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7. PLEADING 11-CARRIAGE OF GOODS-ACTION FOR DAMAGES.

It is not enough to plead evidence that might tend to prove the condition of property when a defendant carrier, sued for damages, took charge thereof.

8. TRIAL 251(1)-INSTRUCTIONS APPLICATION TO ISSUES.

Instructions must present the contention of each party to the jury, and they must correspond to the issues presented.

Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; J. P. Kavanaugh, Judge. Action by W. N. Daniels, doing business as the La Grande Creamery Company, against the Northern Pacific Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The defendant is a railway common carrier of goods. The plaintiff alleges in substance that he purchased in Concordia, Kan., 330 boxes of butter and 37 boxes of poultry, and caused them to be shipped in good order by another railroad company connecting with the line of the defendant consigned to him

self at Portland, Or. He says:

until two days afterward. The answer further charges negligence upon the plaintiff in failing to remove the goods from the car immediately on its arrival. The new matter of the defendant's pleading was traversed by the reply. The judgment went for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

Omar C. Spencer, of Portland (Carey & Kerr, of Portland, on the brief), for appellant. Ralph A. Coan, of Portland (Pearce & Meloney, of Portland, on the brief), for respondent.

BURNETT, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] One error complained of by the defendant is that a witness who testified that he had been in the business of dealing in butter, eggs, and poultry since 1902, and that butter was very susceptible to foul odors, which would damage it, was allowed to answer this question, "What would be the amount of such damage?" by saying, "Well, the amount of such damage would run as high as seven to eight cents a pound." That this was error was decided in Burton v. Severance, 22 Or. 91, 29 Pac. 200; Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Murray, 45 Or. 103, 76 Pac. 1079; Montgomery v. Somers, 50 Or. 259, 90 Pac 674; Pac. Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Elmore Packing Co., 60 Or. 534, 120 Pac. 389, Ann. Cas. 1914A, rule is that a witness is not allowed to in371, and other cases. The reason of this vade the ultimate province or function of the jury to declare the amount which will com

pensate the plaintiff for the injury suffered. "That when the said poultry was delivered to If good butter had a market price known to the said railroad company by the said John dealers generally and to the witness in parStewart, consignor, for shipment as aforesaid, ticular he might have stated that price, and the same was in first-class condition, the poultry if he knew the butter after it became tainthaving been solidly frozen in the boxes and ed and that it had a market price in that thoroughly iced by the consignor after being packed in said car, but by reason of the negli- condition he might have told what it was. gence and carelessness of the defendant, its He might, also, have given his opinion that agents and servants in charge and control of the quality of the butter would be depreciatsaid car containing said goods in failing to ed a certain percentage, but he would have thoroughly re-ice the same and otherwise properly care for the said poultry in boxes in tran- no right to assess the amount of damage per sit," the same became putrid, so that it was ut-pound. That must be left to the jury. terly valueless when it arrived at its destination in Portland.

Substantially the same averment is made concerning the butter which is said to have become tainted by the odor of the decaying fowls. The defendant denies all the allegations in the complaint. The answer says in

effect that the defendant received the car at Billings, Mont., but that at the time the poultry was in a putrid condition because it had not been properly frozen and prepared before loading, and goes on to say that the company transported the shipment to Portland with all possible speed and all the ordinary care and caution required, delivering the articles at their destination in the same condition in which they were when received by the defendant at Billings; that at once it notified the plaintiff of the arrival of the car, but that he did not begin to unload it

The bill of exceptions discloses that there was some testimony to the effect that the shipment was delivered to the initial carrier in good condition, and that on arrival at Portland, Or., it was delivered by the defendant in bad order. From the same source we learn that the defendant offered the depositions of sundry witnesses who handled the refrigerator car in question from its arrival in Billings, Mont., to Portland; that the car was sealed with the seals of another road; that ice and salt were supplied in the ice boxes of the car whenever needed while it was in the custody of the defendant, and that it was properly handled and transported over the line of the defendant in the usual time and without unnecessary delay. It is said in the record that the plaintiff offered no evidence to rebut the testimony of the de

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

fendant, and tendered nothing to prove how the car was handled from the time it left

Concordia until it reached Portland. The defendant seasonably requested the three following instructions:

"If you find in this case that the defendant received the carload of poultry and butter and used reasonable diligence in re-icing the car and handling it through to its destination in Portland, and offered delivery of it in the same condition as when it was received at Billings, Mont., then the defendant has performed its full duty to the plaintiff, and there can be no recovery against it in this case."

they continued in that good condition at the time of transfer to this company. The company, however, might show that at the time they received the goods they were in a tainted or putrid condition, but the burden would rest upon the company to establish that condition by a preponderance of the evidence."

