698 Opinion of the Court doned. We have no doubt that, if the Federal Building had been completed, for example, in February, 1935, the defendant could not have escaped paying rent to plaintiff except by giving thirty days' notice. April 30, 1935, the date of the termination of the lease, passed, and the defendant did not move then, nor until March 31, 1936. It paid the rent as before, which was received without comment. On March 31, 1936, the defendant moved from the premises without giving notice in advance. Plaintiff, claiming that it was entitled to thirty days' notice, sues for the rent for the month of April 1936. The defendant urges that its remaining in the premises after April 30, 1935, and paying rent which was received by plaintiff without comment extended the previous lease, under which the defendant urges it was not obliged to give any notice. Plaintiff contends that, under the previous lease, it was entitled to notice and was similarly entitled under an extension of the lease. Plaintiff further contends that, whether or not it was entitled to notice under the previous lease, the defendant became a hold-over tenant after April 30, 1935, and as such was obliged to give a month's notice before it could escape liability for rent. The defendant's reply to the latter contention is that, conceding that a private tenant holding over would be so obligated, the obligation is one imposed by law rather than by contract, hence the defendant, in the statute prescribing the jurisdiction of this court, U. S. Code, Tit. 28, sec. 250, has not consented to be sued upon it. obligation after However, as we obligation before We agree with the defendant that its April 30, 1935, was the same as before. have indicated above, we think that its that date was to give thirty days' notice. We also think that the defendant's obligation after April 30 was contractual within the meaning of our jurisdictional act. If one person occupies the property of another for a period under an express agreement as to the terms of his occupancy, and, after the end of the period he continues to occupy without any indication that he contemplates a change in terms, and Opinion of the Court 93 C. Cls. if the other accepts rent, thus consenting to continued occupancy, and without indicating that he contemplates a change in terms, their continued relation is consensual. They have, as plainly as if they had put it into words, shown their mutual willingness to continue the existing arrangement. The fact that legal doctrines relating to landlords and tenants would, or might, impose the same legal obligations upon them if they acted as they did, even though they expressed an unwillingness to become so obligated, does not keep their transaction from being treated, for any material purpose, as consensual if it is consensual in fact. It is not an unusual situation in the law for the legal consequences of two similar courses of conduct to be the same, for most purposes, though in one case both parties intended the consequences, and in the other, one of the parties hoped to escape these and all other legal consequences. The familiar procedure of waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit is in point. But the fact that if there were a tort, it could be waived, and a suit in the nature of a contract action could be brought, does not require the court to treat the situation as if there were a tort when there is none, or as if there were no contract, when there is one. The question of whether a hold-over tenant, under other circumstances, could be sued in this court becomes, then, immaterial, and a case such as that of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 287 (62 C. Cls. 270; 66 C. Cls. 764), where the defendant at the beginning of the hold-over period expressly repudiated the obligation which the plaintiff there contended it had become subject to, is not in point. We conclude that plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,500. It is so ordered. JONES, Judge; WHITAKER, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and WHALEY, Chief Justice, concur. 705 Opinion of the Court SWIFT AND COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 45324. Decided May 5, 1941] On Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Processing taxes paid by exporter who was also processor; determina tion of Commissioner final.-Where an exporter who was also the processor brings suit in the Court of Claims to recover processing taxes levied under the Agricultural Adjustment Act on goods subsequently exported; it is held that the court is without jurisdiction to review the determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue denying such refund, under the provisions of section 601 (e) of the Revenue Act of 1936. Same; power of Congress to deny review.-Courts are loath to ascribe to Congress an intention to clothe an administrative officer with uncontrolled authority to adjudicate a claim, without judicial review, but there is no doubt of the power of Congress to do so. Same; jurisdiction.