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Mr. Smyly asked the Witness to read the leading article in the Nation of the 10th of June.

Mr. Whiteside. I object to this paper being read until Mr. Duffy's handwriting has been proved. It should also appear on the face of the declaration, or be proved aliunde, that the person before whom it purports to be made had authority to take it, 2 Hayes' Cr. Law, 565, Rex v. White, 3 Camp. 98. This is signed by Mr. Cooper, but it does not state who Mr. Cooper is.

The Attorney General. Mr. Cooper is here, and we will ex

amine him.

JONATHAN S. COOPER sworn, and examined by MR. SMYLY.

I am Comptroller and Accountant-General in the Stamp Department for nearly twenty years; one of my duties is to take and subscribe the declarations of proprietors, printers, and publishers of newspapers; the declaration in my hand was made before me on the 18th of November, 1842, by Mr. Charles Gavan Duffy, as proprietor of the Nation; I saw him sign it, as also the declarations made and subscribed by George Atkinson and John Gray (as proprietors), and Edward Duffy (printer) of the Freeman's Journal, on the 18th of February, 1841; as also the declaration of Mr. Barrett (proprietor of the Pilot), on the 8th of December, 1837.

Cross-examined by MR. WHITESIDE on Behalf of Mr. DUFFY.

I am authorized by commission to act as Comptroller; I have not my commission here, it is at home: the date (18th November, 1842) in Mr. Duffy's declaration is correct.

Mr. Whiteside. Pray do you know Mr. Duffy?

Witness. I cannot say I do.

Mr. Whiteside. This is not sufficient, they must go farther. There is no proof identifying Mr. Duffy, the traverser, as the proprietor of this newspaper; they must produce some person who knows him. In criminal cases the evidence should be very distinct.

The Attorney General.-The 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 6, provides that no newspaper shall be printed until this declaration has been made, and there is a heavy penalty on any person publishing a newspaper knowingly making a false declaration at the Stamp Office, and the 8th section provides that a certified copy of this declaration shall be conclusive evidence of the facts therein. The question then for the consideration of the Court is, whether this declaration so signed by the party as the publisher and proprietor of this paper, and produced by the proper officer, is not sufficient prima facie evidence that it has been published by Mr. Duffy.

Mr. Brewster. In the case of Morgan v. Fletcher, 9 B. & C. 382, the production of the certificate lodged at the Stamp Office, and an attested copy of the paper were held sufficient evidence of proprietorship, and the same was decided in The King v. Hunt, 31 State Trials, 375.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAMPTON.-I have it upon my notes that the traverser, Mr. Duffy, is the proprietor of the Nation.

Mr. Whiteside. There is no legal evidence of it.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAMPTON.-Suppose there were two traversers of the same name on trial for the same offence, and evidence like the present was brought forward, which of the two is the person conclusively bound by the Act of Parliament ?

The Solicitor-General.-Prima facie, it is evidence against either. -of them.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAMPTON.-If it be evidence against either, you might have two men convicted on two indictments upon the same paper, on which it was alleged only one was the proprietor. In my opinion, something in addition to the statutable evidence is required, but very slight evidence is sufficient. For my own part, I feel no difficulty, in point of fact, for I find Mr. Duffy described by a witness who was very closely cross-examined, as the Editor of the Nation.

The Attorney-General.—I think it would be a bad precedent, where a Statute makes a certain thing evidence, that the Court should go beyond the Act. The words of the Statute are: "that this shall be as good evidence as if the handwriting had been proved."

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE.-I am not satisfied that the Crown has shown sufficient evidence of identity. I think that the proof at present is imperfect. The Act requires that Mr. Duffy should sign a declaration. The original declaration would certainly be evidence against the person who had signed the declaration as proprietor, and who had made a declaration at the Stamp Office. But in order to prevent any difficulty arising at the Stamp Office, the eighth section contains a further provision, furnishing a different species of evidence to be given against the party; a species of secondary evidence is this certificate, signed by the authorized officer, and if that officer had given evidence that he knew the person who signed, all would have been right.

The Attorney-General.-I do not feel bound to give further evidence, unless the Court shall so direct.

