disavowal of those who represent him, and to take their assurances for our guide in this impending crisis. It is to these alone that we can look for the foundation of a system of precautionary vigilance commensurate to its danger. The consolidation of the continental union on the principles put forth by Russia in her Circular on the affairs of Spain, by Prussia in her Official State Gazette, and by Austria in her Declaration on carrying her arms into Italy, leaves no choice to England as to the course befitting her to pursue. The determination of the Sovereigns to put down all revolutions without enquiring into their necessity, calls peculiarly for resistance, from Us, the English People, who were driven, by necessity, to save our laws and liberties through Revolution. The union of arbitrary Sovereigns must be counteracted by a union among all States which have made their own Constitutions. This must be begun, and effected, under the auspices of England. All representative Governments ought to be invited to accede to it. It is not enough that amicable relations actually exist among the States. which have adopted that system. Special conventions, with direct reference to the matters which the three allied Sovereigns have now, brought to an issue between themselves and every free People, ought forthwith to be negociated. Such conventions would, in their nature, be purely defensive. The nations adopting them would respect the institutions of all other States, even the most opposed to their own. They would defend to the last extremity, and with the whole force of the confederacy, those which they had given to themselves. The materials for such a union are not wanting in Europe. Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, the representative Governments of Sweden, the Netherlands, Hanover, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and the Republic of Switzerland, would be more than equal to the establishment of a Conservative System, which should prescribe limits to the pretensions of " the monarchical principle," as now about to be enforced by the three military Sovereigns. The concurrence of France in a system grounded on such a basis, could not long be delayed. Without entering into speculative considerations as to the royal or popular origin of her existing institutions, France must be aware that the stability of her internal peace is, beyond that of any other State, dependent on that of the Continent. She must be aware that without war, the Allies can never execute their projects; and that without continuing nearly in a state of war, they cannot maintain them. She must know that no war can break out in Europe, and be continued for long on any possible subject of controversy, without assuming, sooner or later, a revolutionary character; and that although under her present Sovereign, there might be reason to hope that the horrors of her first revolution would not be renewed, the existence of such a war in any part of Europe could not but be eminently dangerous to the tranquillity of a country still so much in need of moderate and healing councils. Neither can the possible, and even necessary changes in the territorial limits of the three Sovereigns, be less matter of alarm to France, as affecting her just station in Europe. The new monarchical principle, using war as its means, must require indemnification for the expenses of war. It must take securities against future resistance. Demands of this nature can only be answered by a surrender in trust of the revenues and fortresses of the conquered state. The continued possession of these by one great power requires some counterbalancing advantages for the others. If Austria extend her trust in Italy, Russia must be permitted to do the same on the side of Poland or the Turkish provinces on the Danube; and Prussia must not be forgotten in arrangements which destroy the comparative balance between her and her rival. All these claims must be satisfied out of the possessions of the smaller states; three of which have already been declared guilty of Revolution by the Congress of Carlsbad. It is for France to consider whether she will find a better security for her present institutions, and for her consideration in Europe, in the extension of "the monarchical principle" by these means, than by an open alliance with Great Britain and the other free Governments, for the express purpose of defending them. The Sardinian Monarch must see, in the establishment of the "Rights of Thrones" by Austrian armies in Italy, the unlimited aggrandisement of her political power. He cannot forget that the first step of Austria towards the execution of her present designs on Naples was, to require him to admit her garrisons into his fortresses. He must feel that while Austria is exercising a settled, habitual, military influence over the two Sicilies, her necessary communications with Lombardy must annihilate the Papal sovereignty; and that when, by a no very distant contingency, she shall have annexed Bologna and the Marches to her own dominions, leaving nothing in Italy that is not Austrian except himself, there will be no safety for him unless he have already joined the free union of Europe. The States of the New World must rejoice in a confederacy which would secure them from all molestation from the Old, in regard to their settling by themselves their scheme of government. They cannot but be aware that the "monarchical principle" has ! Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden. no limits but its means; that in the eye of the Sovereigns, legitimacy never dies; that if its claims be renounced by one possessor they are ready at hand to gather them to the general fund. The states must be aware that at the Congress of 1818, it was matter of consultation among the members of the union, how they should be dealt with that if the Sovereign of Russia professed his wish to see "pure and vigorous institutions" established in South America, he would concede that character to such only as should "emanate from the throne" of Spain; and that he valued the institutions themselves but as means for restoring and consolidating the royal authority. They must know that a deficiency of power alone prevented at that time an enterprise for their subjugation. IT WILL BE FOR THOSE to whom His Majesty has committed the concerns of his Empire, to give effect to these our dispositions. It is for us to arouse their courage and