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and when and where the presentment was made and that the names of the grand jurors having been set forth in the caption it sufficiently appeared thereby that the bill was found by twelve grand jurors, though

the number was not stated.

Held, also, that the caption was not vitiated by the omission of the words sworn and charged. John Martin v. The Queen, 318.

In setting forth the indictment, the past tense was used: "it was presented," instead of "it is presented."

Held immaterial. King v. the Queen, 561. An indictment charged the prisoner with stealing one ham."

66

Held, that it sufficiently described an article which was the subject of larceny. Reg. v. Gallears, 572

For perjury, 36, 205, 254, 561

damage, or was likely to do so. Reg. v. Cooper, 559

INFORMATION.

For seditious libel, 93
Under 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 62; 163

INSANITY.

A mere uncontrollable impulse of the mind, co-existing with the full possession of the reasoning powers, will not warrant an acquittal on the ground of insanity. The question for the jury being, whether the prisoner, at the time he committed the act, knew the character and nature of the act, and that it was a wrongful one. Reg. v. Barton, 275

INTERPRETER.

Jury may be charged with more than one at Practice as to, 75

the same time, 79

Assignment of perjury in, 86

For seditious libel, 93

For sedition, 183, 291

Under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, s. 41, for falsely
stating facts in marriage register, 127
For discharging fire-arms with intent, &c.,
under 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, sufficiency of, 141
Appeal Court will see and quash, if bad,
though no question be reserved thereon, 183
For manslaughter by neglect, 191
Omission of prisoner's addition in, is not de-
murrable, 215

For indecent exposure, 248
Reversal of judgment in, 252
For false pretences, 284, 483
For murder, 300

For night poaching, 304

For illegal training, 306

Under Crown and Government Security Act, 318

For high treason, 360

Description of money in, 460

For obtaining a marriage licence by perjury
and personation before the surrogate, 467
Right of prisoner to have it read, 509
For deserting and exposing an infant, 559
For attempt to defraud, 570
Keeping a disorderly house, 578

INFANT. Exposure and desertion of

An indictment for leaving and deserting an infant child in a certain parish, with intent to injure and aggrieve the inhabitants of the said parish, is not sufficient, there being no allegation that the child was settled elsewhere, nor that the child received any

JUDGMENT.

General, when good, 36

Of respondeat ouster, notwithstanding prayer of final judgment, 93

In one count not vitiated by discharge of jury from finding on others, 141

Form of, for receiving gifts as officer of the East Company, under 33 George 3, c. 52, s. 62; 163 Practice as to, in a conviction for perjury, 205 Reversal of, 252

Of transportation, entering, 318

JURISDICTION.

SPECIAL LOCAL COMMISSION.

An offence was committed within a separate locality, which had a body of justices exercising jurisdiction within the liberty, by virtue of three separate commissions; 1st, the ordinary commission of the peace; 2nd, a commission to try all treasons, misprisions of treasons, insurrections, murders, felonies, manslaughters, &c.; the 3rd, a general commission of gaol delivery. Neither of the commissions contained any non-intromittant clause, but the general county magistrates, in fact, exercised no jurisdiction within the liberty, which had a gaol and separate custos rotulorum and clerk of the peace.

Held, that these commissions did not oust the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Justices of Gaol Delivery for the whole county; and

that the prisoner having been removed from the liberty by writs of habeas ad deliberandum, and recipias corpus, was properly tried by such justices. Reg. v. Crane, 53. Of judges, 254

Of judge of assize, as to discharge of prisoners, 431

JURY.

The array was challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that the panel was arrayed partially, and to the prejudice of the prisoner; and that, for the purpose of depriving him of a fair trial, the names of jurors usually summoned, and of other jurors, had been omitted from the panel, because they were deemed more likely to acquit than to convict; and the names of other jurors were inserted therein, because they were deemed more likely to convict than to acquit.

Held, that the mere fact of the existence of a great disproportion between the relative number of persons of different religious persuasions upon the panel was, per se, no evidence in support of such a challenge.

By the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 91, it is the duty of the recorder, at a special sessions in each year, to revise in open court, the general list of jurors returned, pursuant to the statute, and to deliver it when so revised and signed by him, to the clerk of the peace, who gives a copy thereof to the sheriff, as the jurors' book for the ensuing year, and from which the sheriff is bound to form the jury panel.

