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INTRODUCTION

TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART SECOND.

COMPRISING:

I. THE CATEGORIES.

II. THE PROPOSITION.

III. REASONING.

S

Ce n'est pas Barbara et Baralipton qui forment le raisonne

ment. Il ne faut pas guinder l'esprit; les manières tendues et pénibles le remplissent d'une sotte présomption par une élévation étrangère et par une enflure vaine et ridicule, au lieu d'une nourriture solide et vigoureuse.-PASCAL.

THE CATEGORIES.

HAVING completed our Philosophical Vocabulary, we are now better prepared for the consideration of the CATEGORIES. The term Categories, or rather the Categories, has been applied especially to the famous classification of Aristotle, under which he professed to include every object of human thought, every thing capable of being named. In other words, the Categories were the Summa genera, or highest classes, under which all things might be comprehended, all things of which we could think, or to which we could give a name. The Categories of Aristotle were the following:-

1. Ovoía SUBSTANCE. 2 Пóσov QUANTITY.

3. Ποῖον QUALITY.

4. Πρός τι RELATION.

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5. Που WHERE OR PLACE.

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8. "Exew HAVING, HOLDING, OR POSSESSING. 9. Ποιεῖν ACTION.

10. Πάσχειν PASSION.

Such is the celebrated classification of Aristotle; which, for the time when it appeared, may be considered as not unworthy of that great philosopher, though to us, at the present day, it appears very far from perfect, erring, as it does, by omission, as well as by redundancy.

First, as to omission. Among these Categories we look in vain for some things which have received names in all languages under the sun, things which are present to us during all our waking hours, and often even when asleep, which alone are intimately and immediately known to us, and by means of which alone we become acquainted with all other things. Such are the various sensations, thoughts, and emotions, which together make up our consciousness. Of these, which we may call in general mental phenomena, we find no mention in the above classification. Quality and Relation may no doubt apply to mind as well as to body; but sensations, emotions, and conceptions, are overlooked. This is the one great omission. The other faults are faults of redundancy.

Allowing that the first six genera are well distinguished, what can we think of classing Action and Passion as genera distinct from Relation? Both action and passion mean the relation of power, or of cause and effect, only with this difference, that action refers particularly to the cause or antecedent, passion to the effect or consequent; both being names of relation. Consequently, the ninth and tenth Categories must be expunged as redundant, being included under the fourth.

The fifth and sixth Categories, or Place and Time, are quite distinct; but how does Situation differ from Where or Place? Situation, Position, and Place, all mean the same thing; all relate to space, and to something existing in space, considered in reference to something else so existing. These somethings, being not named, must be supposed included under one of the other Categories, as Space is included under Place or Where. Consequently, the seventh Category may be expunged as redundant.

And surely the eighth, Having, Holding, or Possessing, can have no pretence to a Summum genus, expressing, as it does, not a simple thing, but something very complex, the elements of which must be comprehended under the other Categories, Therefore, the eighth Category may also be expunged.

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