An introduction to mental philosophy |
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Side 23
... inference from the preceding , until I arrived at the conclusion , which was the last irresistible inference . The demonstration finished , I can no more doubt the truth in question , than I can doubt the existence of that feeling of ...
... inference from the preceding , until I arrived at the conclusion , which was the last irresistible inference . The demonstration finished , I can no more doubt the truth in question , than I can doubt the existence of that feeling of ...
Side 24
... inferences from the first proposition be not directly felt to be irresistible , no arguments remain to make them so ... inference . You either see it , or you do not . A necessary truth is that which is either evident at once , or ...
... inferences from the first proposition be not directly felt to be irresistible , no arguments remain to make them so ... inference . You either see it , or you do not . A necessary truth is that which is either evident at once , or ...
Side 71
... inference , and in that sense it is prior , and in no other . This distinction must be kept in mind , in case we persist in using the word principle to signify a general premiss . If that sense be retained , though generality and even ...
... inference , and in that sense it is prior , and in no other . This distinction must be kept in mind , in case we persist in using the word principle to signify a general premiss . If that sense be retained , though generality and even ...
Side 74
... of the nature of causes . But they must be carefully dis- tinguished from causes physical , as well as from causes purely metaphysical . Now a proposition from which we draw an inference , is called , 74 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY .
... of the nature of causes . But they must be carefully dis- tinguished from causes physical , as well as from causes purely metaphysical . Now a proposition from which we draw an inference , is called , 74 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY .
Side 75
sir George Ramsay (9th bart.) from which we draw an inference , is called , in logical language , a premiss ; and hence we see that a reason expressed in words , and a premiss , are the same . Were we to adopt that distinction before ...
sir George Ramsay (9th bart.) from which we draw an inference , is called , in logical language , a premiss ; and hence we see that a reason expressed in words , and a premiss , are the same . Were we to adopt that distinction before ...
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An Introduction to Mental Philosophy: In Two Parts George Ramsay Ingen forhåndsvisning tilgjengelig - 2015 |
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
affirmed or denied antecedent applied Logic Archbishop Whately argument Aristotle Attribute axioms belongs bodies called Categories causation Cause and Effect Chap classification Coexistence common comprehended conceive conceptions conclusion copula corn trade deductive reasoning defined definition demonstrative reasoning distinction doubt emotions equal experience former genus gism Grammar Hypothesis imply induction inference invariable knowledge known laws of nature laws of thought Matter meaning Mechanical Philosophy Mental Phenomena Mental Science Metaphysics mind natural history necessary notion Novum Organum Number object observation Organon particular facts philosophy Predicables premises Prior Analytics proof Property proved proximate pure Logic pure Mathematics Quality question quinine Relations of Quantity resemblance rule seen self-evident sensations sense sequence similar simple Sir William Hamilton space species specimen stances Substance succession supposed syllogism syllogistic tendency term Theory things three angles tion trace treats triangle truth ultimate cause uniform universal universal propositions verbal Propositions Whewell words
Populære avsnitt
Side 186 - Thou shalt not covet'; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' '"Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.
Side 8 - Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the subject wherein that power is.
Side 247 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Side 252 - Whately says that the object of reasoning is " merely to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied in those with which we set out, and to bring a person to perceive and acknowledge the full force of that which he has admitted...
Side 21 - Necessary truths are those in which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which the negation of the truth is not only false, but impossible; in which we cannot, even by an effort of imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of that which is asserted.
Side 173 - It may perhaps be esteemed an endless task to enumerate all those qualities, which make objects admit of comparison, and by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced.
Side 8 - I call idca, and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, — the power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities, and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas...
Side iv - L'homme n'est qu'un roseau le plus faible de la nature, mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser. Une vapeur, une goutte d'eau, suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il meurt; et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien. Toute...
Side 257 - Again ; the mathematical postulate, that " things which are equal to the same are equal to one another," is similar to the form of the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle term.
Side 9 - I think it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves.