OBJECT EXPRESSED IN TITLE-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4).

OFFSPRING OF ADULTEROUS RELATIONS-See ILLEGITI MATES (2).

OPINIONS-See EVIDENCE (6); FRAUD (8, 10).

ORAL CONTRACTS-See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2, 3).

ORAL TESTIMONY-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2).

ORDINANCES-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

OTHER OFFENSE-See CRIMINAL LAW (5).

OWNERS-See MECHANICS' LIENS (1).

PARAMOUNT TITLE-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (3).

PAROL CONTRACT-See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2, 3).

PAROL EVIDENCE-See CARRIERS (3).

PAROL TESTIMONY-See CONTRACTS (1); FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (1).

PAROL TRUSTS-See TRUSTS.

PARTIES.

A bank to whom defendant gave a note and mortgage as security for his indorsement on a note given to it by a corporation of which he was a director, would not be a holder for value under 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6068, after its note was paid, and it therefore had no such interest in said note and mortgage as entitled it to bring foreclosure proceedings, since section 12353, 3 Comp. Laws 1915, commands that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Mooney, 514.

See CONTRACTS (11); PLEADING (3, 4).

PARTIES BOUND-See JUDGMENT (2).

PARTNERSHIP.

In proceedings for a partnership accounting, based upon an oral agreement to secure and sell options on real estate, where the evidence was insufficient to establish the agreement, the decree of the court below dismissing the bill will be affirmed, on appeal, although erroneously based upon the ground that such agreement was in violation of the statute of frauds. Mullholland v. Patch, 490. PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATIONS, LIMITED - See JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES.

PARTNERSHIP IN REAL ESTATE OPTIONS- See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2).

PASSING OF TITLE-See SALES (1).

PAYMENT OF DEBT-See BILLS AND NOTES (8); PARTIES; PLEDGES (1).

PAYMENT OF FORGED CHECK-See BANKS AND Banking (2).

PEDIGREE-See ILLEGITIMATES (5, 6).

PENAL STATUTE-See CONTRACTS (4, 10).

PERFORMANCE-See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (3).
PERPETUITIES.

The creation of a life estate in a husband and wife is but
one estate, hence the creation of a subsequent life estate
in the same premises does not violate the provisions of
the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11532 et seq.) pro-
hibiting the suspension of the power of alienation for a
longer period than two lives in being. Truitt v. City of
Battle Creek, 180.

PERSONAL INJURIES-See CARRIERS (2); DAMAGES (1, 2); MASTER AND SERVANT (2, 4, 6-9, 11); NEGLIGENCE (4); RAILROADS (12); STREET RAILWAYS; TRIAL (3, 13).

PHYSICAL CONNECTION- See TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES (4).

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-See EVIDENCE (1); FRAUD (1). PLEADING.

1. In an action against a railroad company for damages by a fire alleged to have been caused by an engine, where no demurrer was interposed or motion made, in view of the present liberal rule relating to pleadings under the judicature act (Act No. 314, Pub. Acts 1915, 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12004 et seq.) and Circuit Court Rule No. 22, this court cannot say that the declaration was insufficient although the time of day when the fire occurred is not alleged. Sayre v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 294.

2. An amendment to the declaration changing the allegation of the date of the fire from July 18, 1895, to July 17, 1895, did not introduce a new cause of action. Id. 295.

3. Where the declaration charged all defendants jointly with assault, but under the plaintiff's own theory of the case it appears that there were two separate assaults, with no connection between them, and that there was no concert of action between defendants, the court below was not in error in compelling plaintiff to elect which defendant he would proceed against. Albrecht v. Benevolent Society, 395.

4. The fact that it is difficult to separate the injury done by each from that done by the other furnishes no reason for holding that one tortfeasor should be liable for the acts of others with whom he is not acting in concert. Id.

PLEADING Continued.

5. The question as to whose duty it was to maintain a bridge over the race being a question foreign to the pur. poses of plaintiff's bill, the chancellor was in error in permitting an amendment to the bill to include said issue. Moore v. Provost, 687.

6. Where an amendment to a bill, though asked for and
granted, was never actually made, the question raised by
the amendment will not be considered by the Supreme
Court; the general rule being that nothing can be claimed
for an amendment which is never actually incorporated
into the pleadings. Id.

See DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT; DIVORCE (3); EQUITY (1);
GARNISHMENT; QUIETING TITLE; RAILROADS (11); TAXATION

(2).

PLEDGES.

1. Where a note given to a bank by a corporation was indorsed by its directors, and defendant executed a note and mortgage as collateral security for his indorsement on the bank note, the lien created by said note and mortgage was released by a renewal of the bank note without defendant's indorsement. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Mooney, 513.

2. Although defendant's coindorsers may have a right to demand of defendant that he contribute his share of the amount paid on said bank note, the doctrine of contribution would give them no legal title to, nor lien on, the note and mortgage. Id.

