tractors, on the same contract, but as separate | bench, in England and America. After many contractors upon co-existing contracts, forming parts of the same general transaction. Of that very nature is the contract now before the court; and if the intention of all the parties was, that the letter of the 15th of November should be delivered to Belknap, as evidence of the original agreement between all the parties, and, indeed, as part execution of it, to bind the defendant, not merely to George D'Wolf, but to the plaintiffs (and so it has been established by the verdict), then it is not very easy to distinguish the case from that which was put. doubts, it seems at last in England, by the recent decisions of Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 Barn. & Ald. 595, and Jenkins v. Reynolds, 3 Brod. & Bing. 14, to have settled down into an approved authority. It has, however, not received a uniform recognition in America; although in several of the States, and particularly in New York, it has to a limited extent been adopted into its jurisprudence, as a sound construction of the statute. On the other hand, there is a very elaborate opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Packard v. But assuming that the true construction of Richardson, 17 Mass. 122, where its authority the statute of frauds is, as the authorities seem was directly overruled. What might be our to support, and that such a promise would be own view of the question, unaffected by any within its purview, it remains to consider local decision, it is unnecessary to suggest; whether the arguments at the bar do establish because the decisions in New York, upon the any error in the opinion of the Circuit Court. construction of its own statute, and the exIn the first place, there is no repugnance tent of the rules deduced from it, furnish in between the terms of that letter and the parol the present case a clear guide for this court. evidence introduced. The object of the latter In the case of Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 John. was to establish the fact that there was a R. 29, Mr. Chief Justice Kent in delivering sufficient consideration for the agreement; and the opinion of the court, adverting to the fact what that consideration was, and also the cir- that that case was one of a guarantee, or cumstances under which it was written, as promise collateral to the principal contract, but explanatory of its nature and objects. Its made at the same time, and becoming an esterms do not necessarily import that it was an sential ground of the credit given to the prinagreement exclusively between George D'Wolf cipal or direct debtor, added, "and if there was and the defendant. If the paper was so drawn no consideration other than the original transup and executed, by the assent of all the par- action, the plaintiff ought to have been perties for the purpose of being delivered to Bel-mitted to show that fact, if necessary by parol knap, as a voucher, and evidence to him of an absolute agreement by the defendant to make the shipment, and so was in fact understood by all the parties at the time, there is nothing in its terms inconsistent with such an interpretation. The defendant agrees to the shipment. But with whom? It is said with George D'Wolf alone; but that does not necessarily follow, because it is not an instrument in its terms inter partes. If the parties intended that it should express the proof; and the decision in Wain v. Warlters did not stand in the way." One of the points in that case was, whether the parol proof of the consideration [*502 was not improperly rejected at the trial; and the decision of the court was, that it ought to have been admitted. It is not, therefore, as was suggested at the argument, a mere obiter dictum, uncalled for by the case. It was one, though not the only one, of the points in judgjoint assentment before the court. The same doctrine has been subsequently recognized by the same court in Bailey v. Freeman, 11 Johns. R. 221, and in Nelson v. Dubois, 13 Johns. R. 175. 501*] *of George D'Wolf and the defendant, to the shipment, and it was deliverable to Belknap accordingly, as evidence of their joint assent that it should be made upon the terms and It does not seem necessary to pursue this subin the manner stated in it, there is nothing ject farther, because here is a clear authority which contradicts its proper purport; and it is justifying the admission of the parol evidence, then, precisely, what the parties require it to upon the principle of the local jurisprudence. be. It was for the jury to say whether the evi-It seems to us a reasonable doctrine, founded in dence disclosed that as the true object of it, and to give it effect accordingly, as proof of an agreement in support of the declaration. The case of Sargent v. Morris (3 Barn. & Ald. 277), furnishes no uninstructive analogy for its admission. In the next place, was the parol evidence inadmissible to supply the defect of the written instrument, as to the consideration, and res gestae, between the parties. The case of Wain v. Warlters (5 East, 10) was the first case which settled the point, that it was necessary to escape from the statute of frauds, that the agreement should contain the consideration for the promise, as well as the promise itself. If it contained it, it has since been determined that it is wholly immaterial whether the consideration be stated in express terms, or by necessary implication. That case