Mr. Hay has dehis counsel knew Was it not cor. circumstances, to

number of material witnesses were stated; among which was an honorable member of this court (Mr. Giles) and general Mason, but in which the name of Col. Taylor does not appear. It appears that subpænas had issued for three witnesses; two of which did not attend, for whom no attachment was prayed. Col. Taylor alone appeared; and the counsel were certainly ignorant at the time he was sworn, what he could prove. clared that neither Callender or what col. Taylor could prove. rect in the court, under these ask what he could prove? Col. Taylor was produced, under an expectation, it is said, that he could prove the twelfth set of words contained in the second count of the indictment. Let us, to elucidate the conduct of the court, refer to the testimony of Mr. Robertson, a man distin. guished for his stenographical talent, which remains on paper, which was drawn up at the time, and does not therefore depend on the frailty of his memory.

Mr. Robertson says, "The attorney for the United States having concluded, the counsel for the traverser introduced Col. Taylor as a witness, and he was sworn; but at the moment the oath was administered, the judge called on them, and desired to know what they intended to prove by the witness. They answered, that they intended to examine Col. Taylor, to prove that Mr. Adams had avowed principles in his presence which justified Mr. Callender in saying that the President was an aristocrat-that he had voted against the sequestration law, and the resolutions concerning the suspension of commercial intercourse with Great Britain." This was then the object and view with which Col. Taylor was called on. What is the charge in the articles of impeachment? That the

testimony of Col. Taylor was rejected" on pretence that the said witness could not prove the truth of the whole of one of the charges, contained in the indictment, although the said charge embraced more than one fact."-The charge in the indictment is that the President "was a professed aristocrat; that he proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest :" and Col. Taylor was called to prove that Mr. Adams had voted against the sequestration law, and the resolutions concerning the suspension of commercial intercourse with Great Britain.-Was it competent to Col. Taylor to give evidence on this point? The best evidence the nature of the case will admit must be adduced. Col. Taylor then was clearly an incompetent witness on this point; as there was better evidence, the journals of this honorable body, within the reach of the traverser. It only then remained for Col. Taylor to prove that the President had avowed principles which shewed him to be an aristocrat; which, if proved, would have been altogether immaterial. To prove no other facts was he called upon. Are then counsel to be indulged in consuming the time of courts in the examination of witnesses, who have nothing relevant to offer? Let us familiarise this to a common case. Suppose a man is indicted for stealing a horse. One witness deposes that he saw him go into the stable where the horse was; another saw a man coming from the stable leading a horse; and another saw, an hour after, the man, with the horse, five miles off, selling him as his own property. This testimony will be admitted? But state the case the other way; that a witness was brought forward solely to prove the first fact; is there a court on earth that would say such testimony should be admitted? And this was the case here. Col. Taylor was called upon to prove what is altogether unim

portant, a part only of one charge; or that which, if true, could be proved by better evidence. Are not, also, the court the exclusive judges of the competency of the testimony that shall go to the jury; and does not every day's experience shew us that evidence that is offered, but which does not go to the whole of the case, is refused? This is done by all courts at all times. But say gentlemen, was it possible for the court to know whether the questions offered to be put might not have led to other enquiries, and produced information of consequence? True, but on this ground no testimony ever could be rejected, because by possibility, it may lead to what is important.

But, admitting the judge to have been wrong, I again ask, does an error of judgment in itself imply corruption? Most surely not. In the nature of things can it be so? To give credit to my honorable client but for a moiety of the talent allowed him, he must have seen that, even had he ad. mitted the testimony of Col. Taylor, and admitting that it had justified the whole of the twelfth charge, there remained nineteen other charges, on which Callender must have been convicted. And whence this conduct towards Col. Taylor? Did not the judge know that Col. Taylor stood high in the esteem of a large portion of the community; and that umbrage offered to him would naturally excite the indignation of his friends? The decision given could not then flow from a corrupt motive. No. It was given in the sternness of his integrity. Had his motives been impure, had he viewed his conduct as wrong, instead of acting in this manly way, he would have put a gloss on his actions, he would have courted the reputation of forbearance by admitting the testimony of Col. Taylor, and would still have satiated his vengeful feelings, if he had them, with a conviction on the remaining charges.

Let us examine another fact in this case. Judge Chase, as appears by the statement of Mr. Robertson, requested the attorney of the United States to permit the questions to be put to the witness; but Mr. Nelson "declared that he did not feel himself at liberty to consent to such a departure from legal principles." If then, in this act, there was error, that error did not depend on him. The prosecutor for the United States objected to the indulgence which he proposed. I do for myself believe, that where no evidence is offered to prove the whole of one entire fact, it is within the sound discretion of the court to refuse the testimony of part-But, notwithstanding this, the judge was willing to relax the severity of the law.

Is there nothing else that goes to shew that there was no intention on the part of the judge to oppress the traverser ? As I have already observed, if he had possessed but half the talent ascribed to him, he would, with such intention, have gilded the pill. But he did not do so. Further, the subsequent act of the judge in imposing so light a fine, and so short a period of imprisonment, for so atrocious an offence, when he had power to impose a fine of 2000 dollars, and an imprisonment for two years, is indisputable evidence of his freedom from all such intention. No; the conviction flow. ed of necessity from the evidence, which was too powerful to be resisted. But did not the judge, in the integrity of his heart, declare, on rejecting the testimony of Col. Taylor, gentlemen, "I may be mistaken, but if I am not right, it is an error in judgment, and you can state the proceedings on record, so as to shew my error, and I shall be the first man to grant you the benefit of a new trial by granting you a writ of error, in the supreme

court."

It is said, however, that this was a mere pretext; that a bill of exceptions would not lie in a criminal case; and what could then be done? The simplest thing on earth-a point of law can be saved without an exception. The counsel were not so ignorant as not to have respected this declaration, and to have known that they might, under it, have saved the point, and taken the opinion of the superior court. The least informed counsel can shew a multitude of cases of this kind. In the progress of my argument I shall shew why this offer was not accepted.

It does then appear to me, that, considering the third article as connected with the facts substantiated, the judge was perfectly correct in point of law in the decision he made. All must agree in the opinion that if the testimony of Col. Taylor had proved Mr. Adams an aristocrat, it could not have justified the libellous matter with which the traverser was charged. If this is the fact, and no other evidence was offered that could be legally received, the rejection must have been perfectly correct. Supposing, however, that we are wrong on this point, there is still abundant evidence to shew that Judge Chase was not influenced by any intention to oppress the accused, or to procure his conviction, because that unavoidably flowed from the nature of the charges and the state of the defence, whether the testimony of Col. Taylor were admitted or not.

In the course of my whole observation through life, I never heard it doubted till yesterday, that in a case of doubtful aspect, a man is to be considered innocent until he is proved to be guilty. But we are now told that whenever an infraction of a law is committed by a judge, he is to be presumed guilty, unless he establishes his innocence. But this is not the case, the benignity of our law is very