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From The Quarterly Review for April. 1. La Quistione Italiana. Il Conte Buol ed il Piemonte. Lettere di L. C. Farini a Lord J. Russell. Turin. 1859. 2. Della Indipendenza d'Italia. di V. Salvagnoli. Florence. 1859. 3. Toscana e Austria. Florence. 1859. 4. La Proprietà Fondiaria in Lombardia. Studi di S. Jacini. Milan and Verona.

1857.

5. Condizioni Economiche della Provincia di Sondrio. Memoria di S. Jacini.

Milan and Verona. 1858.

6. Sulla Necessità di accordare al Regno Lombardo-Veneto la Perequazione della sua Imposta Prediale con quella delle Provincie Tedesche del Impero. Di V.

Pasini. Venice. 1858.

|from the contemplation. It is assuredly not the less terrible, because the war in which France will be avowedly a principal will be waged on her part in the name of liberty. Liberty is a plant that will not thrive in artificial heat, but is the growth of its own inward energies, matured in free contact with its native atmosphere. In contemplating the threatened strife, a throng of tormenting questions press upon the mind. Will the high organization of the Austrian army and the enable that highly centralized but ill-balanced strategic accomplishments of its commanders and ill-consolidated Empire to encounter with success the greater and more varied resources, the loftier spirit, and the more daring ener

7. L'Empereur Napoléon III. et l'Italie.gies of France? On the other hand, will the

Paris. 1859.

pacific temper which the French nation has "WE close," says Mr. Hallam," the history latterly acquired, partly from the experience of the Middle Ages, while Italy is still un- of suffering and partly in the pursuit of touched, and before as yet the first lances of wealth, allow it freely to embark its fortunes France gleam along the defiles of the Alps." in the war on which the Sovereign, not the There is still a moment, if only a moment, people, has determined? If it does not corbefore us, resembling that which the illustrious dially embrace the war, can the throne of the historian has chosen to mark the conclusion second Napoleonic dynasty survive the misof his first great literary journey. But al- carriage of so gigantic a venture? If it does, though blood has not yet begun to flow, and and if success crown the operations of the the hum of peaceful industry is still unbroken French armies, then can we suppose that the by the roar of cannon, the cloud of military nation will rest contented with having vindipreparation has grown so dense that it ap-cated a liberty for Piedmont or for Italy which pears as though it could not choose but burst, they do not enjoy themselves? That they and abashed diplomacy seems almost on the will bear with equanimity a fresh addition of point of ceding her place and office to the five or it may be ten millions sterling to their sword. Three months or even one month annual taxation? That they will not seek ago, we might have treated the Italian ques-large territorial compensation, and thus add tion as one for simple argument in senates, and in those wider circles where public opinion lives and moves. The issue grows narrower now, and may soon be reduced simply to this with what feelings ought England to regard the combatants in the impending strife, and what will be the nature and scope of her concern in the combat?

to that power which is already so great as to constitute almost a "standing menace" to the equilibrium of the European Continent? Nay, even if we have boldness or credulity sufficient to meet these demands, can we hope that the well-ordered liberty of Piedmont will survive both the assaults of its despotic antagonist, and the assistance of its despotic We fear that, at the point which we have ally? Or, if Freedom runs fearful risks on now reached, it might not improbably be as- the standing point she has so laboriously and sumed that the interval between the manifes-painfully acquired, is it more likely that she, tations which have already occurred and the the child and ally of peaceful reason, will first outbreak of war, is but like the moment after the eye has seen the flash and before the ear hears the report; that though divided in time they are one in causation; that, the first having occurred, we cannot hope eventually to escape the latter. But the prospect which such a supposition offers is one of which, as long as hope remains, the eye must shrink

make new ground amidst the frightful convulsions of a European war, and will build the stately temple of Order with one hand while she wields the sword with the other? And what in particular will be the fate of that hybrid Sovereignty, ever a marvel and now undoubtedly a monster, which at once op presses and enervates Central Italy, and in the

sacred names of the Gospel and the Saviour | tion and bethink him of another in its place. overrides every social right, and raises again Foreign affairs, in his normal state, he regards the question whether government and law are with indifference. But in the crises when they indeed intended for a blessing or for a curse to absolutely force themselves upon his attention, mankind? It would be far easier to multiply he takes them in hand with the earnestness these inquiries than to answer them. The and force that belong to him. Yet this upboldest speculator is reduced to silence and rightness of purpose, when it is not guided by to awe, and nothing is left him but the sad carefulness and knowledge, may itself become words of the prophet-" Lo, a roll of a book; the minister of injustice. For we often fail and there was written therein lamentations to discriminate between objects, which we and mourning and woe.” * hastily assume to be identical for no better