The court held that a list of the jurors' names, checked off by the witness as they were in open court placed on the revised list by the recorder, but which was not compared with the revised list after it was signed by the recorder, or with the jurors' book, was not admissible as evidence of the contents of the jurors' book :

And refused to direct the book itself to be produced for the purpose of ascertaining the different religions of the jurors named therein, and comparing their relative number with the proportion in which jurors of the same persuasion appeared on the panel.

Held, that a juror whose name, though he was summoned to attend the court, was left off the panel, could not be asked what his religion was.

The triers are entitled to know whether, in the opinion of the court, there is any evidence to sustain such challenge. The Queen v. J. Mitchell.

A challenge was tendered to one of the jurors,
on the ground that he was interested in the
conviction of the prisoner, inasmuch as by a
charter of Henry the Fifth, it was granted to
the then corporation of Dublin, their heirs
and successors (which charter and the rights
and franchise thereby granted, was averred
to have become by the Municipal Corpora-
tions Act (3 & 4 Vict. c. 105), duly vested
in the present corporation of the city of
Dublin) that they "should have all and all
manner of goods and chattels of felons and
fugitives to be condemned or convicted
within the said city of Dublin and the liber-
ties thereof thereafter arising;" and that
such goods and chattels were applicable to
the purposes of the borough fund of the city
of Dublin; and that the prisoner had within
the city goods to the value of twenty shil-
lings and that William Duff was a burgess
of said city, and occupier of certain heredita-
ments within the city liable to be rated to a
borough rate; and that the borough fund
was deficient after the payment of all the
claims upon the corporation: and that,
therefore, the juror was interested in the
conviction of him the said John Martin.
This challenge was upon demurrer over-
ruled.

writ of error that it was rightly
Held, upon
disallowed, and that the juror was not liable
to objection, he not having, as a burgess,
any direct personal interest in or control
over the application or disposal of such goods
and chattels, the disposal of which was vested,
if at all, in the town council: nor yet as a
rate-payer, for that it did not appear by the
challenge that the preliminaries which were
by the 133rd section of the statute essential
to enable the council to impose a borough-
rate, had been complied with, and at all
events that his liability to be rated (if any)
was a contingent liability to a future rate;
and, therefore, did not affect his compe-
tence.

Quære, whether in such challenge the absence of an averment that the franchise has been lost or forfeited by non user, is not a fatal omission? John Martin v. the Queen, 318

If a juryman, on calling over the names of the
panel, answer to a wrong name, and be sworn
by the wrong name, the trial is a mistrial
for the prisoner has not had his opportunity
of challenging the juryman mis-named.
Reg. v. Metcalfe and another, 220

Charging, practice as to, 79
Duties of, in a defence of insanity on a charge
of murder, 275

A challenge of a juror may be allowed after he Discharge of, where they cannot agree, 489

has been sworn. Reg. v. Flint, 66

Right of prisoner to copy panel, 509

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A. the bailee of B.'s mare, took her to a certain livery stable in the town of P. where B. was, paid to B. the balance of money due to him after deducting one pound due for the keep of the mare, and told B. that she was at the livery-stables. B. sent word to the stable-keeper not to let A. have the mare again; and on A. asking to be allowed to ride the mare to a certain place, twice told him never to put finger near her more, to which A. said, "Well." After B. had left the town, A. obtained the mare from the ostler at the livery-stables by a false story, and never returned her.

Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury that a change of possession of the mare had taken place after she had been left at the stables, and that the stable-keeper had become B.'s agent. Reg. v. Steer, 187

EVIDENCE OF.

In a portmanteau not proved to belong to a prisoner on trial was found a paper folded like a letter, and containing in the inside what purported to be an inventory of goods pawned at different times. The inventory was not in the prisoner's handwriting; but on the outside of the paper the prisoner's name, and the word "private," both in his handwriting, were indorsed.

Held, that the contents of the paper were not admissible in evidence against him. Reg. v. Hare and another, 547

BY FINDING.

Where lost property is found, the appropriation of it by the finder is not larceny, unless he knew, or had reasonable means of ascertaining, the owner.