has from its origin encountered many difficulties, and been matter of serious observation both at the bar and on the good sense and convenience, and tending rather to suppress than encourage fraud. But whether so or not, it sustains the opinion of the Circuit Court in a manner entirely free from exception. The next objection to the charge, founded on the variance between the declaration and proofs, has been abandoned at the argument, and need not be dwelt upon. And the last objection, to wit, to the designation of a vessel for the shipment as ineffectually made, has been already in part answered; and we entirely coincide with the views expressed on this point by the Circuit Court. Without, therefore, going more at large into the points of the case, or commenting upon the various authorities and principles so elaborately brought out in the discussions at the bar, it is sufficient to say, that we perceive no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court, and it is therefore to be affirmed with costs. Peters 1. nated as "the third codicil" annexed to the will of George Mason, which it was said was not proved and certified according to law. 3d. That the plaintiff could not recover, un Ejectment-courtesy-evidence-wills-law of less he could show that the land sued for was Kentucky. In an action of ejectment to recover land in Kentucky, the law of real estate in Kentucky is the law of this court, in deciding the rights of the parties. [505] It seems, that the rigid rules of the common law do not require that the husband shall have had actual seisin of the lands of the wife, to entitle himself to a tenancy by courtesy, in waste, or what is sometimes styled "wild lands." [506] If a right of entry on lands exists, it ought to be sufficient to sustain the tenure acquired by the husband, where no adverse possession exists. [508] At present it is fully settled in equity, that the husband shall have courtesy of trust as well as of legal estates, of an equity of redemption, of a contingent use, or money to be laid out in lands. [508] Under the law of the State of Kentucky, and the decisions of their courts upon it, a will with two witnesses is sufficient to pass real estate; and the copy of such will, duly proved and recorded in another State, is good evidence of the execution of the will. [508] It is a settled rule in Kentucky, that although more than one witness is required to subscribe a will disposing of lands, the evidence of one may be sufficient to prove it. [509] HE lessee of Richard B. Mason commenced Tan action of ejectment in the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky, against John Davis and others, tenants in possession, for the recovery of eight thousand acres of land, claiming to recover the same under a right of entry, under and by virtue of a grant from the State of Virginia to George Mason, of Fairfax, dated 19th of March, 1817. William Mason and others conveyed, by deed, their interest in and to the land in contest (they being children of the patentee), to George Mason, of Lexington, the eldest son of George Mason, the patentee. George Mason, the grantee and the father of the lessor, died the day of December, 1796, having first made his last will and testament; in a codicil to which, made on the 3d of November, 1796, he devised to the child of which his wife was then ensient, his Kentucky lands, "if the child should be born alive, and arrive at the age of twenty-one years, or married, whichever may first happen." Richard B. Mason, the lessor of the plaintiff, is, by the evidence in the cause, the posthumous child referred to in the codicil. This will was fully proved, and admitted to record, according to the laws of Kentucky, and was said to vest the title in Richard B. Mason. At the trial of the cause in the Circuit Court, the plaintiffs in error requested the court, by 504] instructions to the jury, 1st. *To exclude the depositions of Lund Washington and George Graham, on the alleged ground that they were not taken and certified according to law. 2d. To exclude what the defendants desig NOTE.—That the law of real estate, in a State, as settled by the decisions of the State Court, is the law of the United States Courts, see note to Clark v. Graham, 5 L. ed. U. S. 334 and note to Elmendorf v. Taylor. 6 L. ed. U. S. 289; and note to Darby v. Mayer, 6 L. ed. U. S. 367; and note to Jackson v. Chew, 6 L. ed. U. S. 583; McCormick v. Sullivant, 6 L. ed. U. S. 300; D'Wolf v. Rabaud, ante, 227; Waring v. Jackson, post, 266. Proving attested instruments by testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses, see note 35 L.R.A. 341. entered after George Mason, the elder, made his will, and not patented at his death. 4th. That if from the evidence they believe that the daughters of the patentee were dead before the commencement of this suit, they should find for the defendants, as the deed from the husbands did not pass the interest of the femes; nor had the husbands a right by courtesy to the lands, as they never had other or further possession of the lands than that given by deed. The court refused to give the several instructions prayed for, and a bill of exceptions was tendered, upon which the case was brought before this court. The facts of the case which appeared upon the record, in connection with the matters contained in the exceptions, are stated in the opinion of the court. It The defendants in error insisted, 1st. That the court should have excluded the third codicil. It was not, upon proof, ordered to be recorded by the County Court of Fairfax county. is not certified as having been proved, and ordered, or admitted to record. It was not proved upon the trial, by any admissible and competent proof, to have been executed by George Mason. 