7. May we not, on the whole, soberly affirm, that the scheme of necessity is philosophy in her right mind? And that the scheme of contingency is philosophy run mad?

CHAPTER III.

Several Objections, to the Scheme of Necessity,

answered.

Ir seems most agreeable to the radical simplicity, which God has observed in his works, to suppose, that, in themselves, all human souls are equal. I can easily believe, that the soul of an oyster-woman has, naturally, the (unexpanded) powers of Grotius, or of sir Isaac Newton: and that what conduces to raise the philosopher, the poet, the politician, or the linguist, so much above the ignorant and stupid of mankind, is not only the circumstance of intellectual cultivation, but (still more than that) his having the happiness to occupy a better house, i. e. a body more commodiously organized, than they.

The soul of a monthly reviewer, if imprisoned within the same mud walls which are tenanted by the soul of Mr. John Wesley, would, similarly circumstanced, reason and act (I verily think) exactly like the bishop of Moorfields. And I know some very sensible people, who even go so far, as to suppose, that, was a human spirit shut up in the skull of a cat, puss would, notwithstanding, move prone on all four, pur when stroked, spit when pinched, and birds and mice be her darling objects of pursuit.

Now, though I can, by no means, for my own. part, carry matters to so extreme a length as this;

yet, I repeat my opinion, that much, very much, depends on corporeal organization. Whence the

usual remark, that a man is (I would rather say appears to be) sensible and ingenious, according to his dimension and solid content of brain. That is, as I apprehend, the soul is more capable of exerting its powers, when lodged in a capacious and wellconstructed vehicle. I dare believe, that the brain of Dr. Thomas Nowell is, to that of Mr. John Wesley, as two to one, at the very least. And yet, all this is the result of absolute necessity. For, what is brain, but matter peculiarly modified? And who is the modifier? Not man, but God.

I just now hinted the conjecture of some, that a human spirit, incarcerated in the brain of a cat, would, probably, both think and behave, as that animal now does. But how would the soul (a) of a cat acquit itself, if inclosed in the brain of a man? We cannot resolve this question, with certainty, any more than the other. We may, however, even on this occasion, address every one of our human brethren in those words of that great philosophic necessitarian, St. Paul; and ask, who maketh thee to differ from the lowest of the brute creation? Thy Maker's free will, not thine. And what pre

(a) Let not the reader start, at that expression, The soul of a cat." For though the word, so applied, may seem strange to those who have not weighed both sides of the question (it would have seemed very strange to me, about fifteen years ago); yet, on giving the cause an impartial hearing, the scale of evidence will, in my judgment, strongly decide for an immaterial principle in brutes.

I mean not here to discuss the argument. But let me hint, that one principal hinge, on which the enquiry turns, is: Do those inferior beings reason, or do they not? If they do (be it in ever so small a degree), they must consist of something more than body: i. e. they must be compounded of matter and spirit.-If they do not reason at all (and we may as well doubt whether they can feel at all); we may set them down for mere material machines.-He, however, who seriously thinks, that even birds, or insects, are watches; may, with equal ease, while his hand is in, advance a few steps higher, and suppose, that men are clocks, i. e. larger watches of the three.

eminence hast thou, which thou didst not receive from him? Not the least, nor the shadow of any.Now, if thou didst [not acquire, but] receive it, as a distinguishing gift of his free and sovereign pleasure, why carriest thou thyself proudly (zavara), as though thou hadst not received it (a)?

"He, who through vast immensity can pierce;
See worlds on worlds compose one universe;
Can tell how system beyond system runs;
What other planets circle other suns;
What vary'd being peoples ev'ry star:

May tell, why Heav'n has made us as we are.”

Even so, Father:

What the poet could not tell, the Bible does.-
Why are we made as we are ?"
for so it seemed good in thy sight.

enough to satisfy me.