in company. In the heroic struggle for national independence or existence, the power of concentrating on one idea the whole energies of the soul is a power of inestimable value. But where, as is likely to be more and more the case in European struggles, England is rather an arbiter than originally a party, what she requires beyond all things is the judicial temper; and, to play her part aright, she must neither grudge the labor necessary for exact discernment, nor be hasty to permit the entrance of passion as an auxiliary even in the cause of right. The ruder processes, the Lynch law, so to speak, which we commonly call in aid of imperfect comprehension, is ill adapted for the great, and at the same time nice issues, with which we are constantly presented in the vicissitudes of Continental affairs.

Even the outbreaking of such a war, how-reason than because they are presented to us ever, and far less the prospect of it, cannot dispense us from the duty of considering the rights and wrongs involved in it. It is easy to give sufficient reasons why England should not enter into the arbitrament of blood; but it is easier still to show cause why she cannot sever herself from the moral and social interests of the contest which is to shake the European system from top to base and from centre to edge. Nay, more, why she should reserve to herself a perfectly unfettered discretion as to the future, and should even stand free to entertain at any time the question of a positive and perhaps decisive intervention. Either the aggrandizement of Austria at the cost of Italy, or the aggrandizement of France at the cost of Austria, would be an event which might impose determinate and weighty duties upon England. In what character these duties might have to be performed is a question at which we shall presently have to glance; and we shall strive to show that it is one of no less dignity than importance. The simple admission, however, that we must be interested spectators, and may at some period perforce be parties, requires us to consider whether the public opinion of England on the questions at issue is enlightened and matured in the degree which the magnitude and the urgency of the case require.

The love of the Englishman for what he calls broad views is a motive power better suited to domestic than to foreign affairs. In his own sphere, he is fed with knowledge by his daily experience; and his abhorrence of subtlety and chicane, though it may sometimes make him judge with precipitation, is sufficiently guarded by sound information to prevent its hurrying him into any gross injustice. Although he can only well comprehend one idea at a time, yet, upon the whole, he knows when he ought to drop his favorite concep* Ezekiel, 2: 9, 10.

Austria, even at her best, can never attract much of enthusiasm in England. Her best chances of popularity here have been much damaged of late years. In the eighteenth century, she was more than once the champion of national independence both in the temporal and in the spiritual sphere; and her internal government was found compatible with much of local liberty, and with the free development of local character. In all these respects she has of late been seriously changed. At the epoch when the policy of the Popedom was mild, she, notwithstanding, regarded that power with wakeful jealousy, and fortified herself by the Josephine code against its essentially aggressive action. In our own time, when Rome has become ten times more Romish, she has thought fit to purchase the most odious support in the most odious manner, and has offered up the dear-bought acquisitions of former and manlier generations by the recent Concordat, as a sacrifice to the genius of clerical ascendency. In an age of sharpened appetite for freedom, she has waged war against local immunities, and strained

every nerve of her system by centralizing its motive powers in Vienna. As to national independence, even if for the moment we set wholly aside the case of Italy, still she has but a beggarly account to render. The Russian war was a war for national independence in general, and for her own independence, after that of Turkey, in particular. Yet she hobbled through its several stages with the continual acknowledgment of obligations the same with those of England and France, and with a continual postponement of performance. She chose the part of diplomacy, and left others to fight battles which were pre-eminently hers.

"Larga quidem, Drance, semper tibi copia fandi

Tum, cum bella manus poscunt." *

Apart from the rankling of the old wound struck by Hungarian recollections into the heart of Russia, Austria found herself at the close of the struggle neither loved as a comrade and friend, nor respected as an honorable foe, but in the condition of the neutral angels of Dante:

"Che non furon ribelli,

Nè fur fedeli a Dio, ma per se furo."t Her policy with respect to the Danubian Principalities, to Servia, and to the navigation of the Danube, has won her no favor in this country, but has borne in English eyes the stamp of narrow and selfish views, together with the disposition at once to push the doctrines of legality to the uttermost point in her own interest, and to deal lightly with them in cases where they threaten to bring her within the reach of that capital evil-contagion from any institutions more liberal than

her own.

At the same time, a sentiment not unlike that which excited this country during the Russian war was enlisted on behalf of Austria, when we were told about the beginning of this year that the Emperor of the French had used menacing expressions to the Austrian Minister at his Court. We know not what may have been the views of our Government; but, so far as the people were concerned, the course which opinion manifestly took after this announcement was not due to any love for the Austrian Government or system, but to mistrust of Louis Napoleon, and t an impression that his words to M. Hübner

* En. xi. 378.

