"and it was common for men to say that they would not (Vol. III., Chivalry was a kind of sentimental organization, by which a person devoted himself in a very solemn manner to the duties of the order and to a certain ascetic life. The devotee rendered himself liable to very severe punishments for breaking the oath which bound him to render service to the distressed and generally to adopt a course of life which would now be considered merely as consistent with ordinary moral obligations, but which were then exceptional. ness of lan I have before stated that a common language was needed in order to enable States, which have been brought up to the necessary pitch of uniformity of morals and of intercourse with one another, to facilitate the creation of International Law. Now it happened that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the States of Europe, consisting, as they did, of the fragments of the old Roman Empire, Serviceablethere was a language eminently legal ready to their guage of hand, the language of Roman Law. And when International Law became organized,-in the days of Grotius especially, although it had been sketched out before his time,-it at once assumed the language of Roman Law. You will remember that Roman Law figured in Europe through two systems, or rather flowed through two channels; through secular law, or the Roman Law as properly so called; and through the Ecclesiastical, or Canon, Law. Both Roman Law. Modes of Modern systems of Law were closely approximated to one another in form, and, except that they concerned different matters, in substance. They were at least both serviceable for International Law. The idea gained ground that, to a certain extent, Roman Law was, by its nature, binding upon all the Nations of the earth, just because it was Roman Law. Not because it was an accidental language which gave form to the moral and social institutions of the whole of the nations of Europe; but because it had, to a certain extent, a mystic power of its own; and that mystic force became all the stronger because it was undoubtedly based on the best moral and political conceptions that the world had yet attained to. However, although you must consider the use of the Roman language, as the instrument for expressing International Law, as a mere accident, yet it was a very favourable and fortunate accident; and perhaps without that accident International Law would never have been organized to the extent it has been. The recognition of the Roman Law, then, is the fourth of the main groups of facts which supply the conditions for the existence of International Law in Europe. I may notice some other accidental facts which have contributed to the growth of International Law. It is a matter of fact that the States of Europe, from the time of what is called the Middle Ages, that is, from about the 15th Century,-have been constantly brought into contact with one another, through joining in wars, especially religious wars, in which they made alliances and treaties of all sorts, one with another, and these treaties and alliances have reacted and tended to strengthen the condition which made them possible. Alliances were possible only because States were coming nearer to each other. The very effect of such alliances was to make the States feel still nearer to each other, and this action and reaction continued; and favoured the growth of International Law. Secondly the States of Europe had been engaged in various ventures outside Europe, for instance in founding the Indian Empire, to which several other States besides England originally contributed, or, in founding or fighting for the various States of the American Continent at different periods. The French and the Spanish have been especially prominent in this. Then again, there has been, more recently, a class of mercantile interests in the different Nations, which have given rise to commercial treaties of all sorts, and of temporary alliances for commercial purposes. All these circumstances together have contributed to create a rough system of International Law, and have been the origin of a final and growing system. Hereafter, we may look to a long series of these events. We look to the Nations of Europe coming closer and closer together, and to that very fact of their coming closer together reacting as before, and thus to its enlarging the system of International Law. In my next lecture I shall have to treat especially of the Rights of individual States, and to fix our attention on all their Rights and all their Duties, not merely in times of peace only or in times of war only, but in all times. LECTURE III. THE RIGHTS OF STATES. IN my last lecture I traced all the conditions necessary for the growth of International Law, and I pointed out how far those conditions had been fulfilled in the history of Europe. I glanced cursorily at all the leading classes of facts which have characterized that history, so far as they could affect the development of International Law. I need not recur to this now, but I wish you to notice particularly the relation of the ideas and to trace the connection between that lecture and the present one. I am, in this lecture, about to speak of the Rights of States generally in times of peace and in times of war. Many writers oppose the Rights of States in times of peace to those in times of war, as if, in times of war, all the Rights a Nation enjoys in times of peace were suspended. This error has occurred because it happens that in times of war certain hitherto unexercised Rights came to the surface-Rights such as there is no occasion to exercise in time of peace. But, although those other Rights are D |