[2, 3] The essence of the accusation against the defendant is that it failed thoroughly to re-ice the car and otherwise properly to care for the goods in transit. The issue was joined on this averment only, and nothing further. It is not directly alleged that the property "It is alleged in the second amended complaint was delivered to the defendant itself in good that the negligence of the defendant consisted order. The nearest approach to that is that in its failure to thoroughly ice the butter and the chattels were in that condition when depoultry and otherwise properly care for the

same while in transit. I charge you that the delivered to the initial carrier. It is admitted fendant railway company did not insure against that the property was perishable in its nanatural decay of the produce shipped except ture, and hence the company was not liable such decay as would happen because of its as an insurer. The measure of its duty was failure to use reasonable diligence in re-icing and salting the car. If, when this produce to use reasonable care and diligence, conreached Portland, it was in a worse condition sidering the nature of the chattels involved. than when it left Concordia, Kan., because of This feature was discussed in Michellod v. its age, nature, or quality, or because it was Ore-Wash. R. & N. Co., 86 Or. 329, 168 Pac. unable to stand the summer weather under ordinary and reasonable car refrigeration, and you 620. These first two instructions embraced find that it had ordinary and reasonable car the contention of the defendant as disclosed by refrigeration, then there can be no recovery in the pleadings, and it was entitled to have the case against the defendant." that theory presented to the jury; there being testimony on that point supporting such instructions. For this reason it was error to refuse them. Bingham v. Lipman, 40 Or. 363, 67 Pac. 98, Scholl v. Belcher, 63 Or. 310, 127 Pac. 968, and West v. McDonald, 64 Or. 203, 127 Pac. 784, 128 Pac. 818, are illustrative of this rule.

"If you find in this case that the damaged condition of the butter or poultry was caused by the failure of the shipper at Concordia, Kan., to properly prepare the same, or to properly load it in the car, or to properly ice or cool the car at the beginning of the journey, or if you find that the damaged condition of the poultry or butter was caused by the failure of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company to ice or care for the car, and that the defendant Northern Pacific Railway Company used reasonable diligence in icing and handling the car from the time it received the car until it offered delivery, then there can be no recovery against the defendant Northern Pacific Railway Company in this case."

These were refused over the exception of the defendant, and the court charged the jury on that branch of the case as follows:

[4] There is no evidence disclosed by the bill of exceptions indicating that there was any failure at Concordia, Kan., properly to prepare the shipment, either in loading or cooling it at the beginning of the journey. Neither was there anything tending to show hence the third instruction is without a basis that the initial carrier was remiss in its duty; authorizing the jury to consider it. It was properly refused.

"Your first inquiry, gentlemen, will be what was the condition of the poultry and butter at the time it was shipped at Concordia, Kan.; [5-7] The charge given by the court does and if you find from the evidence in this case not allow the defendant to exonerate itself that this butter and poultry was in good condition and properly packed for shipment at the even by showing affirmatively that it did in initial point of shipment, which was Concordia, fact thoroughly re-ice the car and properly Kan., and that when it arrived in the city of care for the property while in its custody, Portland it was in a tainted and putrid condi- but imposes upon it the additional burden, tion, then the presumption of law arises that it became tainted en route, and through the fail- not included in the pleadings, of proving that ure of the transporting company. The burden the damaged condition was due to some would rest upon the defendant, therefore, to cause over which it had no control. If the show that the property, if received in good goods were damaged by decay when they condition, became tainted from some cause for which it was not responsible. And it would came into the possession of the defendant have to satisfy you in that case by a preponder- the re-icing would not have restored them. ance of the evidence that the tainted and putrid On the other hand, if they were sound when quality of those goods when they arrived in the the defendant took them, its whole duty in city of Portland, if such you find it to be, was the case, as the pleadings state the issue, was caused by something which it could not control,, either by the act of the shipper or by some in- fulfilled if and when it thoroughly re-iced herent quality of the goods themselves, which the car as reasonably necessary and with fair produced this putrefaction and taint. The bur- diligence took proper care of it over its line. den of proof would likewise be upon the company to show that at the time the goods were Further than this the plaintiff does not point transferred to it in the state of Montana, or at out anything which the defendant ought to whatever point the transfer was made, that have done, but did not, which would have the goods were then in a putrid or tainted con- kept the articles wholesome and merchantdition, because, as I have said, if it be found by you that the goods were in good conditionable. As they were admittedly perishable in

