Estoppel. State claiming title under a deed is subject to all the estoppels running with the title, p. 87.

Cited approvingly, but with no particular application, in Oxford Twp. v. Columbia, 38 Ohio St. 95.

Remainders.- Estates in remainder shall be construed to vest as soon as they may be, p. 92.

Cited and rule followed in Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 475, 478, 18 L. 874, 875, holding estates in remainder vest at the earliest period possible, unless there be a clear manifestation of intent to the contrary; Cropley v. Cooper, 19 Wall. 175, 22 L. 113, holding child took a vested estate; Mercantile Bank v. Ballard, 83 Ky. 491, 4 Am. St. Rep. 166, holding children took a vested remainder; as also in Williamson v. Field, 2 Sandf. Ch. 561.

Marriage settlements.- Acts of parent under, cannot affect the validity of the rights of the children once vested, p. 93.

Cited and applied in Magniac v. Thompson, 1 Bald. 363, F. C. 8,956, holding omission of trustee under marriage settlement, did not affect the cestui que trust.

Powers. In deeds under power to sell recital of the power is unnecessary, p. 98.

Cited and applied in Terry v. Rodahan, 79 Ga. 286, 11 Am. St. Rep. 427, 5 S. E. 42, holding deed made by an executor as an individual will execute a power of sale, though deed make no reference to power.

Damages.- Party is not in all cases bound to pay for improvements on his land, made against his will, p. 101.

Cited and applied in Newton v. Thornton, 3 N. Mex. 210, 5 Pac. 259, one making improvements upon land of another is not entitled to compensation. Cited, arguendo, in Tufts v. Tufts, 3 Wood. & M. 512, F. C. 14,233.

Miscellaneous.- Citation in Westbrooke v. Romeyn, 1 Bald. 203, F. C. 17,428, is to argument of counsel; State v. Patton, 5 Ired. 185, and State v. Floyd, 13 Ired. 385, as to force of prima facie evidence.

4 Pet. 102-107, 7 L. 796, EX PARTE BRADSTREET v. THOMAS. Mandamus.-The writ will lie to compel a judge to sign and settle a bill of exceptions, although not to control his discretion as to the frame of the bill, p. 106.

The following cases upon this point are collected by the citations: In re Streep, 156 U. S. 208, 39 L. 399, 15 S. Ct. 358, refusing to issue writ of mandamus requiring circuit judge to resettle bill of exceptions; Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 288, 39 L. 428, 15 S. Ct. 454, holdIng writ of mandamus will issue to compel district judge to admit to bail, where he has not exercised any discretion in the matter, but

has declined to act at all; People v. Pearson, 2 Scam. 204, 33 Am. Dec. 448, granting mandamus to compel judge to sign bill of exceptions as originally presented to him; People v. Jameson, 40 Ill. 96, 89 Am. Dec. 338, judge cannot, by mandamus, be compelled to sign bill of exceptions, which he believes incorrect; People v. Anthony, 129 Ill. 223, 21 N. E. 781, holding judge cannot, by mandamus, be forced to sign an amended bill of exceptions at a subsequent term, when he is unable to determine that exceptions were in fact taken on the trial; Halstead v. Brown, 17 Ind. 203, holding no other judge than the one who tried the cause can correct a bill of exceptions; Ketcham v. Hill, 42 Ind. 68, holding successor to judge presiding at trial has power to sign a bill of exceptions; Jelley v. Roberts, 50 Ind. 7, holding mandamus lies to compel a judge to sign a bill of exceptions; Shepard v. Peyton, 12 Kan. 618, holding judge cannot, by mandamus, be forced to sign a bill of exceptions which he believes untrue; State v. Todd, 4 Ohio, 352, discharging mandamus where bill of exceptions was incorrect; as also Vanvabry v. Staton, 88 Tenn. 341, 12 S. W. 788, and Douglass v. Loomis, 5 W. Va. 545, 546, where judge under oath denied its correctness; Page v. Clopton, 30 Gratt. 427, holding mandamus lies to compel judge to settle and sign bill; State v. Noggle, 13 Wis. 382, holding judge will not be compelled by mandamus to insert instructions in a bill, when he returns he has already settled it; State v. Kellogg, 95 Wis. 679, 70 N. W. 302, holding board, If facts are undisputed, may be compelled by mandamus to revoke a license.

Denied in dissenting opinion, Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 219, 8 L. 103, majority holding Supreme Court has power by mandamus to command Circuit Court to sign a bill of exceptions.

Practice. Bill of exceptions should be tendered at trial, and can only be signed after the term with consent of parties, or by special order of judge, p. 107.

