1829. IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISION. delivered the permit to the inspector on board the ship, and asked for plaintiff's crates. On the 22d June, one or more crates mentioned in his list were received by the plaintiff, and one or more on the two following days. The porter did not attend on the wharf during the whole of those days, but called repeatedly each day, and removed them away as received. No. 28 was landed on inquiry of the inspector for these crates, and took the wharf on the 23d of June, but was not received by the plaintiff or his porter, and it is unknown to the parties what became of it. In unloading a vessel, it is usual, as soon as articles of bulk, such as crates, are brought upon deck, to pass them over the side of the vessel and land them on the wharf. It is also the practice of the owners to station a clerk upon the wharf, who takes a memorandum of the goods which leave the wharf, and the day on which they are taken away, for the information of his employers, in a book called the cargo book. The cargo of the Lancaster was, on this occasion, unloaded in the usual manner, but the cargo book contains no entry in regard to No. 28, except a memorandum from the bill of landing, made in the margin, as is usual before beginning to unload, but which has no reference to the actual receipt of the same by the consignee, or on his behalf. It is agreed that the value of the crate, No. 28, be assessed at fifty-one dollars and fifty-three cents, which includes its proportion of duties and other Custom House expenses, (prout statement and invoice,) and the cargo book, plaintiff's invoice, and bill of lacing, shall be in evidence. Upon these facts, if the Court be of opinion that the duty of the defendants required them to see that the said crate, No. 28, after being landed as aforesaid, was received by the plaintiff, their judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of fifty-one dollars and fifthree cents; but, if the Court be of opinion that the duty of the defendants did not so require, their judgment is to be entered for the defendants, and the costs are to abide the event of the suit. It is further agreed that the case thus stated be considered as a special verdict and subject to a writ of error, and that all questions of law be decided under the issue on the present Narr: whether the evidence shows a case of negligence or conversion." 285 and must be decided by some rule which we would be content to see reciprocated in its application to the ships of our own countrymen when abroad. At the season of unlading the master has a variety of duties to perform, which render it impossible for him to hunt out each individual consignee on shore. It is not his business to be conversant with the requisites of such a pursuit. The vessel may perhaps be owned and manned by foreigners, of whom not one is acquainted with so much as the language of the place of arrival. Even in a case like the present, where the ship reaches her home, the master and owner ought not to continue subject to responsibility after they are, to all intents and purposes, deprived of their controul over the cargo by the ope ration of the revenue laws. The consignee, on the other hand, is, or ought to be, familiar with the means proper to be used in order to obtain possession of his own particular consignment. He knows of the shipment through his letter of advice. He also knows when the vessel arrives, or (what is the same thing) he is bound to know it. According to the rules of the law-merchant he is not excusable for ignorance of her arrival in port, (Harman v. Clarke, 4 Camp. 159.Holt on ship, 395, ed. 1824.) Upon the ship's arrival, either he takes out a permit or he does not. If he does take one out, he is necessarily reminded to send to the vessel for the articles upon which he pays the duty. If he does not pay the duties, the goods cannot be touched, either by himself or by the ship owner. Both must submit to the act of Congress which provides that the goods shall be carried from the vessel to the Custom House. All this time they remain in the custody of the law. Now it is a fundamental maxim that the act of law shall work no wrong. It would be a very great wrong to continue a man's liability after compulsorily divesting him of all controul over the subject of that liability. Upon the strictest rule, a carrier's liability is of necessity at an end when nothing remains to be done by him in his capacity of carrier. The extent of his duties in this respect must vary according to the description of carriage undertaken. Consequently, this case is not to be gov erned by authorities bearing upon the duties of carriers by land, or by inland navigation, or river craft. Among vessels which make sea voyages, some distinction should also be made between those employed in the coasting The cause was argued by J. Cadwalader