3. The rule that where collateral security is furnished by the maker of a note, upon payment thereof by the sureties they would have a right to demand the collateral, does not apply where a third party furnishes security in aid of an indorsement. Id. 514.

POLICE POWER-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5).

POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT-See DIVORCE (5, 6).

POWERS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3).

POWERS OF CASHIER-See BANKS AND BANKING (1).

POWERS OF RECEIVERS-See RAILROADS (6).

PRACTICE.

The proper practice to prove any action of the Michigan securities commission is by producing the original or a certified copy of such proceedings; a telegram from a member of the commission is hearsay. Armstrong v. Rachow, 170.

See APPEAL AND ERROR (10); EQUITY (1, 2).

PREJUDICE-See BANKS AND BANKING (5); DEPOSITIONS (2).

PRESENTMENT-See BILLS AND NOTES (3).

PRESUMPTIONS-See CARRIERS (1); EVIDENCE (5); ILLEGITIMATES (3, 4); NEGLIGENCE (4-9).

PRINCIPAL-See CRIMINAL LAW (8).

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-See BILLS AND NOTES (1); LANDLORD AND TENANT; MASTER AND SERVANT (5).

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-See PARTIES.

PRIVATE BANKS-See BANKS AND BANKING (1).

PRIVATE WAYS-See EASEMENTS.

PRIVILEGE-See CRIMINAL LAW (7); EVIDENCE (1).
PROBATE COURT-See DEPOSITIONS (1).

PROCESS.

Where a writ purporting to be an alias summons has no proper basis as an alias, the previous writ not having been seasonably returned, the second writ is not for that reason void, but, the statute of limitations not having run against the suit, it should, in case the first suit goes down, be treated as a new writ for a new suit and sustained accordingly. Gunn v. Gunn, 198.

PROMISE TO PAY PREMIUMS-See INSURANCE (4).

PROOF See ADULTERY; CRIMINAL LAW (6); HUSBAND AND WIFE (1); JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES (2); PRACTICE; STIPULATIONS. PROPERTY CONVEYED-See DEEDS (1, 4).

PROPERTY RIGHTS-See DIVORCE (5).

PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AS BASIS OF DECREE-See DIVORCE (5-7).

PUBLIC OFFICERS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1-3, 7); CRIMINAL LAW (1); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

PUBLIC POLICY-See ILLEGITIMATES (2).

PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS-See RAILROADS (4, 5, 1620); TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.

QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION-See DEEDS (1).

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW-See APPEAL AND ERROR (3). QUESTIONS REVIEWABLE-See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (3). QUIETING TITLE.

On a bill to quiet title to a mill site and establish in plaintiff certain flowage rights and easements in other lands, where plaintiff was given substantially the relief prayed for in his bill, he is not legally interested in the disposal of the title to the lands under the mill pond, title to which he disclaimed. Moore v. Provost, 687.

RAILROADS.

1. The incorporation of a private railroad by the owners, and its assumption of the obligation of a common carrier, could not affect vested rights under a prior mortgage. Gasser v. Garden Bay R. Co., 5.

2. Where a franchise from a township to a lumber company, the owner of a railroad constructed for the purpose of transporting its own products, granting the right to construct, maintain, and operate the same for a period of 30 years, contained no language implying an undertaking on the part of the company to construct or operate such road, and in the construction of the road no right or privilege granted by the franchise was exercised, there is no obligation upon defendant railway company, as assignee, to continue its operation during the franchise period. Id.

3. The equity court has jurisdiction to entertain the application of a railroad company to abandon operation and dismantle its line, where its receipts are inadequate to pay operating expenses and pay interest on its mortgage indebtedness. Id.

4. A railroad company, having been incorporated as a common carrier, and having secured permission from the railroad commission to issue stock, and having entered upon the operation of its line under the implied duty to the public to continue its operation as a public service corporation, could not thereafter, in less than 18 months after its last hearing before the commission relative to its stock issue, arbitrarily abandon operations, permanently discontinue the assumed service, and dismantle the road without the consent of the State through its constituted authority. Id. 6.

5. The State can, and generally will, when possible, enforce the continuous exercise of such granted corporate powers for public service and benefit, even though unprofitable or at a loss to the corporation, except under special circumstances where peculiarly equitable considerations justly warrant permitting abandonment. Id.

6. In proceedings to foreclose a mortgage on a railroad, which had assumed the duties of a common carrier, where it was purposed to dismantle and abandon the road, the decree of the court below appointing a receiver to con serve the property is affirmed, but reversed as to giving him authority to borrow money on certificates with which to repair, equip for operation, and operate the road as an experiment to determine whether it could be operated at a profit. Id.

7. Intervening petitioners, residents of the village and township through which the road ran and others, are equitably entitled to have all of the property of the railroad offered for sale as an entirety on condition that the purchaser operate said road as a common carrier. Id.