The following citing cases affirm and apply the foregoing rule: Sheppard v. Wilson, 6 How. 275, 12 L. 436, holding where bill of exceptions was signed two years after the trial, the Supreme Court of Iowa were right in striking it out of the record; Turner v. Yates, 16 How. 29, 14 L. 831, holding record must show exception was taken at that stage of the trial, when its cause arose; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 358, 26 L. 117, holding where bills of exceptions are signed during the term, it is not necessary that they be antedated to time of trial; Davis v. Patrick, 122 U. S. 143, 30 L. 1092, 7 S. Ct. 1103, refusing to strike out bill of exceptions, where signature was delayed until term succeeding trial, through fault of judge; United States v. Jarvis, 3 Wood. & M. 225, F. C. 15,469, declaring record must show exception was made at time of trial; Nicoll v. Insurance Co., 3 Wood. & M. 537, F. C. 10,259, holding where exceptions are taken at trial, court may allow them to be reduced to form afterwards and filed nunc pro tunc; Marine, etc., Co. v. Manufactur

ing Co., 32 Fed. 824, refusing to sign bill of exceptions, not presented at the term nor within a reasonable time; United States v. Claasen, 46 Fed. 69, holding defendant in criminal case cannot obtain a further bill of exceptions, after issuance of a writ of error; Johnson v. Garber, 73 Fed. 525. 43 U. S. App. 107, exceptions to rulings cannot be considered by appellate court, if same were not taken at the trial, and before verdict was rendered; Lumber Co. v. Chapman, 74 Fed. 451, 42 U. S. App. 21, sustaining bills of exceptions signed after regular term, where their considerations had been postponed by formal order of court; Ex parte Nelson, 62 Ala. 382, holding, under statute, bill of exceptions must be signed before the adjournment of the term; Lenox v. Pike, 2 Ark. 22, declaring it must appear that exceptions were taken at the trial; Bardin v. L'Engle, 13 Fla. 572, holding bill of exceptions should be made up and signed during term of court at which trial is had; Bond v. Baldwin, 9 Ga. 14, holding admission of illegal testimony, not objected to at the time, is not ground for a new trial; Evans v. Fisher, 5 Gilm. 456, in any case bill of exceptions should appear on its face to have been taken and signed at the trial; Simonton v. Plank Road Co., 12 Ind. 380, holding where leave was given to file bill of exceptions within sixty days, but there was nothing to show it was then filed by leave of court, it could not be considered; Balt., etc., Assn. v. Grant, 41 Md. 564, holding presumption is that the signing was done by consent of parties or leave of court; Hooker v. Sawyer, 56 Md. 469, refusing to review bill of exceptions signed after the expiration of the term; Edelhoff v. Manufacturing Co., 86 Md. 606, 39 Atl. 315, holding bill validly signed within the time fixed by order; Commonwealth v. Greenlaw, 119 Mass. 209, holding application for an extension of time not having been made before adjournment of term, bills, though filed three days after verdict, cannot be allowed; V. & M. R. R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 51 Miss. 454, by agreement the bill may be settled and signed during vacation; Williams v. Ramsey, 52 Miss. 858, holding it error where bill was signed in vacation; Consaul v. Lidell, 7 Mo. 256, holding successor to trial judge had no right to sign bill of exceptions without consent of opposite party, under the statute; Pomeroy v. Selmes, 8 Mo. 732, holding bill of exceptions cannot be signed at a subsequent term of the court without the consent of the other party; Law v. Merrills, 6 Wend. 278, holding bill of exceptions must appear on its face to have been taken and signed at trial of cause; Ah Lep v. Gong Choy, 13 Or. 210, 9 Pac. 485, holding bill should be tendered immediately after trial, but settlement may be made within a reasonable time; as also in Ferrell v. Alder, 2 Swan, 79, ruling similarly, Clark v. Lary, 3 Sneed, 80, refusing to notice bill filed out of term time; McGavock v. Puryear, 6 Cold. 37, also so holding, Mallon v. Tucker M. Co., 7 Lea, 66, holding rule, that bill of exceptions be presented within fifteen days after verdict, is not unlawful or unreasonable; Nadenbousch v. Sharer, 2 W. Va. 295, declaring exceptions

ought to be taken before the jury retires. Cited approvingly in Brown v. Clarke, 4 How. 15, 11 L. 855, without special application; note, 8 Blackf. 575, on this topic; dissenting opinion, State v. Withrow, 135 Mo. 385, 36 S. W. 1038, discussing statute limiting time of preparing bill of exceptions.

Distinguished in Woods v. Lindvall, 48 Fed. 73, 4 U. S. App. 49, holding bill of exceptions may be allowed and filed at the term when the motion for a new trial is finally acted on, even though such action is taken at a term subsequent to the entry of judgment.