for the plain-trade, whose cargoes are not subject to the Custom tiffs in error, who were defendants below, and by H. MIlvaine for the defendant in error. For the plaintiffs in error it was said, that the decision of the Court below could not be supported without requiring of the owners of vessels, whose cargoes are subject to the revenue laws of the United States, the performance of duties such as these laws rendered it impossible to perform. This would appear by considering the effect of the act of Congress of the 2d March, 1799, sect. 53, 54, 55, and 56. (1 Story's Ll. U. S. 619, et. seq.) House regulations, and ships from foreign countries. As to such ships, thus arriving from sea, it is a settled law that the liability of their owner or master, as a carrier, is at an end as soon as the thing carried is safely deposited in the usual manner, on the usual wharf. (Hyde v. Trent, 5, T. R. 889. Chickening v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371. Abbott, [Story's ed. of 1829] 249. 1 Valin, 636, 637.] If the general doctrine were not so clear, the same result might, in the present case, be fairly contended for upon a narrower ground. For, inasmuch as the consignee chose to send his own servant to the wharf The special verdict expressly states that the missing to receive the goods in question, and thus designated crate of hardware was landed on the wharf. It also states the wharf as the place of delivery, he must be underthat the cargo of this vessel was unloaded according to the stood to have taken the goods into his own custody, and usual manner, and it likewise describes the usual mode to have dispensed with any duty of the carrier in this of unloading. The usage so defined appears to be iden- respect, which he might otherwise have claimed to astical with that of the port of Marseilles, as recognized insert (Sparrow v. Caruthers Str. 1236 Strong v. Natally a decision of the Admiralty in 1748. (1 Valin, 530.) Sim- 4 Bos. and Pul. 16., 5 T. R. 396. per Ashurst, J.) ilar usages have been sustained in London, in the Tur- For the defendant in error the question was stated by key trade, (Drumage v. Jolliffe, Abbott on Ship: 250, his counsel to be, not whether the wharf was the proStory's ed. 1829,) and at New York, in our own coast-per place of delivery as had been contended on the ing trade, (Warren v. Crocheron, N. Y. Com. plaintiffs, Oct. 26th, 1827, published the following day in the Statesman.) But, independently of usage, and without reference to the law concerning land carriers or coasting traders, who are presumed to be conversant with persons and localities at each end of their transit, the question here presented depends upon principles exclusively applicable to the case of vessels arriving from foreign parts. In this point of view the question is one of general law, other side, but, whether there had in fact been any delivery at all of the crate in question, to any body, either at the wharf or elsewhere, (Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. 39.) To deliver the goods he carries is the most important part of the carrier's contract. That the defendants below understood their own duties in this respect appears from the fact found in the special verdict, that they stationed their clerk upon the wharf, as was their practice, to take an account of the delivery of the cargo in a book specially appropriated to that pur mer 1, Maule and Selw. 167. Holt on ship. 395–6. Northey v. Field 2, Esp. 613. Nix v. Olive, Abbott on ship. 393.) The duties once secured, the goods on board are no longer in the custody of the law. Where the consignee does not take out his permit, the goods may indeed be said to remain in the custody of the law. But, even then, the possession of the law is the possession of the ship owner for all purposes, except the mere collection of the duties, until the actual receipt of the goods by the consignee or on his behalf. The lien for the freight continues even after the goods are warehoused in the Custom House; so the consigner may stop them in transitu. This is quite irreconcileable with the idea of their having been delivered. pose and no other. This constituted of itself an undertaking, independently of their general duty to manage and superintend the discharge and delivery of the cargo in all its details. Now the question occurs. What is a delivery? The answer may be found in the definition of a bill of landing, an engagement, which, in substance as well as in form, includes a duty to keep the goods until they are received into the actual possession of the consignee or his assigns. A constructive or imaginary transfer of the possession is no delivery. To hold it to be so would be repugnant to principles which lie at the very foundation of the law of carriers. (Garnett v. Willan 5, Barnew. and Ald. 53, Duff v. Budd 3 Brod. and Bing. 177.) It would be in effect to