constituent part, whether proximate or ultimate, of any compound, that which helps to make it up; or a rule to direct us; or even a general proposition of any kind, from which consequences logically flow. In this latter sense, we talk of the principles of a science, as the principles of morals, of political economy, &c.; meaning the most important, the fundamental propositions, from which the rest may be deduced. Though it is vain to suppose that we can accurately limit the sense of words in daily use, yet in philosophy we may be more precise, and ought to be so, for without precision of language there is no science. I would therefore exclude principle from a philosophical vocabulary, in the sense either of rule, or axiom, or general proposition of any kind, from which particular consequences flow.

Omitting, for the present at least, these significations as improper, we shall then find that the term Principle, besides the notion of generality, always has a reference to origin, and hence implies priority; for though we certainly cannot prove that the elements of any compound existed before the compound, yet we suppose so, and having first the elements, we can in many cases unite them so as afterwards to obtain a new product; as when from copper and zinc we obtain a new substance, brass. Where then Principle does not mean cause, in the

proper sense of the word, or the indispensable antecedent of some change, it at least means that which is essential to the being of any thing, that which is supposed to have preceded the existence of something else, and without which the latter could never have been. It is on account of this supposed priority, that the term Principle is applied to the elements of bodies, as well as to the causes of manifest changes in matter or in mind. This notion of priority then belongs essentially to Principle. The two notions then essential to Principle, are generality and priority; and accordingly it may be defined to be that from which many particular things originate, or at least are supposed to originate; that without the prior existence of which many particular things could not be.

In this sense, Principle comprehends two species. Active Principle or Cause, and Constituent Principle.

Now were we to allow the word Principle in the sense of general proposition leading to particular conclusions, what analogy could we find between this and the other signification just given? Generality, no doubt, belongs to both, and even priority, in a certain sense, inasmuch as a general proposition is a premiss from which conclusions follow. But it is evident that this is a very different sort of priority from the real priority of a cause to its effect; it is

in technical language, a Subjective, not an Objective priority; or, in plain words, it is a priority in reference to our view of it, while the other is a real priority in the phenomena themselves. We must first see the general proposition, before we can draw the inference, and in that sense it is prior, and in no other.

This distinction must be kept in mind, in case we persist in using the word principle to signify a general premiss. If that sense be retained, though generality and even priority in a certain sense may still be the characteristics of a principle; yet we must draw a line between the genera, which will be two in number; namely,

I. A general and ultimate cause, from which many effects follow; or else, an elementary body from which compounds result.

II. A general proposition from which, as premiss, particular conclusions follow.

The first is either a purely metaphysical or a physical Principle, as the case may be; the latter is a logical Principle.

Lastly. A Principle, whether metaphysical or physical, comprehends, as we have seen, two species: 1. Active Principle or Cause.

2. Constituent Principle: while a logical Principle is either speculative or practical, otherwise called rule, according to the division of Locke.

Those Principles or general propositions which expressly direct our thoughts, emotions, and actions, are called practical; while those that do not are speculative in other words, speculative principles relate to the existence of things as they are, practical, to things as they may be or ought to be; as before illustrated by the case of speculative and practical principles of morals.

A REASON.

What is called a Reason is a cause of a peculiar sort, a cause suited to act on the understanding, so as to produce conviction, or a lower degree of belief. The question, why do I approve of such an action? may mean either what is the cause that actually rouses my sentiment of approbation, or else, what is the reason (or cause) which on reflection fixes my conviction of the worthiness of the actor, and hence tends to rouse emotion in his favour? It certainly may happen that these two causes coincide, but they also may differ.

Why did Cæsar overthrow the constitution of his country? Through ambition or desire of power. Why was Tiberius a tyrant? or why do you call him a tyrant? Because he perpetrated arbitrary and cruel acts. The former is evidently a cause, usually so called; the other a reason, or a cause of my opinion. The one sort of causes may be called physical, or metaphysical, as the case may be; the other logical, being addressed solely to the understanding. Another classification would be to divide causes into the physical, and the mental or metaphysical; and then to sub

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