2d. That there was no competent proof upon the trial that the land in contest passed by conveyance to George Mason. It does not appear that they were not patented before the date of the will of George Mason, and otherwise disposed of by him in his will. The plaintiff should have proved that the lands were acquired by the said George Mason after his will, and not having done so, the court should have given the instructions asked for, on that point, by defendants. 3d. The court erred in stating to the jury that the deed conveyed to George Mason the courtesy right of the husbands of the femes covert, daughters of George Mason, Sen. 4th. The court erred in refusing to give the instructions asked for by defendants, upon the other points stated in the bill of exceptions. The case was argued by Mr. Rowan for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Wickliffe for the defendant in error. In reference to the rights of the husbands in the estates of their wives, Mr. Wickliffe cited 3 Bos. & Pull. 643. *Mr. Justice Johnson delivered the [*505 opinion of the court: The plaintiffs here were defendants below, to an action of ejectment, brought to recover eight thousand acres of land lying in the State of Kentucky. The law of real estates in Kentucky, therefore, is the law of this court, in deciding on the rights of the parties. The plaintiff's below derives title under, 1st, a patent to George Mason, of Gunston, issued in 1787; 2d, a deed of bargain and sale, from seven out of nine legal representatives of the patentee, their brother, to George Mason, of Lexington, executed in 1794; 3d, a codicil to the will of. George Mason, of Lexington, devising the premises to the lessor of the plaintiffs. Judg ment was rendered for plaintiffs, to recover eight-ninths of the premises. The defendants below relied on their possession, affecting to claim through the patent to the elder Mason, but adducing no evidence to connect themselves with it. The questions to be here decided are brought up by a bill of exceptions, taken by defendants below; and they will be considered, as they regard the deduction of title, in the order in which they have been stated above. The first question in this order relates to the deed executed by the representatives of Mason, the elder, to Mason, the younger, under whose will the lessor of the plaintiffs makes title. No exception was taken to the proof, upon which this deed went to the jury. The exceptions go to the nature and extent of the estate which passed under it. And first, it was insisted that it could pass nothing, unless the plaintiff's should show that the land sued for was entered after George Mason, Senior, made his will, and not patented at his death, on the ground that, otherwise, it passed under his will, and did not descend to these donors. argument here. It appears that the requisitions of the Act have been well complied with. This testimony, besides establishing the pedigree, marriage, and birth of issue, etc., of the husbands and their wives, and identity of the lessor of the plaintiffs, as devisees of G. Mason, the younger, also goes to prove the death of some, if not of all the daughters; and the exception is intended to raise the question whether, in the absence of evidence of actual seisin, the husbands had good estates as tenants by the courtesy, in the portions of the land belonging to their respective wives; if they had not, then by the death of their wives their estates were determined. To repel this objection to the vesting of the estate by the courtesy, evidence is introduced into the bill of exceptions to prove that "the adverse possession of the premises relied on by the defendants did not commence until after the execution of the deed, and after the death of George Mason; in other words, that the land was waste, or as is sometimes styled, "wild lands," at the time of executing the deed, and at all times before and down to the time of the devise from George Mason, Jr., to the lessors of the plaintiff took effect. But it is obvious that this instruction was properly refused, since the fact nowhere appears in the record that the elder Mason ever made a will competent in law to transfer real estate. The deed, it is true, purports to carry into effect his intentions towards his children; but non constat, whether that intention had ever been signified, otherwise than by parol or by an informal will. If a will had ever been executed, with the formalities necessary to defeat the heir-at-law, the defendants should*It would indeed be idle to compel an [*507 have availed themselves of it by proof. The next instruction prayed for by defendants, and rejected by the court, was, "that if from the evidence the jury believed that the daughters of the patentee were dead before the suit was brought, that then they ought to find for defendants as to the undivided interest of such daughters, and that the deed did not pass their interest. The court instructed the jury 506*] *that the deed did not pass the interest of the daughters, but passed the interest of their husbands, who were tenants by courtesy; although they had never had other or further possession of the land than what they acquired by deed. To understand