of Ireland. But to use that language in 1843, or 1844, when the Irish people have voices in the English Legislature, where they return a hundred members, and to tell the people in the present tense, that no power, in 1843, or 1844, has, or ought to have, a right to bind Ireland, except the King, Lords, and Commons of Ireland— to lay down that doctrine in 1843, and to justify it by analogy to a declaration of the Volunteers in 1782, is absurd in reasoning and illegal in principle. It is contrary to every principle, legal er constitutional; it is seditious to hold such a doctrine at this day. It is neither more nor less than saying this-telling the people of Ireland (and this is the very first charge in the indictment), "you are legislated for, you are governed by a power that has no right to govern you." To hold out the declaration of the Volunteers in 1782 as binding, or as to guide the people in 1843, is just saying this: "you are legislated for by a body that have no right so to legislate; no person has that power, and no body has "that power, but the Queen, Lords, and Commons of Ireland." I say, to lay down that doctrine in 1843 is unconstitutional, illegal, and seditious.

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Mr. Molyneux, who has been so often referred to, published his celebrated letter to vindicate the rights of the Irish people to have representatives in Parliament; and he says: " If from these last"mentioned records it be concluded that the Parliament of England

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may bind Ireland, it must also be allowed that the people of Ire"land ought to have their representatives in the Parliament of Eng"land." That was the grievance against which the movement of 1782 was directed; and it is a mere pretext to take that as the basis of the present movement, which is directed, not against an unconstitutional exercise of authority over Ireland, but against the law and Constitution of this country, as by law established. Mr. Molyneux goes on, alluding to their having representatives in the Parliament of England: "And this, I believe," he says, "we should be willing enough to embrace, but this is an happiness we can hardly hope for." Mr. Molyneux's idea was, that the incorporation of the two Legislatures in one, was a happiness, for the sake of this country, which was hardly to be hoped for; evidently showing that great man's notions of what would be desirable for the two countries in the way of legislation.

Gentlemen of the Jury, I thought it right to disabuse your minds from this notion, if any such impression has been made, that the parties engaged in this movement are doing no more than following the precedent set by some of the greatest men that have adorned this country. You will see at once, the wide distinction between the two cases; and I think you can have no doubt, that the great men, whose names have been thus, I may say, profaned, never would have sanctioned a movement of this kind, which is neither more nor less than persuading the people of this country, that they are governed by persons who have no right to legislate for them, by strangers, by foreigners, by Saxons, by people who, from their earliest times, have had no other object in view but the conquest of their country, and keeping them in subjugation. The distinguished men to whom I

have alluded, would have been the last persons to countenance any thing of such a nature as this agitation.

Gentlemen of the Jury, I have to thank you for the very great attention which you have paid to me in the course of this protracted case. There are many topics suggested by it, on which I might dilate; but I have been reminded by the counsel on the other side, and I fully accede to their view of the case, that it does not belong to me, in my function of public prosecutor, to go into them. But this I must say, my learned friends and I, my colleagues who are with me, have endeavoured to bring this case forward before a jury, in the usual mode of administering justice by the common law, and upon the only charge, and in the only way by which the offence, which we say exists, is legally cognizable. I think I may claim credit for our having conducted the case temperately and fairly. I hope I may also say, that there never was in the history of our jurisprudence a trial in which a more wide latitude was allowed to the persons on trial. Not a single topic has been objected to; not a single declaration of any of the parties, not a single act at any period of his life has been excluded; not a single legal objection has been started by us to the reception of any evidence which the defendant's counsel thought might bear upon the case. Some of the most distinguished men at our bar have been selected for the defence; they have been heard at great length; they have put forward the cases of their respective clients with the most consummate ability. Every advantage in that respect has been afforded to the traversers; and, with all those advantages, what has been the case which has been presented to you on their behalf? Are you at this moment, any one of you, able to understand what the object of the several traversers was, if it was not what we say it was? Has any one of them, has the counsel of any one of them shown, or even asserted, what his real object was ? Has any one of them suggested any legal, any constitutional, any peaceable mode, by which the object which they say they had in view could be arrived at ? Not one. Has any attempt been shown. to resort to any legal or constitutional mode of effecting it? Not one. Has any witness been called to contradict the facts proved against them? Not one. A case more wholly devoid of defence it is impossible, I think, to imagine.

