I

CHAPTER XLVI.

NOMINALLY A CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

HAVE referred (p. 312) to the statement made in the House of Representatives by Champ Clark to the effect that the Brownsville affray had put me out of the Presidential race of 1908.

Recurring to what that remark suggests, there was always after I first became Governor much mentioning of my name, from time to time, both in the newspapers and by individuals in connection with the Presidency. Some of these comments were favorable and others unfavorable.

It was with me about as it is with every other man who is elected Governor of one of the important States of the Union, especially if his election be preceded by a campaign that involves questions of importance that are discussed in such a way as to attract attention.

This talk, however, apparently gave others a great deal more concern than it gave me. I was not unmindful of it. I appreciated the compliment involved, but there was never a time when I felt that it was wise, or that I would have any fair chance for the nomination, if I should, at that particular time, become a candidate.

As I now look back over my career, I can see, as I saw then, that I had a good chance for the nomination in 1888, and rightfully so, according to political usage and practice.

I had at that time a soldier record, a judicial record, and was serving my second term as Governor of one of the most important States of the Union. I was not, however, a candidate; and refused to allow my name to be used for two reasons; in the first place, because Ohio had, with my approval and co-operation-no one man doing more or even so much in that behalf as I had done-endorsed Mr. Sherman at our

State Convention of 1887 as Ohio's candidate for the Presidency in 1888.

When, at the National Convention, it became apparent to all that Mr. Sherman could not be nominated, I was according to all the rules applicable to such a situation at liberty to allow the use of my name, but I declined although urgently solicited to do so by the Blaine element which was strong enough to have given me the nomination, as it afterward gave it to Harrison, because I did not want to be liable to the charge of infidelity to Mr. Sherman's cause, and, therefore, refused to consider the matter unless first requested by him to do so. But also, because, it appeared to me presumptuous for me to aspire to the Presidency while there were ahead of me in years and experience such great Republican leaders as Harrison, Allison, and a dozen others, who were yet available after both Mr. Blaine and Mr. Sherman had been dropped out of consideration.

I had not at that time had any experience in the public service beyond my own State. I thought then, and subsequent experience has confirmed the correctness of that view, that men who have served as Members of Congress in either the House or the Senate, and have been in this way brought into contact with our actual National life are so much better qualified for the Presidency than are the men, as a rule, who have not had that experience, that, all other things being equal, they should have the preference; not because they merit the honor more, but because they are in an important sense much better qualified for an intelligent and satisfactory discharge of the duties of Chief Executive.

Harrison had the advantage of this experience. He had served with distinction in the Senate, and had seen enough of practical politics and official life to be typically well qualified not only for the official but also the social duties of the position.

He was one of the ablest men who ever occupied the White House. In all official respects his administration was admirable. But he was unfortunate in his intercourse with others. Some one truthfully said he had a great faculty for measures, but none for men. Nearly everyone who called upon him

came away with a feeling that he had been an unwelcome visitor. His reputation in this respect was in time exploited by the newspapers, but long before anything was publicly said in criticism it had been widely advertised privately by word of mouth.

This made him much trouble; so much that it was with difficulty he secured a renomination. The defeat that followed was due almost altogether to the fact that while everybody had great admiration and respect for his integrity and ability nobody had any enthusiasm for his personality.

But, irrespective of all this, the term he served and the term for which he was defeated, served by Mr. Cleveland, carried us down to 1896, at which time, I, in common with Republicans generally, regarded McKinley as the logical candidate because of his authorship of the McKinley Law, and the fact that the hard times under Mr. Cleveland's second administration had made the tariff the leading issue.

I was personally a warm friend of Thomas B. Reed, McKinley's chief opponent. It was with regret I found the two men pitted against each other. Under any other circumstances it would have been to me a great pleasure to have supported Mr. Reed, for I thought then, and my subsequent better knowledge of him confirmed the opinion, that he was one of the most intellectual and one of the most capable public officials our country has ever produced.

He was a much more scholarly man than McKinley and a greater man in other important respects, but McKinley was a man of such popular manners, such a pleasing and effective campaign orator, and withal such an all round safe and prudent man that in view of the fact that he was from our State, and just then the most distinguished and popular champion of protection, I could not have hesitated to give him the preference even if I had not desired to do so in making choice of a Republican candidate for the Presidency.

His election and re-election carried us down to 1904, at which time nobody had any chance for the nomination as against President Roosevelt. His nomination and election brought us to 1908. I have mentioned all this in detail to

show that except in 1888 there was never at any time any reasonable chance for my nomination to be President, even if I had seen fit to become a candidate.

I recognized that as fully then as I do now, and it was because of this fact that I said there was never any time for me to be a candidate for the Presidency that seemed to me to be a favorable time, and, therefore, I never indulged that ambition prior to 1908, except only in so general a way that it had no influence whatever upon my course in the discharge of my public duties.

In 1908 I was a formally announced candidate for the nomination, but with full knowledge at the time that I had no chance whatever to be nominated. That I should become a candidate under such circumstances requires some expla

nation.

In 1906 after my vote against the Hepburn Rate Bill there was a loud outcry, preceding our State Convention, that year held at Dayton, O., against the endorsement of the Senators. Mr. Burton, then a member of Congress from the Cleveland District, appeared to sympathize with this feeling. In a speech, shortly prior to our convention, he undertook to occupy middle ground by advising that the approaching convention should heartily endorse the National administration and "less cordially" endorse the Senators.

I do not now recall exactly what his opposition was to giving a cordial endorsement to Senator Dick, but the specifications against me were that I had not loyally supported the administration as to the Rate Bill, and, perhaps, some other matters, about which I had been wicked enough to have opinions of my own.

I was spending the summer with my family in a cottage at Seabright, New Jersey. I had not intended to attend the convention until I read the "less cordial" proposition of Mr. Burton. I had barely time to reach Dayton; but I was there when the Convention assembled. It was one of the most remarkable in the history of our State.

I was not on the program, but I was on the platform when the Convention was called to order.

The gentlemen who supposed they had that Convention in charge did not intend I should have a place on either the program or the platform, but in view of the question that had been raised I wanted to be present to see for myself whether or not the Republicans of Ohio wanted to give me a "less cordial" endorsement. If they had given me such an endorsement my services in the Senate would have terminated then and there. It was perfectly manifest to me from the moment I reached the Convention that the great majority of the Convention had no sympathy whatever with Mr. Burton's proposal.

On the contrary the majority of the Convention were overwhelmingly and enthusiastically and unqualifiedly "cordial." So much so that they wanted to adopt a resolution then and there endorsing me for the Presidency in 1908. It was only on account of my positive interdiction that such a resolution was not offered.

The excuse for then offering it was that, on account of a change that had been made as to the time for the election of State officials, there would be no Convention in 1907, and no opportunity therefore for the Republicans of Ohio to express their preference until 1908.

I disapproved the proposition and enjoined my zealous friends from bringing it forward, not because of any fear I had of the result, for a blind man could see that it would have been adopted, but simply because the delegates had not been elected to that Convention with reference to that matter, and in my opinion it would be like taking a snap judgment to utilize delegates not selected with respect to so important a matter, to express so long in advance of a nomination the Presidential choice of a Great State.

That Convention will always justly hold a prominent place in the annals of Ohio politics. Governor Herrick was Temporary Chairman. He made a long speech and the hour was late when he had concluded, but immediately there came from all over the hall loud cries for a speech from me. The temper of the Convention as well as my own temper may be