this part of the bill of exceptions it is necessary to notice that from the record it appears that among the parties of the first part to the deed to G. Mason, the younger, were four daughters of G. Mason, the elder, and their husbands; that the daughters had formally executed a release of inheritance under a commission issued from a court in Virginia, but because the States were then separated, as a judicial proceeding it had no validity as to lands in Kentucky; and the lessor of the plaintiffs was compelled to stand upon the interest conveyed to him by the deeds of the husbands, as tenants by the courtesy. In order to prove the pedigree of the donors, the marriage, birth of issue, etc., and of the sons-in-law of the elder Mason, the testimony of two witnesses was introduced by plaintiff's, taken under the Act of Congress. To the introduction of this testimony an objection was Imade and overruled; and this constituted another ground of exception, which, however, has been very properly waived by the counsel in It is believed that the rigid rules of the common law have never been applied to a wife's estate in lands of this description. In the State of New York, 8 John. Rep. 271, these rules have been solemnly repelled; and we know of no adjudged case, in any of the States, in which they have been recognized as applicable. heir or purchaser to find his way through pathless deserts, into lands still overrun by the aborigines, in order to "break a twig," or "turn a sod," or "read a deed," before he could acquire a legal freehold. It may be very safely asserted, that had a similar state of things existed in England when the conqueror introduced this tenure, the necessity of actual seisin, as an incident to the husband's right, would never have found its way across the channel. It is true that Perkins and Littleton, and other authors of high antiquity and great authority, lay down the necessity of actual seisin, in very strong terms, and exemplify it by cases which strikingly illustrate the doctrine. But even they do not represent it as so unbending as to be uncontrolled by reason. The distinction is taken between things which lie in livery and things which lie in grant; and with regard to the latter, the seisin in law is enough, because they admit of no other; and as Lord Coke observes, "the books say it would be unreasonable the husband should suffer for what no industry of his could prevent;" and further, "that the true reason is, that the wife had those inheritances which lie in grant, and not in livery, when the right first descends upon her, for she hath a thing in grant when she has a right to it, and nobody else interposes to prevent it." And in another place he says, "a husband shall be a tenant by courtesy, in respect to his wife's seisin in law, where it was impossible for him to get an actual seisin." for "the favor which the law shows to the husband that has issue by his wife shall not be lost without some default in him." So, when describing what is livery of seisin, and defining the distinction between livery and deed, and two witnesses is sufficient to pass real estate; and the copy of such a will, duly proved and recorded in another State, is good evidence of the execution of the will livery in law, he says of the latter, "if the, the decision of their courts upon it, a will with feoffee claims the land, as near as he dares to approach it, for fear of death or battery, such entry in law shall execute the livery in law." And as a proof that even in his time the common law had begun to untrammel itself of the rigorous rule that livery of seisin, or entry, was indispensable to vesting a freehold, the fact may be cited that livery of seisin was held unnecessary to a fine, devise, surrender, release or confirmation to lessee for years. The mode of conveyance, by lease and release, and some other modes, it is well known arose out of an effort to disembarrass the transfer of titles of an idle form which had survived the feudal system. As it relates to the tenure by courtesy, the necessity of entry grew out of the rule which invariably existed, that an entry must be made in order to vest a freehold (Co. Lit. 51); and out of that member of the definition of the tenure by courtesy, which requires that it should be inheritable by the issue. When a descent was cast the entry of the mother was 508*] necessary, or the *heir made title direct from the grandfather, or other person last seized. But in Kentucky, we understand, the livery of seisin is unheard of. Freeholds are acquired by patent, or by deed, or by descent, without any further ceremonies; and in tracing pedigree, the proof of entry, as successive descents are cast, is never considered as necessary to a recovery, or in any mode affecting the course of descent. If a right of entry therefore exists, it ought by analogy to be sufficient to sustain the tenure acquired by the husband, where no adverse possession exists; as it is laid down in the books relative to a seisin in law "he has the thing if he has a right to have it." Such was not the ancient law; but the reason of it has ceased. It has been shown that in the most remote periods exceptions had been introduced on the same ground; and in the most modern, the rule has been relaxed upon the same consideration. We ought not to be behind the British courts in the liberality of our views on the subject of this tenure. A husband, formerly, could not have courtesy of an use; that is, where his wife was cestui