stories in the confused manner in which they are sometimes related by puzzled witnesses: let them reduce the heterogeneous circumstances to order, make a clear statement of the case for themselves, and try if they can point out the facts on which the decision principally rests. This is not merely education for a lawyer; the powers of reasoning and judgment, when we have been exercised in this manner, may be turned to any art or profession. We should, if we were to try the judgment of children, observe, whether in unusual circumstances they can apply their former principles, and compare the new objects that are placed before them without perplexity. We have sometimes found, that on subjects entirely new to them, children who have been used to reason, can lay aside the circumstances that are not essential, and form a distinct judgment for themselves, independently of the opinion of others. Last winter the entertaining life of the celebrated miser Mr. Elwes was read aloud in a family, in which there were a number of children. Mr. Elwes, once, as he was walking home on a dark night, in London, ran against a chair-pole and bruised both his shins. His friends sent for a surgeon. Elwes was alarmed at the idea of expense, and he laid the surgeon the amount of his bill, that the leg which he took under his own protection would get well sooner than that which was put under the surgeon's care; at the same time, Mr. Elwes promised to put nothing to the leg of which he took charge. Mr. Elwes's favourite leg got well sooner than that which the surgeon had undertaken to cure, and Mr. Elwes won his wager. In a note upon this transaction, his biographer says, This wager would have been a bubble bet if it had been brought before the Jockey-club, because Mr. Elwes, though he promised to put nothing to the leg under his own protection, took Velno's vegetable sirup during the time of its cure." C (a girl of twelve years old) observed when this anecdote was read, that "still the wager was a fair wager, because the medicine which Mr. Elwes took, if it was of any use, must have been of use to both legs; therefore the surgeon and Mr. Elwes had equal_advantage from it." C had never heard of the Jockeyclub, or of bubble bets before, and she used the word medicine, because she forgot the name of Velno's vegetable sirup. : We have observed,* that works of criticism are unfit for children, and teach them rather to remember what others say of authors, than to judge of the books themselves impartially but, when we object to works of criticism, we do not mean to object to criticism; we think it an excellent exercise for the judgment, and we have ourselves been so well corrected, and so kindly assisted, by the observations of young critics, that we cannot doubt their capacity. This book has been read to a jury of young critics, who gave their utmost attention to it for about half an hour at a sitting, and many amendments have been made from their suggestions. In the chapter on Obstinacy, for instance, when we were asserting that children sometimes forget their old bad habits, and do not consider these as a part of themselves, there was this allusion: "As the snake, when he casts his skin, leaves the slough behind him, and winds on his way in new and beautiful colours." The moment this sentence was read, it was objected to by the audience. Mr. objected to the word slough, as an ill-sounding, disagreeable word, which conveyed at first to the eye the idea of a wet, boggy place; such as the Slough of Despond. At last Swho had been pondering over the affair in silence, exclaimed, "But I think there's another fault in the allusion; do not snakes cast their skins every year? Then these new and beautiful colours, which are the good habits, must be thrown aside and forgotten the next time; but that should not be." This criticism appeared conclusive even to the author, and the sentence was immediately expunged. When young people have acquired a command of language, we must be careful lest their fluency and their ready use of synonymous expressions should lessen the accuracy of their reasoning. Mr. Horne Tooke has ably shown the connexion between the study of language and the art of reasoning. It is not necessary to make our pupils profound grammarians or etymologists; but attention to the origin, abbreviations, and various meanings of words, will assist them not only to speak, but to think and argue, with precision. This is not a study of abstract speculation, but of practical, daily * See Chapter on Books. utility; half the disputes, and much of the misery of the world, originate and perpetuate themselves by the inaccurate use of words. One party uses a word in this sense, the opposite party uses the same word in another sense; all their reasonings appear absurd to each other; and, instead of explaining them, they quarrel. This is not the case merely in philosophical disputes between authors, but it happens continually in the busy, active scenes of life. Even while we were writing this passage, in the newspaper of to-day we met with an instance that is, sufficiently striking. "The accusation against me," says Sir Sidney Smith, in his excellent letter to Pichegru, expostulating upon his unmerited confinement, " brought forward by your justice of the peace, was, that I was the enemy of the republic. You know, general, that with military men, the word enemy has merely