• CHAPTER II.

The present Existence of Mankind considered as a State of moral Trial.

On our entrance upon this subject, it is necessary to premise what has sometimes been kept out of sight by the visible and prominent disorders of man's moral state, namely, that there are still proofs of an evident determination in favour of virtue in the world. This determination is shown by the tendency of virtue to promote happiness, to gain superiority, to acquire the love and approbation of mankind; while vice, on the other hand, is not only punished as detrimental to society, but excites general abhorrence, as it were from some innate principle, however in many instances perverted. The fact, at all events, whether ascribed to innate sentiment, or to the spontaneous influence of reason, or to the universal effects of virtue upon society, is undeniable, that, in spite of the extent and prevalence of evil, it is the

uniform tendency of mankind to favour, love, and admire virtue; and that this

being part of the constitution of things, or - necessarily arising out of it, amounts to a declaration from "Him who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, and which part he takes a declaration clearly in favour of virtue and against vice*.”

But supposing it allowed, that mankind, by the exertion of some of their inherent faculties, usually discern, and even choose by preference, where their passions do not interfere, a course of conduct conformable to the general rules of moral virtue; a fact which, in this low view of it, will hardly be denied; the question, it is still said, does not so much concern the degree, as the existence, of moral evil-an evil which has hitherto kept the world in a state of perpetual disturbance; which deforms universally, though unequally, the human mind and character in every individual, and overwhelms a large proportion

* Butler, Analogy, chap, iii, to which I refer, as having indisputably established the fact alluded to. See also some remarks to the same purpose in Search's Light of Nature, vol. v. p. 307.

in unrepented sin; which exposes them to present misery and detestation, and, as we are expressly told by Revelation, to the severest punishment in a life to come* This question is not completely answered by alleging, that free-will is man's most valuable quality; that his abuse of this power has introduced the disorders of the moral world; and that man, therefore, himself the delinquent, cannot reasonably arraign the divine goodness for his own bad use of his distinguishing property †.

The Scripture history of the fall of our first parents, and its consequences, however satisfactorily it accounts to Christians for the present state of man, cannot be expected to silence sceptics; because the argument of the objector goes farther back, and inquires why they were permitted, or created liable to fall. This is the objection of Bolingbroke, when he complains of the severity with which God punished our first parents for a fault which he foreknew they would commit, when he abandoned their free-will to the temptation of committing it.

+ This is the scope of King's argument, in his famous Origin of Evil. "If we can show that more evils necessarily arise from withdrawing or restraining the use of free-will, than from permitting the abuse of it, it must be evident that God is obliged to suffer either these or greater evils. And since the least of these necessary evils is chosen, even infinite goodness could not possibly do better." Sect. v. subs. 1.

Surely, when we reflect upon the past history of the world, when we contemplate its present appearance, and when at the same time we turn our thoughts to that future state of existence which forms the best hope and consolation of the good; our reason must forcibly suggest to us, that, as far as our views can embrace the question, it would appear infinitely better for mankind if they had possessed no opportunity of making a bad election, or had been determined invincibly in favour of a good one, than that they should be exposed to the hazards of a contest where all are endangered, and so many are sure to fall irrecoverably *.

Whoever endeavours to prove that mankind, in being left liable to error, are

*It is a principal inquiry of Bayle, in his well-known discussion of this subject, why God, foreseeing that a creature would sin, if left to its own free conduct, did not determine it to that which was good, as he does conti nually determine the souls of the blest in paradise. The best answer, probably, which that objection can meet with is given by Law in his notes on King, vol. iv. p. 112, chap. v. sect. 5, subs, 2, But it is more calculated to silence, than to satisfy objections,,

placed in the most desirable state, lies under the disadvantage of arguing against the general apprehension and conviction which must result from a survey of the world. That general conviction asserts, that the being free and liable, and consequently likely, without constant diligence and painful struggles, to choose evil, is not only the greatest drawback on individual, but on universal happiness; that it leads to the heaviest misfortunes and the most poignant anguish to which life is exposed of which the chief alleviation is the hope of becoming at length victorious in such a difficult trial, of being relieved from intercourse with guilty free agents, and of enjoying the delightful tranquillity of a repose from the disturbing power of pas

sion *.

It is a position wholly untenable, that, according to our view of the subject, the degree of moral evil must necessarily have been as great as it is, unless an absolute

* The passage in Cicero to this purpose is very striking: "O felicem illum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium cœtumque proficiscar, et cum ex hac turba et colluvione discedam!" De Senectute,