Quære, whether, in the case of a bank note, the finder can be indicted for felony on the proof that, though he did not know the owner when he found the note, he did know him before he put it off? Reg. v. Wood, 277

If a man finds goods which have been actually lost, or which he reasonably supposes to have been lost, and takes possession of them, intending to appropriate them entirely to his own use, and there are no circumstances to rebut the presumption that he believed the owner could not be found, he is not guilty of larceny, even though he disposes of them after he has notice of the title of the real owner, for the original taking is lawful, and the subsequent conversion is not a trespass. If, on the other hand, there is a reasonable evidence of his belief, at the time of taking them, that the owner could be found, then the original taking is felonious. Reg. v. Wood, 453

RECEIVING-HUSBAND AND WIFE. Where a wife was indicted with her husband for receiving stolen property, and the evidence was, that, although not present when her husband received the property, she had subsequently dealt with it, and ultimately destroyed it.

Held, that it was a question for the jury whether, in receiving it and taking an active part in dealing with it afterwards, she did so with the purpose of aiding her husband in the object he had in view of turning it to profit; or whether what she did was merely for the purpose of concealing her husband's guilt, or screening him from the consequences. In the first place she might be found guilty; in the second she ought to be acquitted. Reg. v. M'Clarens and others, 425

INDICTMENT.

An indictment containing counts for stealing as well as receiving, under sect. 3 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 46, may have as many counts for receiving as for stealing; and the prosecutor is not bound to elect upon which of the counts for receiving he will rely. Reg. v. Beeton, 451.

An indictment charged a larceny of "two pieces of the current silver coin of the realm called shillings, of the goods and chattels of A. B."

Held, that, though "goods and chattels " was an incorrect description of money, those words might be rejected as surplusage, and that then there was a sufficient allegation that the money belonged to A. B. Reg. v. Radley, 460

PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSARY.

If A. unlocks a door of a room of which he has the key, in order to allow B. to commit a larceny in it, and A. then goes away, and B., in his absence, enters the room, and removes articles out of it, A. is not a principal in the larceny. Reg. v. Jeffries and another, 85

BY SERVANT.

A servant entrusted with the care of his master's property, and who subsequently appropriates it to his own use, is guilty of larceny at the time he so disposes of it, and not at any previous time he may have intended to steal it, the principle of animus furandi not applying to the relation of master and servant. Reg. v. Roberts and another, 74

A person employed in a tannery got clandestine access to a warehouse, which was part of the tannery, and in which dressed skins were kept, and took from it certain skins dressed by other workmen. They were afterwards seen and recognized at the porch or place in which he worked, and he was indicted for the larceny of them. The jury found that he had not intended to remove the skins from the tannery and dispose of them elsewhere, but that his intention in taking them was, to deliver them to the foreman and to get paid for them as if they were his own work, and that in this way he intended the skins to be restored to the possession of his

master.

Held, that he was not guilty of larceny. Reg. v. Holloway, 241

The prisoner being a watchmaker received a watch from the prosecutor to be repaired, not then intending to steal it. But in a few days he went away, taking the watch with him; and when taken into custody he said, "I have disposed of the property and it is impossible to get it back:"

Held, that there was no evidence of a larceny. Reg. v. Thristle, 573

A. employed B., a drover by trade, to take pigs to C., and to bring back such sum as C. should give him, on being shown a paper given to B. for that purpose. B. had no authority to do anything but deliver the pigs to C. B. took them to the house of C. at an hour in the morning when the inmates were in bed. C. himself was not at home; and the persons who spoke to B. from the window of the house gave him no instructions. B. then sold the pigs to another person and absconded with the price. He had received 21. from A. for expenses, for which he was to account; and by custom he was entitled to receive a sum per day for the time occupied, and also to drive cattle for any other person at the same time.

Held (dissentiente Lord Denman, C. J.), that these facts did not prove B. to be a mere servant of A.; and that, therefore, he had been improperly convicted upon an indictment which charged a larceny of the pigs. If he was a bailee, he could not be guilty of larceny, unless he intended, at the time of the receipt of it, to appropriate the property to his own use; and there was no evidence of any such intention.

The case of Barnard v. Macnamee (1 Moo. C. C. 368), questioned. Reg. v. Hey, 582. Special verdict in, 181

By stealing and secreting letters, 271
Indictment for, 447
For stealing a ham, 572

Act for amendment of law of, App. lv.

LETTERS.