er that the goods would arrive in good condition. If it had been alleged, but it was not, that the poultry and butter were sound when the defendant took charge of them, the plaintiff to prove the averment, if denied, could have used in evidence the presumption spoken of in the excerpt quoted by plaintiff from 4 R. C. L. & 383, to the effect that if it were shown that the articles were sound when delivered to the initial transporting road the supposition is that they remained so even to the ultimate carrier who must defend himself by overcoming the effect of the presumption if he delivers them in bad order. It would

seem to be quite as important to aver that the shipment was in good order when the defendant received it as to allege it was in bad order when delivered at Portland, for the company is not responsible for injury to the goods not occurring while they are in its custody. 10 C. J. § 897. It is not enough to plead evidence that might tend to prove the condition of the property when the defendant took charge of it. The complaint contains no statement that the goods were delivered to the defendant in good order; hence the direction given by the court goes beyond and expands the issue tendered.

[8] The standard rules relating to instructions to a jury require that the contention of each party must be presented to the jury, and that they must correspond to the issues presented.

For the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

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have judgment entered for amount of verdict and execution allowed. 4. EMINENT DOMAIN 263-CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS-REVIEW.

Under the provision of Const. art. 7, § 3, that if the judgment appealed from is such as should have been rendered in the case it should be affirmed, where the record upon appeal by plaintiff in a proceeding for the condemnation of land does not disclose any benefit to plaintiff by requiring defendants to submit to another trial, the case will be affirmed.

Department 2. Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; J. P. Kavanaugh, Judge. Action by the Portland & Oregon City Railway Company, a corporation, against E. A. From judgment on the verdict for amount of McGrath and wife, for condemnation of land. award, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This is an action brought in 1916 for the condemnation of a right of way over the land of defendants. Issues were joined and a trial had on October 25th of that year. A verdict was returned finding that it was necessary for the plaintiff to acquire the land for railroad purposes, and assessing defendants' damages at $958.33. Formal order on the verdict was entered November 14, 1916. After the action was brought plaintiff, by virtue of some understanding that there would be no trouble, entered upon and appropriated the right of way and constructed and commenced the operation of its railroad across the land. In December, 1916, defendants moved the court for judgment against the plaintiff upon the verdict for the amount thereof. This motion was supported by affidavits showing the facts of possession and

MCBRIDE, C. J., and BENSON and HAR- appropriation above stated. The matters RIS, JJ., concur.

(88 Or. 346)

were not controverted. In opposition to the motion an affidavit was filed showing that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the amount fixed as damages, and that it was

PORTLAND & O. C. RY. CO. v. McGRATH attempting to secure a different route for its

et al.

(Supreme Court of Oregon. April 9, 1918.) 1. EMINENT DOMAIN 246(2) — REQUISITES AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

road; that if this could be done for a satisfactory price it was plaintiff's intention to abandon the course of its line across defendants' land. There was no surrender of the premises or offer to surrender, nor any declaration of intention to do so. Upon the hear

Under L. O. L. § 6866, providing upon the payment into court of the damages assessed by the jury in proceedings for condemnation of land the court shall give judgment appropriat-ing on December 23d, the court entered a ing the lands to plaintiff, the plaintiff, after ver- judgment against the plaintiff for the amount dict, may elect whether it will pay for and take of the verdict, of which plaintiff complains. the property.