Then, Gentlemen of the Jury, what remains? What remains but this, that you should ask yourselves, is not the case of some common plan clearly developed, clearly shown? Are not the traversers more or less engaged in that common plan? Is it a lawful one? Has it been shown to us to be lawful? Has it been asserted to be lawful? Has even the principal traverser, who all along said it was lawful, shown it to be so? I think you can have no doubt in saying, that, on the contrary, it has been clearly shown to be unlawful. The only remaining consideration is, how far the persons upon trial have embarked in this illegal design. With respect to the principal traverser, I think it is unnecessary to make any further observations. With regard to those who assisted him, by the publications in the newspapers, I presume not the slightest doubt will be entertained. With regard to Mr. Steele, the fidus Achates,

who has himself avowed here the sentiments I read from his speech, and who has identified himself with Mr. O'Connell, I should presume there can be no doubt. Then, there remains Mr. Tierney, who, on two occasions did, certainly in his language, and by the communications which he appears himself to have admitted he had with Dublin, identified himself with the objects of the several conspirators, for so I must now call them. And with regard to Mr. Ray, he is clearly a member of the Association; he is the person who appears to have conducted the finance department. It was said that something would be shown with regard to the application of the funds of that body; I do not know whether that was intended to be a pledge, but I would merely make this remark, that not an explanation has been given on the part of these traversers, either of the application of these funds, or of the real object which the parties had in view. How could that be testified? By resolutions in their books; by communications with their officers; by accounts of the application of their money; by officers or persons produced, who would be able to say: “We are acquainted with the details of this machinery, and will tell you what the object is." Not a single individual of that description is brought forward; the greatest caution has been observed in keeping them back. I do not say that it is incumbent upon persons who are charged with offence and crime, to come forward and vindicate themselves till they are implicated by evidence; I do not mean to say, that this Association is bound, at the bidding of the Crown, or merely on being prosecuted, to come forward and show you what the real nature of their constitution is. I do not say that; but when I find the persons connected with that Association conducting themselves in such a way, as clearly to bring themselves within the law; and when it is said on the other side, "We are not violating the law, but keeping within the limits of it;" I think I have a right to say to them, show me by evidence, which I know is in your power, what your objects really are, or how far they have gone, and to what they tend. I do not profess to know in what state we might have been at this moment, but for the stopping of these proceedings in the month of October. You will recollect, the last time we heard Mr. O'Connell speaking, before the commencement of this prosecution, he says to the people, "I have one or two more steps which I shall not at present disclose." He doles out his information to the assembled multitudes, piece by piece, as he finds occasion will justify; you find there is a regular scheme in progress and concoction, but it is not until he conceives the other machinery sufficiently perfect, that the head of the combination thinks fit to disclose what it is. I will not at present say what might have been the consequences to the persons connected with this movement, if three hundred persons had assembled in the month of January or February, and had taken upon them the functions, either of representatives or delegates of the people, of different counties and places in Ireland, or erected themselves into a body for the purpose of opening what is called a negotiation with the British Minister. What negotiation" means, I do not understand; my learned friend, Mr. Sheil, says, that the agitator must sometimes

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be a diplomatist, and that in order to get what is practicable, it is sometimes a prudent thing to ask for what is unattainable. This was Mr. Sheil's language in a part of his speech; whether "negotiation" means that or not, it is not for me to say; but if he does mean, as it may mean, a threat and denunciation to the British Minister, that things were now come to that pass, that he must not think any longer of refusing the Repeal of the Union, then the conspiracy was complete, which we charge to have progressed to a certain extent that conspiracy being to accomplish its object by intimidation.