que use (Perkins's Curtesy, fol. 89), and this continued to be the law down to the time of Baron Gilbert (Law of Uses and Trusts, 239); at present it is fully settled in equity that the husband shall have courtesy of a trust as well as of a legal estate, 2 Vern. 536; 1 P. W. 108; Atk. 606, of an equity of redemption, a contingent use, or money to be laid out in lands. The case made out in the bill of exceptions is one in which there could not possibly have been any default in the husbands, since the disseisin by defendants did not take place until after the death of George Mason, Jr., and of consequence after the transfer of title by the husbands, and after the devise took effect in favor of the plaintiff's lessor. These points being disposed of, it only remains to consider the questions raised upon the introduction of the will of George Mason, Jr., or rather of the codicil under which the lessor of the plaintiffs takes title. Under a law of the State of Kentucky, and The objection here is, that it does not appear from the exemplified copy that this codicil was duly proved, because the probate does not go to that codicil, but to another; and second, because it appears to have been admitted to record on the testimony of a single witness. *The probate purports "that the two [*509 codicils were proved by the oath of Daniel M'Carty." From the exemplification it appears that at three several dates the testator added to his will, what he calls codicils, but as there is no signature to the first, we are satisfied that the first and second were well considered as making but one; and therefore that the probate, although purporting to go to two codicils only, was well considered as going to this; which, but for the want of the signature to the first, would have been the third codicil. What is decisive on this subject, is, that the first two codicils have no subscribing witness, distinct from the last; and the name M'Carty, the witness sworn, is subscribed to the second, or as the defendants contend it should be considered, to the third codicil. of With regard to the second exception to the sufficiency of the proof of this codicil, it can only be necessary to resort to adjudged cases, as they seem conclusive to this point. There were two witnesses to this codicil, to wit, Thompson Mason and M'Carty. M'Carty only was sworn, and the probate upon which it was ordered to be recorded, imports that the two codicils were proved by the oath of Daniel M'Carty. In the case of Harper et al. v. Wil son et al., decided in the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky, in 1820, in which the right to lands was in controversy, the probate was in these words: "This will was produced in court, proved by the oath of Sarah Harper, a subscribing witness thereto, and ordered to be recorded." There was another subscribing witness to the will, and exception was taken to the sufficiency of the proof. The language of the court in that case was: "As to the proof of the execution of the will it need only be remarked that its admission to record is sufficient to show that the witness by whom it was proven in that court, established every fact essential to its due execution; and it is a settled rule, that although more than one witness is required to subscribe a will disposing of lands, the evidence of one may be sufficient to prove it." 2 Marshall, 467. The same doctrine has been since fully recognized in the case of Turner v. Turner, 1 Litt. Rep. 103, adjudged in the same court in 1822; and the identity of the certificate and facts in this case with those in the case of Harper v. Wilson, leaves nothing for this court to deliberate upon. There is spread upon the record a consid. erable body of testimony, taken by the court by which the will had been previously admitted to record, and which upon the face of it, appears to have been taken in order to remove all doubt on the sufficiency of the will, and authenticity of the attestations to it. But as it does not appear to have been followed up by any order of that court, it was not [*510 taken into view in the bill of exceptions, and made no part in the evidence in the court below. It therefore only required this remark in order to prevent any misapprehension on this point. We are of opinion that there was no error in the judgment below, and that it be affirmed with costs. 511*] *THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, and The Ocean Insurance Company (of New York), Appellants, V. 356 BALES OF COTTON. David Canter, Claimant and Appellee. Treaty-making power-usage of nations as to occupation of conquered territory-legal status of Florida after its cession to the United States-powers of Federal courts, of Florida courts. The Constitution of the United States confers. absolutely, on the government of the Union, the power of making war, and of making treaties. Consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty. [542] The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace, If it be ceded by treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed; either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose. On such transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which trans fers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it, and the law which may be denominated political, is, necessarily, changed; although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly created power of the State. [542] The treaty with Spain, by which Florida was