"the juft perfuafion, that it is impoffible to hold CHAP. XX. "a diftant country, against the wishes and efHis lordship might "forts of its inhabitants."

probably be of the fame opinion. This opinion was juftified by his own experience, in too many mortifying inftances for the tranquillity of a man of his fenfibility.

It has been above observed, that by the fud-. den death of general Phillips, all thefe letters fell into the hands of lord Cornwallis, with feveral others of the fame ftyle and tenor. This circumstance greatly aggravated the diffenfion and difguft, between the commanding officers in New York and Virginia. Yet notwithstanding the implied cenfure or reproach which they contained, in most of fir Henry Clinton's letters afterwards to lord Cornwallis, he had written with great complaifance, and had expreffed the higheft confidence in his lordfhip's abilities and judgment. But the breach became irreconcile

able.

Through the whole bufinefs, lord Cornwallis conftantly affirmed, that his force was infutlicient even for defenfive operations. He took the liberty to intimate to fir Henry Clinton, that notwithstanding there had been a call for a part of his troops for the defence of New York, that he had never been under any apprehenfions

* Gibbon on the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

1781.

CHAP. XX.

1781.

for the fafety of that city. With the fame free. dom, he remonftrated against a plan that had been meditated by the commander in chief at New York, for an attack on the city of Philadelphia.

His lordship afferted with fome degree of warmth, that it appeared to him highly imprudent, that any part of his army fhould be detached for that or any other purpose. But he obferved further, that in his fubordinate situation, unacquainted with the inftructions of adminiftration, ignorant of the forces under the command of his excellency general Clinton, and without the power of making arrangements, he could only offer his opinion that plans of execution must come from himself, who had the materials for forming, as well as the power of executing.

These remonftrances had little weight with the British commander in chief. It appears through all their correspondence, that these gentlemen differed very widely in opinion, with regard to the modes of action, the numbers neceflary for effective execution, the best posts for defence, and indeed in the general plan of all their operations. However, fir Henry Clinton ftill kept up the idea of fupporting the war in Virginia, and of aiding lord Cornwallis to the utmoft, notwithstanding he had fent an order to draw off a part of his troops.

1781.

After he was thoroughly alarmed at the haz- CHAP. IX. ardous fituation of the commander in Virginia, he relinquifhed his chimerical project of attacking Philadelphia; he countermanded the orders for drawing off a confiderable part of the troops; and endeavoured to haften on a small fquadron of British ships then lying at SandyHook. He flattered himself that a few ships under the flag of Britain, might intercept the fleet, and interrupt the defigns of admiral Barras, who had failed from Rhode Island; or retard a ftill more important object, the arrival of the count de Graffe in the Chesapeake, where he was hourly expected. He made fome other ineffectual efforts for the relief of the British army, which was soon after cooped up by a large French fleet that arrived within the Capes.

The diffenfion, difcord, and division of opinion, among the British officers, was not all that occafioned the fatal delay of ftrengthening lord Cornwallis in Virginia; it may be ascribed more to that atmosphere of doubt in which fir Henry Clinton was involved. Irrefolute meafures are ever the refult of a confufion of ideas. The vaft object of reducing fuch a wide extended country, and fetting the wheels of operation in motion, fo as to work with equal facility, from Georgia to Virginia, from Virginia to the north, and from Canada to the eastern extreme,

CHAP. XX.

1781.

was of too wide an extent for the compafs of his ability.

His mind feemed for a time to be plunged in a chaos, uncertain where to begin, in the complicated difficulties of his official duties, or where to fet the ftrongest materials of his machinery to work in all its parts, in a manner that would produce a complete fyftem of conqueft through the United States. There was no deficiency of courage, ardor, or fidelity to their mafter, among the officers of the crown, however diffentient in opinion with regard to the modes of execution. But thefe diffenfions prevented that ready co-operation in action, which is neceffary both to defeat the defigns of their enemies, and to complete their own fyf tems by judicious and prompt decifion, and the immediate execution of well digested plans.

The movements of the continental and French army, had alarmed fir Henry Clinton to fuch a degree, that he long perfifted in his determination of recalling a part of the troops from Virginia, for the immediate defence of New York. He informed lord Cornwallis, that general Washington had with him eight or ten thousand men, befides the French battalions; and obferved, that every one acquainted with the difpofition of the inhabitants eaft of the Hudson, must be fenfible in what manner their

appearance would affect the numerous and war- CHAP. XX. like militia of the New England states.

Sir Henry Clinton, doubtful of the farther fuccefs of lord Cornwallis, apprehenfive of an immediate affault on New York, and reafonably calculating the numbers in array against him, as very far fuperior to his own, loft fight for a time, of the dangerous fituation of lord Cornwallis and the army in Virginia. To complete the agitation of his mind, he was now trembling for his finking reputation, which had been severely attacked in England. From these circumstances, his defpondency was nearly equal to his irresolution. Yet, apparent neceffity awakened his energy for the defence of the city of New York; and every poffible step was taken, to meet the combined troops in a manner becoming a British veteran commander.

Lord Cornwallis, with very different ideas, was parrying the attacks of the Americans then in Virginia, and preparing, as far as poffible, for the resistance of stronger bodies of enemies. He was perfuaded, that general Washington and the count de Rochambeau, aided by a powerful French fleet, had deeper laid systems, and were on the point of disclosing defigns of higher magnitude, and more important confequences, than had ever been apprehended by fir Henry Clinton.

1781.