† Inferno, iii. 32.

savored of that very spirit of brigandage which Russia had shown six years ago in the Menschikoff mission and in the invasion of the Danubian Principalities.

The Emperor of the French has more than once boxed the compass upon the wheel of popularity in England. The coup d'état of December, 1851, was abhorred by the British nation as the most glaring and gigantic, and the most fatal because the most successful, violation of legality upon record. But time flowed on; and the total absence of all British causes of complaint against the hero of that unrivalled conspiracy, together with the palpable acquiescence, and more than acquiescence, of the French nation in their lot, wrought a gradual change. While we did not retract our objections, there was no place found for them in current feeling or action, and our humor gradually mended under the influence of good fellowship. At a later period, co-operation in diplomacy and war, brotherhood in the triumphs of the battle field and in the afflictions of the camp, generated a feeling of close amity between the nations, such as absolutely required a symbol upon which to spend itself, and naturally found that symbol in the person of the Emperor. This is the best apology for the favor, largely sprinkled with adulation, that marked his reception here during the visit of 1856. But a turn of the wheel was to follow. As it was more and more perceived that the Eastern policy of the French Government and of the Palmerston Ministry did not move in parallel lines, a cooler sentiment crept in. Then came the famous epoch of the Orsini plot, the Walewski dispatch, and the pitiable charges against England in the "Napoléon III. et l'Angleterre." On this occasion our faithful ally (and such he had, truly and strictly, been) dropped to a heavier discount than even at the time when he had seized his crown. Our vanity was, however, gratified when we found that he put up in silence with the nearly unanimous determination of every man, woman, and child in England, that, even under the strain of the great Indian convulsion, the laws of England should not be altered at his bidding. But, on the other hand, we were more or less disturbed from time to time with ugly rumors. His naval preparations were larger than we liked, and led us to extend our own. An impression went abroad that he meant to have a passage of arms with some

body; that he felt he had lost ground in where the interests contemplated are posi

France, meant to recover it, and thought this was the way; that the great question in the Imperial mind was at whose head his red right hand should discharge the thunderbolt; that England and Austria were the involuntary and unconscious competitors for the honor of his choice; and that with a laudable, perhaps a cold-blooded, impartiality, he was rather inclined to select England of the two, provided he could succeed in effecting the necessary Continental combination against her. The choice would have been natural in so far, at least, that our rival could present the plea of kindred institutions. In spite, then, of reiterated and somewhat inflated panegyrics from rather high quarters, the Emperor of the French was already the object of suspicion, or at least mistrust, in England, at the time when it was announced that he had used language indicative of a desire to pick a quarrel with Austria. It was almost a necessary consequence that the immediate occasion of the fray, when made known, should be interpreted by the light, and valued according to the estimate, of this anterior declaration. In due time we learned that the state of Italy was to afford the plea. From that moment Italian interests were viewed in England, not as they are in themselves, but as the ministerial instruments of French or rather of Napoleonic ambition.

The purely disinterested or chivalrous adoption by one nation of the quarrel of another is a case so rare in history, that it never enters into the calculations of the Englishman as an hypothesis available for the solution of any problem in practical politics. There are but three modes in which such cases appear to be commonly susceptible of explanation. One has received perhaps its very first vivid illustration on a large scale from the late war against Russia, which was waged by England and France in the interest of European order, and with no separate interest other than that of other members of the European family in the repression of the ambition of the Czar. Another may be found in the case of the combinations against Napoleon I. Russia fought at Austerlitz without an immediate cause of quarrel against the French, because she considered that her case was virtually the same as that of Austria, and her existence substantially though indirectly involved. The third is the more common form

tively selfish, and where the champion expects to be paid, and well paid, for his labor, either in meal or in malt. In which of these classes are we to place the French championship of the Italian quarrel? It cannot be accounted for by identity of cause, for no man supposes that Austria is or can be in a condition menacing to the independence or the institutions of France, independently of the fact that, as they are centralized and absolute, she, in all likelihood, cordially approves them. Are we then to suppose that France is to interfere between the Italian peninsula and the stranger, as the vindicatress of European order, or of the general interests of reason and justice? The question would immediately be asked, in what way she had come to be invested with this world-wide and supreme authority; what precedent there is for the exercise of such an ecumenical function by a single and self-chosen Power; what is to prevent some other Power at the present time, or France herself at some other time, from interfering again, as she interfered at Rome in 1849 to put down popular government and re-establish impotence in the robes of despotism? or why some other Power may not now interfere in a sense hostile to France, and with a title just as well or as ill grounded in the public law and right of nations? Indeed, the pretensions of any particular Power, however eminent, to become the judge and avenger of Europe are so obviously hollow, that they not only fail to find support in argument, but they are incompatible with bona fides in the Sovereign who urges them, and tend with resistless force to impress the belief that the paraphernalia of public justice are assumed either to hide the weapons of the brigand, or in some other mode to screen from view purposes which must not be avowed because they are incapable of defence.