hold that a carrier would comply with his engagement safely to deliver the merchandize carried by merely putting it down unprotected upon a wharf, open to the weather and exposed to the pilferer, to remain there over night unless called for, without even the safeguard of a single watchman. Many actions have been sustained against carriers for delivering goods to the wrong persons. A single such instance would suffice to prove that the carrier is bound either to find the proper person, or at least to keep the goods safely till the proper person comes to take them. As to the authorities cited; to that of Valin and the case in 4 Pickering 371, we oppose the decision of the Supreme Court of New-York, in Ostrander v. Brown, already cited, and the obvious leaning of chancellor Kent, twice manifested in his commentaries, (2 K. Comm. 469, 3 do. 170.) In the case in 5, T. R. 389, so much pressed upon us, the re-ship owner would be answerable? If not, where shall marks of the three judges which are relied on by the other side were entirely extra-judicial. These remarks were adapted to a state of things which does not here exist. In England the intervention of wharfingers who are distinct bailees interposed between the ship owner and the freighter for the accommodation and security of both, may have introduced there an appropriate principle of decision which would be utterly inapplicable to the case of vessels discharging their cargoes at the port of Philadelphia. As to the custom of our port, the special verdict finds that the wharf is the usual place of landing goods as taken from the vessel. Where else could they be landed? How does this prove a custom that when the goods are thus landed, their delivery is complete, or the duties of the carrier in this respect ended? Even though such an inference were deducible, the argument would not avail the carrier. In Ostrander v. Brown, (15 Johns, 39,) the court rejected the evidence offered for the purpose of proving that precisely such a usage prevailed at Albany. The custom of the river Thames has been found and decided upon directly to the point, that the carrier to London is not discharged of his engagement to deliver the goods carried, by landing them upon the usual wharf. (Wardell v. Mowrillyan 2 Esp. 603.) Such a custom would be a violent encroachment on the common law; and, moreover, it would be both unrea sonable and inconvenient. The discharging of a cargo occupies several days. Each consignee would, upon the doctrine contended for on the other side, be separately put to the same expence and trouble to secure the receipt of his own particular consignment, which if, on the contrary; the duty were devolved upon the carrier, as we contend it ought to be, might at a comparatively trifling inconvenience be borne by him for the common benefit of all. case. In reply the counsel for the plaintiffs in error said that the question, what constitutes the performance of a carrier's contract, must depend upon principles very different from those which govern the doctrine of stoppage in transitu. The analogy contended for on the other side would not help their case if pursued in all its consequences. For instance, a delivery of part of the goods carried is for all purposes of the law of stoppage in transitu, equivalent to a delivery of the whole. Now while we do not claim the benefit of such an absurdity as the extension of this rule to the case of a carrier, we also protest against the argument that the termination of the transitus for the purposes of stoppage is in all cases to determine the question, whether a carrier's duty is ended. Suppose the goods burnt in the Custom House, is it contended that the we draw the line? The argument proves too much, since, if good for any thing, it must needs result in these conclusions. So it is said, that after the goods are landed the carrier has a right to retain (or more properly resume) the possession for the purpose of collecting his freight. He undoubtedly has the right, but like every other right, it may be waived by the party for whose benefit it is exerciseable. Now suppose he does waive it, is he to continue nolens volens in possession by construction of law? Surely not! But on the other hand, suppose he chooses to exercise the right, does it follow that the goods are therefore to remain at all events in his custody as carrier? If, after the carrier's duties are complied with, the thing carried remains in his possession, he does not continue to hold it as carrier, but becomes a bailee of another description. As such, he is not liable for accidental loss, as a carrier would be, and as here contended on the other side (Garside v. Trent 4, T. R. 581. In re. Webb and al: 8 Taunt. 