Which is answer

I take the truth of the matter to be this: All the intellectual distinctions, which obtain throughout the whole scale of animated existence, from the brightest angel down to man, and which give advantage to one man above another; which intellectual distinetions descend, likewise, in just gradations from man, to the minutest animalcule; are distributed to each individual, in number, in measure, and in weight (b), by the sovereign will and the unerring hand of God the only wise. The uses to which those intellectual powers shall subserve; the term of their duration; and, in short, every circumstance relative both to them and their possessors; I consider as falling under the regulation of God's determining and permissive decree before time, and of his ever-present and ever-acting providence in time.

According to this scheme of things (a scheme, which, when fairly weighed, will be found the most cheerful to men, and the most worthy of God, which

(a) 1 Cor. iv. 7.

(b) Wisd. xi. 20.

was ever proposed to the human mind), that melaucholy, that absurd, that atheistical fiction, whose name is Chance, has nothing to do with God or with his works. On the contrary, the golden chain of necessity, providence, or fate (it is no matter which you term it), is let down, from the throne of the supreme, through all the ranks of animated and of unanimated creation: guiding and governing every individual spirit, and every individual atom, by such means, and in such a manner, as best comport with the dignity, the efficacy, the wisdom, and the love, of him who holds the chain, and who has implicated every link.

Thus, he doth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou (a)? Hence it is, that the very (b) hairs of our heads are all numbered in his book; and not one of them can fall from its pore, without the leave of Heaven. He is the guardian of sparrows; and will not let what we account the meanest insect expire, until the point of time, divinely destined is come. He not only tells the number of the stars (c), and calls them each by name; but notices and directs the very particles of (d) dust, which float in the atmosphere. The (e) sun shines not, but at his command; nor can a (f) wind blow, but by authority from him. May we not say of necessity, what the Psalmist says of the central luminary, round which our globe is wheeled; that there is nothing hid from the heat thereof?

And yet there are those, who think that necessity makes no part of the Christian system!

Mr. Wesley is, or pretends to be, of this number. Let us give a concise hearing to the difficulties, which, in his estimation, clog the scheme of evan

(a) Dan. iv. 35. (d) Isa. xl. 12.

(b) Mat. x. 29, 30.
(e) Job ix. 7.

(c) Psal. cxlvii. 4.
(ƒ) Psal. cxxxv. 7.

gelical and philosophical fate: though they are such as have been refuted again and again.

1. "There can be no moral good or evil; no virtue, and no vice."

So thought Aristotle (a); and his disciples, the Peripatetics. Hence, they defined moral virtue to be an elective habit, flowing originally from freewill, and rendered easy by repeated acts.

It is no wonder, that proud heathens should thus err; seeing they know not the scriptures, nor the power of God. But Mr. Wesley should remember, that he has read, and professes to believe, a book which tells him, that a man can receive nothing, except it be given him from heaven (b); that we cannot even think a good thought (c), unless God breathe it into our hearts; and that it is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who must work in us that which is well pleasing in his sight (d).

Nor should his lordship of Moorfields forget, that he has solemnly subscribed (to omit all present mention of articles and homilies) a certain liturgy in which liturgy, among a thousand other passages equally excellent, God himself is addressed, as the sole being, from whom all holy desires, all good counsels [or sincerely devout intentions], and all just works, do proceed. The supreme is, likewise, in the same "Calvinistical and Antinomian Prayerbook," declared to be the almighty and everlasting God, who maketh us both to will and to do those things that be good, and acceptable to his divine

(a) And yet Aristotle, though a vehement, was not (any more than his disciple of the Foundery) a consistent, free-will man. Hence, Aristotle, being once asked, "Who can keep a secret?" made this odd answer: He that can hold red hot coals in his mouth.—Surely, free-will must be very feeble, and necessity irresistibly potent, upon this principle! Not to ask: If free-will cannot, on a proper occasion, shut the mouth of the man that has it; how can it bring him virtue, and save his soul? (d) Heb. xiii. 21.

(b) John iii. 27.

(c) 2 Cor. iii. 5.