ENFORCE

2. EMINENT DOMAIN 246(2) MENT OF AWARD AND JUDGMENT. Where, after verdict for plaintiff in proceedings for condemnation of land, plaintiff took possession of premises, and made no offer to surrender possession, it elected to accept the benefits of the verdict, and a judgment entered on the verdict against plaintiff for the award

was proper.

J. N. Hart and J. Harold Hart, both of Portland, for appellant. M. H. Clark, of Portland (Clark, Skulason & Clark, of Portland, on the brief), for respondents.

BEAN, J. [1, 2] The statute provides that upon payment into court of the damages as3. EMINENT DOMAIN 241-DUE PROCESS ment appropriating the lands, property, sessed by the jury, the court shall give judgOF LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. Under Const. art. 1, § 10, providing that rights, easements, crossing, or connection in every man shall have remedy by due process of question, as the case may be, to the corporalaw for injury done him and his property, tion. Lord's Oregon Laws, § 6866. In a prowhere, after verdict for plaintiff in proceeding to condemn land, plaintiff has taken possession ceeding of this kind, after a verdict assessing of such land, the defendant has the right to the damages has been obtained, it is for the

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

plaintiff to elect whether it will pay for and take the property for a right of way. Oregon Railway Co. v. Hill, 9 Or. 377. The proper judgment was entered on the verdict after the trial, as prescribed in the opinion in O. R. & N. Co. v. Taffe, 67 Or. 102, 134 Pac. 1024, 135 Pac. 332, 515. If the plaintiff elects to take the land, can it complain by reason of the order being reversed and instead of "paying and taking" it "takes and then pays" for the property? Concededly, the taking possession of the desired premises, the construction of a line of railroad thereon, the retention of the same, and the operation of the road without any offer to surrender the possession of the land so taken must be considered as the exercise of an option to accept the benefits of the award made by the jury.

[3] The Constitution of this state (article 1, 10) provides that every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his property. The amount of the injury to defendants' land has been fixed by a verdict. No evidence is contained in the record, and we cannot assume that the amount is excessive. There is no dispute that the right of way has been utilized. There then remained nothing to be done in the ordinary course of procedure, except to enter judgment for the amount and allow execution. oria, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 74 Ill. 394, 398; Bellingham Bay, etc., Co. v. Strand, 14 Wash. 144, 44 Pac. 140; Witt v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 404, 29 N. W. 161; Wilcox v. St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co., 35 Minn, 439, 29 N. W. 148; Wood v. Hospital, 164 Pa. 159, 30 Atl. 237; Roberts v. N. P. R. R. Co., 158 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 756, 39 L. Ed. 873.

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The judgment of the lower court recites, among other things:

"That at the conclusion of the argument upon said motion, upon being informed by the court that judgment would be entered against the plaintiff pursuant to said motion, unless the plaintiff tendered surrender of possession of said property to the defendants, counsel for plaintiff thereupon stated in open court that plaintiff was not willing or prepared to do so at this time, and that he was not prepared to state that plaintiff would at any time surrender possession."

The judgment of the court on condemnation of property for public use is conditional, depending on the payment of the damages found, and the party seeking condemnation acquires no vested right until such payment is made or the sum deposited, and the rights of the parties are reciprocal, so that the property owner has no vested right in the damages found by the jury until the same is paid or deposited. If the property, however, is taken or damaged by the owner's consent before compensation is made, the owner will then have a vested right in the compensation when ascertained. City of Chicago v. Jo seph Barbian, 80 Ill. 482. It is said in 19 Cyc. p. 937 (b):

"The condemnation proceedings may be dismissed or abandoned at any time prior to final the commissioners or appraisers appointed to judgment, or final confirmation of the report of assess damages or compensation, or before the compensation has been paid or deposited in the manner provided by law, or the right of the property owner to compensation has otherwise become vested. The proceeding may be abandoned even after the damages are assessed, and a reasonable opportunity should be given, after the price of the land is fixed, for the petitioner to reject the award and abandon the proceeding."

[4] The record before us does not disclose that any benefit would be obtained by requiring defendants to submit to another trial for the purpose of obtaining the damages to their land, except the advantage that might be gained by plaintiff of having the defendants' compensation reassessed or a retrial of the identical question passed upon by the jury. Substance should not be sacrificed for

form.