443.) If the object of the cargo book be, as in the case stated, the information only of the ship owners, it cannot operate so as to superinduce or create a liberality on his part, which the law would not otherwise recognize. This is a necessary check in his hands upon the the of ficers of the customs, as well as upon those of the vessel. It is a memorandum made to correspond in subtor on board prescribed by the act of Congress. Withstance with a part of the entry in the book of the inspecout it the ship owner could not ascertain whether the bills of lading were true or false; whether the goods mentioned in the manifest were, or were not, on board the vessel when she arrived, what progress was making towadrs completing the unlading, nor could he take proper measures to collect the freight. It would seem that the cargo book in this case contains no entry about the crate in question. But this is immaterial to the decision, because it is expressly found that in this crate was actually landed on the wharf, which is all that the law requires. The revenue laws do not operate so as to vary the When the consignee pays or secures the duties he receives his permit, and thenceforth deals altogether with the master or owner of the vessel, without reference to the officers of the customs. The act of Con- The definition of the bill of lading should be somegress was never intended to interfere with the regular thing more than a bare repetition of the words it concourse of dealing between the owner of the ship and tains. Every contract expressed in formal terms must the owners of her cargo. The policy of all such enact- include a designation of the party to whom its performments is to leave the respective rights of the partics ance is promised and of the party to whose benefit such unimpaired, and their duties unaltered. (Wilson v. Ky-performanoe is to inure. By the bill of lading the car 1829.] IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISION. 287 rier promises to deliver safely to the Consignee or his the merchandize to the warehouses, by introducing arAssigns. Then what is the dǝlivery to him or his As-ticles into one which ought to have gone to another. signs The answer is, the depositing the goods carried at their destined port at the usual place of landing them. As to the case in 15 Johns, 39, the report is not very clear upon the fact whether the consignee had had notice of the sloop's arrival at Albany, but the Counsel and the Court appear to have taken it for granted that he had not had such notice. Now as this was the case of a coasting vessel, the consignee was entitled to expect no-landing to be placed on the wharf. The Ordinances of tice of her arrival (4 Pick. 371) although we have seen that it is otherwise with ships from foreign countries.Uuless this were the ground of decision the case may be denied to be law. The most authorative definitions of the contract of affreightment do not by any means include the alleged essential of an actual manuel tradition to the freighter or his agent. The bill of lading has been described as "merely an undertaking to carry from port to port”(5 T. R. 397 per Butler, J. Jeremy, 66.) In Beawes 114, there is an appropriate definition. He there says of charter party, "It settles the agreement as the bills of lading do the contents of the cargo, and binds the Master to deliver them well conditioned, AT THE PLACE OF DISCHARGL according to the agree ment." The opinion of the Court was delivered as follows, by ROGERS, JUDGI.—The substance of a bill of lading is a formal acknowledgment of a receipt of goods and an engagement to deliver them to the consignee or his assigns. And this suit is brought on an alleged breach of such a contract in the non-delivery of a crate of merchandize shipped on board the ship Lancaster from Liverpool, and consigned to Raphael Cordova in the us ual form. The goods were landed on the wharf of the Liverpool Packets, and whether this amounts to a delivery to the Consignee is the principal question. It must be conceded that by the general custom, the liability of ship owners is at an end when the goods are landed at the usual wharf, and this seems to be taken by the whole court as a position not open to dispute in the strongly contested case of Hyde vs. The Trent and Mersey Navigation Company. 5 T. R. 394. 3 Wilson 429. 15 Johnr 41. 2 Wm. Black. 916. 4 T. R. 581. The usage in France, although not uniform in every particular, goes to the whole extent of the English doctrine. At Rochelle, when the vessel is moored at the wharf, the merchant freighters at their own expense and risk, have their merchandize deposited upon the deck of the vessel. From the time when they reach the deck, it is the business of the hands on board to receive and place them in their proper situation. In unlading, the freighters have them taken in like manner from the deck by their porters, to lower them to the wharf, from which time they are at the Merchant's risk, without any liability on the part of the master of the vessel, if they happen to sustain damage as they are lowered from the vessel. At Marseilles it is the business of the master to put the merchandize on the wharf, after which he is discharged. 