Mr. JUSTICE PERRIN.-That is rather inconsistent with the course you have taken. You proved Mr. Barrett's handwriting by the first witness, and have produced Mr. Cooper to prove Mr. Duffy's handwriting, and having failed, you have had recourse to this certificate.

The Solicitor General.-Requiring such evidence would render the Act nugatory, because if it is necessary to prove the handwriting to the original declaration, why direct that an attested copy of that declaration should be evidence? What the Act intended was to do away with, and guard against the difficulty of proof arising from the circumstance that the person going before the public officer might be unknown to him. It therefore makes this certificate evidence, and it would be contrary to the policy and intention of the Act to require such proof.

Mr. JUSTICE PERRIN.-In my opinion the case cited does not go to the point. The objection in that case was, that it was necessary to prove the actual publication of the libel by the defendant. Formerly you should prove the fact, as in that case; and the Statute referred to did away with the necessity for such proof. Mr. Justice

Bayley says: "If a paper corresponding with the paper described in "the affidavit is produced, the party producing it is to be in the same "situation as if he had proved that the paper had been bought at "the house, shop, or place of business of the defendant."

The Attorney General. I think the concluding portion of the section leaves the matter beyond doubt, for it provides: "In all pro❝ceedings, and upon all occasions whatsoever, a copy of any such de"claration certified to be a true copy under the hand of one of the "Commissioners, or of any officer in whose possession the same shall "be, upon proof made that such certificate hath been signed with the "handwriting of a person described in or by such certificate as such "Commissioner or officer, and whom it shall not be necessary to prove "to be a Commissioner or officer, shall be received in evidence against "any and every person named in such declaration as a person making "or signing the same as sufficient proof of such declaration, and that "the same was duly signed and made according to this Act, and of "the contents thereof; and every such copy so produced and cer"tified shall have the same effect, for the purposes of evidence against any and every such person named therein as aforesaid, to all intents "whatsoever, as if the original declaration, of which the copy so pro"duced and certified shall purport to be a copy, had been produced "in evidence, and been proved to have been duly signed and made "by the person appearing by such copy to have signed and made the 66 same as aforesaid."

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The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. The Court is of opinion, that the evidence should be admitted.

[The Witness here read an article in the Nation of the 10th of June [ante, p. 82].

Mr. Whiteside, for Mr. Duffy, called on the Witness to read other portions of the paper, which were read accordingly.

Mr. Henn. My Lords, I submit if the Crown produce and give a document in evidence, and read any part of it, we are entitled to have all read as evidence on the part of the Crown, 1 Phil. Evid, 340, Dagleish v. Dodd, 5 C. & P. 238; Wilson v. Bowie, 1 C. & P. 10, and note; Calvert v. Flower, 7 C. & P. 386. These authorities establish clearly that it is not made evidence for the party who calls for it, but for the party by whom it is produced.

Mr. JUSTICE PERRIN.-I know in Rex v. Perry, 2 Camp. 398, it was decided that a party might use an advertisement in a different part of a paper, but I do not know whether he was entitled to use it as the evidence of the prosecutor.

The Attorney-General.-In 1 Phil. Evid. 340, cited by Mr. Henn, there is nothing to show that it was proposed to be read by the defendant, as part of the plaintiff's evidence, and in the next page the contrary is laid down. But even if a doubt did arise, it is only applicable where the plaintiff reads a document, which is qualified or referred to by some other document which may be calculated to give it a meaning. In that case it may perhaps be read, but what the traversers contend for is, that where there is a distinct paragraph totally disconnected from the other part, they are entitled to read it. There is no authority showing that, and in page 342 of the same book

this principle is laid down, that if a document contains matter connected, and other matter entirely disconnected with the subject, and a portion of it is read, that does not make every portion of it evidence; here there is no connexion between the two articles. In Sturge v. Buchanan, 10 A. & E. 159, it was held that, where a letter book which was produced by the defendant, on notice given him for that purpose by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff read certain letters in that book as evidence, the defendant had no right to read in his own behalf, other letters on the same subject, copied in the same book, but not referred to in those read by the plaintiff.