Gentlemen of the Jury, I hope I have satisfied you, that in point of law, so far as the law is for you, there is a conspiracy in this case, in the legal signification of the word. Not a secret combination, to be proved by any person who has been a party to it otherwise we must resort to common informers and spies-but a community of purpose, and illegal purpose, which is enough to constitute the crime of couspiracy in point of law. And that was the only mode, observe, of dealing with this case; because it would not have done to have convicted Mr. Duffy of the publication of a libel, or Mr. Barrett of the publication of a libel, or even Mr. O'Connell for the uttering of a seditious speech. That would not have done; the great question which we want to have tried is, the legality of these proceedings, and of this body. The only mode by which that could be done, is by bringing the leaders of it in one mass or focus, and by charging those leaders with having violated the law. That is the meaning of conspiracy; that is the mode we have manfully and boldly adopted. We have not gone to the inferior agents, and put into prison this person or that person, who had acted a subordinate part; nor have we prosecuted the unfortunate people who were collected together by the machinery of Repeal Wardens, for attending illegal meetings. No; we have at once joined issue with Mr. O'Connell, and we have said: "We will take the "opinion of a court of law, we will take the opinion of a jury, "whether what you say is or is not true, that all these proceedings are "consistent with the law." This is the course we have adopted; and, therefore, we are not to be taunted with having adopted the contrivance of prosecuting for conspiracy, or with having brought the actions of one man to bear upon another. No; but having demonstrated each of these persons to have pursued a particular line of conduct, for which line of conduct he must be answerable, if the result of that conduct be to show, not only that he may have in the particular instance violated the law, as, for instance, in the publication of a libel, but also to show that he has identified himself with a body, with a combination, with a movement that is illegal, we do not visit that man with the guilt of another, but we visit on him the legal and inevitable consequences of his own act, and fasten upon him the responsibility consequent upon his own guilt.

Gentlemen of the Jury, I have now brought to a close the observations which it has occurred to me to make on the evidence in this case. I have not the slightest doubt, that as we have so far discharged our duty, and, I trust, in a mauner temperate and fair to the traversers, and have allowed them the indulgence they have had in

this trial—as we have done our duty to the best of our ability in that way, so I have no doubt that you will fearlessly and impartially discharge yours. I call upon you for your verdict; not because this country is in a state of disturbance, not because that verdict may tend one way or other to act upon the state of the country, not because it may be attended with this or that consequence, either to the public or to individuals, not because it may be productive of this or that effect with regard to legislative enactment; no, but that verdict I call upon you to give, which the law, the justice, the uncontradicted and unexplained evidence in this case demand.

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE.

Gentlemen of the Jury, it now falls to me to make such observations as occur to me, to be submitted to your consideration upon the manifold circumstances of this very important case; and I am happy to say, that on conference with my learned Brethren of the Bench, there is a concurrence of opinion existing between us upon the subject matter which I shall have to lay before you. Gentlemen, it has been, and, is most highly satisfactory to the Court, most creditable to you, the unvaried and constant attention which you have paid throughout, from beginning to end, to the circumstances of this strange and important case. I say strange, only in reference to its duration; because for myself I do not feel that it is a case, in which there exists any great difficulty in the law, or upon the facts on which so intelligent a jury as I have now the honour of addressing, will finally have to pronounce their verdict.

Gentlemen, you have heard during this long trial a great deal of eloquence-brilliant eloquence; you have heard somewhat also of declamation; you have heard great oratorical powers, and powers of reasoning; you have heard a great deal of what may be deemed poetic; and I do not mean to say but that you have also heard a good deal of what might be more justly termed prosaie. Gentlemen, you have heard observations made to you, which, I cannot help saying generally, bordered upon the very verge of propriety. But what is more material, you have heard a great deal, which it would be very difficult indeed to prove was properly relevant to the subject which you are to decide on. Gentlemen, there are many questions made both of law and of fact. On the latter subject you are the constitutional judges. The law of the case you will take from the Court, the Judges of which are constitutionally entrusted with the administration of that law, bound to administer it under the most solemn sanctions, and independent alike both of the Crown and of the people. We, the Judges, therefore, sit here in this Court of Queen's Bench, under the same obligation as the Queen holds her Crown, to administer justice with mercy according to the laws of the land.

Gentlemen, there are, as you know, eight traversers now upon their