1. Valin 510. The error is almost always discovered by ascertaining In unloading a vessel in the port of Philadelphia, it is usual as soon as articles of bulk, such as crates, are brought upon deck, to pass them over the side of the ship, and land them on the wharf. The owners station a clerk on the wharf, who takes a memorandum of the goods, and the day they are taken away, and this for the information of his employers. A manifest or report of the cargo is made by the master, and deposited at the Custom House, and the collector, on the arrival of the vessel withiu his district, puts and keeps on board one or more inspectors whose duty it is to examine the contents of the cargo and superintend its delivery. And no goods from a fo eign port can be unladen or delivered from the ship in the United States but in open day, between the rising and setting of the sun, except by special license; nor at any time without a permit from the the Collector, which is granted to the consignee upon payment of duties or securing them to be paid. The holders of a bill of lading are presumed to be well informed of the probable period of the vessel's arrival, and at any rate such arrival is matter of notoriety in all maritime places. The consignee is previously informed of the shipment, as it is usual for one of the bills of laAnd this rule of the French commercial code is cited ding to be kept by the merchant, a second is transmitwith approbation by the learned commentator, in page ted to the consignee by the post or packet, whilst the 636 of his treaties on the Marine Ordonnance. As the third is sent by the master of the ship together with the master, in conformity with the prevailing usage in this goods. With the benefit of all these safeguards, if the respect, upon his arrival deposits in the Custom House consignee uses ordinary diligence, there is as little dana manifest or general list of his cargo, with a designation ger in this country as in England and France, of inconof all the individuals to whom each parcel of the mer- venience or loss, whereas the risk would be greatly inchandize should be respectively delivered, and as there creased if it should be the duty of the ship owner to see are always officers of the customs who attend to the un- to the actual receipt of the goods, and particularly in the lading, to superintend and make a list of all the merch- case of a general ship with numerous consignments on andize which leaves the vessel, for the purpose of ascer- board, manned altogether by foreigners unacquainted taining whether the manifest of the cargo which has been with the language at the port of delivery. I have tafurnished is accurate and faithful, and by this means the ken some pains to ascertain the opinion and practice of list of these officers constitute a proof of the landing of merchants of the city on this question, which is one of the merchandize, it is the end of the engagement which general concern. My inquiries have resulted in this, the master has contracted by the bill of lading. If then that the goods, when landed, have heretofore been condisputes arise, it is only when in the bustle of a hasty dis-sidered at the risk of the consignee, and that the gencharge mistakes occur on the part of those who convey ral understanding has been that the liability of the ship We are informed that several barns and dwellings were unroofed, a great many trees and a large quantity of fencing thrown down. We have not heard of any lives being lost, or any further particulars.-Gaz. owner ceases upon the landing of the goods at the usu- neighbourhood, and perhaps, throughout the country. al wharf. I see no reason to depart from a rule which has received such repeated sanctions, from which no inconvenience has heretofore resulted, and which it is believed in practice has conduced to the general welfare. If the special verdict had found a uniform usage in the one way or the other, we should have held ourselves bound by the custom, for I fully accede to the principle that the mode of delivery is regulated by the practice of the place. The contract is supposed to be made in reference to the usage at the port of delivery. But if no usage had been found, we hold it to be equally clear, that we should be governed by the general cus tom. The case finds that the consignee obtained a permit for the landing of the goods, that they were landed on the wharf, that he was aware the master was employed in discharging his cargo, and that the consignee sent his own porter to receive and take them away; that he inquired for them, but did not receive them. If under such circumstances the goods were lost, it was in consequence of his own negligence or his servant's. It was the duty of the porter, instead of merely inquiring, to have staid until he actually received the goods. The Governor has appointed Elihu Chauncey, Esq. to be Commissioner of Loans, under the Act of Assembly, passed 22d April. A disease similar to the dengue, has recently made its appearance in Harrisburg. It is confined to females alone. It attacks the little finger, extends up one arm and descends the other, causing pain and inflammation. 