The servant of a tallow chandler removed fat belonging to his master from the room in which it was kept, to a room where his master was accustomed to buy fat from per- Indictment for stealing and secreting, 271

sons who had it to sell, and placed it on a pair of scales there, with intent to sell it to his master, and appropriate the proceeds to his own use.

Held to be a larceny in the servant. Reg.

v. Hull, 245

If at the time of the taking of a chattel there is no animus furandi, a subsequent fraudulent appropriation of it will not make the entire *ransaction larceny.

LIBEL.

Form of indictment for, with a plea of justification under Lord Campbell's Act, App. xxxviii.

MALICIOUS INJURIES.

DAMAGING A WARP.

A warp not sized, but on its way to the sizers
to be sized, to fit it for being used in manu-
facturing goods is not a warp, "in any
stage, process, or progress of manufacture,"
or "prepared for, or employed in, carding,
spinning," &c., within the 7 & 8 Geo. 4,
c. 30, s. 3, though the indictment is not bad
for not averring it to be so. Reg. v. Mary
Clegg, 295.

MALICIOUSLY SHOOTING, 58

MALICIOUSLY WOUNDING.

What is, 441, 442

MANSLAUGHTER.

In an indictment for manslaughter by neglect
to give a proper signal to denote the obstruc-
tion of a line of railway, whereby a collision
took place and a passenger was killed,

1st: It was charged that the prisoner's
duty was to attend to the proper working of
the signals, according to the rules.

Held, that it was not necessary to set out
the rules.

2nd: It appeared that the prisoner had
many other duties, besides attending to the
signal posts, some of them being incompa-
tible with his duty there.

Held, that it was not necessary to set forth
all the other duties and then to negative that
the prisoner was employed at the time in the
discharge of either of such other duties.

3rd: Held, that an averment that it was
prisoner's duty to signal an obstruction,
and that there was an obstruction which pri-
soner neglected to signal, was a sufficient
description of the offence, and that it was not
necessary to aver that the prisoner's duty
was, if there was an obstruction, and he saw
it, to signal it, and that there was an obstruc-
tion which he might have seen but neglected
to see.

4th: That it is sufficient to aver the duty
to be to make "a proper signal," without
further describing it.

5th: That a count which charged both a
neglect to give the right signal, and the
giving of the wrong signal, is not bad for
duplicity.

Wherever death ensues from injuries inflicted
by parties engaged in any illegal act, an in-
dictment for manslaughter will lie, even
though it appear that the deceased had ma-
terially contributed to his death by his own
negligence. Reg. v. Longbottom and another,
439.

MARRIAGE LICENCE.

Indictment for perjury and personation in
order to procure, 467.

MARRIAGE REGISTER.
FALSE STATEMENTS IN.

On an indictment under the 41st section of
the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, the indictment
alleged that a certain clergyman had duly
solemnized a marriage between the defen-
dant and another person, and that he was
about to register in duplicate, in certain mar-
riage register books, furnished to him for
that purpose by the Registrar-General,
several particulars required to be known, re-
lating to such marriage, and that the defen-
dant wilfully made to the said clergyman for
the purpose of being inserted in the said
marriage register books, certain false state-
ments, touching the particulars relating to
the said marriage. The evidence showed
that the entry had been made before the
marriage, by the parish clerk, who put the
questions to the defendant, and wrote down
the answers in the absence of the clergyman,
but that after the marriage ceremony was
performed, the clergyman read over the
whole entry to the defendant, and asked him
if it was correct, to which he answered in the
affirmative.

Held, that the evidence was sufficient to
support the indictment.

Held, also, not necessary to prove that
the marriage register books had been fur-
nished to the clergyman by the Registrar-
General. Reg. v. Brown, 127

MATERIAL FACT.

What is, in perjury, 36

MERCHANT SEAMAN'S ACT.

Indictment for mutiny under, 423

MERGER.

MISDEMEANOR.

6th: That it is sufficient to charge "that Misdemeanor not merged in felony, 229
the prisoner did neglect and omit to alter
the said signal," without stating more parti-
cularly what was the specific alteration which
he so neglected to make. Reg. v. Pargeter,

191

VOL. III.

Upon an indictment for misdemeanor it is no
ground for an acquittal, that the evidence
necessary to prove the misdemeanor also

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