a technical signification, without expressing the least character of hatred. You will readily admit this principle, the result of which is, that I ought not to be persecuted for the injury I have been enabled to do while I carried arms against you." Here the argument of two generals, one of whom is pleading for his liberty, if not for his life, turns upon the meaning and construction of a single word. Accuracy of reasoning and some knowledge of language may, it appears, be of essential service in all professions. It is not only necessary to attend to the exact meaning which is avowedly affixed to any terms used in argument, but it is also useful to attend to the thoughts which are often suggested to the disputants by certain words. Thus, the words happiness and beauty suggest, in conversation, very different ideas to different men; and in arguing concerning these, they could never come to a conclusion. Even persons who agree in the same definition of a word, frequently do not sufficiently attend to the ideas which the word suggests; to the association of thoughts and emotions which it excites; and consequently they cannot strictly abide by their own definition, nor can they discover where the error lies. We have observed✶ that the imagination is powerfully affected by words that suggest long trains of ideas; our reasonings are influenced in the same manner, and the * See Chapter on Imagination. elliptical figures of speech are used in reasoning as well as in poetry. "I would do so and so, if I were Alexander." "And so would I, if I were Parmenio ;" is a short reply, which suggests a number of ideas and a train of reasoning. To those who cannot supply the intermediate ideas, the answer would not appear either sublime or rational. Young people, when they appear to admire any compressed reasoning, should be encouraged to show that they can supply the thoughts and reasons that are not expressed. Vivacious children will be disgusted, however, if they are required to detail upon the subject; all that is necessary is, to be sure that they actually comprehend what they admire. Sometimes a question that appears simple, involves the consideration of others which are difficult. Whenever a preceptor cannot go to the bottom of the business, he will do wisely to say so at once to his pupil, instead of attempting a superficial or evasive reply. For instance, if a child were to hear that the Dutch burn and destroy quantities of spice, the produce of their Indian islands, he would probably express some surprise, and perhaps some indignation. If a preceptor were to say, “ The Dutch have a right to do what they please with what is their own, and the spice is their own," his pupil would not yet be satisfied; he would probably say, "Yes, they have a right to do what they please with what is their own; but why should they destroy what is useful?" The preceptor might answer, if he chose to make a foolish answer, "The Dutch follow their own interest in burning the spice; they sell what remains at a higher price; the market would be overstocked if they did not burn some of their spice." Even supposing the child to understand the terms, this would not be a satisfactory answer; nor could a satisfactory answer be given, without discussing the nature of commerce and the justice of monopolies. Where one question in this manner involves another, we should postpone the discussion, if it cannot be completely made; the road may be just pointed out, and the pupil's curiosity may be excited to future inquiry. It is even better to be ignorant than to have superficial knowledge. A philosopher who himself excelled in accuracy of * See Attention. reasoning, recommends the study of mathematics, to improve the acuteness and precision of the reasoning faculty. To study any thing accurately, will have an excellent effect upon the mind; and we may afterward direct the judgment to whatever purposes we please. It has often been remarked, as a reproach upon men of science and literature, that those who judge extremely well of books and of abstract philosophical questions, do not show the same judgment in the active business of life: a man undoubtedly may be a good mathematician, a good critic, an excellent writer, and may yet not show, or, rather, not employ, much judgment in his conduct: his powers of reasoning cannot be deficient; the habit of employing those powers in conducting himself, he should have been taught by early education. Moral reasoning and the habit of acting in consequence of the conviction of the judgment, we call prudence; a virtue of so much consequence to all the other virtues; a virtue of so much consequence to ourselves and to our friends, that it surely merits a whole chapter to itself in Practical Education. CHAPTER XXIV. ON PRUDENCE AND ECONOMY.. VOLTAIRE says that the King of Prussia always wrote with one kind of enthusiasm, and acted with another. It often happens that men judge with one degree of understanding, and conduct themselves with another; hence the commonplace remarks on the difference be-tween theory and practice; hence the observation, that it is easy to be prudent for other people, but extremely difficult to be prudent for ourselves. Prudence is a vir * Locke. Essay on the Conduct of the Human Understanding. "Here lies the mutton-eating king, Whose promise none relied on; And never did a wise one.' Epitaph on Charles Second. |