to strengthen their purpose. They need have no fear of wanting the means. The spirit of a free people is at their command; the resources of a just cause will rise unbidden to their hands; and the path is again within their reach by which they may retrieve what they have lost for their country, and what they have forfeited for themselves. We tell them, they may yet place their Sovereign in the station his predecessors long filled in Europe. But if His Majesty be reduced from that high rank, and become a continental Sovereign of the third order, following in the train of the Three Allies, he should know that it will be the fault of no part of his subjects, except of those whom he has entrusted with his councils. If the weapons of freedom are too weighty for his Ministers to wield-we must submit to their imbecility, but we will not share in their disgrace. We protest against their yielding to the ascendancy of the Holy Alliance. Whatever be the event of this unprovoked aggression on Italy, to whatever extremity the Sovereigns may be driven by possible reverses, we trust in our Parliament to grant them no aid; we protest against any encouraging assurance, any prospective promise which may be made to them by others in our name. We declare that our hearts are against them that all our sympathies are with their enemies; and we will succour and assist those enemies to the very utmost that the laws allow. 1 ! Note of the Russian Court to the Chev. Zea de Bermudez. APPENDIX. HEADS OF APPENDIX. Pag. Substance of the Imperial Propositions adopted by the Diet of Frankfort, 1819. 16 Note of the Imperial Russian Ministry, to the resident Spanish Minister 20 Memorial addressed to all the Ministers of Russia, on the subject of the Affairs of Spain Naples and Austria (Official Paper). The Duke of Campo Chiaro, to Prince Metternich Article from the Berlin Gazette, Dec. 19, 1820 The Austrian Declaration 21 24 28 29 31 33 38 39 Protocol of Conferences, and Declaration of the Allied Sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle, Nov. 1818 SUBSTANCE OF THE IMPERIAL PROPOSITIONS ADOPTED BY THE DIET OF FRANKFORT, 1819. Decree of Regulation for provisional execution, relative to Article XX. of the Act of Confederation. Art. 1. UNTIL a regulation of execution definitive and complete in all its parts be prepared, the Diet of the Germanic Confederation is authorised and invited by the present provisional regulation to assure, in the following manner, the accomplishment and execution of all the resolutions which it may consider itself sufficiently engaged and authorised to adopt, for the preservation of internal security, public order, and for the maintenance of the rights of the state of possession, until legal or judicial process take place. 2. For this purpose the Diet will, every six months, elect for that period a Commission of five members chosen from its body, which Commission shall continue in activity during the vacations. 3. To this Commission shall be addressed all representations, reports, propositions, and questions, relative to the execution of the resolutions of the Diet. [The remaining Articles of this Decree point out the means by which the Commission is to communicate with the members of the Confederation, and regulate its powers and duties.] Provisional Decree relative to the Measures to be taken concerning the Universities. Sect. 1. THE Sovereign shall make choice for each University of an extraordinary Commissioner, furnished with suitable instructions and powers, residing in the place where the University is established; he may be either the actual Curator, or any other person whom the Government may think fit to appoint. The duty of this Commissioner shall be to watch over the most rigorous observation of the laws and disciplinary regulations; to observe carefully the spirit with which the Professors and Tutors are guided in their public and private lectures; to endeavour, without interfering in the scientific courses, or in the method of instruction, to give the instruction a salutary direction suited to the future destiny of the students, and to devote a constant attention to every thing which may tend to the maintenance of morality, good order, and decency, among the youths. Sect. 2. The Governments of the States, members of the Confederation, reciprocally engage to remove from their Universities and other establishments of instruction, the Professors and other public teachers, against whom it may be proved that, in departing from their duty, in over-stepping the bounds of their duty, in abusing their legitimate influence over the minds of the youths by the propagation of pernicious dogmas hostile to order and public tranquillity, or in sapping the foundation of existing establishments, they have shown themselves incapable of executing the important functions entrusted to them; without any obstacle whatever being allowed to impede the measures taken against them, so long as the present Decree shall remain in force, and until definitive arrangements on this point be adopted. A Professor or Tutor thus excluded, cannot be admitted in any other State of the Confederation, or any other establishments of public instruction. Sect. 3. The laws long since made against secret and unauthorised associations at the Universities shall be maintained in all their force and rigor; and shall be particularly extended with so much the more severity against the well-known Society formed some years ago under the name of The General Burgenschaft;-as it has for its basis an idea absolutely inadmissible of community and continued correspondence between the different Universities. The Government shall mutually engage to admit to no public employment any individuals who may continue in, or enter into, any of those associations after the publication of the present Decree. Sect. 4. No Student, who, by a Decree of the Academic Senate, confirmed by the Government Commissioner, or adopted on his application, shall be dismissed from a University, or who, in order to escape from such a sentence, shall withdraw himself, shall be received in any other University; and, in general, no student shall be received at another University without a sufficient attestation of his good conduct at the University he has left. Decree relative to the Measures for preventing the Abuses of the Press. Sect. 1. As long as the present Decree shall be in force, no writing, VOL. XVIII. NO. XXXV. B Pam. |