ascending continuously and gradually, so as at last to arrive at the most general; which is the true but untried way.' Though these two modes of inquiry, Induction, and Deduction, embrace a very large part of probable reasoning, yet there seem to be some reasonings, which cannot properly be classed under either. As instances, take the following: A is the cause of B; but B is the cause of C: Application depends upon the will; but intellectual advancement depends much upon application: Therefore, intellectual advancement depends much upon the will. Romulus founded Rome; but Rome conquered great part of the known world, and rose to an unexampled pitch of power and grandeur; Therefore, Romulus was the original cause of the power and grandeur of Rome. In these, and similar reasonings, we neither rise from particulars to generals, nor descend from generals to particulars; but we remain as it were, on a plain, as in pure Mathematics; and from two previous propositions, likewise as in pure Mathematics, we infer a third: whereas in * Novum Organum, Aph. xix. deductive reasoning, though there may be three propositions when the argument is stated in full, yet, one is very often suppressed; in inductive reasoning always. This, then, I shall beg leave to call plain reasoning. Thus, we find, that probable reasoning embraces at least three kinds; the Inductive, the Deductive, and the Plain; and the last seems to approach nearer to the nature of demonstration, than either of the others. In it, no general principle is tacitly assumed and reasoned from, but all is openly stated; and though the last proposition follows from the two former, it is not comprehended under either of them. Plain reasoning, then, differs much more from the Deductive and the Inductive, than these two from each other. Therefore, they ought not to be classed on the same line. Indeed we have seen, that though the whole process of Induction differs widely from Deduction, yet, the reasoning, strictly so called, contained in both, is very similar. Consequently, we ought to class Inductive and Deductive Reasoning together, as species of a common genus, opposed to which, will be Plain Reasoning. IV. After these remarks on the nature of reasoning in general, as well as its different kinds, we shall be better able to answer that oft debated question, what are we to think of the SYLLOGISM? In the whole history of philosophy, there is not a more singular fact than this, that the syllogism is still a matter of dispute. Since the days of Bacon, however, the empire of Aristotle has gradually been going to decay, and faith in the all-sufficiency of the syllogism has more and more been shaken. Bacon himself, in his Novum Organum, frequently decries the syllogism; Pascal depreciates it; and Locke, with some succeeding philosophers, particularly Thomas Brown, scoffs at it altogether. But in our days, an attempt has been made to restore the logic, as well as the religion of the middle ages, and the same university which nursed a Newman, has produced a Whately. The latter See Novum Organum in Distributione operis, and Aph. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. and Ixiii, where Aristotle is blamed for corrupting Physics by his Dialectics. See also De Augmentis Scienti arum, Lib. V. Cap. ii. * See Pascal "De l'esprit Geometrique," and "De l'art de persuader," contained in the last and best edition of the "Pensées de Pascal," by Prosper Faugère, Paris 1844. a It is worthy of remark, that Whately, in the Preface to his "Elements of Logic," acknowledges that the Rev. J. Newman "actually composed a considerable portion of the work, as it now stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication ;" and that he is "the original author of several pages." has written a work, chiefly to prove that the Logic of Aristotle is the only Logic, and syllogism the only reasoning; that, in fact, the syllogism is not a particular kind of reasoning, but the form to which all sound reasoning may be reduced, by whatever name it be called. Thus, according to the Archbishop and Philosopher, there are no different sorts of reasoning, but all are alike, whether certain, or probable, a priori, or a posteriori, demonstrative, inductive, or deductive; all are exactly similar. That the reasoning, strictly so called, contained in induction, is akin to deduction, I am willing to allow, and indeed, have endeavoured to show; but, that mathematical or demonstrative reasoning differs not specifically from either, I can by no means admit. This, Dr. Whately assumes without any attempt at proof. What I have called plain probable reasoning seems to me also to differ materially from the deductive, as well as from the inductive. No doubt there must be something common to all reasoning, or the same name reasoning would not have been given to the process in all cases; but had there been no differences, neither would there have been any specific names, such as probable, demonstrative, inductive, &c. What is common to all reasoning, what it is which makes reasoning a genus, we have seen in the opening of this article; and that account we must bear in mind during the following discussion. Wherein consist the differences which mark out several species of reasoning, we have also seen; and if these differences be real, especially the grand difference between demonstration and probability, then it follows, contrary to the opinion of Whately, that all reasoning is not specifically the same. Consequently, unless the word syllogism mean nothing more than a sound argument in general, stated in full, unless it be merely a generic word, then all sound reasoning, stated explicitly, cannot be syllogistical. But, in order to know what the word syllogism really does mean, we must refer to the definitions which have been given of it, the examples brought forward in illustration, and the general principle said to pervade all syllogisms. When we know what a syllogism really is, then, and not till then, can we determine whether it include all reasoning, or any. Let us first take Aristotle's own definition of the Syllogism, which is as follows:-"A syllogism is a speech in which certain propositions being stated and granted, some other proposition different from these follows of necessity; and this |