ceded to the United States, is the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoy ments of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States. They do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share in the government, until Florida shall become a State. In the meantime Florida continues to be a territory of the United States, governed by virtue of that clause in the Constitution which empowers "Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States." [542] The powers of the territorial Legislature of Florida, extend to all rightful objects of legislation; subject to the restriction, that their laws shall not be "inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States." [543] All the laws which were in force in Florida, while a province of Spain, those excepted which were political in their character, which concerned the relations between the people and their sovereign, remained in force until altered by the government of the United States. Congress recognizes this principle, by using the words "laws of the territory now in force therein." No laws could, then, have been in force but those enacted by the Spanish government. If among them there existed a law on the subject of salvage-and it is scarcely possible there should not have been such a lawjurisdiction over it was conferred by the act of Congress relative to the territory of Florida, on the Superior Court; but that jurisdiction was not exclusive. A territorial act, conferring jurisdiction over the same cases as an inferior court, would, not have been inconsistent with the seventh section of the act, vesting the whole judicial power of the territory in two Superior Courts, and in su.. Inferior courts, and justices of the peace, as the jegislative council of the territory may from time to time establish. [544] *The eleventh section of the act declares [*512 "that the laws of the United States relating to the revenue and its collection, and all other public acts not inconsistent or repugnant to the act, shall extend to and have full force and effect in the territory of Florida." The laws which are extended to the territory by this section, were either for the punishment of crimes, or for civil purposes. Jurissection, but in civil cases, that section gives ju isdiction is given in all criminal cases by the seventh diction only in those which arise under, and are cognizable by the laws of the territory. Consequently, all civil cases arising under the laws which are extended to the territory by the eleventh section, are cognizable in the territorial court by virtue of the eighth section; and in those uses, the Superior Courts may exercise the same jurisdiction as is exercised by the court for the Xentucky District. [544] The Constitution and laws of the United States give jurisdiction to the District Courts, over all cases in admiralty; but jurisdiction over the ase, does not constitute the case itself. [545] The Constitution declares that "the jua cial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under it-the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made ur der their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all ases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The 'onstitution certainly contemplates these as three listinct clases of cases; and if they are distinct, the grant of jurisidiction over one of them, does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The discrimination made between them is con elusive against their identity. [545] A case in admiralty does not, in fact. arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law admiralty and maritime, as it existed for ages, is applied by our courts to the cases as they arise. It is not, then, to the eighth section of the territorial act, that we are to look for the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the territorial courts of Florida. Consequently, if that jurisdiction is exclusive, it is not made so by the reference in the act of Congress to the District Court of Kentucky. [545] The judges of the Superior Courts of Florida hold their offices for four years. These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial powers conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty, which exists in the government; or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make laws regulating the territories belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested. is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the third article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the exercise of its powers over the territories of the United States. [546] Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States, in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and State governments. [546] The act of the territorial Legislature of Florida, erecting a court which proceeded under the provisions of the law to decree, for salvage, the sale of a cargo of a vessel which had been stranded, and which cargo had been brought within the territorial limits, is not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States, and is valid; and consequently a sale of the property made in pursuance of it changed the property. [546] PPEAL from the Circuit Court of [*513 the United States for the District of South Carolina. The libel filed in this cause in the District Court of South Carolina, on the 18th April, 1825, alleged that five hundred and eighty-four bales of cotton, insured by the libelants, were |