The delicacy of the question in virtue of what right France is to interfere by force in the Italian quarrel is evidently felt by the able writer of Napoléon III. et l'Italie. It is contended by him that the status quo in Italy is dangerous, the revolution impotent, and reform impossible; that the problem must be solved, and that Italy cannot solve it against Austria for herself. But the title of France to assume this august and even awful function-and where she has heretofore been *P. 45.

a party only to become also a judge-is no | the French Republic in arms against them, more than darkly hinted under references to and they succumbed, after a bloody struggle, the policy of Henry IV., and to a supposed to her superior force. The people of the immutability of the cardinal ideas of political Roman States submitted to sheer coercion, tradition; together with the one-sided enigma that the Alps are a rampart for France, but not a fortress against her-a distinction of which Nature, we presume, was ignorant when she supplied that portion of mother earth with such formidable girders.

but they at least lost none of their rights and claims; while France, which had trampled them under foot, found herself in effect, while wearing outwardly the robes of conquest, chained to the triumphal car of the Pope whom she had re-established. Under the plea of maintaining her influence and author

the same sectional interests, the same necessity of courting the ultramontane party in the internal politics of the country, which had caused the expedition to be sent to Rome, forbade it to be withdrawn. The Curia was well aware that the very act by which France had flattered her vain glory was fatal to her independence in the face of the Papal Power; that the intrigue which had rendered the original service to the Popedom would still stand it in good stead; and that the Pontiff had nothing to do but to turn a deaf ear to his check-mated advisers, and to govern as he pleased.

It is true that there is a speciality in the case of France; but the inspirers of the pam-ity, she had committed a gross wrong. But phlet probably have felt that it is one so sore as not to bear handling. It is the Roman occupation. Without doubt, France feels the shame, scandal, and embarrassment in which the outrage of 1849 has involved her. She has peculiar reasons for desiring the Italian question to be accommodated. It cannot be without the stings of remorse and a burning indignation that she finds herself punished for her offence in being doomed to sustain by her own arm a Government which is strong for no earthly purpose except to reject her advice and repudiate such alleviations or improvements as for decency's sake she cannot do otherwise than suggest. Of all European Governments, the Papal one is at once perhaps the worst, and certainly the most ridiculous; and though the Emperor of the French might have philosophy enough to endure the former quality, he can have no patience with the latter, which freely imparts itself to him in the face of his people, so vulnerable in that particular. This embarrassment is a real one; but yet it is not available as a grievance against Austria, because it arises out of the hyper-Austrian policy of France herself on a particular occasion. When the French overthrew, in February, 1848, a Government of their own at least tolerably good, the Romans thought fit, in humble imitation, to overthrow one which, in spite of its shadowy pretensions of reform, was incurably bad. This is the true history of the case as respects the people of the Roman States. Their cause was indeed disgraced by the dagger which took the valuable life of Rossi. But that great crime cannot be charged upon the people; and even if it were so chargeable, France at least should have been lenient with her own first Revolution on record. Instead, however, of receiving countenance or even toleration from those who had set the example, they found

* P. 54.

The Emperor was President at the time of the siege of Rome. It appeared from his well-known letter to Edgar Ney that it was repugnant to his feelings, but we have yet to see the day when he will shrink from any sacrifice that his personal interests may require. He judged of the Roman expedition, as of all other things, neither by passion nor by principle: but he read it in the cold frosty light of his ambition. As President he lent himself to the scheme: and he reaped his political reward in the services of M. de Falloux as a Minister, and in the influence they insured to him over the party of the Church. Again, at the critical moment of the coup d'état, he received his crowning recompense in the decided support of M. de Montalembert; which carried, in his so-called election to the Empire, every vote that the party could command. Had that election required annual repetition, and had he thus periodically pocketed the equivalent of his condescension, we may doubt whether his conscience would have been so much disturbed, as it now appears to be, by the woes of Italy, and by the dangers to the peace of Europe which they engender. But as M. de Montalembert and his friends are of no further use, nothing remains either to soothe or to compensate the mortification

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