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Where deceased had received five bullet wounds through the body, and physicians told him that he was about to die, advised him to make his will, and gave him morphine to ease his pain, statements then made by him while his mind was clear and rational as to the cause of his death were admissible as dying declarations; he having died a few minutes thereafter.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Dying Declaration.]

3. HOMICIDE

LARATIONS.

207-EVIDENCE-DYING DEC

Statements made by deceased immediately before death, although in response to questions, be admissible as dying declarations. and even in reply to leading questions, may

Appeal from Superior Court, Gila County; Frank O. Smith, Judge.

William Sparks was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Benton Dick, of Phoenix, Thomas E. Flannigan, of Globe, and Clifford C. Faires, of Miami, for appellant. Wiley E. Jones, Atty. Gen., W. P. Geary, George Harben, and L. B. Whitney, Asst. Attys. Gen., Norman J.

Johnson, Co. Atty., of Globe, Kirby D. Little, | through his body. The deceased was told Asst. Co. Atty., of Miami, and F. C. Jacobs, of Globe, for the State.

FRANKLIN, C. J. Appellant was charged with the crime of murder, and convicted of murder in the second degree.

[1] It is urged that the trial court committed error in allowing the state to prove by several witnesses certain threats that appellant had made against the deceased some considerable time previous to the commission of the homicide. Where malice is an ingredient of the offense charged, it is always proper to introduce evidence of threats and previous troubles as tending to show malice. Leonard v. State, 17 Ariz. 293, 151 Pac. 947. Courts will not exclude threats because of their remoteness. The length of time which may elapse between the threat and the homicide may be considered by the jury in connection with all the facts and circumstances of the case to determine its weight as evidence, but the admissibility of such testimony is not to be measured by mere remoteness in point of time. Wharton's Criminal Evidence (10th Ed.) vol. 2, § 882; Cyc. vol. 21, p. 892; State v. Quinn, 56 Wash. 295, 105 Pac. 818. [2] Mr. Thompson, the deceased, who was the victim of this homicide, was asked if he had been in a quarrel or fight with appellant Sparks that day, to which he replied, "No; not that day." Thompson was then asked this question, "Did he (Sparks) just come up and shoot you?" Thompson replied, "Yes." Dying declarations are always admissible to show who killed the deceased, and the res gestæ of the killing, and such statements make one of the exceptions to the hearsay

rule. It is objected that the court erred in admitting these questions and answers as a dying declaration. The admission of this testimony, under the circumstances, is free from error. When a surgeon first examined the deceased upon the ground at the scene of the killing, he was in a dangerously wounded condition with five bullet holes

that he would probably not live until he reached the hospital. At the hospital he was attended by two surgeons, and was again informed of his grave condition and the slight chance for his recovery. The deceased had been given some morphine to ease his pain, and the surgeons began to administer ether preparatory to an operation; but they found the physical condition of the patient such that they at once desisted. The deceased was told to make his will, and did indicate what disposition he wished made of his property, and then he was asked the questions and made the answers that have been quoted. The surgeons testified that at the time he was perfectly conscious and rational, and five or ten minutes afterwards he died. The circumstances clearly indicate that the statements made by him were by one about to die, who was in fear of impending death, and who subsequently died; that they were freely and voluntarily made as to a relevant and material fact, and with sufficient consciousness to comprehend the situation and the questions asked and answered. This, we think, places the matter squarely within the rule pertaining to the admissibility of a dying declara

tion.

[3] The fact that the declarations were made in response to questions asked the declarant, in the absence of statute, does not affect the admissibility; nor the fact that they consisted of direct answers to leading questions. Wharton, Crim. Ev. (10th Ed.) vol. 1, par. 293. It affects only the value of the evidence which is exclusively for the jury, 986; State v. Foot You, 24 Or. 61, 32 Pac. and not its admissibility. 21 Cyc. pp. 9791031, 33 Pac. 537.

In addition to the assignments of error made, we have carefully examined the record and are convinced that substantial justice has been done.

There is no reversible error. The judgment is affirmed.

ROSS and CUNNINGHAM, JJ., concur.

END OF CASES IN VOL. 171

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