298 29,800 It is beside the question to say that perishable articles may be landed, at improper times, to the great damage of the consignee. When such special cases arise, they will be decided on their own circumstances. This goes on the ground that the master has acted with good faith, and in the usual manner, and in such case it is the opinion of the court that the ship owners are dis-works; and as fuel, a most important article in that mancharged. We would wish to be understood as giving no opinion on the law which regulates the internal or coasting trade, to which I understand the case of Ostrander v. Brown and Staffords 15 Johns. 39, to apply. We do not consider this decision as interfering with the principles of that case. Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendants below upon the case stated. Daily Chron. 14. SECOND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH. SOUTHWARK. This Church was regularly organized, and takes under the care of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, in April 1827. The number of communicants was at that time 138 have been added since, making in all 152: on account of deaths, removals &c. deduct 14, which still leaves 138 at the present time in the full communion of the church. Since the meeting of the Philadelphia Presbytery in April 1828, 62 on examination and 9 on certificate, in all 71, have been received. The propor tion of female to male communicants is about 3 to 1 or 196 females, 44 males. Single persons 94, Heads of families 45. The congregation, as soon as organized, resolved, with the blessing of God, to erect a place of worship as soon as possible. Accordingly a lot of ground was purchased in Second street below Christian; and in May 1828 the corner stone of a building 50 by 65 was laid. In December, the congregation, for the first time, worshipped in the basement story; and in January last, baving borrowed some benches, and having made a few more pro tem-the house was dedicated, and has since then been occupied by the Congregation, the poor accommodations notwithstanding. The treasurer has paid towards the erection of the building Received in various ways Philadelphia receives, we presume, a considerable quantity of glass from the New England states; but in a short time, the western counties will claim to supply our whole demand. This they will be abundantly able to do. Pittsburg, for instance, has extensive glass ufactory, my be had at a price scarcely worth naming, this circumstance must, as soon as the means of communication between the eastern and western portions of the state are completed, place all the manufactures of the west, in which fuel is of consequence, in an advantageous situation in our market.-U. S. Gazette. Weather Guage.—Mr. Lukens hrs lately constructed a weather guage for the Merchant's Coffee House. It is inclosed in a case resembling a clock case, with a dial and hand-which being connected by machinery with $2376 a vane on the top of the building—apprises those with2284 in the house of the various changes of the wind. Which leaves a balance in his favour of 92 Ice was discovered in the vicinity of this city early in The debt on the Church is now about $3500 the morning of 25. 26. 27th. ult. There is, however, nearly $800 subscribed, yet to be collected. Philadelphian. Greensburgh, April 24. Printed every SATURDAY MORNING by WILLIAM F GEDDES, No. 59 Locust Street. Philadelphia; where, and at the PUBLICATION OFFICE, IN FRANKLIN PLACE, second door back of the Post Office, (back room) subscriptions will be The Storm.-On Monday last we had a severe storm thankfully received. Price FIVE DOLLARS per annum, payable of wind and rain accompanied by thunder and light-annually by subscribers residing in or near the city, or where ning, which has done considerable damage in this there is an agent. Other subscribers pay in advance. THE REGISTER OF PENNSYLVANIA. DEVOTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF EVERY KIND OF USEFUL INFORMATION RESPECTING THE STATE. Jacob K. Boyer, for many years a respectable Mer-fendant, addressed to Benjamin Thompson, and prov. chant of Reading, and the father of a large family, was indicted for forging, uttering and delivering a false and counterfeited note of $100, on the United States Bank. The prosecution was based upon this single note, but, as the District Attorney remarked, "if he was guilty at all, he was guilty of the most expert, extensive and