Mr. Fitzgibbon. The question here is, whether having given notice in their bill of particulars, that they will use certain newspapers, and that they will make use of the contents, which must mean all the contents, as evidence, they are to be allowed to stop short and use only certain portions of them? These papers are produced in order to prove overt acts against the traversers as members of the Association, because Mr. Duffy, the proprietor, was a member of the Association. It is sought by these to show the objects of the Association, and for that purpose they give certain portions in evidence, and yet seek to withhold from the Jury what would clearly and more plainly explain those objects. We are entitled to call upon them to read every thing that bears upon the subject matter in issue. It is like stopping a witness who has given only part of an answer and preventing him from giving the remainder. Here it is sought to give in evidence part of these documents, in order to make an impression on the Jury which we may find it difficult to obliterate. What I get from a witness on cross-examination is evidence for the party producing him; here the articles which we wish to read should be made part of their evidence. They should read the whole of the document and should not stop when they have read only what they think favourable to themselves; for the question is, what is the purport of the whole of this document ?

Mr. Monahan. The case cited by the Attorney General from 10 Ad. & El., does not apply to the present case; in that case a book was produced containing a series of letters, and one of the parties wished to give evidence of a letter written on a particular day, and the other party was not allowed to read letters written on a different day. Suppose Mr. Vernon brought a volume of newspapers, we should not be entitled to call on him to read them all, but we are entitled to have the whole of a particnlar newspaper read.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAMPTON.-Where do you draw the limit? Is every thing in a newspaper to be evidence ?

Mr. Monahan. I say, that every thing regarding the subjectmatter of the charge, every thing showing the object of the parties, is evidence. King v. Lambert and Perry, 2 Camp. 398.

The Solicitor General. The question here is, whether the Crown having read from a newspaper the whole of an article, the traversers have a right to insist upon reading another part of that newspaper, upon a different subject-matter, namely, a publication of a speech appearing to have been made some days before the publica

tion in question, and the argument is, that by the word "contents,” in our bill of particulars, we are bound to read the entire newspaper. The word contents" means what is pertinent, and relevant to the issue. If we read the entire of the article, that is sufficient, and cannot be called a garbled extract. The document is the article, and we have read the whole of it. In the case in 2 Camp. an advertisement was allowed to be read, because it was part of the same publication which bore upon, and qualified the sense and meaning of what had been read; but it did not qualify the charge. If this article qualified the meaning of the article which we read, justice would require that it should be read too, but not so, if it merely qualifies the charge.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAMPTON.-The question does not seem to be, whether it is to be read or not, but whether it is to be read as evidence for the Crown or for the traversers.

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The Solicitor General.—The reason why such evidence was admitted in Rex v. Perry was, that it affected the character of the article which had been read. But the proposition here, is widely different. It is sought to read an article, which, though relevant to the issue, is not explanatory of the article which we have read. Batt v. Howard, 3 Stark. 6, the entry was referrible to the charge, but it was refused, because it was not referrible to the former entry. Adey v. Bridges, 2 Stark. 189, was to the same effect. So was the case in 10 Ad. & Ellis, cited by the Attorney General.

The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. This case has been so much discussed that I shall be brief in giving my reasons for the decision I have come to. A newspaper was given in evidence for the purpose of having an article which was printed in that paper, entitled" The Morality of War," read. This article in itself is perfect and distinct, and the whole has been read by the Crown. On another occasion, after an interval of several days, and having no connexion with that article, a speech was made by one of the traversers, which happens to have been reported in another part of the same paper, apparently having no connexion and giving no qualification of the opinions published in the same newspaper upon the subject of "The Morality of War." Now, suppose the speech, instead of having been spoken by Mr. O'Connell, was spoken by Mr. Duffy on an isolated occasion, having no reference to the article; could it be said that Mr. Duffy, having made that speech, would be entitled to have it read, if he were unable to show its connexion with the article on "The Morality of War." No case has been cited which would lead to that conclusion (so far as I can see), or to support the proposition now advanced on the part of the traversers; and if called upon to decide, I should have great doubts whether the traversers, without the consent of the Crown, would have had a right to have had that distinct and independent publication read at all. It is quite a different publication, as different as if the speech had been made one day and the publication had taken place six days afterwards. Though both in the same newspaper, one is not an explanation or a qualification of the other; however, the Crown have made no objection to the speech being read, therefore it is not necessary to decide whether, if an objection had been made, the Court would or

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