4 Pet. 108-110, 7 L. 798, EX PARTE TILLINGHAST.

Contempt.— Supreme Court will not punish attorney for contempt, for which he was stricken from the District Court roll of attorneys, by forbidding him the right to be a counsellor at its bar, p. 109. Cited and followed in In re Litchfield, 13 Fed. 869, holding parties in other district than that in which bankruptcy proceedings are pending may bring suits against assignee in State court without being guilty of a contempt of the court which appointed assignee. See also note, 12 Am. Dec. 184, on this topic, collecting authorities; 12 Am. Dec. 185, that judgment for contempt is not revisable in any other court, collecting authorities; note on effect of disbarment as to other courts, 95 Am. Dec. 343, collecting authorities; note, 2 Am. St. Rep. 861, on punishment of contempt, collecting authorities.

4 Pet. 111-123, 7 L. 799, BOYCE v. EDWARDS.

Bills and notes.- Letter describing a bill of exchange so its identity could not be mistaken, and promising to accept it, if shown to one who afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the letter, is a binding acceptance, p. 121.

Cited and rule applied as follows: Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. 414, 23 L. 249, holding a parol promise to accept a bill is an acceptance thereof; Cassel v. Dows, 1 Blatchf. 340, 341, 342, F. C. 2,502, holding where letter is a general authority to draw, writer cannot be held as acceptor; Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story, 237, 240, F. C. 12,165, under facts similar to main case; Bayard v. Lathy, 2 McLean, 464, F. C. 1,131, holding an authority to draw several bills of exchange, payable at specified periods, is an acceptance to one taking bills on the credit of such an authority; State Nat. Bank v. Young, 5 McCrary, 14, 14 Fed. 890, where draft was not described in unmistakable terms; Garrettson v. Bank, 39 Fed. 167, 7 L. R. A. 431, and n., to telegram asking if A. would pay F.'s check for $22,000, reply "T. is good. Send on your paper" held an acceptance; Smith v. Ledyard, 49 Ala. 282, holding one acting on faith of letter of credit, not actually shown him, may sue for a refusal to accept; Nelson v. Bank, 48 Ill. 39, 40, 95 Am. Dec. 512, 513, allowing action for breach of

.

promise to accept; Carrollton Bank v. Tayleur, 16 La. 499, 35 Am. Dec. 222, holding a general authority to draw bills will not enable a purchaser to charge drawee upon an implied promise to accept; Franklin Bank v. Lynch, 52 Md. 279, 36 Am. Rep. 377, holding telegram did not amount to an acceptance of a certain draft; Murdock v. Mills, 11 Met. 10, holding party not liable where agent's authority to show bills was special, and he exceeded it; Exchange Bank v. Rice, 98 Mass. 292, 293, holding a promise to accept a bill, contained in a letter after bill has been negotiated, will not authorize writer to be sued as acceptor; Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 459, holding letter to be an unconditional acceptance; Overman v. Bank, 30 N. J. L. 69, holding it essential that holder took bill on the faith of the promise; Ulster Bank v. McFarlan, 3 Den. 557, holding that the promise to accept must describe bill unmistakably; Lonsdale v. Bank, 18 Ohio, 140, holding action could not be maintained against parties as acceptors, but merely for a breach of promise to accept. Cited in note, 28 Am. Rep. 347, on this topic, collecting authorities; note, 2 Gall. 239, F. C. 10,860, collecting authorities; dissenting opinion, Talmadge v. Williams, 27 La. Ann. 655, without particular application; likewise in Birckhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 643; Cunningham v. Shaw, 7 Pa. St. 408, and Roman v. Serna, 40 Tex. 316. Cited in Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Met. 406, but not necessary to decision.

Bills and notes. In action on an accepted bill, the promise must be applied to that particular bill; in action on breach of promise to accept the evidence may be of a more general character, p. 122.

Cited and applied in Exchange Bank v. Hubbard, 62 Fed. 115, 26 U. S. App. 133, holding defendants not liable as acceptors, but as for a loan made to their agents; Kennedy v. Geddes, 3 Ala. 585, 37 Am. Dec. 716, holding action will lie on promise to accept bill thereafter to be drawn, though amount and date of payment are unknown; Whilden v. Bank, 64 Ala. 28, 30, 38 Am. Rep. 2, 4, holding that in declaring against a party as the acceptor, it was not necessary to aver the acceptance was in writing; Light v. Powers, 13 Kan. 98, holding contract to accept draft need not be in writing; Von Phul v. Sloan, 2 Rob. (La.) 150, 38 Am. Dec. 208, holding letter not to be an acceptance; First Nat. Bank v. Clark, 61 Md. 407, 48 Am. Rep. 116, holding drawee is not liable for breach of promise to accept, unless promise was made at time draft was drawn; Henrietta Nat. Bank v. Bank, 80 Tex. 651, 26 Am. St. Rep. 774, 16 S. W. 321, holding description in telegram sufficed to sustain an action for refusal to pay check; Kelley v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 664, 38 Pac. 160, holding action maintainable on breach of promise to accept, though not in writing; Putnam Nat. Bank v. Snow (Mass.), 52 N. E. 1079, holding action lies for breach of promise to accept an existing bill, in favor of holder of a bill drawn pursuant to such promise, and taken by him on the faith of it.