution which exists in this country. On account of the sentiments of that governor upon that subject, the people of the Commonwealth restrained him from the exercise of his official duties; and I would restrain any governor from making any such proposition again.

The question was then taken upon the amendment offered by Mr. Spooner, and it was rejected.

The question then recurring upon the resolution, as amended,

Mr. LORD, of Salem, said: The gentleman who represents Wilbraham, (Mr. Hallett,) very frankly told us, in answer to an inquiry, or rather he volunteered to tell us, that this resolution was intended to take away all disqualification of witnesses, on account of their want of religious belief. It was calculated to do that. Now I desire to ask that gentleman if, in his judgment also, this resolution, or the principle of it, if incorporated into the Constitution, would prevent the punishment of any person for blasphemy?

Mr. HALLETT. If the gentleman will inform me what he means by the word "blasphemy," I will answer him.

Tuesday,]

Mr. LORD. Just what the law of the Commonwealth defines blasphemy to be, the contumeliously denying the existence of the Deity, or reproaching the Deity. Does he mean to say that a man, in the promulgation of his sentiments concerning religion, may contumeliously deny the existence of a God, or reproachfully deny it? I ask that because the gentleman knows that the language at the end of the sentence, which is "provided he doth not disturb the public peace," does not affect it, because it is a well settled principle of law, that no words disturb the public peace.

Mr. HALLETT. I desire to ask the gentleman another question: what does he mean by contumeliously? What signification has it?

Mr. LORD. I will read the statute of the Commonwealth; and I ask the gentleman whether this resolve would abrogate that statute?

"If any person shall wilfully blaspheme the Holy name of God by denying, cursing, or contumeliously reproaching God, his creation, government, the final judging of the world, or by cursing or contumeliously reproaching Jesus Christ or the Holy Ghost, or by cursing, or contumeliously reproaching the holy word of God, contained in the Holy Scriptures, or exposing them to contempt and ridicule, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the State Prison not more than two years, or in the county jail not more than one year, or by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars, and may also be bound to good behavior."

Now I ask the gentleman, if in his judgment, this resolution is intended to abrogate that statute?

Mr. HALLETT. The gentleman is very much distinguished in law, and I presume he must be equally so in polemics, and if that be so, he can explain this matter. I cannot. I do not know what contumeliously means. It may be that it will be explained, as in this volume of Pickering's Reports, it is said "wilfully" means "intentionally."

Mr. LORD. I do not now ask what he understands to be the meaning of this, but does he intend to abrogate it?

Mr. HALLETT. I mean to abrogate every power of every tribunal, ecclesiastical, civil, religious, or irreligious, to call any man in question for the opinions which exist between him and his God. That is what I mean. And then outside of that, outside of religious opinion, there exist the duties which man owes to society. Neither a religious man, or an atheistical man can infringe the duties which he owes to society. This is one thing, and the duty he owes to God another. It is entirely immaterial, as far as we have any control over them, what opinions he holds as to his God; but his duties between himself and his fellow men, are imperative that he shall so use his own as not to injure the possessions of others. He shall, therefore, so hold his opinions, and exercise them, as not to injure and abuse the opinions of others. In short, in the language of this Constitution, he may do anything, " provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship." A man, therefore, might contumeliously reproach God in his own closet, and injure nobody; but, if he goes into the streets and does it, it may be another thing.

Mr. LORD. Will the gentleman tell me whether he means to have this resolution abrogate that law? Does he mean that it shall be abrogated or not? That is the question.

Mr. HALLETT. I mean that the courts shall put their own construction upon it.

Mr. LORD. I do not want to know what the courts will do, but what the gentleman means? He can certainly have no objection to telling us whether he means to abrogate the statute I have read. Of course the gentleman has no conceal

ment.

[July 26th.

have come to this conclusion, as from the testimony of lawyers and others who are familiar with the proceedings in courts. Therefore, in voting for this, I do it because I believe it is useless to question a man as to his belief in God. Everybody believes in some sort of a superintending power, even if it be that of blind chance. Whatever belief he may have, he may swear if he pleases before the court that he believes in a God, although he may be what is called an infidel; and therefore in voting for this proposition, which may do away with the law forbidding infidels to testify, I trust none of us will be charged with any want of awe or reverence for the Supreme Being.

Mr. KINGMAN, of West Bridgewater. I shall vote for the amendment of the gentleman for Wilbraham, and I shall do so because I am in favor of the greatest liberty being allowed in this matter. Why, Sir, if the prediction of the distinguished member for Berlin is to be verified, we shall, in less than half a century, have half a million of Chinese in the State of Massachusetts, every one of whom is an idolater. And are these Chinamen to be deprived of the right of testifying in our courts of justice? It certainly appears to me to be a curious idea. I hope the amendment will be adopted, so that every man, be he Christian, Mahometan, or idolater, may have the privilege of testifying in our courts.

Mr. CHAPIN, of Webster. Mr. Chairman: I should like very much to know, what are the main objects which this Convention was called to consider. It has been said, that we have assembled here for certain purposes, and we have considered and acted upon many important subjects, but, Sir, I claim that we are not here to amend the Constitution in the manner now proposed. The people never contemplated any such amendment; they did not expect it; and are not prepared to vote upon it. I do not believe that the legal voters of our Commonwealth are ready to deny the existence of a Supreme Being in our courts of justice; but, on the contrary, they desire that every man connected with these proceedings, should feel and acknowledge His presence; that the judge upon the bench should feel it; that the juries in their boxes should feel it; and, above all, that the man upon whose testimony is depending the life and liberty of a fellow creature, should feel that the Great God is looking down upon him, and that the Recording Angel is writing every sentence he utters. And yet, from the remarks of the gentleman for Wilbraham, I am inclined to think that the design of this amendment is to effect that very object.

I wish to say, farther, that as a member of this Convention, and especially from the peculiar relations I sustain to the gentleman for Wilbraham, (Mr. Hallett,) I have the right to an answer from him, to the question proposed by the gentleman from Salem, (Mr. Lord). It so happens, that the town which he represents is my native place, and I am very happy it has been so ably and correctly represented in this Convention. I wish to say, for the encouragement of the gentleman for Wilbraham, that my eye has continually been upon him and his actions, during this session; and I have had occasion to feel proud that my native town has had so able, just, and learned a representative; but I do feel a mortification this afternoon, in seeing the town of my birth and education represented in this Minority Report of the Committee. I am sorry that that Report has