wholesale plan of counterfeiting ever known in the United States." The evidence consisted chiefly of details given by accomplices. It seemed that in the fall of 1827, John McClintock and David Seltzer, two wretches, of miserable character, were arrested at Reading, with a quantity of counterfeit money in their possession. As a measure of self-defence they blowed, as the technical phrase goes, and gave a detail of facts, implicating the defendant deeply, in fact shewing him to be the chief of the gang. McClintock took the police officers to the top of a mountain near Reading, covered with stones, removed one and discovered a tin box, containing several plates and tools used for counterfeiting, and nearly 15,000 dollars of counterfeit money already signed, and ready for passing. He afterwards went to his own house, which had been previously searched without success, and brought back to the officers a bundle of about $1700 in spurious paper money. The note on which the indictment was founded was not found at the mountain, but was among the bundle brought by McClintock from his own house. He was entirely out of custody when he went there, and did not return until the next morning. John McClintock swore, that he gave the tin box, plates, and money, up to the Marshal; there was but one $100 U. S. Bank note in the bundle. He then went on as follows; he got it from Jacob K. Boyer, and gave him nothing for it; he gave it to me to pass and give him $25 or $30 for it; and gave me other notes at the same time; I had dealings with Boyer in 1826; I got several notes from him; one $100 of the Commercial Bank; I gave him $25 for it; I got several times afterwards; no time more then $100; I always paid him in good money. He gave me an order on Seltzer for 1200 or $1400; I presented the order and got the bills. The witness in his cross-examination said he had been confined crazy in the Hospital since; he went also into a full detail of circumstances. ed his hand writing by Richard Porter, and proved by John McLean, that Benjamin Thompson was called Benj. Moses, also; and was convicted of forging and counterfeiting at this court within a year. The letter was then read. It contains no express mention of coun terfeit money, but made use of phrases and terms, ambiguous and double in their signification, from which the defendant's counsel argued innocence, and the U. S. Attorney guilt. William P. Orrich stated, that in 1820, while in Philadelphia, he received from his clerk a $50 counterfeit note on the U. S. Bank. Witness sent it back to Reading. They aleged that it had been got from defendant; a suit was brought against him, and judgement entered for the plaintiff for $50, and paid. Frederick Rodenburger stated, that he knew Craig's house, (the place where the counterfeiters resided, and a receptacle for stolen goods. He rented it once. Defendant had the renting it; he was agent for the owner. John Auranld, Deputy Sheriff of Berks county, knew Craig's house; he searched it, and found a press for counterfeiting there. David Fisher received a counterfeit note from defendant five years ago; don't remember the amount; John Keim said it was counterfeit; it was returned to the defendant; he made some excuse and paid the money. Jacob Eargood borrowed three notes of five dollars from the defendant, four years ago, and gave him a judgement for them. They were counterfeit, and witness took them back to him. Boyer said he did not think the witness was going to pass them in Reading.— The notes were bad. One Wells allowed he would not give me a plug of tobacco for them. The testimony for the United States closed, and C. J. Jack, Esq. opened for the defence. George K. Bishop, William Fricker, and Henry Betts, sworn, that they knew Jacob Eargood, and his character was bad; they would not believe him on his oath. Four witnesses sworn, that Seltzer's character was infamous, and they would not believe him on his oath. Fifteen or twenty witnesses sworn to defendant's standing in Reading; that he was an excellent father and husband; a good citizen, upright in his business; doing large transactions as a merchant, and as largely concerned as any western merchant in Pennsylvania.On cross examination, the witnesses said they had heard reports of his counterfeiting in Reading; people called his store the Callowhill street Bank, &c.; but other res pectable people were also talked of; and they also said Boyer had been tried in Reading for a conspiracy and David Seltzer sworn, to the same effect except that John Sales sworn, that he had received a $100 U. S. Drs. Otto and Wilbank, swore to McClintock having been previously crazy in the Hospital: the effect of which disease was to impair the memory; the disease was seated in his brain. Dr. H. Klapp and William Ruff proved, that he was crazy in the cell of Arch street prison, and was sent to the Hospital from there. |