—Where Congress expressly provided for review of the Commissioner's determinations on questions of law involving a claim for refund filed by a processor under title VII, section 906 (b); and where Congress in section 601 (e), Title IV, expressly denied to all courts jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's determination on a claim by an exporter, or by one claiming a refund of floor stock taxes, without making any exception to this denial of jurisdiction; it is held that Congress intended to deny jurisdiction in such cases to the courts for all purposes. Mr. W. Parker Jones for the plaintiff. Mr. James W. Jones was on the brief. Mr. Hubert L. Will, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Samuel O. Clark, Jr., for the defendant. Messrs. Robert N. Anderson and Fred K. Dyar were on the brief. The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion of the court. WHITAKER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This is a suit by an exporter who was also the processor to recover processing taxes on goods subsequently exported. It comes before us on defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that this court is without jurisdiction. In Wilson & Company v. United States, 90 C. Cls. 131 (311 U. S. 104), we held that an exporter was entitled to a draw Opinion of the Court 93 C. Cls. back of the processing taxes paid, although it was also the processor; but that, under the facts of that case, its sole remedy was before the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and that this court did not have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's determination. This was because of the provisions of section 601 (e) of Title IV of the Act of June 22, 1936 (49 Stat. 1648, 1740), which reads: The determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with respect to any refund under this section shall be final and no court shall have jurisdiction to review such determination. The Supreme Court agreed with us that we did not have jurisdiction. That case and this case, however, are distinguishable in this: In the Wilson case it did not appear for what reason the Commissioner had disallowed the claim, whereas in this case it appears it was because he construed the Revenue Act of 1936 to deny the draw-back to an exporter who was also the processor. The plaintiff says that Congress did not intend by section 601 (e) to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to review questions of law. It says the Commissioner's determination is final only as to questions of fact, and that even as to such questions it is subject to review by the courts if arbitrary or capricious, or supported by no evidence. This is the issue presented. In the Wilson case the Supreme Court did not pass on this issue; nor did we. The Supreme Court said: Petitioners contend that Congress intended to commit to the final determination of the Commissioner only "such matters as findings of fact, computations, and the like." Quite apart from the fact that in sec. 601 (d) Congress uses virtually the quoted words in limiting review by administrative officers, we fail to see how the argument can aid petitioners here because the record does not show why their claims were denied. Since the record is silent on this point, such decisions as United States v. Williams, 278 U. S. 255, and Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221, are plainly distinguishable. Except for section 601 (e), it is clear that this court would have jurisdiction to determine the plaintiff's right to recover, because that right is "founded upon a law of Congress," to 705 Opinion of the Court wit, section 17 (a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, (48 Stat. 31). Sec. 145 of Judicial Code; United States v. Laughlin, 249 U. S. 440; Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 169. Nor will this section be construed to deprive the courts of jurisdiction unless the evidence of such an intention on the part of Congress is inescapable. In United States v. Laughlin, supra, suit was brought under section 2 of the act of March 26, 1908 (35 Stat. 48), for an alleged excess payment for public lands. This section reads: That in all cases where it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Interior that any person has heretofore or shall hereafter make any payments to the United States under the public land laws in excess of the amount he was lawfully required to pay under such laws, such excess shall be repaid to such person or to his legal representatives. [Italics ours.] The Government contended that under this section the decision of whether or not there had been paid an amount in excess of the lawfully required amount was committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior. This contention was rejected by the court. It said: * In our view it was the intent of Congress that the Secretary should have exclusive jurisdiction only to determine disputed questions of fact, and that, as in other administrative matters, his decision upon questions of law should be reviewable by the courts. In the case before us the facts were not and are not in dispute and were shown to the Secretary's satisfaction; whether, as matter of law, they made a case of excess payment, entitling claimant to repayment under the Act of 1908, was a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 497-498; McLean v. United States, 226 Ú. S. 374, 378; United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1, 10. The case of United States v. Williams, 278 U. S. 255, involved the right of the court to review the action of the Director of the Veterans' Bureau on a claimant's rights under an adjusted-compensation certificate. The court quoted the provisions of section 310 of the Act which made the decisions of the administrative officers "final and conclusive," but it intimated that if they were wholly dependent on a |